Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 97115 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
ETRD EAGR ETTC EAID ECON EFIN ECIN EINV ELAB EAIR ENRG EPET EWWT ECPS EIND EMIN ELTN EC ETMIN EUC EZ ET ELECTIONS ENVR EU EUN EG EINT ER ECONOMICS ES EMS ENIV EEB EN ECE ECOSOC EK ENVIRONMENT EFIS EI EWT ENGRD ECPSN EXIM EIAD ERIN ECPC EDEV ENGY ECTRD EPA ESTH ECCT EINVECON ENGR ERTD EUR EAP EWWC ELTD EL EXIMOPIC EXTERNAL ETRDEC ESCAP ECO EGAD ELNT ECONOMIC ENV ETRN EIAR EUMEM ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID EREL ECOM ECONETRDEAGRJA ETCC ETRG ECONOMY EMED ETR ENERG EITC EFINOECD EURM EENG ERA EXPORT ENRD ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EGEN EBRD EVIN ETRAD ECOWAS EFTA ECONETRDBESPAR EGOVSY EPIN EID ECONENRG EDRC ESENV ETT EB ENER ELTNSNAR ECHEVARRIA ETRC EPIT EDUC ESA EFI ENRGY ESCI EE EAIDXMXAXBXFFR EETC ECIP EIAID EIVN EBEXP ESTN EING EGOV ETRA EPETEIND ELAN ETRDGK EAIDRW ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ENVI ELN EAG EPCS EPRT EPTED ETRB EUM EAIDS EFIC EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM EAIDAR ESF EIDN ELAM EDU EV EAIDAF ECN EDA EXBS EINTECPS ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EPREL EAC EINVEFIN ETA EAGER EINDIR ECA ECLAC ELAP EITI EUCOM ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID EARG ELDIN EINVKSCA ENNP EFINECONCS EFINTS ECCP ETC EAIRASECCASCID EINN ETRP EAIDNI EFQ ECOQKPKO EGPHUM EBUD ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ENERGY ELB EINDETRD EMI ECONEFIN EIB EURN ETRDEINVTINTCS EIN EFIM ETIO ELAINE EMN EATO EWTR EIPR EINVETC ETTD ETDR EIQ ECONCS EPPD ENRGIZ EISL ESPINOSA ELEC EAIG ESLCO EUREM ENTG ERD EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH ECINECONCS ETRO ETRDECONWTOCS ECUN EFND EPECO EAIRECONRP ERGR ETRDPGOV ECPN ENRGMO EPWR EET EAIS EAGRE EDUARDO EAGRRP EAIDPHUMPRELUG EICN ECONQH EVN EGHG ELBR EINF EAIDHO EENV ETEX ERNG ED
KMDR KPAO KPKO KJUS KCRM KGHG KFRD KWMN KDEM KTFN KHIV KGIC KIDE KSCA KNNP KHUM KIPR KSUM KISL KIRF KCOR KRCM KPAL KWBG KN KS KOMC KSEP KFLU KPWR KTIA KSEO KMPI KHLS KICC KSTH KMCA KVPR KPRM KE KU KZ KFLO KSAF KTIP KTEX KBCT KOCI KOLY KOR KAWC KACT KUNR KTDB KSTC KLIG KSKN KNN KCFE KCIP KGHA KHDP KPOW KUNC KDRL KV KPREL KCRS KPOL KRVC KRIM KGIT KWIR KT KIRC KOMO KRFD KUWAIT KG KFIN KSCI KTFIN KFTN KGOV KPRV KSAC KGIV KCRIM KPIR KSOC KBIO KW KGLB KMWN KPO KFSC KSEAO KSTCPL KSI KPRP KREC KFPC KUNH KCSA KMRS KNDP KR KICCPUR KPPAO KCSY KTBT KCIS KNEP KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNNB KGCC KINR KPOP KMFO KENV KNAR KVIR KDRG KDMR KFCE KNAO KDEN KGCN KICA KIMMITT KMCC KLFU KMSG KSEC KUM KCUL KMNP KSMT KCOM KOMCSG KSPR KPMI KRAD KIND KCRP KAUST KWAWC KTER KCHG KRDP KPAS KITA KTSC KPAOPREL KWGB KIRP KJUST KMIG KLAB KTFR KSEI KSTT KAPO KSTS KLSO KWNN KPOA KHSA KNPP KPAONZ KBTS KWWW KY KJRE KPAOKMDRKE KCRCM KSCS KWMNCI KESO KWUN KPLS KIIP KEDEM KPAOY KRIF KGICKS KREF KTRD KFRDSOCIRO KTAO KJU KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KEN KO KNEI KEMR KKIV KEAI KWAC KRCIM KWCI KFIU KWIC KCORR KOMS KNNO KPAI KBWG KTTB KTBD KTIALG KILS KFEM KTDM KESS KNUC KPA KOMCCO KCEM KRCS KWBGSY KNPPIS KNNPMNUC KWN KERG KLTN KALM KCCP KSUMPHUM KREL KGH KLIP KTLA KAWK KWMM KVRP KVRC KAID KSLG KDEMK KX KIF KNPR KCFC KFTFN KTFM KPDD KCERS KMOC KDEMAF KMEPI KEMS KDRM KEPREL KBTR KEDU KNP KIRL KNNR KMPT KISLPINR KTPN KA KJUSTH KPIN KDEV KTDD KAKA KFRP KWNM KTSD KINL KJUSKUNR KWWMN KECF KWBC KPRO KVBL KOM KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KEDM KFLD KLPM KRGY KNNF KICR KIFR KM KWMNCS KAWS KLAP KPAK KDDG KCGC KID KNSD KMPF KPFO KDP KCMR KRMS KNPT KNNNP KTIAPARM KDTB KNUP KPGOV KNAP KNNC KUK KSRE KREISLER KIVP KQ KTIAEUN KPALAOIS KRM KISLAO KWM KFLOA
PHUM PINR PTER PGOV PREL PREF PL PM PHSA PE PARM PINS PK PUNE PO PALESTINIAN PU PBTS PROP PTBS POL POLI PA PGOVZI POLMIL POLITICAL PARTIES POLM PD POLITICS POLICY PAS PMIL PINT PNAT PV PKO PPOL PERSONS PING PBIO PH PETR PARMS PRES PCON PETERS PRELBR PT PLAB PP PAK PDEM PKPA PSOCI PF PLO PTERM PJUS PSOE PELOSI PROPERTY PGOVPREL PARP PRL PNIR PHUMKPAL PG PREZ PGIC PBOV PAO PKK PROV PHSAK PHUMPREL PROTECTION PGOVBL PSI PRELPK PGOVENRG PUM PRELKPKO PATTY PSOC PRIVATIZATION PRELSP PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PMIG PREC PAIGH PROG PSHA PARK PETER POG PHUS PPREL PS PTERPREL PRELPGOV POV PKPO PGOVECON POUS PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PWBG PMAR PREM PAR PNR PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PARMIR PGOVGM PHUH PARTM PN PRE PTE PY POLUN PPEL PDOV PGOVSOCI PIRF PGOVPM PBST PRELEVU PGOR PBTSRU PRM PRELKPAOIZ PGVO PERL PGOC PAGR PMIN PHUMR PVIP PPD PGV PRAM PINL PKPAL PTERE PGOF PINO PHAS PODC PRHUM PHUMA PREO PPA PEPFAR PGO PRGOV PAC PRESL PORG PKFK PEPR PRELP PREFA PNG PGOVPHUMKPAO PRELECON PINOCHET PFOR PGOVLO PHUMBA PRELC PREK PHUME PHJM POLINT PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PGOVE PHALANAGE PARTY PECON PEACE PROCESS PLN PRELSW PAHO PEDRO PRELA PASS PPAO PGPV PNUM PCUL PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGIV PRFE POGOV PEL PBT PAMQ PINF PSEPC POSTS PHUMPGOV PVOV PHSAPREL PROLIFERATION PENA PRELTBIOBA PIN PRELL PGOVPTER PHAM PHYTRP PTEL PTERPGOV PHARM PROTESTS PRELAF PKBL PRELKPAO PKNP PARMP PHUML PFOV PERM PUOS PRELGOV PHUMPTER PARAGRAPH PERURENA PBTSEWWT PCI PETROL PINSO PINSCE PQL PEREZ PBS

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 08HANOI695, Part III: PM VOWS TO DEFEND THE CURRENCY, REJECTS CAPITAL

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #08HANOI695.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08HANOI695 2008-06-10 07:43 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Hanoi
VZCZCXRO5078
PP RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHFK RUEHHM RUEHKSO RUEHNAG RUEHNH RUEHPB
DE RUEHHI #0695/01 1620743
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 100743Z JUN 08
FM AMEMBASSY HANOI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7997
INFO RUEHHM/AMCONSUL HO CHI MINH 4842
RUCNASE/ASEAN MEMBER COLLECTIVE
RUEHZU/ASIAN PACIFIC ECONOMIC COOPERATION
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 HANOI 000695 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
SINGAPORE FOR TREASURY 
TREASURY FOR SCHUN 
USTR FOR DBISBEE 
STATE FOR EEB/IFD 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EFIN EAID ECPS ECON EAGR ETRD VM
SUBJECT:  Part III: PM VOWS TO DEFEND THE CURRENCY, REJECTS CAPITAL 
CONTROLS AND TALKS RESERVES AND BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 
 
REF:  Hanoi 634 (Economic Data Sends HCMC Into a Panic) 
 
HANOI 00000695  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
1.  (SBU) Summary:  The Prime Minister told a group of bankers on 
June 8 that the GVN has no plans to devalue the dong and will 
continue to intervene to defend the currency.  He rejected the 
notion of capital controls, which he said would be a mistake.  The 
PM further stated that Vietnam is not contemplating an IMF program. 
Shortly after his statements, the government of Vietnam (GVN) began 
cracking down on black market currency exchanges, which may affect 
Vietnam's small and medium enterprises.  End Summary. 
 
PM: NO PLANS TO DEVALUE THE DONG 
------------------------------- 
 
2.  (SBU) Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung met in Hanoi with 
representatives from JP Morgan and the Bank for Investment and 
Development of Vietnam (BIDV, one of the large state-owned 
commercial banks, not equitized) on June 8.  (JP Morgan was given 
access to the PM via BIDV, with whom they have a business 
relationship.)  The banks were required to submit their questions in 
writing before the meeting, which is not uncommon in Vietnam. 
 
3.  (SBU) PM Dung told the visitors that the GVN has no plans to 
devalue the dong.  He noted that, even at this time of stress in 
markets, the overall balance of payments showed a small $1 billion 
surplus in the first five months of 2008.  He admitted that the GVN 
needed to send stronger and clearer messages about its resolve to 
maintain currency stability in order to reassure investors. 
 
BLACK MARKET RATES BASED "ON RUMORS AND SPECULATION" 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
4.  (SBU) The PM said that he believed that the higher black market 
exchange rate for dollars was not based on "true" supply and demand, 
but on rumors, speculation and the activities of some "commercial 
banks" (although he did not elaborate on the last point).  He also 
acknowledged that offshore markets are pricing in a devaluation of 
the dong of up to 20-40 percent, but he does not believe this is an 
accurate reflection of where the currency is headed.  He said that 
although up until now the State Bank of Vietnam (SBV) had not 
intervened substantially, intervention will increase in size and 
breadth in terms of counterparties.  (Note:  On June 9, the SBV made 
a public announcement that it would begin cracking down on black 
market currency exchanges.  The exchanges that post usually contact 
to check black market dollar rates are now not answering their 
phones, and visible activity outside these shops has diminished 
considerably.  There are even reports that plain-clothes policemen 
have been posted outside these establishments.) 
 
5.  (SBU) The PM assured the bankers that potential foreigner 
portfolio outflows are manageable, relative to the size of SBV's 
foreign currency reserves.  PM Dung added that he planned to ask the 
SBV whether it could report publicly the dollar level of FX 
reserves.  (Note:  A mid-level SBV official was quoted in the press 
on June 9 reporting that its foreign currency reserves were at $22 
billion.  This squares with what our contacts at the SBV told us 
early last week - "about $20 billion.")  The PM said that he is 
aware that Vietnam has the ability to tap the swap lines set up 
through the Chiang Mai Initiative.  Drawing on the swap lines has 
been studied and they are keeping it in view. 
 
CAPITAL CONTROLS "A MISTAKE" 
--------------------------- 
 
6.  (SBU) PM Dung also told the bank representatives that he is 
confident that the balance of payments will return to a significant 
surplus in the medium term.  With this medium-term view in mind, he 
said that the SBV can intervene more aggressively now, if that is 
what it takes to restore market confidence in the GVN's ability to 
maintain a stable currency.  The imposition of capital controls is 
not/not being considered, he said, and added that he thought such 
controls were a mistake and went against Vietnam's commitment to 
freer markets. 
 
MAINTAINING CONFIDENCE 
---------------------- 
 
7.  (SBU) The PM added there were two key points for maintaining 
local confidence in the economy.  First, depositors must be assured 
of the overall stability of the banking sector and second, dong 
deposit rates must be attractive.  The PM said he would act to make 
sure both occur.  He also said that Vietnam will not enter into a 
 
HANOI 00000695  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
program with the IMF. 
 
8.  (SBU) Comment:  The PM's comments and the subsequent release of 
the reserve level show that the GVN is getting the message on 
transparent and public action.  While many of the PM's statements 
are reassuring, the move to crack down on black market currency 
exchanges may carry negative ramifications for Vietnam's small and 
medium sized businesses (SMEs).  These businesses are already having 
a difficult time obtaining the capital they need to conduct 
legitimate operations, while the big SOEs gobble up available 
dollars through preferred lending with certain banks (Reftel).  This 
state-bias is also important because most observers believe that 
profligate state-sector spending is a major contributing factor to 
Vietnam's current inflation woes.  While the SBV announced on June 9 
that it was directing state banks to make some credit available to 
Vietnam's aquaculture industry, which had been virtually excluded 
from the credit markets due to credit tightening measures, many 
thousands of other private sector firms continue to be frozen out of 
official mechanisms for borrowing money and obtaining foreign 
currency to purchase inputs.  Closing down the black market may 
completely eliminate the only source of foreign currency for these 
SMEs, or drive the black market rate much higher (or a combination 
of both.)  End comment. 
 
ALOISI