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Viewing cable 08HANOI654, STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISE REFORM KEY TO IMPROVING THE BUSINESS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08HANOI654 2008-06-04 08:49 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Hanoi
VZCZCXRO0726
PP RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHFK RUEHHM RUEHKSO RUEHNAG RUEHNH RUEHPB
DE RUEHHI #0654/01 1560849
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 040849Z JUN 08
FM AMEMBASSY HANOI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7935
INFO RUEHHM/AMCONSUL HO CHI MINH 4795
RUCNASE/ASEAN MEMBER COLLECTIVE
RUEHZU/ASIAN PACIFIC ECONOMIC COOPERATION
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 HANOI 000654 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ECON EAID EFIN EINV KCOR KPRV PGOV VM
SUBJECT: STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISE REFORM KEY TO IMPROVING THE BUSINESS 
CLIMATE, PRIVATE SECTOR TELLS GVN 
 
REF: A) Hanoi 606 ("DPM Hung Speaks On Inflation"); 
B) Hanoi 634 (Latest Economic Data Sends HCMC Into A Panic); 
C) Hanoi 563 ("GVN Arrests Anticorruption Reporters); 
D) HCMC 320 ("Labor Shifts Put Pressure On Manufacturers"); 
E) Hanoi 451 ("Paying Heed To Business Concerns") 
 
HANOI 00000654  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
1. (U) Summary:  The Government of Vietnam (GVN) got an earful of 
solicited advice from domestic and foreign businesses on how to 
improve its business climate at the GVN-sponsored Vietnam Business 
Forum on June 2.  Commonly-cited prescriptions included redoubling 
efforts against corruption and red tape, harmonizing conflicting 
laws and legal interpretations, accelerating infrastructure 
development and addressing labor woes.  The most poignant of the 
presenters' criticism, however, was on the need for reform in the 
state-owned sector.  Local firms decried how state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs) mopped up and misused available credit, while foreign 
investors argued that SOEs made the economy less competitive and 
effective.  Both the GVN and the private sector cited the country's 
ongoing macroeconomic difficulties as underscoring the need for 
further reform, but no one urged radical measures and the general 
mood was optimistic that Vietnam could surmount the challenges.  End 
summary. 
 
GVN ASKS FOR ADVICE AND GETS IT 
------------------------------- 
 
2. (U) The Vietnam Business Forum (VBF), a biannual dialogue with 
the private sector convened by the GVN with help from the World 
Bank, was held in Hanoi on June 2, 2008, as part of the Mid-term 
Consultative Group Meeting 2008 (Septel).  The event was chaired by 
the country directors of the World Bank and the International 
Finance Corporation and Planning and Investment Minister Vo Hong 
Phuc, and included high-level representatives from a bevy of GVN 
ministries, the local and foreign business community, the diplomatic 
corps and international donors.  Private sector participation was 
organized by working groups on banking, capital markets, 
infrastructure, trading and distribution, and tourism. 
 
IT'S THE SOES, STUPID 
--------------------- 
 
3. (U) The most resonant and oft-cited demand made by the working 
groups was the need for SOE reform.  Criticism of SOEs came from 
foreign and domestic firms.  The negative influence of these 
"well-connected incumbents," as an AmCham presenter put it, was 
cited on issues as diverse as land use, prudent fiscal measures, 
good business governance, fair competition, effective allocation of 
state resources, and credit.  The Eurocham urged the GVN to "avoid 
further delays" on SOE reform, accelerate privatization, and provide 
a roadmap for full privatization instead of the piecemeal approach 
that the GVN has followed (known as "equitization"). 
 
THE LOCALS THUNDER LOUDER AGAINST THE SOES 
------------------------------------------ 
 
4. (U) Some of the most poignant criticism came from Vietnamese 
firms themselves, in some cases directly pointing fingers at the 
miscreants (as one business group did when it used the example of 
state-owned shipbuilding company Vinashin's spendthrift ways).  The 
Hanoi Business Association criticized the "operational inefficiency 
of state-owned enterprises --especially the difference between their 
total capital and their contributions to the national economy -- 
[which] results from uncompetitive production, which, in turn, stems 
from poor management".  Another local organization, the Hanoi 
Association of Industry and Commerce, accused SOEs of speculating 
with state capital and upsetting macroeconomic stability.  "We don't 
know for sure how much money [the SOEs have] invested in securities 
and real estate segments, but according to the Ministry of Finance, 
28 out of 70 state-owned corporations and groups hold shares in 
banks, insurance companies, securities trading houses, real estate 
brokerages, and fund management enterprises to the tune of [$1.4 
billion].  And many of these corporations and groups have a high 
debt/equity ratio. The above factors have been, and still are, 
driving inflation, rather than 'loose monetary policy' alone as the 
[GVN claims]." 
 
5. (U) Despite the Prime Minster's oft-mentioned call for curtailing 
the speculative activities of the SOEs (Ref A), most of the GVN 
representatives at the VBF did not address the calls for SOE reform 
directly.  On banking, Deputy Governor of the State Bank of Vietnam 
Nguyen Dong Tien acknowledged that the "poor management" by state 
banks and the GVN had led to the current macroeconomic instability. 
He vowed to force smaller SOE banks to merge with larger ones "very 
soon" (Septel).  Tien also agreed with private sector assessments 
that, while restricting credit to speculative SOEs was a move in the 
right direction, the GVN should ensure that exporters and 
manufacturers still have access to credit. 
 
 
HANOI 00000654  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
MACROECONOMIC COMPOSURE 
----------------------- 
 
6. (U) Both the private sector and GVN representatives at the VBF 
alluded to Vietnam's current macroeconomic challenges during their 
discussions, but they stayed clear of alarmist tones (Ref B).  The 
chair of the Capital Markets Working Group, Dominic Scriven from 
Dragon Capital, summed up the mood by stressing that good economic 
governance, calm and continuing reform were the best course of 
action.  "In times of economic volatility, it is extremely important 
to encourage good governance practices, and penalize breaches of 
governance," he said.  The head of the Banking Working Group, Ashok 
Sud from Standard Chartered Bank, commended the GVN for its monetary 
policy but also urged it to enact "strong fiscal measures" and 
quicken the development of the financial sector. 
 
RED TAPE AND CORRUPTION 
----------------------- 
 
7. (U) Business leaders also urged Vietnam to accelerate 
administrative reform.  Delays in licensing were commonly cited 
irritants for the Manufacturing, Trade and Distribution and the 
Banking working groups.  "Huge gaps in interpretation" of 
regulations were another, according to the head of the Manufacturing 
working group.  The president of the Australian Chamber of Commerce 
noted the "lack of consistency with different departments within the 
government, meaning many share the same rules, but have different 
interpretations of what these mean," and asked the GVN to ensure 
"the formation of a standard, consistent procedure" for interpreting 
regulations.  The Japanese External Trade Organization also cited 
the lack of clear trade regulations, especially for foreigners in 
the service sectors. 
 
8. (U) While recognizing Vietnam's anti-corruption efforts, the head 
of the Hanoi AmCham, Mike Pease of Ford, said that the business 
community was concerned about the May 12-13 arrests of two 
journalist and other GVN officers for exposing corruption (Ref C). 
"For anti-corruption measures to be effective, it is critical that 
members of the public and officials who are responsibly acting to 
remove corruption are not penalized.  Active government support and 
endorsement of anti-corruption measures at all levels of society, 
government and business is required." 
 
LABOR AND INFRASTRUCTURE BOTTLENECKS 
------------------------------------ 
 
9. (U) Much like last year's VBF, skilled labor shortages and 
inadequate infrastructure came up again as two key areas that could 
choke off further growth.  Port congestion and insufficient cargo 
handling capacity at Vietnam's ports are "particularly acute," 
according to Shirley Justice, from Nike, who presented the report on 
Ports and Infrastructure.  The GVN replied that it would accelerate 
its master plan for ports, and would have it ready by December of 
this year rather than May of 2009. 
 
10. (U) Another source of concern was illegal labor strikes, which 
have been exacerbated by rising inflation (Ref D).  AmCham's Pease 
recognized that workers had "legitimate concerns," but that these 
needed to be addressed "in a legal, constructive and peaceful way." 
He and the EuroCham urged the GVN to take mediating action and to 
ensure that workers abide by Vietnam's Labor Code. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
11. (U) The frank discussion between Vietnam and the private sector 
is a good indication that the GVN continues to favor a pragmatic and 
inclusive approach to economic governance.  The criticism from 
domestic business groups, particularly against the entrenched 
interests of the SOEs, was even more encouraging.  The criticism did 
not detract from the recognition that Vietnam has moved fast and has 
been responsive to private sector concerns, including those raised 
during the latest VBF in December 2007 (Ref E).  Vietnam will be 
wise to pay heed to the friendly advice, particularly calls for 
further reform in order to stay competitive and weather the 
macroeconomic turbulence.  End Comment. 
 
MICHALAK 
 
 
 
5