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Viewing cable 08DUBLIN384, IRELAND ON THE HOOK TO DEVISE SOLUTION TO LISBON

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08DUBLIN384 2008-06-25 11:34 2011-07-22 00:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Dublin
VZCZCXRO2712
PP RUEHAG RUEHROV
DE RUEHDL #0384/01 1771134
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 251134Z JUN 08
FM AMEMBASSY DUBLIN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9292
INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DUBLIN 000384 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/25/2018 
TAGS: PGOV PREL EUN EI
SUBJECT: IRELAND ON THE HOOK TO DEVISE SOLUTION TO LISBON 
TREATY DILEMMA 
 
REF: DUBLIN 368 AND PREVIOUS 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Thomas C. Foley; Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D). 
 
------- 
Summary 
------- 
 
1.  (C) In the past week and a half, Irish Prime Minister 
Brian Cowen has succeeded in getting breathing space from his 
counterparts in the European Council to find a solution to 
the dilemma created by the rejection of the Lisbon Treaty by 
the Irish people in a referendum on June 12 (reftel). 
Nonetheless, recent discussions with senior Irish officials 
indicate that the way forward is far from clear, in part 
because the Irish don't fully understand why the voters 
rejected the Treaty.  (Eighty-two percent of the Irish say 
membership in the EU is good; only 46 percent voted for the 
Treaty).  It is becoming more and more clear that the Lisbon 
Treaty referendum failed due to an ineffective campaign by 
the political parties and other 'Yes' supporters.  Ireland is 
now on the hook to  suggest ways out of the dilemma at the 
October 2008 meeting of the European Council.  Whatever the 
outcome, Ireland has probably lost a significant amount of 
the political good-will, credibility, and clout built up 
since it joined the EU 35 years ago.  As the former "poor 
man" of Europe who has received more than 83 billion euro in 
EU subsidies, Ireland is now seen in some parts of the EU as 
ungrateful.  End summary. 
 
---------------------------------------- 
Taoiseach Addresses the European Council 
---------------------------------------- 
 
2.  (U) On June 19, a week after the Irish rejection of the 
Treaty, Prime Minister Brian Cowen met in Brussels with the 
Heads of Government of the other 26 members at the European 
Council, which reportedly dedicated its entire four-hour 
dinner discussion to the issue.  Taking his cue from his 
speech to the Irish Parliament on June 18 (reftel), Cowen 
stressed that the will of the people in Ireland had to be 
honored, touched on the myriad reasons for the referendum's 
defeat, and asserted that Ireland remained firmly committed 
to the European Union.  Calling the defeat of the referendum 
"an Irish and a European challenge," he asked for time to 
consult with the Irish people and EU partners, which would 
enable his Government to "engage in serious and careful 
analysis of the outcome of the referendum and its 
implications."  Cowen declared his determination to resolve 
the dilemma and voiced his confidence that Ireland and the EU 
would find an acceptable way forward. 
 
3.  (U) The conclusions of the June 19 European Council 
meeting made clear that Cowen had received the breathing 
space he desired.  The conclusions stated that the Council 
agreed more time was needed to analyze the outcome of the 
referendum, noting that the Irish Government would actively 
consult, both internally and with other Member States, to 
suggest a way forward.  Noting that the ratification process 
was continuing in other Member States, the Council agreed to 
Ireland's suggestion to revisit the issue at the Council's 
meeting on October 15, 2008. 
 
4.  (C) On the same day as Cowen addressed the European 
Council, the Ambassador met with Minister of Justice, 
Equality and Law Reform Dermot Ahern (other issues reported 
septel), who appeared exasperated with the referendum 
outcome.  Ahern (a former Foreign Minister, 2004-2008) 
declared that the Treaty had failed because of its legalistic 
complexity, which made it hard for 'Yes' campaigners to 
explain the document and difficult for voters to understand 
it.  Ahern also intimated that some politicians didn't 
enthusiastically participate in the 'Yes' campaign, noting 
that it was hard for the politicians to assure their 
constituents that there was really something in the Treaty 
worth supporting.  Ahern flatly asserted that "there was 
nothing the Government could have done to win the referendum 
-- the problem was the Treaty itself." 
 
5.  (C) Dan Mulhall, Director General, EU Division, 
Department of Foreign Affairs told EMBOFFs on June 24 that 
the tone of the European Council meeting was positive, saying 
that Ireland "couldn't have expected a better result."  He 
said that the leaders of the other EU Member States displayed 
a good deal of understanding and recognized that the 
situation was a European, not merely Irish, problem.  He said 
that the Council's process was cooperative and transparent, 
with no evidence of anyone ganging up on Ireland, and he 
voiced appreciation that the European Council had not placed 
any hard deadlines on Ireland.  Nonetheless, Mulhall noted, 
it was clear that the EU leaders expect Ireland to devise a 
solution to the dilemma; that the Treaty ratification process 
 
DUBLIN 00000384  002 OF 002 
 
 
would proceed throughout the EU; and that the EU wants to see 
positive progress by the October 2008 Council meeting.  If 
Ireland has not presented a way forward by the end of the 
year, Mulhall predicted, the pressure on Ireland would 
intensify greatly. 
 
6.  (C) When asked what the way forward might be, Mulhall 
replied that he did not know.  He said that in spite of a 
recent poll -- which indicated that 82 percent of the Irish 
people think Ireland has benefited from membership in the EU 
-- only 46 percent of voters supported the Treaty on June 12. 
 He stated that Ireland needed a period of reflection. 
Mulhall mentioned his and others' surprise at the outcome 
despite a 53 percent turnout, when it had been widely 
believed that a voter turn-out of more than 45 percent of the 
electorate would ensure passage. 
 
7.  (C) In response to a question whether any solution to the 
problem was "off the table," Mulhall said all options -- 
including another referendum -- had to be kept open as the 
Irish Government teased out options that would satisfy 
Ireland's fellow EU Member States, while meeting the needs 
and expectations of the Irish people.  He noted that Ireland 
could attempt to remain within the terms of the current EU 
treaties (which would likely create a two-tier EU), try to 
re-negotiate the Lisbon Treaty (which would probably not be 
acceptable to other EU Member States), or devise 
modifications to make the Lisbon Treaty work.  Mulhall 
revealed that the Government has commissioned studies to sift 
through the referendum results and determine why the voters 
rejected the Treaty.  These studies, he said, would inform 
the way forward.  He stated that the defeat of the Lisbon 
Treaty was much more significant than the defeat of the first 
Nice Treaty in 2002 because the percentage of the electorate 
voting was so much higher in the Lisbon defeat. 
 
8.  (C) Mulhall commented that the election result indicated 
a huge shift in Irish public opinion, noting that more than 
300,000 additional voters voted 'No' in the Lisbon Treaty 
than had voted 'No' in the 2002 Nice Treaty referendum. 
Paradoxically, he added, polls subsequent to the Lisbon 
referendum indicated that the popularity of the political 
parties (which were leading the 'Yes' campaign) have held 
steady in spite of the referendum's defeat.  The 'No' vote, 
he concluded, had little to do with lack of support for the 
Government, and everything to do with protests against a 
proliferation of narrow single issues, perhaps the greatest 
of which was a mild, but widespread and seemingly growing, 
concern that the Treaty would cede too much of Ireland's 
national authority to Europe.  The emergence of such a 
euroskeptic view, Mulhall reflected, was a new phenomenon in 
Ireland, which would complicate the Government's efforts to 
devise a solution to the Treaty's rejection. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
9.  (C) The verdict seems to be that the Lisbon Treaty 
referendum failed due to an ineffective campaign by the 
political parties and other 'Yes' supporters in getting out 
the 'Yes' message.  Ireland is now on the hook to choreograph 
a solution to the dilemma -- and it is hard to see how 
Ireland can avoid another referendum in light of the 
constitutional and judicial requirements that changes to the 
existing EU Treaties must be ratified by the people. 
Whatever the outcome, Ireland has probably lost a significant 
amount of the political good-will, credibility, and clout 
built up since it joined the EU 35 years ago.  As the former 
"poor man" of Europe who has received more than 83 billion 
euro in EU subsidies, Ireland is now seen in some parts of 
the EU as ungrateful. 
FOLEY