Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 97115 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
ETRD EAGR ETTC EAID ECON EFIN ECIN EINV ELAB EAIR ENRG EPET EWWT ECPS EIND EMIN ELTN EC ETMIN EUC EZ ET ELECTIONS ENVR EU EUN EG EINT ER ECONOMICS ES EMS ENIV EEB EN ECE ECOSOC EK ENVIRONMENT EFIS EI EWT ENGRD ECPSN EXIM EIAD ERIN ECPC EDEV ENGY ECTRD EPA ESTH ECCT EINVECON ENGR ERTD EUR EAP EWWC ELTD EL EXIMOPIC EXTERNAL ETRDEC ESCAP ECO EGAD ELNT ECONOMIC ENV ETRN EIAR EUMEM ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID EREL ECOM ECONETRDEAGRJA ETCC ETRG ECONOMY EMED ETR ENERG EITC EFINOECD EURM EENG ERA EXPORT ENRD ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EGEN EBRD EVIN ETRAD ECOWAS EFTA ECONETRDBESPAR EGOVSY EPIN EID ECONENRG EDRC ESENV ETT EB ENER ELTNSNAR ECHEVARRIA ETRC EPIT EDUC ESA EFI ENRGY ESCI EE EAIDXMXAXBXFFR EETC ECIP EIAID EIVN EBEXP ESTN EING EGOV ETRA EPETEIND ELAN ETRDGK EAIDRW ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ENVI ELN EAG EPCS EPRT EPTED ETRB EUM EAIDS EFIC EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM EAIDAR ESF EIDN ELAM EDU EV EAIDAF ECN EDA EXBS EINTECPS ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EPREL EAC EINVEFIN ETA EAGER EINDIR ECA ECLAC ELAP EITI EUCOM ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID EARG ELDIN EINVKSCA ENNP EFINECONCS EFINTS ECCP ETC EAIRASECCASCID EINN ETRP EAIDNI EFQ ECOQKPKO EGPHUM EBUD ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ENERGY ELB EINDETRD EMI ECONEFIN EIB EURN ETRDEINVTINTCS EIN EFIM ETIO ELAINE EMN EATO EWTR EIPR EINVETC ETTD ETDR EIQ ECONCS EPPD ENRGIZ EISL ESPINOSA ELEC EAIG ESLCO EUREM ENTG ERD EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH ECINECONCS ETRO ETRDECONWTOCS ECUN EFND EPECO EAIRECONRP ERGR ETRDPGOV ECPN ENRGMO EPWR EET EAIS EAGRE EDUARDO EAGRRP EAIDPHUMPRELUG EICN ECONQH EVN EGHG ELBR EINF EAIDHO EENV ETEX ERNG ED
KMDR KPAO KPKO KJUS KCRM KGHG KFRD KWMN KDEM KTFN KHIV KGIC KIDE KSCA KNNP KHUM KIPR KSUM KISL KIRF KCOR KRCM KPAL KWBG KN KS KOMC KSEP KFLU KPWR KTIA KSEO KMPI KHLS KICC KSTH KMCA KVPR KPRM KE KU KZ KFLO KSAF KTIP KTEX KBCT KOCI KOLY KOR KAWC KACT KUNR KTDB KSTC KLIG KSKN KNN KCFE KCIP KGHA KHDP KPOW KUNC KDRL KV KPREL KCRS KPOL KRVC KRIM KGIT KWIR KT KIRC KOMO KRFD KUWAIT KG KFIN KSCI KTFIN KFTN KGOV KPRV KSAC KGIV KCRIM KPIR KSOC KBIO KW KGLB KMWN KPO KFSC KSEAO KSTCPL KSI KPRP KREC KFPC KUNH KCSA KMRS KNDP KR KICCPUR KPPAO KCSY KTBT KCIS KNEP KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNNB KGCC KINR KPOP KMFO KENV KNAR KVIR KDRG KDMR KFCE KNAO KDEN KGCN KICA KIMMITT KMCC KLFU KMSG KSEC KUM KCUL KMNP KSMT KCOM KOMCSG KSPR KPMI KRAD KIND KCRP KAUST KWAWC KTER KCHG KRDP KPAS KITA KTSC KPAOPREL KWGB KIRP KJUST KMIG KLAB KTFR KSEI KSTT KAPO KSTS KLSO KWNN KPOA KHSA KNPP KPAONZ KBTS KWWW KY KJRE KPAOKMDRKE KCRCM KSCS KWMNCI KESO KWUN KPLS KIIP KEDEM KPAOY KRIF KGICKS KREF KTRD KFRDSOCIRO KTAO KJU KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KEN KO KNEI KEMR KKIV KEAI KWAC KRCIM KWCI KFIU KWIC KCORR KOMS KNNO KPAI KBWG KTTB KTBD KTIALG KILS KFEM KTDM KESS KNUC KPA KOMCCO KCEM KRCS KWBGSY KNPPIS KNNPMNUC KWN KERG KLTN KALM KCCP KSUMPHUM KREL KGH KLIP KTLA KAWK KWMM KVRP KVRC KAID KSLG KDEMK KX KIF KNPR KCFC KFTFN KTFM KPDD KCERS KMOC KDEMAF KMEPI KEMS KDRM KEPREL KBTR KEDU KNP KIRL KNNR KMPT KISLPINR KTPN KA KJUSTH KPIN KDEV KTDD KAKA KFRP KWNM KTSD KINL KJUSKUNR KWWMN KECF KWBC KPRO KVBL KOM KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KEDM KFLD KLPM KRGY KNNF KICR KIFR KM KWMNCS KAWS KLAP KPAK KDDG KCGC KID KNSD KMPF KPFO KDP KCMR KRMS KNPT KNNNP KTIAPARM KDTB KNUP KPGOV KNAP KNNC KUK KSRE KREISLER KIVP KQ KTIAEUN KPALAOIS KRM KISLAO KWM KFLOA
PHUM PINR PTER PGOV PREL PREF PL PM PHSA PE PARM PINS PK PUNE PO PALESTINIAN PU PBTS PROP PTBS POL POLI PA PGOVZI POLMIL POLITICAL PARTIES POLM PD POLITICS POLICY PAS PMIL PINT PNAT PV PKO PPOL PERSONS PING PBIO PH PETR PARMS PRES PCON PETERS PRELBR PT PLAB PP PAK PDEM PKPA PSOCI PF PLO PTERM PJUS PSOE PELOSI PROPERTY PGOVPREL PARP PRL PNIR PHUMKPAL PG PREZ PGIC PBOV PAO PKK PROV PHSAK PHUMPREL PROTECTION PGOVBL PSI PRELPK PGOVENRG PUM PRELKPKO PATTY PSOC PRIVATIZATION PRELSP PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PMIG PREC PAIGH PROG PSHA PARK PETER POG PHUS PPREL PS PTERPREL PRELPGOV POV PKPO PGOVECON POUS PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PWBG PMAR PREM PAR PNR PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PARMIR PGOVGM PHUH PARTM PN PRE PTE PY POLUN PPEL PDOV PGOVSOCI PIRF PGOVPM PBST PRELEVU PGOR PBTSRU PRM PRELKPAOIZ PGVO PERL PGOC PAGR PMIN PHUMR PVIP PPD PGV PRAM PINL PKPAL PTERE PGOF PINO PHAS PODC PRHUM PHUMA PREO PPA PEPFAR PGO PRGOV PAC PRESL PORG PKFK PEPR PRELP PREFA PNG PGOVPHUMKPAO PRELECON PINOCHET PFOR PGOVLO PHUMBA PRELC PREK PHUME PHJM POLINT PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PGOVE PHALANAGE PARTY PECON PEACE PROCESS PLN PRELSW PAHO PEDRO PRELA PASS PPAO PGPV PNUM PCUL PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGIV PRFE POGOV PEL PBT PAMQ PINF PSEPC POSTS PHUMPGOV PVOV PHSAPREL PROLIFERATION PENA PRELTBIOBA PIN PRELL PGOVPTER PHAM PHYTRP PTEL PTERPGOV PHARM PROTESTS PRELAF PKBL PRELKPAO PKNP PARMP PHUML PFOV PERM PUOS PRELGOV PHUMPTER PARAGRAPH PERURENA PBTSEWWT PCI PETROL PINSO PINSCE PQL PEREZ PBS

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 08DAKAR661, IMF RESREP SPEAKS OUT ON SENEGAL'S BUDGET PROBLEMS

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #08DAKAR661.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08DAKAR661 2008-06-06 14:52 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Dakar
VZCZCXRO3206
PP RUEHMA RUEHPA
DE RUEHDK #0661/01 1581452
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 061452Z JUN 08
FM AMEMBASSY DAKAR
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0608
INFO RUEHAD/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI PRIORITY 0051
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
RUEHLMC/MCC WASHDC
RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 DAKAR 000661 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
DEPT FOR AF/W, AF/EPS, EB/IFD 
ABU DHABI FOR TREASURY/GRIFFERTY 
TREASURY FOR RHALL AND DPETERS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EFIN ECON EAID PGOV SG
SUBJECT: IMF RESREP SPEAKS OUT ON SENEGAL'S BUDGET PROBLEMS 
 
REF:  A) 07 DAKAR 1591, B) 07 DAKAR 1515 
 
DAKAR 00000661  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
1.  (SBU) Summary:  During recent press interviews, IMF Resrep Alex 
Segura underscored growing concerns about Senegal's critical budget 
deficit.  He stated that the deficit (currently estimated at more 
than USD 300 million) could weaken the economy and speculated that 
the government could have difficulties paying civil servants' 
salaries if corrective measures are not taken soon.  Segura also 
publicly highlighted the problem of the GOS's stock of unpaid bills 
to private suppliers of goods and services.  He asserted that these 
arrears could "destroy" the private sector.  In response, Prime 
Minister Soumare convened a special cabinet meeting on May 16 to 
address the country's public finances.  The same day, the Finance 
Minister described the financial situation as "difficult but 
manageable" and said concrete steps would be taken to bring public 
spending back in line.  He also announced plans for issuing 
approximately USD 260 million in treasury bonds to pay the 
government debt.  End Summary. 
 
IMF RESREP OUTSPOKEN ON BUDGET DEFICIT 
-------------------------------------- 
2.  (U) In an interview published May 16 by the daily "le 
Quotidien," IMF Resident Representative Alex Segura made an unusual 
public critique of Senegal's public finances, pointing out that the 
budget is in serious deficit.  He claimed that Senegal could face 
severe difficulties in paying civil servant salaries and meeting 
other financial obligations in the coming months if no drastic 
measures are taken.  Segura pointed to GOS subsidies as the main 
culprit in the budget deficit, especially those targeting energy and 
food.  He added that the budget deficit is especially difficult 
because of the GOS's surprising accumulation of unpaid bills owed to 
the private sector, which amount to an estimated CFA 150 billion 
(USD 357 million).  Senegal's Policy Support Instrument (PSI) with 
the IMF caps such arrears at CFA 30 billion (USD 71 million). 
Segura's critique was direct: "The accumulation of unpaid bills to 
the private sector is a clear indication that Senegal is not capable 
of supporting its current level of spending.  It is therefore 
sacrificing the growth of its private sector in exchange for the 
expansion of subsidies." 
 
3.  (U) Regarding subsidies, Segura was equally blunt:   "This is 
unacceptable and unsupportable."  He noted that the recent 
elimination of customs duties and VAT on certain imported food items 
(especially rice), as well as longstanding subsidies on cooking gas 
and electricity, cost the budget much as CFA 200 billion, which is 
equal to 3.5 percent of GDP. 
 
4.  (SBU) Segura also blamed extra-budgetary spending as another key 
factor in Senegal's current budget crisis.  A number of Ministries 
have signed contracts or taken on other funding obligations not 
previewed in the budget and without the approval of the Ministry of 
Finance.  We have learned from our sources that the biggest 
perpetrators have been the Ministry of Infrastructure, with more 
than CFA 70 billion (USD 166 million, largely for contracts over the 
past two years to support last March's Dakar Summit of the 
Organization of Islamic States), and the Ministry of Interior (for 
programs also related to the OIC summit as well as the 2007 
presidential and legislative elections), and the Presidency with an 
estimated CFA 2 billion (USD 4.7 million).  The President frequently 
travels - at least twice a month - accompanied by staff members in a 
leased aircraft. 
 
5.  (U) Segura urged the government to implement "courageous and 
effective" measures to face its budget deficit and restore 
macroeconomic stability.  Segura's proposals include a combination 
of a CFA 20 billion (USD 47 million) cut on the operating budget and 
CFA 70 billion (USD 166 million) cut on the investment budget, 
representing eleven percent of the FY08 operating budget and 5 
percent of total expenditures.  He warned that the IMF "won't 
support a country with a huge budget deficit, a high level of unpaid 
bills to private suppliers, and a lack of commitment . . . to 
stabilize the macroeconomic situation." 
 
6.  (U) In his May 16 interview and subsequent public statements, 
Segura underscored his support for the Minister of Finance, 
Abdoulaye Diop: "Minister Diop did not create this situation; he has 
our support and that of many donors," said Segura.  He recommended 
that Diop be given full authority to take corrective measures and to 
monitor Senegal's financial commitments and expenditures. 
 
GOS CRITICISM BUT ALSO ACTION 
----------------------------- 
7.  (SBU) The government's initial reaction to Segura's public 
scolding was defensive.  "We know that the budget situation is 
critical, we understand that the unpaid bills to the private sector 
 
DAKAR 00000661  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
are problematic, but Segura has challenged our credibility by 
releasing the content of a working document - not yet completed - to 
the press," commented a senior official from the Finance Ministry. 
The tone was more "virulent" among the ruling PDS party supporters 
and some senior officials from the Ministry of Finance who asked the 
Government to consider Segura as "persona non grata" for trying to 
"set fire" to the country.  According to one contact, Prime Minister 
Soumare was so upset he wanted to take action to "PNG" Segura, but 
he soon backed off that idea. 
 
8.  (U) In reaction to Segura's interview, Prime Minister Soumare 
held an emergency cabinet meeting on the afternoon of May 16 to 
reassure the Senegalese on the budget situation.  Deputy Minister of 
Finance in Charge of the Budget, Ibrahima Sarr, and his senior staff 
members along with Segura attended the meeting.  In a press 
conference following the emergency meeting, Deputy Minister Sarr 
adopted an optimistic view and noted, "we have no problem in meeting 
our financial obligations to pay the salaries of our civil servants. 
 I think our current situation is under control and we can stop the 
'fire' anytime."  Segura reiterated his earlier remarks, stating, "I 
confirm that the budgetary situation is critical and alarming." 
 
9.  (U) On May 22, the Prime Minister signed an administrative note 
to urge all the Ministries -- except for the Ministries of Health, 
Education, and Water -- to significantly reduce their level of 
spending on goods and services (from their FY08 operational budgets) 
and also limit their investment budgets in an effort to meet the CFA 
70 billion in cuts proposed by Segura.  The PM also reiterated the 
primacy of the Finance Ministry for controlling expenditures, and 
the need to pay all expenditure obligations in a timely manner. 
 
DEBT FOR BILLS 
-------------- 
10.  (U) Shortly after Segura's press statements, MinFin Diop 
confirmed the existence of budget difficulties but stressed that 
Senegal has several tools and measures to bring the situation under 
control.  He downplayed any perceived tension with the IMF: "our 
relations with the IMF are excellent and based on trust and mutual 
understanding."  Diop also announced plans to issue new treasury 
bonds worth CFA 110.8 billion (USD 264 million) before September. 
These issuances, reportedly with around 30 percent as treasury bills 
targeting the regional CFA zone, and 70 percent as government bonds 
targeting local banks, apparently have been given the green light by 
the IMF and will be used to pay off the government's arrears.  Diop 
also made a point of allaying fears about nonpayment of civil 
servant salaries.  He noted monthly fiscal revenues of CFA 90 
billion (USD 214 million) are sufficient to cover the country's 
monthly wage bills of CFA 28 billion. 
 
11.  (SBU) In a June 4 meeting with the Charge, Budget Minister Sarr 
claimed the first issuance would take place before June 20.  He also 
claimed that CFA 70-80 billion would be sufficient to cover the 
arrears, leaving CFA 30-40 billion as a "cushion" for the treasury. 
Even with the new debt financing, Senegal's budget relies on donor 
budget support of CFA 102 billion (USD 243 million), and this money 
is not yet forthcoming.  According to Sarr, he is pleading with the 
World Bank, the EU, and France to speed up disbursement of their 
pledged budget support. 
 
CONCERN ABOUT SUBSIDIES 
----------------------- 
12.  (U) Segura also raised his concern about "routine" government 
subsidies for certain food items, cooking gas, and electricity, 
which could cost the government a combined CFA 170 billion in 2008. 
With the newer subsidies on rice the total could reach CFA 200 
billion (USD 476 million).  The budget is also impacted by the 
recent suspension of duty and VAT on rice and other items.  Segura 
asserted these measures produce little benefit for truly poor 
households (who already can't afford such items), but and have 
created a major disequilibrium in public finances.  Segura, as well 
as the broader donor community, has pointed out that despite these 
subsidies and other protections, Senegal generally pays more for 
electricity, gasoline, rice, milk, sugar, and cooking oil than many 
of the other countries in the sub-region. 
 
REACTION 
-------- 
13. (SBU) The IMF Resrep was aware that his interview would raise 
the hackles of the government (he granted it to one of the most 
consistently anti-government dailies).  Segura told Econ Counselor 
that he did so with the support of IMF headquarters as an admittedly 
attention-grabbing measure to highlight the need for swift GOS 
measures to address the looming budget crisis.  There were serious 
calls by PDS officials and some in government to "kick out" the 
Resrep, but calmer heads prevailed - with the understanding that 
 
DAKAR 00000661  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
donors largely approved of Segura's actions.  Many officials at the 
Ministry of Finance were privately pleased by Segura's actions, 
which should help bring expenditures mostly back under their 
control.  One senior MOF official said, "it had to be done." 
Hundreds of businesses waiting to be paid are undoubtedly also 
appreciative of this public challenge to an untenable situation. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
14.  (SBU) Segura's interview was a necessary exercise to force the 
government's hand on the budget deficit, reimburse unpaid bills, and 
pursue economic reforms within the PSI program.  However, the 
government did not turn over easily and it is not assured that this 
marks the beginning of a new commitment by the Wade political 
machine to assure sound fiscal management is a top priority.  We 
heard that officials from the Budget Ministry tried to undermine the 
government's commitment to immediate budget cuts, first by trying to 
target health and education spending (and perhaps foist the blame on 
the IMF), and then by substituting a different document at the last 
minute, apparently hoping the IMF would not go through with its 
threat to suspend its program.  Fortunately, the IMF stuck to its 
guns and, we hope, real budget discipline will follow.  The IMF is 
not blameless in this saga.  The accumulation of unpaid bills was 
widely known, and the IMF failed to fully follow the trail last fall 
when it gave the GOS a pass on that prior action (Reftels).  When 
the full scope of the problem came to light, the IMF had to rescue 
its own reputation, not just companies in the long payment queue. 
 
SMITH