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Viewing cable 08COLOMBO619, CLOSING CAC AT AMEMBASSY COLOMBO DUE TO WHITE

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08COLOMBO619 2008-06-25 13:03 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Colombo
VZCZCXYZ0005
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHLM #0619/01 1771303
ZNR UUUUU ZZH (CCY ADX0AA9D8E MSI9613 611)
O 251303Z JUN 08
FM AMEMBASSY COLOMBO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8332
UNCLAS COLOMBO 000619 
 
(C O R R E C T E D C O P Y) CHANGING DATES IN TEXT 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
FOR DS/IP/SCA, DS/IP/WMD, DS/CC, M/MED, SA/INS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ASEC CASC PTER AMED CE
SUBJECT: CLOSING CAC AT AMEMBASSY COLOMBO DUE TO WHITE 
POWDER INCIDENT CLOSES AMEMBASSY COLOMBO FOR NORMAL 
OPERATIONS 
 
1. (SBU) Summary: At approximately 1000 hrs. local on June 
25, 2008, RSO Colombo received a report that a mailroom clerk 
had opened an envelope containing a white, powdery substance 
while conducting a secondary screening of the envelope in 
post's mail screening room. Further inquiries revealed that 
someone hand delivered the envelope at approximately 1430 hr. 
on June 24 to the guard post at the Compound Access Control 
(CAC) inspection area. Guard personnel kept the envelope in 
the CAC until mailroom personnel collected it and took it to 
the secondary mail screening facility. After gathering the 
basic facts, RSO Colombo notified the duty officer for 
DS/IP/SPC/WMD, who instructed the RSO to close the CAC until 
such time as lab analysis reveals the nature of the 
substance. Consequently, AmEmbassy Colombo was forced to 
suspend regular business, closing the Chancery to all but 
official visitors and emergency American Citizen Services. 
End summary. 
 
2. (SBU) RSO Colombo learned of a white powder incident at 
AmEmbassy Colombo at approximately 1000 hrs. local on June 
25, 2008. Subsequent queries revealed that a mailroom clerk 
had been conducting a secondary screening of a suspicious 
envelope when, upon opening the envelope, a white, powdery 
substance spilled from it. The clerk had contained the 
envelope within a sealed glove box inside post's mail 
screening room, which is located in an outbuilding, separate 
from the Chancery. Therefore, the Chancery was not affected. 
 
3. (SBU) RSO Colombo interviewed mailroom personnel and CAC 
guards and discovered that the envelope had arrived on June 
24 at approximately 1430 hrs. (i.e. the day before the 
mailroom clerk opened it). Guard staff said that someone hand 
delivered the envelope and signed their log book to 
acknowledge delivery. The subject who delivered the envelope, 
which was addressed to "The Ambassador," signed his name "B. 
SATHYOJAHTHAN." However, the guards had not obtained any 
other biographical information. The guards checked the 
envelope with X-ray equipment and set it aside on a desk, 
where it remained until mailroom staff collected it and took 
it to the secondary screening room. The envelope could have 
sat on the desk in the CAC from one to two hours. The 
mailroom clerk who retrieved the envelope took it directly to 
the screening room and deposited it in the glove box. A 
mailroom supervisor opened it the following day (June 25), 
keeping it contained in the glove box, as per Embassy 
protocol. RSO note - Guard and mailroom personnel are trained 
to detect suspicious mail. All of the staff involved in this 
incident recognized that this particular delivery was 
suspicious, taking the proper steps to inspect it with X-ray 
equipment and set it aside for secondary inspections. 
 
4. (SBU) Upon gathering these basic facts, RSO notified the 
DS Command Center and requested to speak to the 
DS/IPC/SPC/WMD duty officer. The duty officer instructed the 
RSO to close the CAC immediately, which the RSO did at 1100 
hrs. However, the CAC contains the majority of the devices 
(metal detectors, X-ray equipment and Itemizer machine) that 
the guards use to properly screen visitors. The only way for 
visitors to enter the compound on foot is via a entrance in 
the perimeter wall. This entrance cannot serve as a CAC 
because it leads directly onto the compound and has no 
mantrap capabilities. The guards will have to use handheld 
metal detectors to screen visitors and there is no way to 
contain anyone who poses a potential risk to the Embassy. In 
order to reduce the number of pedestrians that guard 
personnel will have to screen, as well as minimize possible 
security risks, Embassy Colombo has closed to routine 
business. The Consular Section will provide American 
Citizens' Services on an emergency basis, but has canceled 
visa interviews until further notice. Visitors arriving for 
business meetings will have access to the compound. Post has 
issued a Warden Message and Public Announcement to this 
effect, as cleared by the Operations Center. This closure 
will remain in effect until such time as DS/WMD directs RSO 
Colombo to open the CAC, and this decision is contingent upon 
determining the true nature of the white powder. 
 
5. (SBU) Post's Chemical and Biological response team 
collected samples of the powder in accordance with WMD 
protocols. The Chem/Bio team collected the samples in two 
vials - one for local analysis and the other for delivery to 
the Centers for Disease Control, Rapid Response Advanced 
Technology Laboratory. Post has utilized the local laboratory 
in the past for several similar events and the results should 
be reliable. RSO personnel, working through the Sri Lanka 
Police Service (SLPS), will the deliver the sample as soon as 
possible on June 26. 
 
6. (SBU) RSO has not been able to personally inspect the 
POWDER INCIDENT CLOSES AMEMBASSY COLOMBO FOR NORMAL 
OPERATIONS 
 
envelope and will not do so unless the results of the 
laboratory analysis reveal a benign substance. Consequently, 
RSO has no investigative leads to report at this time. 
However, digital video recorders capture images from the CAC, 
and the subject who delivered the letter should appear on the 
recordings. RSO will coordinate an investigation into the 
incident with the SLPS and report developments septel. 
 
7.(U) Point of contact for this message is Michael V. 
Perkins, Regional Security Officer, who may be contacted at 
94.11.249.8756, 94.11.249.8888 (MSG Post One after regular 
business hours), and via the unclassified and classified 
email systems. 
MOORE