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Viewing cable 08BUENOSAIRES766, ARGENTINE FARMERS' STRIKE CONTINUES FOR ANOTHER WEEK

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08BUENOSAIRES766 2008-06-03 20:56 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Buenos Aires
VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHBU #0766/01 1552056
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 032056Z JUN 08
FM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1245
INFO RUEHRC/DEPT OF AGRICULTURE WASHINGTON DC
RUCNMER/MERCOSUR COLLECTIVE
UNCLAS BUENOS AIRES 000766 
 
USDA FOR FAS/OA/OSTA/OCRA/ONA/OGA/OTP/OCBD/OAO/OFSO 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: EAGR ECON EINV PGOV ELAB PHUM AR
SUBJECT: ARGENTINE FARMERS' STRIKE CONTINUES FOR ANOTHER WEEK 
 
REF: Buenos Aires 0733 and previous 
 
------- 
Summary 
------- 
 
1. (SBU) The leadership of Argentina's four main agricultural 
organizations decided late on June 2 to prolong their third strike 
against the GOA for another full week, at least until Monday, June 
9.  The farmer groups will continue the boycott on grain sales and 
embargo of grain exports, including soybeans.  The sale of cattle 
for slaughter, however, will be restored to avert disruption to 
domestic supply.  The decision to continue the strike, along with 
ongoing mobilizations across the country, ratifies the sector's 
rejection of the government's minor changes to its export tax regime 
on grains and oilseeds, the precipitating cause of the current 
conflict between farmers and the GOA.  Recent regulations placing 
more controls on agricultural exports and a bill in Congress to 
establish a state trading enterprise for all agricultural products 
show that the GOA is deepening its involvement in agricultural 
markets.  The gulf between both sides of this conflict has widened, 
making a resolution even less likely in the weeks to come.  End 
Summary. 
 
--------------- 
Still On Strike 
--------------- 
 
2. (SBU) The leaders of Argentina's four main agricultural 
organizations decided late on June 2 to prolong their third strike 
since March 12 against the GOA for another full week, at least until 
Monday, June 9.  The farmer groups decided to continue the boycott 
on grain and oilseed sales for export, including soybeans.  The sale 
of cattle for slaughter, however, will be restored to avert 
disruption to domestic supply.  They also decided to deepen their 
mobilization plan in the interior of the country by pressuring 
municipal governments and collecting signatures with the objective 
of gaining support from the Congress to revise tax policies 
affecting the agricultural sector.  The decision to continue the 
strike, along with ongoing mobilizations across the country, 
ratifies the sector's rejection of the government's minor change to 
its export tax regime on grain and oilseeds, which was announced May 
29 (see paras 5-6 below). 
 
--------------------------- 
Both Sides Rallying Support 
--------------------------- 
 
3. (SBU) In concert with its decision to extend the strike, farm 
organizations rallied support across the country yesterday in 
response to what they characterized as the GOA's unwillingness to 
make concessions.  In the small (15,000 person) town of Armstrong, 
Santa Fe province, farmers staged a 35,000-person protest led by 
farm leader Eduardo Buzzi and charismatic protestor Alfredo De 
Angeli.  In addition, "tractorazos" (tractor rallies), 
demonstrations, and road blocks were carried out in numerous 
locations throughout Entre Rios, Cordoba, La Pampa, Chaco, Santa Fe, 
and Buenos Aires provinces.  Support for the farmers was broad, with 
many townsfolk and shop-owners endorsing the strike by shutting down 
commercial activities. 
 
4. (SBU) Government officials and supporters defended the measures 
and attacked the farmers' stance throughout the day.  Vice-President 
Julio Cobos held a press conference in which he expressed support 
for the President.  Also, pro-government picketers staged 
counter-protests in front of the headquarters of one of the farm 
organizations leading the strike in Buenos Aires city, demanding 
that farmers lift the strike.  They also held a make-shift strike in 
front of the residence of a prominent member of that farm 
organization. 
 
------------------------ 
CONCESSIONS NOT ADEQUATE 
------------------------ 
 
5. (SBU) The GOA announced on May 29 changes in the export tax 
regime (covering soybeans, corn, wheat and sunflower) without 
negotiating the changes with farm groups.  The changes created 
export tax reductions when prices are above US$600 per ton ($16.33 
per bushel) for soybeans and above US$300 per ton ($7.62 per bushel) 
for corn.  At those prices, the export tax will be 52.7 percent for 
soybeans (down from 58.5 percent) and 45 percent for corn (down from 
53.8 percent).  The changes do not affect current export taxes paid, 
as they only apply at prices well above current export prices.  The 
GOA also announced measures to make it easier for small and medium 
farmers to collect the subsidies set aside for them.  The GOA 
emphasized that this was not a change in the export tax, but rather, 
a modification to "ensure that futures markets operate." 
6. (SBU) Farm groups were not happy with the largely cosmetic 
changes and called them "insubstantial" and "unilateral."  It 
appears that the GOA action was more to convince the general public 
that the government is trying to sove the issue, rather than a 
serious effort to reach agreement with the farm groups. 
 
--------------------- 
TIGHTENING THE SCREWS 
--------------------- 
 
8. (SBU) The GOA has issued many regulations in the past weeks 
clamping down on the agricultural sector.  On Friday, May 30, the 
GOA published another new rule (Resolution 543/2008) which 
establishes that wheat exporters must maintain 80% of their stocks 
for the domestic market; and they are only allowed to export the 
remaining 20%.  This is similar to a control mechanism previously 
placed on beef exporters.  The same resolution also establishes the 
new rules and guidelines for exporters to seek and qualify for 
export certificates on many agricultural products. 
 
9. (SBU) There have also been reports that the Congress is working 
on a bill to create a state trading enterprise that will have the 
power to set prices and buy/sell grains and other agricultural 
products.  This new state trading enterprise would be similar to 
Argentina's old grain marketing body (the Junta Nacional de Granos), 
but it would include all agricultural products.  Currently, the GOA 
does not have any of the necessary infrastructure to buy, sell, and 
warehouse agricultural products.  Office contacts suggest that if 
the law passes, it will have a profoundly negative effect on the 
solidarity between the four agricultural groups leading the farm 
strike, since one of the four (FAA) supports the idea while the rest 
are opposed to it.  This appears to be a GOA strategy to pressure 
the farm sector rather than a project the President would actually 
sign into law. 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
10. (SBU) It appears that both sides have dug in and are prepared 
for a long fight.  The farmers' groups have maintained solidarity in 
the face of government attempts to divide and conquer; and the 
government continues to "tighten the screws" to show that they will 
not "accept the imposition of any one sector."  Recent regulations 
placing more controls on agricultural exports, the bill in Congress 
to establish a state trading enterprise for all agricultural 
products, and repeated hints that the government will go after 
farmers who do not accurately report their income for tax purposes, 
indicate that the GOA is deepening its involvement in agricultural 
markets and continuing its strategy to divide and conquer.  These 
recent developments, and the absence of any dialogue to break the 
impasse, suggest that a resolution is unlikely in the weeks to come. 
 
 
WAYNE