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Viewing cable 08BOGOTA2178, URIBE THIRD TERM ISSUE DOMINATES REFORM EFFORT,

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08BOGOTA2178 2008-06-17 19:41 2011-04-29 00:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Bogota
Appears in these articles:
http://www.semana.com/wikileaks/Seccion/168.aspx
VZCZCXYZ0003
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHBO #2178/01 1691941
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 171941Z JUN 08
FM AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3198
INFO RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA PRIORITY 8249
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS PRIORITY 0555
RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA PRIORITY 6273
RUEHZP/AMEMBASSY PANAMA PRIORITY 1867
RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO PRIORITY 6941
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFIUU/FBI WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L BOGOTA 002178 

SIPDIS 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/17/2018 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PREF PTER PHUM CO
SUBJECT: URIBE THIRD TERM ISSUE DOMINATES REFORM EFFORT, 
PRESIDENTIAL CONTENDER PLANS, AND SCANDALS 

REF: BOGOTA 1597 

Classified By: Political Counselor John Creamer 
Reasons 1.4 (b and d) 

SUMMARY 
------- 
1. (C)  Key presidential advisors told us President Uribe has 
not decided whether to seek a third term, but agreed he would 
have to make his intentions clear in the second half of 2008. 
 Several GOC coalition and opposition leaders plan to run in 
2010, including Cambio Radical leader German Vargas Lleras, 
former Defense Minster Rafael Pardo, and former Bogota Mayor 
LuchoGarzon.  Other GOC contenders, including Defense 
Minister Juan Manuel Santos, await Uribe's decision.  The 
media speculated that former President Cesar Gaviria might 
run, but Gaviria told us he would focus on building a broad 
political movement to oppose a third Uribe term.  The GOC 
killed a political reform bill, fearing it would undermine 
its control in Congress.  Uribe repeatedly attacked the 
credibility of former Congresswoman Yidis Medina, who has 
testified that she received bribes in exchange for voting for 
the constitutional amendment that allowed Uribe to run for a 
second term.  End Summary. 

URIBE REELECTION DECISION PENDING 
--------------------------------- 
2. (C) Presidential Advisors Bernardo Moreno, Jose Obdulio
Gaviria and Fabio Valencia Cossio told us President Uribe has 
not decided whether to seek a possible third term.  U Party 
Senator Marta Lucia Ramirez said, "his head tells him not to 
run, but his heart tells him yes."  Moreno and Gaviria said 
Uribe would delay any third term announcement for as long as 
possible to avoid lame duck status, but agreed he would need 
to state his intentions in the second half of 2008 so that 
constitutional reform could clear Congress with time to 
complete the rest of the amendment process.  Uribe would 
likely opt to amend the constitution via the referendum 
process which requires a congressional vote on the referendum 
question, Constitutional Court review, and the participation 
of at least 25 percent of registered voters in the 
referendum--approximately 7 million.  Uribe's effort in 2003 
to enact numerous constitutional reforms via referendum 
failed due to low turnout. 

3. (C)  Gaviria said Uribe's indecision reflects his concern 
that he has no qualified political heir.  Defense Minister 
Santos is the strongest option, but Gaviria and Moreno 
stressed that Santos "is not a Casa de Narino insider." 
Presidential Communications Director Jorge Mario Eastman told 
us Santos' recent public announcement of FARC founder Pedro 
Marin's death prior to notifying Uribe raised doubts about 
his reliability.  Gaviria mentioned Peace Commissioner Luis 
Carlos Restrepo, AgriculturalMinisterAndres Arias, and 
Colombian Ambassador to the U.K. Noemi Sanin as possible 
candidates, but said all have weaknesses.  Gaviria said at 
one time Uribe considered independent and former Medellin 
Mayor Sergio Fajardo as a possible successor, but the two 
broke over Fajardo's refusal to identify fully with Uribe's 
agenda.  Ramirez told us Gaviria, Moreno, and Restrepo are 
urging Uribe to run again. 

CANDIDATES EMERGE FOR 2010 
-------------------------- 
4. (C) Despite the uncertainty over Uribe's intentions, 
politicians from the Uribista coalition parties and the 
opposition have announced plans to run for president in 2010. 
 German Vargas Lleras (leader of Cambio Radical) resigned his 
Senate seat in May to run.  He told us he does not favor a 
third Uribe term, and has hinted at a return to the Liberal 
Party.Cambio Radical controls 15 seats in the Senate and 20 
in the House, which could represent the swing votes in any 
effort to allow a third term.  Former Defense Minister Rafael 
Pardo (Liberal Party) said he plans to run.  Senator Gustavo 
Petro (Polo Party) and formerBogota Mayor Luis "Lucho" 
Garzon (Polo) are also candidates.  Sergio Fajardo resigned 
from his political commentator job in June to position 
himself as a candidate.  Polo President Carlos Gaviria, who 
finished second to Uribe in 2006, told us he would not run 
again, but far-left elements of the Polo will push hard for 
Gaviria to enter the race since they have no other 

high-profile standard bearer. 

5. (C) The media has speculated that former President and 
Liberal Party Chief Cesar Gaviria may seek a new term, 
possibly in alliance with the Polo, but Gaviria told us he 
did not intend to run and would focus instead on creating a 
united political front to oppose a third Uribe term.   GOC 
officials -- including Defense Minister Santos and Interior 
and Justice Minister Carlos Holguin -- have their possible 
candidacies on hold pending Uribe's decision.  They would 
need to step down from the cabinet by May, 2009 to be 
eligible to run in 2010. 

POLITICAL REFORM BILL DIES 
-------------------------- 
6. (C) The GOC killed a high-profile political reform bill 
aimed at restoring Congressional legitimacy in early June. 
The bill would have punished political parties with a loss of 
seats if members were found to have ties to illegal armed 
groups (reftel).   Moreno said the legislation was part of a 
radical opposition's effort to strip the GOC of its 
Congressional majorities.  He said the bill would have 
enabled the opposition to block any third term effort, and 
would have weakened Uribe's capacity to govern.  Coalition 
Senator Efrain Cepeda and Representative Roy Barreras told us 
members remain concerned about Congress' legitimacy in the 
wake of the para-political scandal, and were shocked at the 
GOC's last minute decision to let the bill die in Commission.


7. (SBU)  Moreno told us the GOC would introduce a new, 
constitutional reform bill in the Congressional session 
starting July 20 to maintain the political initiative and 
address legitimacy concerns.  Such a package would propose 
changes in the electoral regime, new sanctions and 
inhibitions for legislators, and congressional administrative 
reform.  Uribe installed a commission, comprised of academics 
and former politicians, on June 16 to review and propose a 
new reform package.  Opposition leaders and some in the GOC 
coalition dismissed the group as unrepresentative, and a 
threat to congressional independence. 

SCANDALS CONTINUE 
----------------- 
8. (C) The April wave of arrest orders and new investigations 
from the Supreme Court in the para-political scandal slowed 
in May and June, but allegations over alleged vote buying in 
Uribe's first reelection effort by former Congresswoman Yidis
Medina continue to dog the GOC.  Jose ObdulioGaviria told us 
Medina's charges create doubts about the legitimacy of the 
first reelection, complicating a second attempt.  The 
presidency issued six communiques the week of June 9 
attacking Medina's credibility, and Uribe repeatedly and 
personally criticized her character.  Valencia said Uribe's 
attacks had successfully destroyed Medina's credibility, and 
predicted the scandal would not implicate Uribe directly. 
Still, he warned that former-Interior Minister SabasPretelt
and Minister of Social Protection Diego Palacio -- accused of 
managing the GOC bribery effort -- would have a difficult 
period ahead as the investigation into her allegations 
proceeds. 
BROWNFIELD 

=======================CABLE ENDS============================