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Viewing cable 08BAGHDAD1665, SADR CITY DISPLACEMENT

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08BAGHDAD1665 2008-06-01 15:13 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Baghdad
VZCZCXRO8274
RR RUEHBC RUEHDA RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #1665/01 1531513
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 011513Z JUN 08
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7614
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 001665 
 
FOR USAID/ANE/IR, NEA/I, DCHA/OFDA, DCHA/FFP 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: IZ PARM PGOV PHUM PREL
SUBJECT:  SADR CITY DISPLACEMENT 
 
1.(SBU) SUMMARY: The conflict between the GOI and 
Sadrist militants that ignited in late March led to 
fears of a large-scale humanitarian crisis given the 
heavy density of the civilian population in the area 
and the potential for wide-spread and destructive 
engagements.  Considering a worse-case scenario, the 
GOI developed plans to provide shelter and assistance 
for up to 100,000 Sadr City residents that might be 
forced from their homes by the fighting. The Ministry 
of Displacement and Migration (MoDM) took the lead for 
the GOI, and backed by a USAID-supported NGO, 
established a camp at the Shaab soccer stadium in 
Rusafa that could accommodate 5,000 displaced persons. 
END SUMMARY. 
 
2. Estimates of the total families displaced during 
the fighting ran to 4,700; however, only 39 families 
required shelter and aid at the Shaab stadium.  As 
anticipated by USAID and other aid agencies, virtually 
all of those Sadr City residents displaced by the 
conflict stayed with family, friends and neighbors. 
In the week since the cease-fire went into effect on 
18 May, all families left the Shaab camp and returned 
home and it is believed that the majority of others 
displaced returned to their residences as well.  The 
cease-fire and its successful implementation averted a 
humanitarian emergency. 
 
Background to Anticipated Displacement Crisis 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
3. (SBU) The GOI anticipated significant displacement 
from Sadr City as U.S. and Iraqi forces entered the 
area in early April to target militants firing rockets 
and mortars at the International Zone (IZ) and 
attempting to force Sadr City residents to observe a 
general strike.  U.S. forces started building a 
concrete wall separating the southernmost part of Sadr 
City (sectors 1-9 and the Jamila market area) from the 
northern 75 percent because militants were launching 
daily rocket and mortar volleys at the International 
Zone from those areas.  Militia elements shot at 
civilians not observing the strike and launched 
attacks from densely populated civilian areas against 
U.S. forces building the wall.  Civilians caught in 
the crossfire began fleeing their homes, mostly to 
stay with friends and relatives elsewhere in Sadr City 
or in other neighborhoods in Baghdad.  In anticipation 
of a push by U.S. or Iraqi forces into areas north of 
the walled area, MoDM started planning for the 
potential displacement of thousands of civilians from 
Sadr City in early May. 
 
4.(SBU) MoDM identified three sites to set up tent 
camps to accommodate civilians fleeing Sadr City; 
Shaab Stadium in Rusafa, Sinaa Stadium in Nine Nissan, 
and the Rashid Airbase in Karada. MoDM determined that 
Shaab and Sinaa Stadiums could accommodate several 
hundred families each, while the Rashid Airbase could 
hold thousands of families if necessary.  MoDM said it 
had 1,000 tents on hand and that the Iraqi Red 
Crescent Organization, a MoDM implementing partner, 
had about 15,000 tents on hand and another 15,000 
tents inbound.  Minister of MoDM, Abdel Samd Rahman 
Sultan, told USAID and Baghdad PRT representatives 
that he expected most displaced families would stay 
with friends or relatives rather than going to camps, 
but that the ministry would plan for camps anyway. 
 
5. In an effort to provide an alternative to families 
being displaced in Sadr City, the UNHCR initiated a 
housing rehabilitation project and a Non Food Items 
(NFIs) distribution project through their implementing 
partner Mercy Hands.  To date, approximately 35 houses 
have been returned to a livable state and the families 
are living in the houses; by 31 May, 100 houses will 
have been returned to a livable state so that the 
families can avoid being displaced.  In addition, 
Mercy Hands has distributed 795 NFI packets to 
families in need throughout Sadr City over the last 
month in a further effort to prevent displacement. 
 
6. (SBU) Iraqi Army elements reportedly notified 
residents by loudspeaker and through community leaders 
that people wishing to flee the area could gather at 
identified collection points for transport to the 
camps.  Since there was little demand, MoDM only 
opened the Shaab Stadium Camp on 10 May.  Note: 
Iraqis traditionally eschew camps and see them as only 
 
BAGHDAD 00001665  002 OF 002 
 
 
a last resort when facing displacement.  Preferred 
coping strategies include sheltering with family, 
friends and neighbors or staying in public buildings 
(mosques, schools, etc). In theory, the MoDM planned 
the camp sites and set them up.  However, a USAID 
Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) 
implementing partner, International Medical Corps 
(IMC), provided significant technical assistance, 
water, food, and supplies for the camp. 
 
7.(SBU) The Shaab Stadium Camp was equipped with three 
toilet compounds, each of which had 75 toilets, along 
with large water storage tanks and ten 5,500 liter 
portable tanks that IMC arranged for Amanat Baghdad 
(Baghdad Municipality) to fill.  According IMC, the 
Amanat also agreed to remove trash from the camp.  The 
camp was equipped with a clinic, but when the 
Directorate of Health for Rusafa refused to staff it 
with doctors, IMC paid doctors to work at the camp for 
two hours per day.  The Ministry of Health provided 
two ambulances to provide transport for serious 
injuries or illnesses. 
 
8.(SBU) Families were required to provide 
documentation from either Mudhafar Square or Jazeera 
Iraqi Police Stations to prove that they were from 
Sadr City and that they were not wanted by either 
Iraqi or U.S. security forces before camp personnel 
would let them enter and register.  The Iraqi Army 
provided security for the camp. 
 
9.(SBU) At the height of occupancy, there were 38 
families residing in the camp.  As of 26 May, all 
families had departed Al Shaab and returned to Sadr 
City.  MoDM staff said most of the families had 
returned because of improved security conditions in 
Sadr City.  MoDM staff noted that of 5,000 families 
that were temporarily displaced from or within Sadr 
City in recent weeks, about 4,500 families have 
returned and about 300 remain displaced outside of 
Sadr City. These figures represent rough estimates, 
but it is probable that most families have returned to 
Sadr City since the cease-fire except for those whose 
dwellings were destroyed or badly damaged by the 
recent fighting. 
 
10. (SBU) MoDM formed an emergency cell with 
representatives from the humanitarian, planning, 
administration and information departments to oversee 
developments at the camp and monitor the humanitarian 
situation inside of Sadr City.  The cell continues to 
meet daily and has re-focused its works to assess 
damage to homes and businesses in Sadr City. 
 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
11. (SBU) The ministry took a clear leadership role in 
planning for large scale displacement.  However, 
MoDM's heavy reliance on IMC in establishing and 
maintaining the Shaab Stadium Camp illustrates that 
while MoDM is performing at a much higher level than 
it was a year ago, it still has limited capacity to 
address displacement crises. 
 
12. (SBU) Several international NGOs provided food to 
the camp even when it only accommodated a few 
families, prompting MoDM staff to tell USAID and 
Baghdad PRT representatives during a May 17 visit that 
they had "an arsenal" of food.   The duplicate effort 
on such a small operation illustrates the need for 
better interagency coordination on humanitarian 
activities. 
 
 
 
BUTENIS