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Viewing cable 08ATHENS833, GREEK TEHERAN ENVOY URGES U.S.-IRAN TALKS, OFFERS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08ATHENS833 2008-06-11 15:11 2011-05-28 08:00 SECRET Embassy Athens
Appears in these articles:
www.tanea.gr
O 111511Z JUN 08
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1979
INFO IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
S E C R E T ATHENS 000833 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/10/2018 
TAGS: GR IR POV PREL
SUBJECT: GREEK TEHERAN ENVOY URGES U.S.-IRAN TALKS, OFFERS 
ASSISTANCE 
 
REF: A. ATHENS 32  B. ATHENS 61 
 
Classified By: DCM Tom Countryman.  REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D). 
 
1. (S) SUMMARY: In seperate coversations with A/PolCouns and 
DepPolCouns, former Greek Ambassador to Iran and new head of 
the MFA D1 Directorate for International Organizations 
Merkourios Karafotias offered his interpretation of Iranian 
motives in recent events and urged the U.S. to open discrete 
talks with Teheran -- which Karafotias offered to help 
initiate.  (Karafotias said he was not acting on a request 
from the Iranians, nor was it clear whether his superiors in 
the MFA had knowledge of his efforts.)  Iranian bellicose 
statements and actions were their clumsy way of etting 
Washington's attention.  Such talks, Karafotias argued, while 
likely rocky at first, could lead to lessened tensions and 
more energy supplies.  END SUMMARY. 
 
2. (S) Karafotias, who completed a three-year tour as 
Greece's Ambassador in Tehran in May, said current Western 
policy towardIran was "not the best" and was effectively 
serving Iran up on a platter to the Russians and Chinese. 
The fact that the Russians and Chinese were historical 
enemies of Iran was an indication how far Western policy 
toward Iran had gone awry.  Within this context, the Iranians 
were interested in dialogue with the Europeans, but it was 
the Americans they really cared about.  Whenever Karafotias 
met with Iranians the first thing they asked about was what 
was up in Washington.  The Iranians believed they could 
handle their neighbors and it was only the U.S. that scared 
them. 
 
3. (S) Iran's aggressive statements had "nothing to do with 
reality" and were only the Iranians' clumsy way of trying to 
get the U.S. to pay attention so discussions could begin. 
The Iranians believed they were getting contradictory signals 
from Washington and were searching for ways to start a 
dialogue.  Even Iranian support for Hizballah in Lebanon, 
while pressuring Israel, was really an attempt to get 
Washington's attention.  When asked why, if the Iranians 
wanted talks so badly, they did not take some initial 
positive step, such as halting weapons support for Shia 
forces in Iraq, coming clean with the IAEA, or cutting 
support for terrorists in Lebanon, Karafotias said it was a 
combination of national pride and ignorance of Western ways. 
From the Iranian vantage point, the louder and more bellicose 
the statements, the greater the chance of getting U.S. 
attention and beginning a dialogue.  The Iranians, Karafotias 
said, did not give a wit for the Shia in Iraq or Hizballah 
but by supporting them, they hoped to talk to Washington. 
 
4. (S) The Iranians would want to see several things emerge 
from such talks: U.S. investment in Iran, deals with U.S. 
companies on energy extraction technology, and security 
guarantees from the U.S.  On the latter, Karafotias said the 
Iranians, despite their strong statements, wanted to 
re-create some elements of the relationship the U.S. had with 
the Shah.  Iran did not now want to be a proQe region, but it 
did want the attention and respect it thought it still deserved. 
Iran was no longer interested in exporting Islamic revolution. 
Indeed, Iran was now amongst the least strict Islamic countries. 
What could result from an improved relationship would be eased 
tensions and more energy supplies. 
 
5. (S) As for how such talks could take place, Karafotias 
suggested a secret meeting on a small Greek island, 
preferably during the off-season and out of sight of any 
journalists.  Greece, he said, had a "special relationship" 
with Iran -- the Iranians "listened to the Greeks. 
Karafotias said he met regularly with Iranian officials and 
could help facilitate the process.  (He had also met with the 
Israeli Ambassador a few days before, presumably to discuss a 
similar Iranian-Israeli dialogue.)  But we would have to be 
prepared for some Iranian gamesmanship.  The first meeting or 
two would likely be dominated by Iranian venting at the 
wrongs they perceived had been done them.  But after several 
meetings, the Iranians would calm down and real progress 
could take place.  Indeed, with some effort, the nuclear 
problem would "melt away."  That issue, he argued, should be 
seen as the effect, not the cause, of bad relations between 
Iran and the West. 
 
6. (S) COMMENT: It is difficult for us to judge Karafotias' 
authority, either with the Iranians or within the MFA. 
Greece has, however, been proactive in representing U.S. 
interests to the Iranians in such matters as the case of 
missing Amcit Levinson.  Moreover, judging by Iranian 
high-level visits to Athens, the Greeks do appear to have a 
working relationship with the Iranians.  Should Washington 
decide to open a channel to Teheran, the Greeks could perhaps 
help facilitate the contact. 
 
LEVINSON CASE 
------------- 
 
7. (S) DepPolCouns inquired about further information on 
missing Amcit Levinson, whose case Karafotias had addressed 
with the Iranians while in Teheran (refs A and B).  While 
warning that his information might be only "half right" and 
that the Iranians may well have "lied" to him, Karafotias 
said he got the distinct impression that they did not know 
what happened to Levinson.  He believed that if the Iranians 
did have him, they would have made a show for world public 
consumption, much the way they did in the case a year ago of 
Iranian-American academic Haleh Esfandiari.  Karafotias 
speculated that Levinson may have been murdered by 
bandits/smugglers operating in northern Iran. 
 
BIO NOTE 
-------- 
 
8. (SBU) `haps, in his early fiftieQ@e walked with a crutch, tn 
injury he acquiredpan.  On his earlierened the Gr` in 1986. of years 
dealing wiQh Greek-Turkish relations.  He did a stint in the 
President's office and was also posted in Baku.  In Iran, he 
infrequently traveled outside the country, as many other 
ambassadors did, preferring to stay in Teheran to learn the 
Iranian mindset. 
 
SPECKHARD