Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 97115 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
ETRD EAGR ETTC EAID ECON EFIN ECIN EINV ELAB EAIR ENRG EPET EWWT ECPS EIND EMIN ELTN EC ETMIN EUC EZ ET ELECTIONS ENVR EU EUN EG EINT ER ECONOMICS ES EMS ENIV EEB EN ECE ECOSOC EK ENVIRONMENT EFIS EI EWT ENGRD ECPSN EXIM EIAD ERIN ECPC EDEV ENGY ECTRD EPA ESTH ECCT EINVECON ENGR ERTD EUR EAP EWWC ELTD EL EXIMOPIC EXTERNAL ETRDEC ESCAP ECO EGAD ELNT ECONOMIC ENV ETRN EIAR EUMEM ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID EREL ECOM ECONETRDEAGRJA ETCC ETRG ECONOMY EMED ETR ENERG EITC EFINOECD EURM EENG ERA EXPORT ENRD ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EGEN EBRD EVIN ETRAD ECOWAS EFTA ECONETRDBESPAR EGOVSY EPIN EID ECONENRG EDRC ESENV ETT EB ENER ELTNSNAR ECHEVARRIA ETRC EPIT EDUC ESA EFI ENRGY ESCI EE EAIDXMXAXBXFFR EETC ECIP EIAID EIVN EBEXP ESTN EING EGOV ETRA EPETEIND ELAN ETRDGK EAIDRW ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ENVI ELN EAG EPCS EPRT EPTED ETRB EUM EAIDS EFIC EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM EAIDAR ESF EIDN ELAM EDU EV EAIDAF ECN EDA EXBS EINTECPS ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EPREL EAC EINVEFIN ETA EAGER EINDIR ECA ECLAC ELAP EITI EUCOM ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID EARG ELDIN EINVKSCA ENNP EFINECONCS EFINTS ECCP ETC EAIRASECCASCID EINN ETRP EAIDNI EFQ ECOQKPKO EGPHUM EBUD ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ENERGY ELB EINDETRD EMI ECONEFIN EIB EURN ETRDEINVTINTCS EIN EFIM ETIO ELAINE EMN EATO EWTR EIPR EINVETC ETTD ETDR EIQ ECONCS EPPD ENRGIZ EISL ESPINOSA ELEC EAIG ESLCO EUREM ENTG ERD EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH ECINECONCS ETRO ETRDECONWTOCS ECUN EFND EPECO EAIRECONRP ERGR ETRDPGOV ECPN ENRGMO EPWR EET EAIS EAGRE EDUARDO EAGRRP EAIDPHUMPRELUG EICN ECONQH EVN EGHG ELBR EINF EAIDHO EENV ETEX ERNG ED
KMDR KPAO KPKO KJUS KCRM KGHG KFRD KWMN KDEM KTFN KHIV KGIC KIDE KSCA KNNP KHUM KIPR KSUM KISL KIRF KCOR KRCM KPAL KWBG KN KS KOMC KSEP KFLU KPWR KTIA KSEO KMPI KHLS KICC KSTH KMCA KVPR KPRM KE KU KZ KFLO KSAF KTIP KTEX KBCT KOCI KOLY KOR KAWC KACT KUNR KTDB KSTC KLIG KSKN KNN KCFE KCIP KGHA KHDP KPOW KUNC KDRL KV KPREL KCRS KPOL KRVC KRIM KGIT KWIR KT KIRC KOMO KRFD KUWAIT KG KFIN KSCI KTFIN KFTN KGOV KPRV KSAC KGIV KCRIM KPIR KSOC KBIO KW KGLB KMWN KPO KFSC KSEAO KSTCPL KSI KPRP KREC KFPC KUNH KCSA KMRS KNDP KR KICCPUR KPPAO KCSY KTBT KCIS KNEP KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNNB KGCC KINR KPOP KMFO KENV KNAR KVIR KDRG KDMR KFCE KNAO KDEN KGCN KICA KIMMITT KMCC KLFU KMSG KSEC KUM KCUL KMNP KSMT KCOM KOMCSG KSPR KPMI KRAD KIND KCRP KAUST KWAWC KTER KCHG KRDP KPAS KITA KTSC KPAOPREL KWGB KIRP KJUST KMIG KLAB KTFR KSEI KSTT KAPO KSTS KLSO KWNN KPOA KHSA KNPP KPAONZ KBTS KWWW KY KJRE KPAOKMDRKE KCRCM KSCS KWMNCI KESO KWUN KPLS KIIP KEDEM KPAOY KRIF KGICKS KREF KTRD KFRDSOCIRO KTAO KJU KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KEN KO KNEI KEMR KKIV KEAI KWAC KRCIM KWCI KFIU KWIC KCORR KOMS KNNO KPAI KBWG KTTB KTBD KTIALG KILS KFEM KTDM KESS KNUC KPA KOMCCO KCEM KRCS KWBGSY KNPPIS KNNPMNUC KWN KERG KLTN KALM KCCP KSUMPHUM KREL KGH KLIP KTLA KAWK KWMM KVRP KVRC KAID KSLG KDEMK KX KIF KNPR KCFC KFTFN KTFM KPDD KCERS KMOC KDEMAF KMEPI KEMS KDRM KEPREL KBTR KEDU KNP KIRL KNNR KMPT KISLPINR KTPN KA KJUSTH KPIN KDEV KTDD KAKA KFRP KWNM KTSD KINL KJUSKUNR KWWMN KECF KWBC KPRO KVBL KOM KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KEDM KFLD KLPM KRGY KNNF KICR KIFR KM KWMNCS KAWS KLAP KPAK KDDG KCGC KID KNSD KMPF KPFO KDP KCMR KRMS KNPT KNNNP KTIAPARM KDTB KNUP KPGOV KNAP KNNC KUK KSRE KREISLER KIVP KQ KTIAEUN KPALAOIS KRM KISLAO KWM KFLOA
PHUM PINR PTER PGOV PREL PREF PL PM PHSA PE PARM PINS PK PUNE PO PALESTINIAN PU PBTS PROP PTBS POL POLI PA PGOVZI POLMIL POLITICAL PARTIES POLM PD POLITICS POLICY PAS PMIL PINT PNAT PV PKO PPOL PERSONS PING PBIO PH PETR PARMS PRES PCON PETERS PRELBR PT PLAB PP PAK PDEM PKPA PSOCI PF PLO PTERM PJUS PSOE PELOSI PROPERTY PGOVPREL PARP PRL PNIR PHUMKPAL PG PREZ PGIC PBOV PAO PKK PROV PHSAK PHUMPREL PROTECTION PGOVBL PSI PRELPK PGOVENRG PUM PRELKPKO PATTY PSOC PRIVATIZATION PRELSP PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PMIG PREC PAIGH PROG PSHA PARK PETER POG PHUS PPREL PS PTERPREL PRELPGOV POV PKPO PGOVECON POUS PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PWBG PMAR PREM PAR PNR PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PARMIR PGOVGM PHUH PARTM PN PRE PTE PY POLUN PPEL PDOV PGOVSOCI PIRF PGOVPM PBST PRELEVU PGOR PBTSRU PRM PRELKPAOIZ PGVO PERL PGOC PAGR PMIN PHUMR PVIP PPD PGV PRAM PINL PKPAL PTERE PGOF PINO PHAS PODC PRHUM PHUMA PREO PPA PEPFAR PGO PRGOV PAC PRESL PORG PKFK PEPR PRELP PREFA PNG PGOVPHUMKPAO PRELECON PINOCHET PFOR PGOVLO PHUMBA PRELC PREK PHUME PHJM POLINT PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PGOVE PHALANAGE PARTY PECON PEACE PROCESS PLN PRELSW PAHO PEDRO PRELA PASS PPAO PGPV PNUM PCUL PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGIV PRFE POGOV PEL PBT PAMQ PINF PSEPC POSTS PHUMPGOV PVOV PHSAPREL PROLIFERATION PENA PRELTBIOBA PIN PRELL PGOVPTER PHAM PHYTRP PTEL PTERPGOV PHARM PROTESTS PRELAF PKBL PRELKPAO PKNP PARMP PHUML PFOV PERM PUOS PRELGOV PHUMPTER PARAGRAPH PERURENA PBTSEWWT PCI PETROL PINSO PINSCE PQL PEREZ PBS

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 08AITTAIPEI809, MEDIA REACTION: U.S. AND CROSS-STRAIT RELATIONS

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #08AITTAIPEI809.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08AITTAIPEI809 2008-06-10 09:28 2011-08-23 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
VZCZCXYZ0005
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHIN #0809/01 1620928
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 100928Z JUN 08
FM AIT TAIPEI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9131
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 8350
RUEHHK/AMCONSUL HONG KONG 9583
UNCLAS AIT TAIPEI 000809 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR INR/R/MR, EAP/TC, EAP/PA, EAP/PD - NIDA EMMONS 
DEPARTMENT PASS AIT/WASHINGTON 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OPRC KMDR KPAO TW
SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION: U.S. AND CROSS-STRAIT RELATIONS 
 
 
Summary:  As Taiwan's June 10 print media continued to concentrate 
on reporting the controversy over the foreign permanent residency 
status of officials in the Ma Ying-jeou administration, news 
coverage also focused on the upcoming talks between Taiwan's Straits 
Exchange Foundation (SEF) and China's Association for Relations 
across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS), and on a Taiwan teenage golfer who 
captured the Ladies Professional Golf Association (LPGA) 
championship golf tournament in the U.S. Sunday.  In terms of 
editorials and commentaries, a column in the centrist, KMT-leaning 
"China Times" urged the Ma Ying-jeou administration to speed up its 
coordination and cooperation with the United States when 
cross-Strait relations are moving in high gear toward improvement. 
An editorial in the pro-unification "United Daily News" reminded the 
KMT to watch out for the roles that the government and the party 
should play in the upcoming cross-Strait talks.  An editorial in the 
pro-independence, English-language "Taiwan News," on the other hand, 
criticized Ma's administration for "setting aside" Taiwan's 
sovereignty in its dealing with Beijing.  End summary. 
 
A) "Chance of a Lifetime for Taiwan; Do Not Mess It Up" 
 
Deputy Editor-in-Chief Kuo Chen-lung wrote in the "International 
Column" in the centrist, KMT-leaning "China Times" [circulation: 
400,000] (6/10): 
 
"Taiwan's relations with mainland China are now in the midst of a 
precious moment, which barely occurs once in a hundred years.  Yet 
there are many dangers and difficulties lying ahead, particularly 
when Beijing is acting proactively [to dictate the development of 
cross-Strait relations] while Taiwan is gradually losing its 
initiative.  The Ma [Ying-jeou] administration wants to take 
advantage of [Taiwan's] relations with the United States to balance 
[cross-Strait relations] but is missing the best timing. ... 
 
"... But given the current quick pace of change in cross-Strait 
relations, [it is questionable] whether the United States and Taiwan 
are keeping up with the intensive and continuous communication 
[between China and Taiwan].  For example, the second day after the 
meeting between [Chinese President] Hu [Jintao] and [KMT Chairman] 
Wu [Poh-hsiung], the resumption of negotiations between Taiwan's 
Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) and China's Association for 
Relations across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS) was announced.  Did the 
United States know about it beforehand?  Before the SEF leads a 
delegation to mainland China, has [Taiwan] consulted with the United 
States privately?  These [moves] may seem to jeopardize Taiwan's 
sovereignty, but they are actually essential moves to 'balance' 
[changing cross-Strait relations]. 
 
"What is even more worrisome is how [the Ma administration] will 
respond when [the future cross-Strait talks] touch on the core 
security interests between the United States and Taiwan.  For 
example, what is the Ma administration going to do if mainland 
representatives hint to their Taiwan counterparts in private 
meetings that [Taiwan's] ongoing purchase of weapons from the United 
States will have a negative impact on the amicable atmosphere on 
both sides of the Strait? 
 
"In fact, in Ma's inaugural speech and in Minister of National 
Defense Chen Chao-min's recent remarks made in the Legislative Yuan, 
both emphasized over and over again that Taiwan will maintain its 
independent national defense and will purchase necessary weapons. 
However, the problem is:  Will [Taiwan] be able to reach a consensus 
with the United States and steadfastly draw a red line [telling 
China] that 'there is absolutely no room for negotiation' [over arms 
procurement from the United States] as [the island] grows more and 
more reliant on economic and trade cooperation with mainland China? 
 
 
"Of course the moment for showdown has not arrived yet, and Beijing, 
understanding the sensitivity of the issue as well, will not put the 
issue on the table for the time being.  In the meantime, the United 
States is reluctant to sell F-16C/D fighter jets to Taiwan because 
it is worried that [such a deal] will negatively affect the 
atmosphere surrounding the resumption of cross-Strait dialogue.  In 
particular, officials in the Bush administration only have six 
months left in their term of office, so the administration 
definitely does not want to offend mainland China just to enhance 
U.S. relations with Taiwan. 
 
"However, the countdown is gradually speeding up.  How to arrange 
and define [Taiwan's] relation with the United States is an issue 
that Ma's administration must think about immediately. 
Nevertheless, [Taiwan's] representative to the United States is yet 
to take office, and his deputy who is supposed to assist him is 
undecided as well.  When compared with its hasty attitude toward the 
mainland policy, [Ma administration] is indeed getting out of 
balance in terms of its policy toward the United States. 
 
"Some people suggested that senior officials at [Taiwan's] National 
 
Security Council (NSC) visit the United States as soon as possible. 
Besides establishing a mechanism in which every [Taiwan] agency has 
a counterpart [in the United States] and renewing the NSC's 
understanding of the secret agreements and tacit consensus reached 
between the United States and Taiwan over the last eight years, what 
is more important [for Taiwan] is to report to the United States 
directly on what happens in the SEF-ARATS talks and to come up with 
a policy timetable within the next six months.  The next few months 
will be a key period for Ma, and it will be a key period in Taiwan's 
history as well.  Ma and his NSC staff have no right to screw it 
up." 
 
B) "'Bridge' and 'Road':  Concerted Attack by Converging the Two 
Tracks of Party and Government" 
 
The pro-unification "United Daily News" [circulation: 400,000] 
editorialized (6/10): 
 
"... The current circumstances may seem to bode well for both sides 
of the Taiwan Strait.  But a comparison of how the governments on 
both sides of the Taiwan Strait react to such developments show that 
Beijing has been working in an orderly fashion in terms of its 
strategy and level of officials [dealing with Taiwan].  It is 
obvious that Beijing has it all planned out.  But a look at the 
Taiwan's side showed that since winning the election on March 22, 
the new [Ma Ying-jeou] administration has been inconsistent in terms 
of its speed, progress, and the level of officials [who engage with 
China] -- a move that has confused both its rival and the 
administration itself and has thus created uncertainty for 
interaction across the Strait.  Both President Ma and KMT Chairman 
Wu Poh-hsiung reached a good tacit agreement prior to Wu's visit to 
China last month, which thus made the two tracks -- the government 
and the party -- coordinate with each other quite smoothly.  It 
requires careful planning and some break-in for the KMT to learn 
from this successful experience, so that it will not 'run out of 
control' or even let the role of the 'second track' override that of 
the government. ..." 
 
C) "Ma's Concessions Risk Our Future" 
 
The pro-independence, English-language "Taiwan News" [circulation: 
20,000] editorialized (6/10): 
 
"... Ma's administration seems to believe they are adopting a 'soft' 
non-ideological approach with 'flexibility and pragmatism' that will 
bring more benefits to Taiwan.  But what Ma is actually doing is 
'setting aside' the sovereignty of Taiwan in an approach that is 
'inflexible and unrealistic' and which is driven by the KMT's hoary 
ideology of 'great Chinese nationalism.'  Ma's statement that 'the 
people on both sides of the Strait belong to the Chinese nation,' 
has delivered a clear message to the Taiwanese people that, 
regardless of the mainstream Taiwan-centric identity, their new 
government considers Taiwan to be part of 'China' and to have no 
intrinsic identity except as an instrument to 'link up with China.' 
 
"Ma seems intent on making unilateral concessions of Taiwan's 
sovereignty so that Beijing may kindly bestow Taiwan some survival 
space, presumably under the lasting 'complete governance' of the 
CCP's 'elder brother' China-centric party.  However, this weak-kneed 
mentality will only bring '100 disadvantages and no benefits' to 
Taiwan.  Internally, Taiwan will lose precious time and space to 
consolidate its national development, which is entwined and mutually 
dependent with the concept of a citizen based Taiwan national 
identity fostered under both Lee Teng-hui and the former DPP 
government.  The KMT's evident attempt to supplant the historically 
and democratically-grounded citizen-based concept of Taiwan identity 
with a vague attachment to a 'great Chinese nation' lacks any clear 
vision of what kind of society the 23 million people on Taiwan 
should build and what our distinct place in the world community 
should be. ..." 
 
WANG