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Viewing cable 08ADDISABABA1502, Recent Improvised Explosive Device Incidents in Ethiopia.

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08ADDISABABA1502 2008-06-02 11:48 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Addis Ababa
VZCZCXRO8743
RR RUEHROV
DE RUEHDS #1502/01 1541148
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 021148Z JUN 08
FM AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0805
RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 ADDIS ABABA 001502 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR: DS/IP/AF, IP/ITA, AF/E, AND CA/OCS/ACS 
S/CT FOR B.PHIPPS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: CASC ASEC PTER ET
SUBJECT: Recent Improvised Explosive Device Incidents in Ethiopia. 
 
1. (U) During the past several months there have been numerous 
apparent Improvised Explosive Device (IED) incidents in Ethiopia, 
with an increased number occurring in Addis Ababa.  This appears to 
be a reoccurrence of the trend of approximately 35 to 40 similar IED 
incidents reported within Addis Ababa during the period of April 
2005 and November 2006. 
 
2. (U) Below are the latest apparent IED incidents for 2008 reported 
in Ethiopia.  Note, this list does not include grenade incidents 
(primarily tend to occur in the Somalia region). 
 
A. FEBRUARY 29 - MERKATO DISTRICT COMMERCIAL BANK EXPLOSION. 
 
On February 29, 2008 at 1615 hours there was an explosion outside 
the Commercial Bank Branch located in the Merkato District of Addis 
Ababa.  No injuries or deaths were reported, however the bank 
building did sustain damage.  No groups have claimed responsibility 
for this incident. Police investigation is ongoing. This explosion 
was determined to be the result of an IED. 
 
B. MARCH 13 - HUMERA BUS EXPLOSION 
 
On March 13, 2008 there was an explosion on a bus in Humera 
(northern Ethiopia, near the Ethiopian-Eritrea border) resulting in 
7 killed and at least 10 injured.  No groups have claimed 
responsibility for this incident. Police investigation is ongoing. 
It is assumed this explosion was the result of an IED. 
 
C.  MARCH 21 -IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE DETONATED AT BOLE/RING 
ROAD 
 
During the late night/early morning hours an Improvised Explosive 
Device was detonated under a highway overpass at Bole and Ring Road 
in Addis Ababa (in close proximity to the International Airport). 
No casualties or property damage was reported. No groups have 
claimed responsibility for this incident. Police investigation is 
ongoing 
 
D.  MARCH 21 - EXPLOSION HEARD NEAR CHURCH 
 
On March 21, 2008 at approximately 0400 hours several Embassy guards 
reported hearing a loud explosion in the vicinity of St. Michael's 
church in Addis Ababa.  Further confirmation regarding the cause of 
this explosion could not be verified. 
 
MARCH 28 - EXPLOSION AT ADDIS ABABA LION ZOO 
 
On Thursday, March 27, 2008 at 0130 hours there was an explosion at 
the Addis Ababa City Administration Lion Zoo. 
 
An Improvised Explosive Device exploded in a public restroom 
facility, resulting in some property damage and no deaths or 
injuries. No groups have claimed responsibility for this incident. 
Police investigation is ongoing. 
 
E.  APRIL 14 - TWO COMMERCIAL GAS STATIONS BOMBED IN ADDIS ABABA 
 
On April 14, 2008 at approximately 1835 hours during the evening 
rush hour period two commercial petrol stations experienced near 
simultaneous explosions. The two petrol stations are both part of 
the same chain (National Oil Corporation - which is closely 
affiliated with the government) and are located approximately five 
minutes driving time from each other. These explosions resulted in 
four civilians killed and 16 to 19 others injured. 
 
Both of these explosions were reported to have occurred at the 
kerosene pumps, which seems to indicate the perpetrators were 
focused on targeting Ethiopians.  Kerosene is primarily used by 
local civilians for cooking and heating purposes.  It is not 
uncommon to see lines of local civilians queued at the kerosene 
pumps making purchases in small quantities. 
 
The Ethiopian police confirmed the explosions were the result of 
Improvised Explosive Devices (concealed in jerry cans or liquid 
containers) left in the immediate proximity of the kerosene pumps by 
unknown individuals.  No groups have claimed responsibility for this 
incident. Police investigation is ongoing; there have been some 
reports of suspects in custody. 
 
F.  MAY 20 - MINI BUS PUBLIC TRANSPORT BOMBING IN ADDIS ABABA 
 
On Tuesday, May 20, 2008 at approximately 2008 hours local time a 
local public transport mini bus exploded on a public street located 
adjacent to the Hilton Hotel, directly outside the offices of the 
Ethiopian Government Mapping Agency and in close proximity of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
 
This incident occurred approximately 1.5 miles south of the U.S. 
Chancery, on a heavily traveled street passing through a part of the 
 
ADDIS ABAB 00001502  002 OF 003 
 
 
city primarily occupied by Government of Ethiopia offices (to 
include Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Prime Minister's Office and 
National Intelligence Security Service) as well as the two major 
hotels (Hilton and Sheraton).  Six civilians were reported killed, 5 
others were reported wounded as result of this incident.  One of 
those killed was an American citizen who was a passenger in the bus. 
 The bus originated its route at Addis Ababa University shortly 
before the explosion. 
 
Mini bus public transports are a significant part of the local 
public transportation infrastructure.  These mini buses travel 
throughout the city, picking and dropping off passengers along their 
routes.  These public transports are typically configured to haul 
between 12 to 14 passengers each, and are identified by their common 
markings of blue and white two-tone exterior paint. 
As of yet, no groups have claimed responsibility for this bombing 
and police investigation is on-going.  It has been determined the 
explosion was the result of a timed Improvised Explosive Device 
placed on the bus. 
G.  MAY 26 - HOTEL BOMBINGS NEGALLE BORENA: 
 
On Monday, May 26, 2008 at approximately 1945 hours two hotels 
located in Negalle Boreno experienced explosions resulting in three 
killed and five wounded.  Negalle Borena is a city in Oromiya 
Regional State, located 320 miles south of Addis Ababa. 
 
Police investigation is on going.  There is some speculation these 
bombing were carried out by the Oromiya Liberation Front (OLF).  A 
Somali militant group reportedly accepted responsibility for this 
bombing on a Mogadishu based radio station broadcast, stating the 
hotel bombing targeted Ethiopians as "enemies of Islam." 
 
H.  MAY 28 - MERKATO BOMBING PLOT FOILED 
 
On May 28, 2008 at approximately 1200 hours there was a report of a 
foiled IED attack in the Addis Ababa Merkato district, at a busy 
local liquor/grocery store which includes a small tavern. The 
Merkato district is a densely populated commercial center, primarily 
frequented by Ethiopians. 
 
A local male youth loitering outside the store was approached by an 
unidentified Ethiopian (NFI) and asked to carry a parcel to give to 
another party inside the store.  The local male youth accepted the 
parcel and proceeded into the store. An employee in the store became 
suspicious and confronted the local male youth regarding the parcel. 
 The local male youth stated he received the parcel from another 
party outside the store 
 
By the time the local male youth and store employee went outside to 
look for the unidentified Ethiopian male subject, they had already 
disappeared. The store employee immediately called police. Police 
and EOD personnel arrived at the location and removed the detonating 
device from the explosive device, rendering it safe. 
 
No groups have claimed responsibility for this plot and police 
investigation is on going 
 
3.  (U) The above incidents are most likely not all related to the 
same group, however some inevitably are. The above incidents 
(especially those occurring within Addis Ababa) illustrate the 
following trends which are disturbing: 
 
A.   Previous Addis Ababa IED incidents tended to occur late at 
night, in unpopulated venues where nobody was likely to get hurt. 
 
B.   The most recent Addis Ababa IED incidents occurred during 
day-time hours at populated venues and were carried out in a manner 
in which casualties/fatalities were assured. 
 
C.  Previous IED incidents were never claimed by any group and were 
generally attributed to internal separatist groups. 
 
D.  If the claims by Somali militant group regarding the Negalle 
Borneo hotel bombings is correct, this adds a new dynamic to the 
local threat environment.  Previously it was generally assumed 
any/all IED incidents in Ethiopia were the result of internal 
separatist groups (OLF or ONLF). 
 
4.  (U) The recent Addis Ababa IED incidents targeting densely 
populated venues are disturbing.  Many local public venues (to 
include major hotels and entertainment centers) already enforce 
access control and security screening measures (all person and their 
effects are subject to security screening). Some public venues have 
noticeably enhanced existing security measures (a local cinema was 
noted to have three levels of physical security screening). The RSO 
already encourages Mission personnel not to patronize any large 
uncontrolled public venues that lack access control and security 
screening. Since the May 20 mini-bus bombings the Ethiopia 
authorities have conducted several roadside security checkpoints 
 
ADDIS ABAB 00001502  003 OF 003 
 
 
within Addis Ababa in apparent follow up to tips received. These 
checkpoints involve searching  all vehicles and occupants. 
 
5.  (U) The local population is vigilant, naturally suspicious and 
quick to notify the authorities in the event of unusual activity (as 
was the case in the foiled May 28 IED incident targeting a Mercato 
district retail outlet).  On May 30, 2008 local citizens notified 
the authorities regarding a jerry can observed in the Addis Ababa 
Piazza district during the morning rush hour.  The Ethiopian bomb 
squad quickly responded, and fortunately the jerry can was 
determined to not be a threat (it was empty). Nevertheless, the 
recent IED incidents have resulted in a climate of increased tension 
among the average citizen who already has more then enough worries 
in their day-to-day lives, to include; lack of adequate electrical 
power, lack of adequate water, increased food prices, increased 
fuel/transportation costs, rampant inflation, increased housing 
costs, high unemployment, less then favorable social-economic 
conditions and an uncertain political climate. If these problems 
persist in the coming months, the general security climate in 
Ethiopia will continue to become more difficult and uncertain as 
this country moves towards to 2010 national elections. 
 
YAMAMOTO