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Viewing cable 08TOKYO1447, DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 05/27/08

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08TOKYO1447 2008-05-27 22:47 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Tokyo
VZCZCXRO4404
PP RUEHFK RUEHKSO RUEHNAG RUEHNH
DE RUEHKO #1447/01 1482247
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 272247Z MAY 08
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4553
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAWJA/USDOJ WASHDC PRIORITY
RULSDMK/USDOT WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J5//
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RHHMHBA/COMPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI
RHMFIUU/HQ PACAF HICKAM AFB HI//CC/PA//
RHMFIUU/USFJ //J5/JO21//
RUYNAAC/COMNAVFORJAPAN YOKOSUKA JA
RUAYJAA/CTF 72
RUEHNH/AMCONSUL NAHA 0387
RUEHFK/AMCONSUL FUKUOKA 8008
RUEHOK/AMCONSUL OSAKA KOBE 1689
RUEHNAG/AMCONSUL NAGOYA 6313
RUEHKSO/AMCONSUL SAPPORO 8599
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 3560
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 9557
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0005
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 08 TOKYO 001447 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR E, P, EB, EAP/J, EAP/P, EAP/PD, PA; 
WHITE HOUSE/NSC/NEC; JUSTICE FOR STU CHEMTOB IN ANTI-TRUST DIVISION; 
TREASURY/OASIA/IMI/JAPAN; DEPT PASS USTR/PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE; 
SECDEF FOR JCS-J-5/JAPAN, 
DASD/ISA/EAPR/JAPAN; DEPT PASS ELECTRONICALLY TO USDA 
FAS/ITP FOR SCHROETER; PACOM HONOLULU FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ADVISOR; 
CINCPAC FLT/PA/ COMNAVFORJAPAN/PA. 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OIIP KMDR KPAO PGOV PINR ECON ELAB JA
 
SUBJECT:  DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 05/27/08 
 
 
INDEX: 
 
(1) Report of existence of more Japanese abductees in North Korea: 
Possibly reflecting improving U.S.-DPRK relations (Mainichi) 
 
(2) DPRK conveys to U.S. on Japanese abductees: "Several abductees 
are alive and are ready to return home" (Mainichi) 
 
(3) Scope column: Ruling coalition alarmed that new health insurance 
system for elderly will become major campaign issue for Okinawa 
prefectural assembly election (Tokyo Shimbun) 
 
(4) U.S. government approves Japan's shipment of imported rice to 
Philippines (Asahi) 
 
(5) DPJ Secretary General Hatoyama: Futenma should be relocated to 
Guam (Ryukyu Shimpo) 
 
(6) Guide to choices in run-up to next general election: U.S. 
military bases and livelihood (Mainichi) 
 
(7) Stop cluster bombs - Voices of world and Japan (Conclusion): 
Interview with Hidenao Nakagawa, former secretary general of ruling 
Liberal Democratic Party: Prevent damage by adopting alternatives 
(Mainichi) 
 
(8) U.S. closely watching Japan's preparedness as its ally 
(Mainichi) 
 
ARTICLES: 
 
(1) Report of existence of more Japanese abductees in North Korea: 
Possibly reflecting improving U.S.-DPRK relations 
 
MAINICHI (Internet edition) (Full) 
May 27, 2008 
 
(Asked about a report of North Korea admitting that several more 
Japanese abductees existed,) a senior government official stated 
this morning: "I don't know anything about it. If North Korea has 
informed the United States about such, the U.S. should tell Japan 
about it. On the other hand, there are (abducted victims) whose 
whereabouts the police have not been grasp. If they are allowed to 
return home, that would be progress (in Japan-DPRK relations)." The 
official expressed a desire to respond positively if North Korea 
were to let the abductees return home. 
 
On the North Korea issue, the government has taken the position that 
abductions and the missile issue are to be resolved comprehensively, 
and it has been seeking a parallel resolution linked to reciprocity. 
As the feeling grows that removal of North Korea from the U.S.' 
terrorist-sponsoring list is becoming a reality, there is a growing 
mood in the government that progress in the abduction issue may 
come, too. 
 
Foreign Minister Koumura stressed to the press in this morning's 
news conference: "The Japanese government is making its own efforts, 
as well, for we would like to see progress in Japanese-North Korean 
relations centered on the abduction issue." There is a possibility 
that the government in its secret negotiations may have picked up 
hints about the existence of new abducted victims. 
 
 
TOKYO 00001447  002 OF 008 
 
 
(2) DPRK conveys to U.S. on Japanese abductees: "Several abductees 
are alive and are ready to return home" 
 
MAINICHI ONLINE NEWS (Full) 
May 27, 2008, 15:00 
 
In connection with the abduction issue, it was learned today from a 
source connected to the government that North Korea had conveyed to 
the United States that "there are still several Japanese abductees 
inside the country and we are prepared to send them home." Those 
abductees mentioned by North Korea seem to be different from the 12 
persons recognized by the Japanese government as abductees whose 
whereabouts are unknown. By playing the diplomatic card of letting 
the abductees return home, Pyongyang apparently aims to give the 
U.S. the impression that there is progress on the abduction issue 
and then press it to remove North Korea from the list of state 
sponsors of terrorism. Another motive seems to be to shake up Japan. 
However, whether this will actually lead to abductees returning home 
cannot be predicted. 
 
Negotiating card intended to have Washington delist DPRK as state 
sponsor of terrorism 
 
U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill, the U.S. chief 
negotiator in the six-party talks, is to be visiting Beijing from 
May 27 and meet with North Korea's chief negotiator Kim Kye Gwan 
there. The two officials are expected to discuss North Korea's 
planned declaration of its nuclear programs, the Japanese abduction 
issue, and also what to do about the JAL Yodo-go hijackers, who live 
in Pyongyang. 
 
According to the government-connected source, information about the 
existence of another group of Japanese abductees was conveyed to the 
U.S. last fall. On the premise that all are alive, Tokyo has called 
on Pyongyang to have them all return home immediately. Last October, 
Foreign Minister Masahiko Koumura in fact noted: "If all abductees 
who are alive return home, most of the abduction issue will be 
resolved. If some of them return home, that would mean progress." 
 
As for the Yodo-go hijackers, Koumura noted: "I don't think there 
would be progress even if they return home." 
 
So far, the government has recognized 17 abductees, including Megumi 
Yokota (who went missing when she was 13). Of them, five abductees 
and their family members are back in Japan. Citing an apology by 
North Korean leader Kim Jong Il and the return home of five 
abductees, North Korea had insisted that "the abduction issue has 
been resolved," and that "all the abductees who are alive have 
returned home." 
 
Meanwhile, the Investigation Commission on Missing Japanese Probably 
Related to the North Korea has registered some 470 Japanese as 
missing persons who may have been abducted by North Korea. In view 
of the situations under which they went missing, the commission says 
36 of those missing Japanese are most likely to have been abducted 
by North Korea. 
 
(3) Scope column: Ruling coalition alarmed that new health insurance 
system for elderly will become major campaign issue for Okinawa 
prefectural assembly election 
 
TOKYO SHIMBUN (Page 2) (Full) 
 
TOKYO 00001447  003 OF 008 
 
 
May 24, 2008 
 
A major cause for the sharp decline in the public support rates of 
the cabinet of Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda is public criticism of 
the new health insurance system for people aged 75 and older. The 
ruling parties are increasingly alarmed that the introduction of the 
new medical insurance system for the elderly will adversely affect 
the Okinawa Prefectural Assembly election on June 8. The official 
campaign for the election will kick off on May 30. 
 
The fixed number of the Okinawa Prefectural Assembly members totals 
ΒΆ48. Of the 48 seats, one seat is vacant, with 27 held by the ruling 
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and New Komeito, and 20 held by the 
opposition parties -- the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), the 
Japanese Communist Party (JCP), the Social Democratic Party (SDP), 
and the Okinawa Social Mass Party. It is considered that the ruling 
camp led by Gov. Masahiro Nakaima will be certain to retain the 
majority of the prefectural assembly. If the ruling camp fails to 
secure the majority, the result of the election will have a 
significant impact on the U.S. base issue in Okinawa. 
 
A source connected to the LDP election process gave this severe 
outlook: "The main campaign focus will be on issue connected to 
social welfare and the daily lives of the people; it will not be on 
base issues. The new medical insurance system for the elderly has 
put the ruling camp at a disadvantage." 
 
The ruling coalition was defeated in the Lower House by-election to 
fill the Yamaguchi No. 2 district seat because older voters 
distanced themselves from the ruling bloc. If the ruling camp is 
defeated also in the Okinawa Prefectural Assembly election, the 
opposition, which has called for abolishing the new health insurance 
system, will be certain to gain momentum. Should the row over the 
medical insurance system result in aggravating the issue of U.S. 
bases, which are the foundation of the Japan-U.S. alliance, the 
result could be serious for the government and ruling parties. 
 
In an LDP board meeting on May 23, Election Strategy Council 
Chairman Makoto Koga instructed other senior party members to strive 
for perfection in support arrangements, saying: "The council will 
take the necessary response." The LDP has begun preparations to air 
in Okinawa TV commercials calling for understanding for the new 
medical system for the elderly. The party is also considering 
sending a statement it has readied that counters the DPJ's criticism 
of the new health insurance system. The LDP Okinawa chapter can use 
it for reference. New Komeito leader Akihiro Ota visited Okinawa to 
meet with Gov. Nakaima. The two agreed on the need to come up with 
measures to improve the application of the medical insurance system. 
Ota will call on May 24 at the offices of candidates on the New 
Komeito ticket to explain possible improvements to the system. 
 
The opposition camp is giving priority to the Okinawa election, as 
well. DPJ Secretary General Yukio Hatoyama stated in a press 
conference: "If the opposition force tops the ruling bloc in the 
prefectural assembly, there would be a major impact on national 
politics." 
 
Hatoyama visits Okinawa on May 24. Deputy President Naoto Kan will 
fly there next week. 
 
(4) U.S. government approves Japan's shipment of imported rice to 
Philippines 
 
TOKYO 00001447  004 OF 008 
 
 
 
ASAHI (Page 2) (Full) 
Evening, May 24 
 
(Kaori Nishizaki, Washington) 
 
The United States government on May 24 allowed Japan to ship rice 
imported from the U.S. to developing countries suffering from 
soaring food prices internationally and expressed hopes that the 
rice market will calm down. 
 
Representatives from the Japanese and U.S. governments met in 
Washington on May 23. The U.S. side also expressed support for 
Japan's positive response to the Philippine government's request 
that Japan ship about 200,000 tons of imported rice to that nation. 
 
In the 1993 Uruguay Round Agreement, Japan is required to import 
rice under the so-called minimum access formula. Of the about 
770,000 tons of rice Japan imports annually under the minimum import 
obligation, about 50 PERCENT  comes from the U.S. The U.S. 
government had insisted that the imported rice should be consumed 
within the nation, but the U.S. has now made a policy switch to 
approve Japan's shipment of such rice overseas only for humanitarian 
aid. 
 
(5) DPJ Secretary General Hatoyama: Futenma should be relocated to 
Guam 
 
RYUKYU SHIMPO (Page 2) (Full) 
May 25, 2008 
 
The major opposition Democratic Party of Japan's (DPJ) Secretary 
General Yukio Hatoyama yesterday arrived in Okinawa. The aim of his 
trip to Okinawa was to lend his support to his party-backed 
candidates for the upcoming Okinawa Prefectural Assembly election. 
In an interview later in the day with Ryukyu Shimpo, Hatoyama 
touched on the question of relocating the U.S. Marines' Futenma Air 
Station, "I hope (the U.S. forces) will operate outside Japan as 
often as possible in peace time." Speaking of the DPJ's "Okinawa 
vision," which is under study for revisions, Hatoyama noted that the 
vision should clearly declare the need to relocate the airfield to 
anywhere else outside Japan as well as the prefecture. Hatoyama also 
showed his intention to seek to relocate the Futenma airfield to 
Guam, by noting, "(The Marines) are to be transferred to Guam. It is 
only natural for us to keep in mind Guam as a relocation site for 
the (Futenma) airfield." 
 
Hatoyama articulated: "Ideally, I think it is better to relocate it 
anywhere else outside Japan. But this idea may not necessarily 
obtain the understanding of the United." Even in the case of pushing 
the relocation of the airfield to anywhere else inside the 
prefecture, Hatoyama implied that it would be necessary to set a 
timeframe in a clear-cut manner for the duration of the airfield, 
saying, "We must not allow the airfield to exist indefinitely." 
 
Referring to the next Lower House election, Hatoyama mentioned the 
Okinawa 3rd Constituency, where the DPJ-backed candidate and the 
Social Democratic Party (SDP)-backed candidate will seek the same 
seat and stressed: "Mr. Ozawa's strategy is to field a promising 
candidate. If the other party's candidate is powerful enough, our 
party may join hands with that candidate. But if our party's 
candidate is promising, we will then seek the other party's 
 
TOKYO 00001447  005 OF 008 
 
 
cooperation. Our major aim is to beat the ruling Liberal Democratic 
Party (LDP) and its junior coalition partner New Komeito." Regarding 
the Okinawa 4th Constituency, Hatoyama revealed that the DPJ would 
run a candidate on the premise that the candidate can beat the 
LDP-backed or the New Komeito-backed candidate, noting, "Generally 
speaking, it is likely that our party will have candidates-to-be vie 
with each other inside the party in order to choose the strongest 
one from among them." Speaking of the DPJ-backed candidate Denny 
Tamaki for the Okinawa 3rd Constituency and another DPJ-backed 
candidate Chobin Zukeran for the Okinawa 4th Constituency, Hatoyama 
said: "They should become candidates who can win." 
 
Hatoyama, talking about the Prefectural Assembly election, stressed: 
"We want to reverse the positions of the ruling and opposition 
parties. We want to change prefectural administration and let that 
lead to a change in the national administration. In this sense, the 
Prefectural Assembly election is important." "It is fully possible 
that the results will affect the fate of the controversial medical 
system for the elderly," he added. 
 
(6) Guide to choices in run-up to next general election: U.S. 
military bases and livelihood 
 
MAINICHI (Page 1) (Full) 
May 26, 2008 
 
Differences in stances of Japan, U.S. appearing over transfer of 5th 
Air Force headquarters from Yokota to Guam 
 
In December 2003, then United States Pacific Fleet Commander Admiral 
Thomas B. Fargo briefed the top brass of the Ground, Maritime, and 
Air Self-Defense Forces and others about the planned realignment of 
U.S. forces in Japan. The Admiral said: "The U.S. plans to integrate 
the U.S. 5th Air Force headquarters (in Yokota) into the 13th Air 
Forces headquarters (in Guam)." 
 
A senior ASDF officer retorted: "Recently, war tends to start with 
air warfare. An absence of our counterpart will really perplex us. 
All the more because Japan and the U.S. have acted in cooperation 
without any trouble, North Korea remains unable to make a move." 
 
The 5th Air Force commander also plays the role of commanding the 
U.S. forces in Japan. The ASDF officer feared that a transfer of the 
5th Air Force headquarters to Guam could lead to weakening channels 
to the U.S. Air Force. 
 
However, the U.S. military's intention was to strengthen its base 
functions in Guam in the western Pacific region. According to 
analysis by a senior Defense Ministry official, the U.S. in this way 
aimed to constrain China's moves to make inroads into the Pacific 
region. 
 
The integration plan was returned to a clean state in the end, as a 
result of joint efforts by senior ASDF officers and U.S. Air Force 
members knowledgeable about Japan to scrap the plan. 
 
In February 2005, the governments of Japan and the U.S. put a list 
of "common strategic goals" into a document. It contained this 
passage: "We urge a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan Strait dispute 
through talks." But the draft as first presented by the U.S. Defense 
Department had used this strong expression: "We will never allow 
China to invade Taiwan." In response to Japan's strong request, the 
 
TOKYO 00001447  006 OF 008 
 
 
document also included a provision on Japanese nationals abducted by 
North Korea. 
 
Japan, with North Korea in mind, is eager to strengthen the 
alliance, while the U.S. is eager to deploy troops to the western 
Pacific on a priority basis in order to prepare for China's possible 
advancement into the region. As it stands, differences in motives of 
Japan and the U.S. are gradually emerging. 
 
Complications arising in negotiations with affected municipalities 
 
Japan and the U.S. have agreed to relocate the U.S. Marine Corps' 
Futenma Air Station to the Henoko district adjacent to Camp Schwab 
in Nago City, Okinawa Prefecture. At 06:30 on May 21, Sakae Toyama, 
67, director of the Peace Citizens Liaison Council, which is opposed 
to the government's Futenma relocation plan, told nine participants 
in the coastal blocking action group: "I hope you will use 
nonviolent means today." The members headed off in a rubber boat and 
a canoe into the ocean to the spot where ich the environment impact 
assessment by the Okinawa Bureau of Defense Policy is underway. 
 
Futenma Air Station is a symbolic facility in Okinawa base issues. 
Twelve years have passed since the U.S. and Japanese governments 
agreed to return the facility. Okinawa Prefecture and Nago City had 
agreed on a plan to relocate the functions to waters off Henoko 
district. Under the realignment of U.S. forces in Japan, however, 
the construction site was changed to the coastal area of Camp 
Schwab. Since then, relations between the central government and 
affected municipalities have become strained. The relocation plan 
has yet to be translated into action. 
 
Okinawa Governor Hirokazu Nakaima, who won the election by promising 
to oppose the government plan, has called on the government to move 
the construction site for a pair of runways further into the sea as 
much as possible. Even so, the governor approved the start of the 
environmental impact assessment, premised on the implementation of 
the government plan. With no final agreement reached on the 
construction site, the assessment was started this March. The 
dismantlement of barracks on the compound of Camp Schwab was also 
started in May. Preparations for constructing the runways are 
steadily proceeding. 
 
Toyama said: "The governor is expected to agree on the government 
plan in the end. But Okinawa does not need any new military bases." 
 
(7) Stop cluster bombs - Voices of world and Japan (Conclusion): 
Interview with Hidenao Nakagawa, former secretary general of ruling 
Liberal Democratic Party: Prevent damage by adopting alternatives 
 
MAINICHI (Page 7) (Full) 
May 24, 2008 
 
Interviewer Ken Uzuka 
 
Weapons are tools used by soldiers against other soldiers. Weapons 
that kill and wound civilians indiscriminately deviate from the 
norms in terms of international law. A worst-case scenario is for 
unexploded bombs left after the end of a war causing harm to 
civilians, blowing off their arms and legs. In this sense, cluster 
munitions are called "the devil's weapon." Sometimes children suffer 
damage from duds when they play with them as if they were toys. The 
first priority challenge is to eliminate humanitarian damage as 
 
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swiftly as possible. Old cluster bombs that have been scattered 
across the world and whose failure rates are high must be removed. 
 
I appreciate the fact that Japan is a member of the Oslo Process. I 
deem it is necessary to change non-members' attitudes, for instance, 
the United States, Russia, and China. The ultimate goal is to 
eliminate all cluster munitions from the earth. We must do so, but 
if our discussion of whether to totally ban cluster bombs drags on, 
the damage to humans would simply expand. I think the important 
thing is to consider alternatives to minimize the human damage and 
improve the effectiveness of alternative weapons. In order to 
prepare such alternative munitions, my idea is to budget for them. A 
royal road to eliminate the harm to humanity would be to allow 
alternative weapons to some degree. 
 
The old-model cluster munitions the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) have 
stockpiled so far should be scrapped. I believe a dispatch of the 
SDF abroad on missions to remove duds could obtain public 
understanding. 
 
A draft treaty banning cluster munitions includes support for 
victims and cluster-bomb users' responsibility to work together to 
remove duds. I hope these things will be realized. 
 
It may be a good idea to call on the Group of Eight (G-8) countries 
at the upcoming G-8 Hokkaido Toyako Summit to work together to 
realize them. 
 
Because I have been elected in Hiroshima, I strongly desire to 
eliminate nuclear weapons from the globe. There are neither winners 
nor losers in wars, only victims. 
 
(8) U.S. closely watching Japan's preparedness as its ally 
 
MAINICHI (Page 13) (Full) 
May 26, 2008 
 
Satoshi Morimoto, professor at Takushoku University 
 
The U.S. has carried out the transformation of its military force on 
a global scale. In Asia, it focused on Japan and South Korea. It can 
be said that the major aim of the U.S. military transformation in 
Asia is to develop a China strategy. The U.S. thinks that it must 
not allow any Americans to shed blood in Asia again and that to that 
end, it is important to maintain a cooperative relationship with 
China. 
 
However, when it comes to the moves of the Chinese military's 
advance into the Pacific region, it is another story. The U.S. 
attaches high importance to its maritime interests in the 
Asia-Pacific region. It is determined to fight if China advances 
into the region. 
 
The U.S. studied what strategic system could deal with the Chinese 
Navy and Air Force in a most effective manner and it decided to 
transfer necessary functions to Guam, making it a strategic base. It 
also decided to deploy a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier to 
Yokosuka, thereby attaching more importance to the western Pacific. 
The aim of the U.S. force realignment is to make changes in the U.S. 
forces in Japan so that they can meet the U.S. strategy. 
 
If the relocation of the U.S. Marine Corps' Futenma Air Station to 
 
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an alternative facility does not go smoothly, it would cause the 
structure of the realignment of the U.S. military presence in Japan 
itself to suffer a major setback. Moreover, the U.S. would harbor 
doubts about Japan's preparedness, resolve and ability to get things 
done as its ally. The U.S. does not think that it should defend 
Japan because of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. It is considering 
changing the quality of alliances, after determining to what extent 
its allies are prepared to maintain their alliance with the U.S. and 
to what degree they are willing to make contributions to the 
alliance. In other words, the U.S. is ready to end the alliance if 
its allies have no intention to maintain their end of the alliance 
with the U.S.  Any state would plunge into crisis if it solely 
depends on what is written in a treaty. Its prime example is the 
Japan-USSR Nonaggression Pact. 
 
There is a considerable gap between Japan and the U.S. in views of 
the security treaty and Status-of-Forces Agreement (SOFA). The U.S. 
sees the alliance from a global perspective, while Japan views it 
from legal and technical standpoints. It thinks from the perspective 
of giving consideration to its public. Japan is unable to possess 
nuclear weapons. It cannot possess massive military power, either. A 
military build-up is in progress among its neighbors. The time has 
supposedly come long before for it to discuss a basic national 
strategy of how to defend the nation over the next 50 and 100 years. 
However, political parties do not readily pursue strategic 
discussion, giving priority to maneuvering over party interests. 
 
For the U.S., the Japan-U.S. alliance is part of its Asia-Pacific 
strategy. In essence, its aim is to forge an alliance with a country 
with which it can share maritime interests in the Pacific. Its ally 
does not have to be Japan. It may consider forging a multilateral 
alliance with countries with which it can share values, such as 
Australia, New Zealand or Singapore. 
 
Satoshio Morimoto: Graduated from Defense Academy. In the present 
position at Takusyoku University, after serving in the Air 
Self-Defense Force and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. His works 
include "The U.S. military transformation and U.S. Forces stationed 
in Japan." 67 years old. 
 
SCHIEFFER