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Viewing cable 08TOKYO1354, CLUSTER MUNITIONS: JAPAN PREVIEWS DUBLIN MEETING

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08TOKYO1354 2008-05-16 10:00 2011-06-16 00:00 SECRET Embassy Tokyo
VZCZCXRO6015
OO RUEHFK RUEHKSO RUEHNH
DE RUEHKO #1354/01 1371000
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 161000Z MAY 08
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4326
INFO RUEHXP/ALL NATO POST COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 3394
RUEHDL/AMEMBASSY DUBLIN PRIORITY 0137
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 2300
RUEHNY/AMEMBASSY OSLO PRIORITY 1189
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 9405
RUEHFK/AMCONSUL FUKUOKA PRIORITY 7855
RUEHNH/AMCONSUL NAHA PRIORITY 0237
RUEHOK/AMCONSUL OSAKA KOBE PRIORITY 1536
RUEHKSO/AMCONSUL SAPPORO PRIORITY 8446
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA SEOUL KOR PRIORITY
RHMFISS/USFJ  PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 3329
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 1244
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 9863
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 TOKYO 001354 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/16/2023 
TAGS: PREL MOPS PARM JA NATO
SUBJECT: CLUSTER MUNITIONS: JAPAN PREVIEWS DUBLIN MEETING 
 
Classified By: Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor W. Michael M 
eserve.  Reasons 1.4 (B) (D). 
 
1. (S) SUMMARY: Japan remains committed to handling cluster 
munitions (CM) in the Convention on Conventional Weapons 
(CCW) but will likely join an expected consensus reached at 
the Dublin meeting of the Oslo Process, Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs Deputy Director-General Masatoshi Shimbo told Embassy 
and U.S. Forces Japan representatives on May 16.  If a 
consensus is reached, Japan would register reservations to 
the text, which would still need to be signed in November in 
Oslo before Japan would consider ratification.  DDG Shimbo 
said Embassy outreach to Diet members, if done discretely and 
in a low-key manner, now and after the Dublin meeting would 
be useful in educating members of the debate that will follow 
in Japan.  He also suggested the Secretaries of State, 
Defense, and/or the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
offer high-profile public statements regarding the importance 
the U.S. places on resolving CM in the CCW.  End Summary. 
 
Dublin Meeting Preview 
---------------------- 
 
2. (S) After reaffirming Japan's preference for handling CM 
in the CCW, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Disarmament, 
Non-proliferation and Science Department Deputy 
Director-General Masatoshi Shimbo told Embassy Tokyo and U.S. 
Forces Japan representatives on May 16 that he expects the 
Dublin meeting of the Oslo Process will produce a consensus 
on a text banning CM.  The Core Group in the Oslo Process 
wants to reach this consensus, as opposed to using the 
two-thirds vote, and as such will incorporate some changes 
suggested by ""Like-Minded"" nations regarding definitions of 
CM covered by the text, interoperability and an 
implementation period.  This will give Japan a ""fighting 
chance"" to deal with the negative affect on U.S.-Japan 
interoperability that the Oslo Process will create.  DDG 
Shimbo noted that France and Germany wish to avoid tampering 
with Articles 1 (b) and (c), which they believe hold a 
symbolic meaning for the Core Group and NGOs, by introducing 
a new article which would address interoperability issues. 
 
3. (S) DDG Shimbo said that if the Dublin participants reach 
consensus, Japan will need to become a member of the 
consensus but will express reservations with the text by 
noting Japan's preference for the CCW and Japan's need to 
careful consider the text before ratification.  Following 
Dublin, the text would be in final form and ready for signing 
at Oslo in November, DDG Shimbo said.  He argued that the 
Dublin text would not be legally binding and that Tokyo would 
have no legal obligation to adhere to the treaty until it is 
ratified by the Diet. 
 
Suggestion for High Level U.S. Pressure Outside Japan 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
4. (S) MOD U.S.-Japan Security Division Director Kiyoshi 
Serizawa noted that Deputy Secretary Negronte's decision to 
raise cluster munitions with Foreign Minister Koumura during 
their May 9 meeting in Tokyo proved beneficial and increased 
the awareness level of the issue at senior levels in Japan. 
MOD now believes, however, that the perception Japanese 
officials have been pressured by foreign government argues 
against further direct approaches by other high-level U.S. 
officials to their Tokyo counterparts.  MOFA DDG Shinbo added 
the GOJ would find it helpful if the Secretaries of State or 
Defense, and/or the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
offered high-profile public statements regarding the 
importance of resolving CM in the CCW.  Direct approaches by 
senior U.S. officials to NATO members, Latin American 
countries and the Core Group in the Oslo Process would also 
be helpful.  This would indirectly show Japan's senior 
officials and Diet members the high priority the United 
States places on the issue and give MOFA and MOD ammunition 
in pushing the CCW over the Oslo Process with Core Group 
members, according to DDG Shimbo. 
 
Outreach to Diet Members Would Be Beneficial 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
5. (S) Embassy Tokyo representatives meeting with Diet 
members now and after the Dublin Conference would also be 
useful in shaping the debate over the implications of a 
cluster munitions ban if done with extreme discretion and in 
a low-key manner, Shinbo offered.  Meeting some of the more 
moderate members of the new intra-parliamentary league 
focused on banning CM, such as LDP Lower House member Kenji 
Kosaka who is friendly to U.S. interests, would reap the most 
benefit. 
 
6. (S) During meetings with Diet Members, the U.S. side 
should stress that CM better enables the United States to 
meet its treaty obligations to defend Japan and maintain 
peace and security in East Asia, DDG Shimbo said.  If 
possible, the U.S. should share with Diet members specific 
operational requirements for CM, such as countering North 
Korean WMD and missile threats to Japan.  Diet members will 
respond better to this line of argument, as well as the 
potential negative affect on interoperability between U.S. 
forces and Japan's Self-Defense Force (JSDF).  Many Diet 
members briefed by MOD have dismissed claims that the JSDF 
need CM to defend Japan from an invasion that most Diet 
members doubt will ever occur, according to DDG Shimbo. 
Embassy Pol-Mil Unit Chief told DDG Shimbo that it is 
critical to focus on what the Alliance needs, as opposed to 
just what the U.S. needs, to defend Japan and maintain peace 
and security in the region.  In a contingency, for example, 
it is crucial that U.S. forces be allowed operate with CM out 
of SDF bases.  An Alliance-centric approach will also avoid 
accusations that the U.S. is only seeking to protect its own 
CM equities. 
 
Following the European Lead 
--------------------------- 
 
7. (C) Following the meeting, MOFA Conventional Arms Division 
Director Ryuichi Hirano outlined Tokyo's position in terms 
indicating that Japan would refuse to be isolated in the 
Dublin diplomatic process.  Hirano said Tokyo believed 
European and some other ""Like-Minded"" states would refuse to 
join consensus on a Dublin text that did not adequately 
address concerns about interoperability.  Under those 
circumstances, Japan would join the Europeans in rejecting 
the text.  If, however, the Europeans and others decided to 
join consensus on a Dublin text, even one which did not 
resolve interoperability issues, Japan will not block 
consensus. 
DONOVAN