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Viewing cable 08TOKYO1230, SCENESETTER FOR G-8 LABOR MINISTERS' MEETING MAY

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08TOKYO1230 2008-05-07 07:32 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Tokyo
VZCZCXRO7067
RR RUEHFK RUEHGH RUEHKSO RUEHNAG RUEHNH
DE RUEHKO #1230/01 1280732
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 070732Z MAY 08
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4001
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 3163
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 9180
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 6078
RUEHKSO/AMCONSUL SAPPORO 8219
RUEHOK/AMCONSUL OSAKA KOBE 1303
RUEHNAG/AMCONSUL NAGOYA 5982
RUEHFK/AMCONSUL FUKUOKA 7624
RUEHNH/AMCONSUL NAHA 0009
RUEHGH/AMCONSUL SHANGHAI 0404
RUEHHK/AMCONSUL HONG KONG 6500
RUEHC/DEPT OF LABOR WASHINGTON DC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/TREASURY DEPT WASHDC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
RUEHIN/AIT TAIPEI 7012
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 3310
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 TOKYO 001230 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DOL FOR DEPUTY SECRETARY RADZELY, DEPUTY U/S PONTICELLI 
DOL FOR ILAB 
NSC FOR BROWN AND TONG 
STATE FOR E, G, DRL, EEB, AND EAP/J 
PARIS FOR USOECD 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ELAB PGOV OVIP JA
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR G-8 LABOR MINISTERS' MEETING MAY 
11-13 
 
Summary 
------- 
1. (SBU) Japan's economy is in its longest postwar expansion, 
but for many it does not feel that way.  Japanese consumers 
are pinched by rising commodity prices and stagnant wages, 
and the country is facing long-term fiscal and demographic 
challenges.  Reform, particularly in the labor market, would 
raise productivity and prosperity and make it easier for 
Japan to support a range of bilateral initiatives.  Our 
bilateral challenge in Niigata is to explain how flexible and 
responsive labor markets would help more Japanese benefit 
from today's global market.  End summary. 
 
Economic Expansion Not Felt By Many 
----------------------------------- 
2. (SBU) Japan's economy is in its longest continuous 
expansion of the postwar period, but for many it does not 
feel that way.  Despite moderate GDP growth and strong 
corporate profits, Japan's nominal GDP in 2006 was marginally 
smaller than it was a decade before.  Wages have been 
relatively stagnant over the past six years.  Moreover, the 
labor market has split between career employees with benefits 
and "non-regular" workers, who now account for more than 
one-third of the workforce.  Japanese today talk of "winners" 
and "losers" in the economy, a politically potent shift in a 
society that has prided itself on economic equality. 
 
Fiscal and Demographic Challenges 
--------------------------------- 
3. (SBU) Long-term structural pressures have added to a sense 
of malaise.  Japan unsuccessfully tried to spend its way back 
to growth after its economic bubble burst in the early 1990s, 
and it is still coping with the aftermath.  Government debt 
was around 180 percent of GDP in 2007 -- the highest among 
OECD countries -- and although Japan cut its deficit to 
around 4 percent, it will need to tighten its belt further if 
it is to meet the government's goal of balancing the budget 
(excluding interest payments) by 2011. 
 
4. (SBU) Exacerbating its fiscal challenges, Japan's 
population began shrinking in 2005.  The government recently 
predicted the labor force could be one-third smaller by 2050 
and that more than 30 percent of Japanese will be older than 
65 by 2035.  The resulting squeeze means Japan's pension and 
medical benefits system is unsustainable in the long-run, 
absent significant changes.  Extending the retirement age, 
raising premiums, cutting benefits, and bringing more women 
into the workforce could mitigate the severity of oncoming 
problems, but (in lieu of an unprecedented shift in 
immigration policy) Japan will need to increase its 
productivity to maintain its economic standing. 
 
Labor and Productivity 
---------------------- 
5. (SBU) The "good news" is there is plenty of room for 
improvement, particularly in Japan's labor markets.  The OECD 
recently reported labor productivity in Japan is 30% below 
the U.S. level.  Foreign-invested firms have shown how much 
can be done in the current environment, as they are more 
productive than average domestic companies in both the 
manufacturing and service sectors.  Regulatory reform, 
greater openness to trade and investment, and greater labor 
mobility would all raise average productivity and bring 
greater prosperity. 
 
6. (SBU) Parts of the Japanese government and bureaucracy 
understand what needs to be done.  Former Prime Minister 
 
TOKYO 00001230  002 OF 003 
 
 
Junichiro Koizumi initiated a number of broad financial and 
economic reforms after 2001, and members of the cabinet-level 
organization he used to drive his reforms forward, the 
Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy (CEFP), had grand 
ambitions about labor market reforms to start in 2007.  Last 
summer's Upper House election, however, interfered with those 
plans. 
 
Reform Fatigue and the Divided Diet 
----------------------------------- 
7. (SBU) Economic reform lost steam under former Prime 
Minister Shinzo Abe, who focused more on his diplomatic and 
security agenda than on pocketbook issues and was criticized 
for never fully enunciating an economic agenda.  When it was 
exposed in 2007 that the pension system had lost or garbled 
50 million records, endangering people's retirement savings, 
the government's handling of the situation -- layered over 
cabinet gaffes and an intensifying national conversation 
about growing income and regional disparities -- led to a 
defeat for the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in 
July's election.  The opposition took extended control of the 
Upper House for the first time since 1955.  Abe resigned in 
September 2007. 
 
8. (SBU) Prime Minister Fukuda, also of the LDP, inherited a 
divided Diet.  The LDP maintains a two-thirds supermajority 
in the Lower House with which it can pass legislation over 
the objections of the opposition Democratic Party of Japan 
(DPJ), but Japanese fondness for consensus decision-making 
weighs against its frequent use.  The current session of the 
Diet has thus been consumed by debate over 30-year-old 
"provisional" taxes that fund road construction and a fight 
over appointing a new Governor of the Bank of Japan -- a 
fight that culminated in the post falling vacant for the 
first time in the postwar era (a compromise candidate was 
found after several weeks).  The DPJ continues to prolong 
fights on contentious issues, hoping to force a Lower House 
election and topple the LDP-led coalition government.  Debate 
on necessary economic and structural reform has languished, 
and the CEFP's relevancy as a driver of reform is 
increasingly in question.  Prime Minister Fukuda's cabinet 
support rates have plummeted. 
 
9. (SBU) Significantly, two different interpretations of the 
LDP's electoral loss -- and preferred policy future -- have 
emerged among Japanese politicians.  One is the LDP lost 
because Japanese people tired of former PM Koizumi's economic 
reform agenda.  The other is the reforms did not go far 
enough, and people voted against what they saw as the 
resurgence of the "old LDP" of entrenched interests.  Through 
the Labor Ministerial, we have an opportunity to support the 
reform interpretation and explain how reform, rather than a 
return to a nostalgic past, is the way for Japan to reach 
greater prosperity in a globalized economy. 
 
Your Message 
------------ 
10. (SBU) Minister of Health, Labor, and Welfare (MHLW) 
Yoichi Masuzoe's portfolio includes recent hotbutton issues 
such as the pension and medical systems.  Nonetheless, his 
popular support in the polls remains strong.  In your 
conversations with Minister Masuzoe, other Japanese 
government and political officials, and the media, we suggest 
the following points: 
 
-- To address successfully its fiscal and demographic 
challenges, Japan needs to raise productivity over the long 
 
TOKYO 00001230  003 OF 003 
 
 
term.  Labor market reform would contribute significantly to 
those efforts. 
 
-- Expanding the workforce, increasing labor mobility, and 
enhancing competition would all lead to higher growth and 
greater prosperity.  Supporting women's ability to work and 
simultaneously raise a family would boost productivity by 
bringing skilled but underutilized workers into the economy. 
 
-- So would greater openness to foreign investment. 
Foreign-invested firms, both in the manufacturing and service 
sectors, have higher average productivity than their purely 
Japanese counterparts, and they bring needed jobs and 
know-how to Japan. 
 
-- America's experience shows a flexible and responsive labor 
market can provide continuous opportunities for workers to 
build their skills and grow throughout their careers.  The 
key is a policy structure that facilitates transitions to the 
most productive areas of the economy and encourages skill 
formation. 
 
-- An example is defined contribution pension plans, which 
have proven very popular with American workers.  Making 
saving via Japan's defined contribution pension system more 
attractive would benefit firms, workers, and the economy as a 
whole. 
 
-- Japan has benefited greatly from globalization over the 
past 30 years, but some Japanese economic structures have not 
kept pace with today's global marketplace.  Reforming those 
structures would broaden the reach of globlization's benefits. 
 
 
DONOVAN