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Viewing cable 08SEOUL1104, KOREAN NATIONALISM ACROSS THE GENERATIONS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08SEOUL1104 2008-05-30 06:15 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Seoul
VZCZCXYZ0006
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUL #1104/01 1510615
ZNR UUUUU ZZH (CCY AD9AA3EF MSI8025-695)
P 300615Z MAY 08
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0223
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 4357
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 8680
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 4493
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA SCJS SEOUL KOR PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//OSD/ISA/EAP// PRIORITY
RUEHIN/AIT TAIPEI PRIORITY 2712
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA CC SEOUL KOR PRIORITY
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J5 SEOUL KOR PRIORITY
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J3 SEOUL KOR PRIORITY
RUACAAA/COMUSKOREA INTEL SEOUL KOR PRIORITY
UNCLAS SEOUL 001104 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
C O R R E C T E D COPY CAPTION 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KS PGOV PREL PINR
SUBJECT: KOREAN NATIONALISM ACROSS THE GENERATIONS 
 
1. (SBU) Summary.  Prominent Korean researchers focused on 
Korean nationalism studies believe recent beef protests are 
motivated by what young Koreans see as a deviation from a 
basic expectation of equity among nations.  A distinct divide 
separates the youth and adult protesters.  The student-youth, 
born around 1990, are motivated by an inward-looking concern 
for their own health and frustration over the apparent lack 
of fairness of President Lee Myung-bak,s agreement on beef, 
seen as full of concessions to the U.S.  Older Koreans lack 
the student's expectation of fairness, and primarily object 
to President Lee's deal for U.S. beef as yet another symbol 
of Korean exploitation and victimization.  As the students 
mature, this cognitive divergence may shape the efficacy of 
public diplomacy and eventually challenge basic Korean 
motivations for sustaining the US-Korean alliance. End 
summary. 
 
2. (SBU) Interviews with two prominent ROK professors 
specializing in research on nationalism within developing 
nations, Dr. Kang Won-taek of Soongsil University and Dr. Lim 
Jie-hyun of Hamyang University of Seoul, suggest South Korean 
nationalism is more complex than conventional wisdom 
reflects.  According to Dr. Kang's research, modern Korean 
youth, lacking specific memories of victimization, do not 
share a sense of oppression.  South Korean adult nationalism 
tends to reflect the victimization ideology common to many 
lesser-developed nations with a colonial heritage. 
 
----------------------------- 
Origins of Korean Nationalism 
----------------------------- 
 
2. (SBU) The roots of modern nationalist thought emerged 
during the Japanese occupation (1910-1945).  Unlike many 
colonial relationships, Japan built considerable industrial 
capability in Korea while attempting to eliminate traditional 
Korean culture.  By 1945 Korea accounted for approximately a 
quarter of the Japanese industrial base.  This history of a 
foreign power simultaneously delivering oppression and 
opportunity resulted in mixed feelings toward foreign powers 
that still colors the  South Korean perceptions of the US. 
 
3. (SBU) Dr. Kang observed that anti-U.S. protests over the 
accidental deaths of two girls in 2002, hit by a U.S. 
military vehicle, reflected this oppression-opportunity 
conflict.  The political manipulation of the event was 
steeped in colonial terms.  This seemed to resonate well with 
adults and in the traditional media.  Editorials of the day 
noted, however, that students would rail against the apparent 
U.S. disregard for Korean life and then meet at McDonald's 
and share American pop music. 
 
--------------------- 
Hope is for the Young 
--------------------- 
 
4. (SBU) Both professors agreed that South Korean students 
today have almost no personal relationship to Japanese 
oppression, the Korean War, or even the Cold War.  Dr. Lim 
said students today often participate in US-related protests 
due to deliberate societal attempts to link nationalism and 
victimization.  However, Dr. Kang said the notion that 
textbooks and curriculum, although designed to do so, fail to 
instill a sense of oppression into Korean youth.  The 
students are now less likely than previous generations to 
incorporate victimization into their self-identity.  He feels 
that nationalism defined by the old dual 
oppression-opportunity dynamic simply lost the sting of 
oppression.  Today's ROK youth see the West as 
opportunity--albeit one to be met on their terms.  Their 
presence in street protests against U.S. beef signals anger 
with the process of reaching the beef importation agreement 
-- seen as a gift to President Bush on the eve of the March 
Summit -- rather than a systemic rejection of the U.S.-ROK 
relationship. 
 
5. (SBU) The idea that America would intentionally dump 
harmful or infected products in South Korea appears in the 
conventional media such as TV and print but, Dr. Kang notes, 
does little to motivate the youth.  Instead, rapidly 
replicated text messages spur students' participation.  These 
messages lack the idea of victimization central to previous 
 
generations' sense of oppression, and instead offer the hope 
of empowerment.  Unlike their parents, they are motivated by 
what they perceive as a deviation from a basic expectation of 
equity among nations.  Drs. Kang and Lim both note that 
students now are more likely to protest South Korean 
President Lee Myung-bak's apparent exchange of Korean food 
safety for political expediency.  Their parents, however, 
protest President Lee allowing Americans to once again take 
advantage of South Korean weakness. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
6. (SBU) The gradual loss of victimization identity within 
South Korea bodes well for US-Korean relations, but these 
professors' comments suggest that the U.S. should foster the 
sense of equity in its dealings with South Korea.  The next 
generation entering positions of authority will likely be 
less conflicted by a dual desire for protection and 
liberation, but they appear attuned to South Korea being 
treated like the advanced industrial country that it has 
become.  An emphasis on the U.S.-Korea Alliance as a global 
partnership is in accord with those concerns. 
VERSHBOW