Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 97115 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
ETRD EAGR ETTC EAID ECON EFIN ECIN EINV ELAB EAIR ENRG EPET EWWT ECPS EIND EMIN ELTN EC ETMIN EUC EZ ET ELECTIONS ENVR EU EUN EG EINT ER ECONOMICS ES EMS ENIV EEB EN ECE ECOSOC EK ENVIRONMENT EFIS EI EWT ENGRD ECPSN EXIM EIAD ERIN ECPC EDEV ENGY ECTRD EPA ESTH ECCT EINVECON ENGR ERTD EUR EAP EWWC ELTD EL EXIMOPIC EXTERNAL ETRDEC ESCAP ECO EGAD ELNT ECONOMIC ENV ETRN EIAR EUMEM ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID EREL ECOM ECONETRDEAGRJA ETCC ETRG ECONOMY EMED ETR ENERG EITC EFINOECD EURM EENG ERA EXPORT ENRD ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EGEN EBRD EVIN ETRAD ECOWAS EFTA ECONETRDBESPAR EGOVSY EPIN EID ECONENRG EDRC ESENV ETT EB ENER ELTNSNAR ECHEVARRIA ETRC EPIT EDUC ESA EFI ENRGY ESCI EE EAIDXMXAXBXFFR EETC ECIP EIAID EIVN EBEXP ESTN EING EGOV ETRA EPETEIND ELAN ETRDGK EAIDRW ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ENVI ELN EAG EPCS EPRT EPTED ETRB EUM EAIDS EFIC EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM EAIDAR ESF EIDN ELAM EDU EV EAIDAF ECN EDA EXBS EINTECPS ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EPREL EAC EINVEFIN ETA EAGER EINDIR ECA ECLAC ELAP EITI EUCOM ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID EARG ELDIN EINVKSCA ENNP EFINECONCS EFINTS ECCP ETC EAIRASECCASCID EINN ETRP EAIDNI EFQ ECOQKPKO EGPHUM EBUD ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ENERGY ELB EINDETRD EMI ECONEFIN EIB EURN ETRDEINVTINTCS EIN EFIM ETIO ELAINE EMN EATO EWTR EIPR EINVETC ETTD ETDR EIQ ECONCS EPPD ENRGIZ EISL ESPINOSA ELEC EAIG ESLCO EUREM ENTG ERD EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH ECINECONCS ETRO ETRDECONWTOCS ECUN EFND EPECO EAIRECONRP ERGR ETRDPGOV ECPN ENRGMO EPWR EET EAIS EAGRE EDUARDO EAGRRP EAIDPHUMPRELUG EICN ECONQH EVN EGHG ELBR EINF EAIDHO EENV ETEX ERNG ED
KMDR KPAO KPKO KJUS KCRM KGHG KFRD KWMN KDEM KTFN KHIV KGIC KIDE KSCA KNNP KHUM KIPR KSUM KISL KIRF KCOR KRCM KPAL KWBG KN KS KOMC KSEP KFLU KPWR KTIA KSEO KMPI KHLS KICC KSTH KMCA KVPR KPRM KE KU KZ KFLO KSAF KTIP KTEX KBCT KOCI KOLY KOR KAWC KACT KUNR KTDB KSTC KLIG KSKN KNN KCFE KCIP KGHA KHDP KPOW KUNC KDRL KV KPREL KCRS KPOL KRVC KRIM KGIT KWIR KT KIRC KOMO KRFD KUWAIT KG KFIN KSCI KTFIN KFTN KGOV KPRV KSAC KGIV KCRIM KPIR KSOC KBIO KW KGLB KMWN KPO KFSC KSEAO KSTCPL KSI KPRP KREC KFPC KUNH KCSA KMRS KNDP KR KICCPUR KPPAO KCSY KTBT KCIS KNEP KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNNB KGCC KINR KPOP KMFO KENV KNAR KVIR KDRG KDMR KFCE KNAO KDEN KGCN KICA KIMMITT KMCC KLFU KMSG KSEC KUM KCUL KMNP KSMT KCOM KOMCSG KSPR KPMI KRAD KIND KCRP KAUST KWAWC KTER KCHG KRDP KPAS KITA KTSC KPAOPREL KWGB KIRP KJUST KMIG KLAB KTFR KSEI KSTT KAPO KSTS KLSO KWNN KPOA KHSA KNPP KPAONZ KBTS KWWW KY KJRE KPAOKMDRKE KCRCM KSCS KWMNCI KESO KWUN KPLS KIIP KEDEM KPAOY KRIF KGICKS KREF KTRD KFRDSOCIRO KTAO KJU KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KEN KO KNEI KEMR KKIV KEAI KWAC KRCIM KWCI KFIU KWIC KCORR KOMS KNNO KPAI KBWG KTTB KTBD KTIALG KILS KFEM KTDM KESS KNUC KPA KOMCCO KCEM KRCS KWBGSY KNPPIS KNNPMNUC KWN KERG KLTN KALM KCCP KSUMPHUM KREL KGH KLIP KTLA KAWK KWMM KVRP KVRC KAID KSLG KDEMK KX KIF KNPR KCFC KFTFN KTFM KPDD KCERS KMOC KDEMAF KMEPI KEMS KDRM KEPREL KBTR KEDU KNP KIRL KNNR KMPT KISLPINR KTPN KA KJUSTH KPIN KDEV KTDD KAKA KFRP KWNM KTSD KINL KJUSKUNR KWWMN KECF KWBC KPRO KVBL KOM KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KEDM KFLD KLPM KRGY KNNF KICR KIFR KM KWMNCS KAWS KLAP KPAK KDDG KCGC KID KNSD KMPF KPFO KDP KCMR KRMS KNPT KNNNP KTIAPARM KDTB KNUP KPGOV KNAP KNNC KUK KSRE KREISLER KIVP KQ KTIAEUN KPALAOIS KRM KISLAO KWM KFLOA
PHUM PINR PTER PGOV PREL PREF PL PM PHSA PE PARM PINS PK PUNE PO PALESTINIAN PU PBTS PROP PTBS POL POLI PA PGOVZI POLMIL POLITICAL PARTIES POLM PD POLITICS POLICY PAS PMIL PINT PNAT PV PKO PPOL PERSONS PING PBIO PH PETR PARMS PRES PCON PETERS PRELBR PT PLAB PP PAK PDEM PKPA PSOCI PF PLO PTERM PJUS PSOE PELOSI PROPERTY PGOVPREL PARP PRL PNIR PHUMKPAL PG PREZ PGIC PBOV PAO PKK PROV PHSAK PHUMPREL PROTECTION PGOVBL PSI PRELPK PGOVENRG PUM PRELKPKO PATTY PSOC PRIVATIZATION PRELSP PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PMIG PREC PAIGH PROG PSHA PARK PETER POG PHUS PPREL PS PTERPREL PRELPGOV POV PKPO PGOVECON POUS PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PWBG PMAR PREM PAR PNR PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PARMIR PGOVGM PHUH PARTM PN PRE PTE PY POLUN PPEL PDOV PGOVSOCI PIRF PGOVPM PBST PRELEVU PGOR PBTSRU PRM PRELKPAOIZ PGVO PERL PGOC PAGR PMIN PHUMR PVIP PPD PGV PRAM PINL PKPAL PTERE PGOF PINO PHAS PODC PRHUM PHUMA PREO PPA PEPFAR PGO PRGOV PAC PRESL PORG PKFK PEPR PRELP PREFA PNG PGOVPHUMKPAO PRELECON PINOCHET PFOR PGOVLO PHUMBA PRELC PREK PHUME PHJM POLINT PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PGOVE PHALANAGE PARTY PECON PEACE PROCESS PLN PRELSW PAHO PEDRO PRELA PASS PPAO PGPV PNUM PCUL PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGIV PRFE POGOV PEL PBT PAMQ PINF PSEPC POSTS PHUMPGOV PVOV PHSAPREL PROLIFERATION PENA PRELTBIOBA PIN PRELL PGOVPTER PHAM PHYTRP PTEL PTERPGOV PHARM PROTESTS PRELAF PKBL PRELKPAO PKNP PARMP PHUML PFOV PERM PUOS PRELGOV PHUMPTER PARAGRAPH PERURENA PBTSEWWT PCI PETROL PINSO PINSCE PQL PEREZ PBS

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 08NEWDELHI1321, MENON INDICATES FLEXIBILITY IN END-USE ISSUES FOR VVIP AIRCRAFT

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #08NEWDELHI1321.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08NEWDELHI1321 2008-05-14 10:30 2011-03-24 01:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy New Delhi
Appears in these articles:
http://www.thehindu.com/news/the-india-cables/article1565429.ece
http://www.thehindu.com/news/the-india-cables/article1565551.ece
http://www.thehindu.com/news/the-india-cables/article1565557.ece
VZCZCXRO3921
OO RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHLH RUEHPW
DE RUEHNE #1321/01 1351030
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 141030Z MAY 08
FM AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1722
INFO RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUCNNSG/NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS GROUP COLLECTIVE
RHHJJPI/PACOM IDHS HONOLULU HI
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 1471
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 6397
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NEW DELHI 001321 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/14/2018 
TAGS: PREL PARM TSPL KNNP ETTC ENRG TRGY IN
SUBJECT: MENON INDICATES FLEXIBILITY IN END-USE ISSUES FOR VVIP AIRCRAFT 
 
 Classified By: Ambassador David Mulford for Reasons 1.4 (B and D) 

1. (C) Summary: Foreign Secretary Shivshankar Menon told the Ambassador May 14 that, after reading and having his people analyze note 1 in Amendment 1 of the Letter of Offer and Acceptance (LOA) for the Boeing VVIP Aircraft Self-Protection Suite (SPS), provided to Menon by the Ambassador the previous day, he saw no ""insurmountable difficulties"" in reaching an agreement on Enhanced End-Use Monitoring (EEUM) for the Large Aircraft Infrared Counter-Measures (LAIRCM).  The many references in the Amendment to ""U.S. Air Force standards"" posed a sensitive problem, Menon pointed out, given that the Indian Air Force should uphold its own standards, which he maintained are essentially very similar.  The presentation of the EEUM inspections and inventories, while doable, would require careful presentation, given the political sensitivity of the aircraft, Menon pointed out.  He agreed with the Ambassador that if sensitive and patient representatives from each side could define the objectives and problems in terms of their own military services, he felt sure a negotiation would succeed.  Menon said his people were already developing a counter-draft which would preserve the common objectives but put procedures and requirements into formats recognized by India's own services.  He recognized the importance of resolving the issue quickly, and related that the Joint Secretary (G/Air) Bimal Julka will provide the counter-draft May 14 in Washington, and was empowered to negotiate on behalf of the Indian government.  Menon assured the Ambassador that the Indian government shares our interest in protecting sensitive technology, both regarding the LAIRCM and technology that India will be seeking in future military deals.  End Summary. 

EEUM Resolution Requires Negotiation 
- - - 

2. (C) In a May 14 meeting with Foreign Secretary Shivshankar Menon, the Ambassador urged him to begin ""sensible negotiations"" to resolve the enhanced end-use monitoring (EEUM) arrangements required for the Large Aircraft Infrared Counter-Measures (LAIRCM) on the Boeing VVIP Aircraft Self-Protection Suite (SPS).  The Ambassador explained that the U.S. Congress required the Amendment which sets out the EEUM arrangements, but only an in-depth discussion between the U.S. and India could identify the real ""sticking points,"" which could involve minute details as specific as fence height and entry points.  Resolving the EEUM issue now would also clear the way for future trade in top-of-the-line technology which India wants in other areas, the Ambassador pointed out, and he urged Menon to resolve the issue quickly, since the agreement would be required before the testing of the aircraft which is due for delivery in mid-June.  The Ambassador advised Menon to begin negotiations with representatives who have the authority to negotiate on behalf of the Indian government. 

No Insurmountable Difficulties in EEUM 
- - - 

3. (C) Menon thanked the Ambassador for earlier providing Note 1 of Amendment 1 of the Letter of Offer and Acceptance (LOA) for the aircraft.  After reading the document, he concluded that there are ""no insurmountable difficulties in reaching an understanding that would meet your requirements and ours.""  Menon said that the Indian government has prepared a counter-draft, which the Ministry of Defense Joint Secretary (G/Air) will deliver May 14 in Washington.  He assured the Ambassador that the Joint Secretary had the authority to negotiate, although he also cautioned that the counter-draft still required political level endorsement. 

4. (C) While he acknowledged that standard end-use monitoring had proven viable, EEUM for the LAIRCM had several problems, which he aimed to resolve in the counter-draft.  The Amendment frequently refers to U.S. Air Force (USAF) standards, which gave the appearance as if the Indian Air Force (IAF) now must enforce U.S. requirements, but Menon thought that different wording would resolve the issue. Menon also pointed out that, because the aircraft attracts high-level political attention, the presentation of the inspections regime needed rewrQing.  But Menon found the amendment ""reassuring,"" because the details that it laid out NEW DELHI 00001321  002 OF 002 
 mirror those that the Indian government also wishes to enforce. 

Details to Come 
- - - 

5. (C) Office of Defense Cooperation Acting Chief LTC Brian Hedrick clarified that the authors of the amendment relied on USAF standards because he or she did not know the Indian standards.  However, if the IAF could demonstrate equivalent or better standards, the U.S. might accept those, Hedrick continued.  He noted that the U.S. and India could work out the details during the negotiations of a security plan, during which the teams work out the EEUM arrangements at the actual storage site.  Menon welcomed such a meeting, and said that ""they would be happy to do that."" 

India Shares U.S. Interest in Protecting LAIRCM 
- - - 

6. (C) Menon underlined that India shares the U.S. interest in protecting the LAIRCM technology.  ""We have a huge interest to make sure it is well protected -- not just by us but by others -- and we have no problem with high standards,"" he stressed.  The Ambassador noted that the future of the high-technology defense relationship depended on resolving the EEUM issue, although he regretted that the VVIP aircraft presented the groundbreaking case.  Menon recognized that India and the U.S. had to work out the issue at some point, and learn to deal with the EEUM matter. 

Comment: Menon's Flexibility Could Signal Quick Resolution 
- - - 

7. (C) In sharp contrast with Menon's hard-line demeanor when he first asked the Ambassador to withdraw the EEUM amendment, Menon displayed flexibility and ease when engaging in a discussion on EEUM during the meeting.  At no point in the conversation did Menon reject inspections, and he appeared resigned to on-site verification, as shown by his acceptance of a site visit by negotiators.  The problems that the Foreign Secretary saw in the US' proposed amendment dealt primarily with the cosmetic presentation it seemed, which he believes gives the impression of associating the VVIP aircraft, and by extension the Indian Government, too closely with the U.S.  Mr. Menon during the meeting seemed comfortable with the basic standard presented and the necessity of negotiating a strict protection regime that controls the sensitive LAIRCM technology.  We do not know whether his commitment to resolve the issue quickly will be reflected in the May 14 discussions, but we believe the differences in our two positions have narrowed. 

8. (C) The Ambassador is well aware of the sometimes optimistic language of exchange with Indian officials turning out that be difficult to convert into concrete agreement. However, in this case our effort to, on the one hand, insist on our standard being met, while on the other hand seeking common ground on which to proceed seems to be producing results.  If we can keep to this line of seeking mutual understanding of problems both sides recognize as important, we should be able to get through this sensitive problem area. 

MULFORD