Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 97115 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
ETRD EAGR ETTC EAID ECON EFIN ECIN EINV ELAB EAIR ENRG EPET EWWT ECPS EIND EMIN ELTN EC ETMIN EUC EZ ET ELECTIONS ENVR EU EUN EG EINT ER ECONOMICS ES EMS ENIV EEB EN ECE ECOSOC EK ENVIRONMENT EFIS EI EWT ENGRD ECPSN EXIM EIAD ERIN ECPC EDEV ENGY ECTRD EPA ESTH ECCT EINVECON ENGR ERTD EUR EAP EWWC ELTD EL EXIMOPIC EXTERNAL ETRDEC ESCAP ECO EGAD ELNT ECONOMIC ENV ETRN EIAR EUMEM ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID EREL ECOM ECONETRDEAGRJA ETCC ETRG ECONOMY EMED ETR ENERG EITC EFINOECD EURM EENG ERA EXPORT ENRD ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EGEN EBRD EVIN ETRAD ECOWAS EFTA ECONETRDBESPAR EGOVSY EPIN EID ECONENRG EDRC ESENV ETT EB ENER ELTNSNAR ECHEVARRIA ETRC EPIT EDUC ESA EFI ENRGY ESCI EE EAIDXMXAXBXFFR EETC ECIP EIAID EIVN EBEXP ESTN EING EGOV ETRA EPETEIND ELAN ETRDGK EAIDRW ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ENVI ELN EAG EPCS EPRT EPTED ETRB EUM EAIDS EFIC EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM EAIDAR ESF EIDN ELAM EDU EV EAIDAF ECN EDA EXBS EINTECPS ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EPREL EAC EINVEFIN ETA EAGER EINDIR ECA ECLAC ELAP EITI EUCOM ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID EARG ELDIN EINVKSCA ENNP EFINECONCS EFINTS ECCP ETC EAIRASECCASCID EINN ETRP EAIDNI EFQ ECOQKPKO EGPHUM EBUD ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ENERGY ELB EINDETRD EMI ECONEFIN EIB EURN ETRDEINVTINTCS EIN EFIM ETIO ELAINE EMN EATO EWTR EIPR EINVETC ETTD ETDR EIQ ECONCS EPPD ENRGIZ EISL ESPINOSA ELEC EAIG ESLCO EUREM ENTG ERD EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH ECINECONCS ETRO ETRDECONWTOCS ECUN EFND EPECO EAIRECONRP ERGR ETRDPGOV ECPN ENRGMO EPWR EET EAIS EAGRE EDUARDO EAGRRP EAIDPHUMPRELUG EICN ECONQH EVN EGHG ELBR EINF EAIDHO EENV ETEX ERNG ED
KMDR KPAO KPKO KJUS KCRM KGHG KFRD KWMN KDEM KTFN KHIV KGIC KIDE KSCA KNNP KHUM KIPR KSUM KISL KIRF KCOR KRCM KPAL KWBG KN KS KOMC KSEP KFLU KPWR KTIA KSEO KMPI KHLS KICC KSTH KMCA KVPR KPRM KE KU KZ KFLO KSAF KTIP KTEX KBCT KOCI KOLY KOR KAWC KACT KUNR KTDB KSTC KLIG KSKN KNN KCFE KCIP KGHA KHDP KPOW KUNC KDRL KV KPREL KCRS KPOL KRVC KRIM KGIT KWIR KT KIRC KOMO KRFD KUWAIT KG KFIN KSCI KTFIN KFTN KGOV KPRV KSAC KGIV KCRIM KPIR KSOC KBIO KW KGLB KMWN KPO KFSC KSEAO KSTCPL KSI KPRP KREC KFPC KUNH KCSA KMRS KNDP KR KICCPUR KPPAO KCSY KTBT KCIS KNEP KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNNB KGCC KINR KPOP KMFO KENV KNAR KVIR KDRG KDMR KFCE KNAO KDEN KGCN KICA KIMMITT KMCC KLFU KMSG KSEC KUM KCUL KMNP KSMT KCOM KOMCSG KSPR KPMI KRAD KIND KCRP KAUST KWAWC KTER KCHG KRDP KPAS KITA KTSC KPAOPREL KWGB KIRP KJUST KMIG KLAB KTFR KSEI KSTT KAPO KSTS KLSO KWNN KPOA KHSA KNPP KPAONZ KBTS KWWW KY KJRE KPAOKMDRKE KCRCM KSCS KWMNCI KESO KWUN KPLS KIIP KEDEM KPAOY KRIF KGICKS KREF KTRD KFRDSOCIRO KTAO KJU KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KEN KO KNEI KEMR KKIV KEAI KWAC KRCIM KWCI KFIU KWIC KCORR KOMS KNNO KPAI KBWG KTTB KTBD KTIALG KILS KFEM KTDM KESS KNUC KPA KOMCCO KCEM KRCS KWBGSY KNPPIS KNNPMNUC KWN KERG KLTN KALM KCCP KSUMPHUM KREL KGH KLIP KTLA KAWK KWMM KVRP KVRC KAID KSLG KDEMK KX KIF KNPR KCFC KFTFN KTFM KPDD KCERS KMOC KDEMAF KMEPI KEMS KDRM KEPREL KBTR KEDU KNP KIRL KNNR KMPT KISLPINR KTPN KA KJUSTH KPIN KDEV KTDD KAKA KFRP KWNM KTSD KINL KJUSKUNR KWWMN KECF KWBC KPRO KVBL KOM KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KEDM KFLD KLPM KRGY KNNF KICR KIFR KM KWMNCS KAWS KLAP KPAK KDDG KCGC KID KNSD KMPF KPFO KDP KCMR KRMS KNPT KNNNP KTIAPARM KDTB KNUP KPGOV KNAP KNNC KUK KSRE KREISLER KIVP KQ KTIAEUN KPALAOIS KRM KISLAO KWM KFLOA
PHUM PINR PTER PGOV PREL PREF PL PM PHSA PE PARM PINS PK PUNE PO PALESTINIAN PU PBTS PROP PTBS POL POLI PA PGOVZI POLMIL POLITICAL PARTIES POLM PD POLITICS POLICY PAS PMIL PINT PNAT PV PKO PPOL PERSONS PING PBIO PH PETR PARMS PRES PCON PETERS PRELBR PT PLAB PP PAK PDEM PKPA PSOCI PF PLO PTERM PJUS PSOE PELOSI PROPERTY PGOVPREL PARP PRL PNIR PHUMKPAL PG PREZ PGIC PBOV PAO PKK PROV PHSAK PHUMPREL PROTECTION PGOVBL PSI PRELPK PGOVENRG PUM PRELKPKO PATTY PSOC PRIVATIZATION PRELSP PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PMIG PREC PAIGH PROG PSHA PARK PETER POG PHUS PPREL PS PTERPREL PRELPGOV POV PKPO PGOVECON POUS PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PWBG PMAR PREM PAR PNR PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PARMIR PGOVGM PHUH PARTM PN PRE PTE PY POLUN PPEL PDOV PGOVSOCI PIRF PGOVPM PBST PRELEVU PGOR PBTSRU PRM PRELKPAOIZ PGVO PERL PGOC PAGR PMIN PHUMR PVIP PPD PGV PRAM PINL PKPAL PTERE PGOF PINO PHAS PODC PRHUM PHUMA PREO PPA PEPFAR PGO PRGOV PAC PRESL PORG PKFK PEPR PRELP PREFA PNG PGOVPHUMKPAO PRELECON PINOCHET PFOR PGOVLO PHUMBA PRELC PREK PHUME PHJM POLINT PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PGOVE PHALANAGE PARTY PECON PEACE PROCESS PLN PRELSW PAHO PEDRO PRELA PASS PPAO PGPV PNUM PCUL PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGIV PRFE POGOV PEL PBT PAMQ PINF PSEPC POSTS PHUMPGOV PVOV PHSAPREL PROLIFERATION PENA PRELTBIOBA PIN PRELL PGOVPTER PHAM PHYTRP PTEL PTERPGOV PHARM PROTESTS PRELAF PKBL PRELKPAO PKNP PARMP PHUML PFOV PERM PUOS PRELGOV PHUMPTER PARAGRAPH PERURENA PBTSEWWT PCI PETROL PINSO PINSCE PQL PEREZ PBS

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 08MANAMA313, ACRIMONY IN PARLIAMENT FEEDS SECTARIAN ILL-WILL (C-NE8-00961)

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #08MANAMA313.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08MANAMA313 2008-05-19 15:11 2011-02-18 21:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Manama
VZCZCXRO7732
PP RUEHDE RUEHDIR
DE RUEHMK #0313/01 1401511
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 191511Z MAY 08
FM AMEMBASSY MANAMA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7860
INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHBVAKS/COMUSNAVCENT  PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MANAMA 000313
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/19/2018
TAGS: PGOV KDEM KISL BA
SUBJECT: ACRIMONY IN PARLIAMENT FEEDS SECTARIAN ILL-WILL (C-NE8-00961)
REF: A. 06 MANAMA 1728 B. MANAMA 76 C. MANAMA 236

Classified By: CDA Christopher Henzel for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

1.(C) Summary: After an improvement this Spring in intercomunnal atmospherics, Bahrain's elected lower house of parliament closed down for the summer on a nasty sectarian note May 13 with the unraveling of a compromise over the questioning of ministers. End summary.

2.(C) Sectarian bad feeling seemed to be subsiding a bit throughout this Spring due to several developments. First, in March King Hamad met secretly in London with the leader of the hard-line Shi'a Haq Movement, which rejects participation in parliament. Most in Bahrain viewed the meeting as a surprisingly conciliatory move on the part of the King. The King reportedly secured Musheima's agreement to dissuade his admirers from the low-level, anti-government street violence that has plagued Bahrain for years. Sheikh Ali Salman, leader of the moderate Shi'a Wifaq party, told Ambassador April 30 that the government had consulted him before the King met with Musheima. Salman said he welcomed the move.

3.(C) Second, when a plainclothes policeman died April 9 during a clash between rock-throwing Shi'a youths and riot police (ref C), both the government and the Shi'a community seemed to take a deep breath, and redoubled efforts to restrain both Shi'a hooligans and the police response. The streets were noticeably quieter as a result. Mansour al-Jamri, the Shi'a editor of the liberal daily Al-Wasat, told CDA May 12 that Sunni-Shi'a tensions had cooled for the moment.

------------------------------------------ Struggle Over the Questioning of Ministers ------------------------------------------

4.(C) Meanwhile, in the Council of Representatives (COR), Bahrain's elected lower house of parliament, there was deadlock for much of this Spring's session because of sectarian debates over the COR's authority to compel ministers to appear before it. Wifaq insisted that Minister of State for Cabinet Affairs Ahmed bin Attiyatallah Al-Khalifa answer a parliamentary committee's questions about his alleged role in the so-called "Bandargate" vote-rigging scandal (ref A) and dodgy government population statistics (ref B). In March Sunni blocs marshaled a majority to back the ruling of the (Sunni) speaker of the house, Khalifa bin Ahmed Al-Dhahrani, that it was unconstitutional to question bin Attiyatallah over the Bandargate affair. The Sunni blocs then retaliated by summoning the (Shi'a) Minister of Municipalities and Agriculture, Mansour Bin Rajab, to answer for alleged corruption. The tit-for-tat demands paralyzed the chamber for six weeks.

------------ A Compromise ------------

5.(C) The stand-off was resolved in mid-April when Wifaq leader Ali Salman reached a quiet compromise with Sunni politicians. As Salman later explained to Ambassador, Wifaq agreed to drop its insistence on questioning bin Attiyatallah over Bandargate if he would agree to answer questions about the population statistics. At the same time, Wifaq would not oppose the Sunni MPs' summoning Bin Rajab. Other Wifaq MPs told poloffs the deal also provided for each Minister to face sympathetic committees, dominated by his own sect, which would report to the full house with recommendations against censuring either minister. The ministers at last appeared before the committees on April 24 and 28.

-------------------------- The Compromise Breaks Down --------------------------

6.(C) This tidy arrangement unraveled on a point of procedure. When parliament met May 13 for its last scheduled session before the summer recess, COR speaker Dhahrani ruled, to Wifaq's surprise, to permit debate on the report exonerating Bin Rajab. Incensed and realizing he would be outvoted, Ali Salman led Wifaq deputies out of the chamber, and the rump COR then voted to censure the Shi'a minister and ratifythe committee report exonerating bin Attiyatallah.

7.(C) Wifaq MPs told emboffs afterward that they had thought MANAMA 00000313 002 OF 002 parliament's rules prevented a vote for censure unless a committee recommended it. In the event, the speaker, operating with fuzzy rules and no precedent to refer to, chose to accept the recommendation of his (Sunni, Egyptian) legal advisor to permit debate and the vote censuring Bin Rajab. It is unclear whether Dhahrani and other Sunnis acted in bad faith, but many Shi'a believe so. After the session concluded, Wifaq MP Khalil Marzooq expressed his frustration, telling media that "they (the Sunni blocs) control the House, and our presence or absence does not matter much."

8.(SBU) Prime Minister Khalifa bin Salman and the Cabinet reacted publicly on May 18, labeling the censure vote an apparent violation of the chamber's rules of procedure. While acknowledging the role of the COR in holding ministers accountable, the Cabinet criticized the vote against Bin Rajab.

---------- What Next? ----------

9.(C) Bin Rajab will survive the vote of censure, but Shi'a see it as a slap in the face to Wifaq. Shi'a voices calling for Wifaq to pull out of parliament will likely be louder now. However, Ali Salman and others in Wifaq have told us repeatedly that they remain committed to participation in the political process and that Wifaq will contest the 2010 elections. Wifaq's 60,000 members will vote during the last week of May to elect a new Shura Council and party leaders. We will be watching closely to see whether the rank and file will retain Ali Salman as Secretary General, or whether recent events may prompt them to make a change. Even if Salman is replaced or steps aside, we do not foresee a radical change of direction, as Salman's likely replacements, like him, say they are committed to staying in parliament. (Note: Several of these are from Persian-speaking families. End note.) Wifaq's moderate leadership will probably keep the party engaged in parliamentary politics, but Sunni politicians allied with the government are short-sighted if they think they've gained anything out of all this.

********************************************* ******** Visit Embassy Manama's Classified Website: XXXXXXXXXXXX********************************************* ********

HENZEL