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Viewing cable 08KHARTOUM817, TDRA IN NEED OF REFORM

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08KHARTOUM817 2008-05-28 11:35 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXRO4841
PP RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #0817/01 1491135
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 281135Z MAY 08
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0935
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0231
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000817 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/SPG, S/CRS, SE WILLIAMSON 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PREF PHUM KPKO SOCI UNSC SU
 
SUBJECT: TDRA IN NEED OF REFORM 
 
 
1. (SBU) SUMMARY. The Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) created the 
Transitional Darfur Regional Authority (TDRA) and the six 
commissions tasked with implementing the various components of the 
agreement.  In general, the commissions are plagued by poor 
administration and weak leadership, and characterized by overlap and 
duplication.  The TDRA's partisan agenda, along with its lack of 
strategic planning capacity, risks undermining the impact of future 
peace agreement implementation. Outside pressure will likely be 
required to effect TDRA reform, recommendation in para 8.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
---------------------- 
Administrative Issues 
---------------------- 
 
2. The Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) created the Transitional Darfur 
Regional Authority (TDRA) and the six commissions tasked with 
implementing the various components of the agreement.  The mandates 
of the commissions are fairly well enumerated in the agreement, and 
the scope of work of each individual commission is surprisingly 
narrow.  This should have made the commissions more effective by 
limiting their work to specific activities.  However what is clear 
on paper is less clear in practice, and a lack of experienced 
leadership and qualified technocrats has led to overlap and 
considerable duplication.  For example, the Darfur Rehabilitation 
and Resettlement Commission (DRRC) is tasked with creating Property 
Claims Committees to deal with property disputes that arise from the 
return process.  However the Darfur Land Commission is charged with 
arbitrating disputes between contending parties over rights to land. 
 In conversations with officials from both commissions, neither 
displayed an understanding of the distinction between property and 
land, and neither expressed concern about possible overlaps. 
 
3. (SBU) In another instance, officials from the Darfur 
Reconstruction and Development Fund (DRDF) told FieldOff that they 
were focused on education, water and sanitation and health.  Not two 
hours later, officials from the DRRC told FieldOff they too were 
focused on education, water and sanitation and health.  When 
FieldOff noted that those were the exact areas covered by the DRDF, 
DRRC officials literally stammered, saying "yes, well we will do 
them in other areas!  Like if DRDF is working in the North, we will 
work in the South!" 
 
4. (SBU) The DPA did not address the composition or internal 
structures of the commissions, leaving such decisions to the TDRA 
and commissioners.  Many of the latter wasted no time creating 
complicated bureaucracies and bloated payrolls.  In general, the 
commissions are divided into between six and nine directorates.  In 
general, between two and three of those directorates are tasked with 
nearly identical scopes of work.  A claim filed with the 
Compensation Commission will be "investigated" or "evaluated" by at 
least three departments, which helps to explain why that body 
already has 180 employees, according to its executive director. 
While each commission complained that they had not received the 
funds promised by the DPA and therefore could not begin their work, 
every official managed to list the array of properties and office 
spaces they had leased and furnished without a hint of irony. (Note: 
One commission, the DRRC, reported that it had received full funding 
with no delays.  Commissioner Ibrahim Madibbo, a Rizeigat, was 
brought back to Sudan by GoS after 18 years in exile in Saudi Arabia 
a*_sman 
for resettlement projects, his strong GoS ties have ensured that 
this commission is well funded and equipped. End Note) 
 
------------------ 
Partisan Agenda 
------------------ 
 
5. (SBU) The DPA gave the TDRA president the authority to appoint 
key personnel, including the heads of the commissions.  Predictably, 
these bodies are led by Minni Minawi's cronies, and in some cases, 
relatives.  The impact of this decision on the efficiency of the 
commissions was noted above.  However the effects reach far beyond 
administrative incompetence.  Almost every TDRA official, from the 
Secretary General on down the chain of command, noted that upon 
receipt of the DPA money, projects and work would begin in those 
areas controlled by the Sudanese Liberation Army Minni Minawi 
(SLA/MM) faction "because those are the most secure areas."  (Note: 
One notable exception to this trend was the administration at the 
DRDF, which has plans for projects throughout Darfur. End note) 
With no Inspector General or other auditing or oversight mechanism, 
it is unclear who will be responsible for ensuring that resources 
are distributed throughout Darfur, rather than concentrated in 
SLA/MM enclaves. 
 
 
KHARTOUM 00000817  002 OF 002 
 
 
----------------------------------- 
Lack of Vision, Strategic Planning 
----------------------------------- 
 
6. (SBU) The TDRA was created as a temporary body; however, none of 
the officials appeared to know the operational timeline of their 
commissions (Note: According to the DPA, a referendum on the status 
of Darfur should be held by July 2011, after which the TDRA will 
either transition into a regional government or be dissolved. End 
note).  The purpose of the commissions was to assist Darfuris with 
the transition from conflict to peace - i.e. to facilitate the 
return of refugees and internally displaced persons, coordinate the 
restoration of security, and promote peace and reconciliation.  A 
large portion of this work legitimately cannot or should not be 
started in the current environment, given the ongoing violence and 
insecurity.  It would be unrealistic, even unwise, to expect the 
DRRC to assist with returns while displacement continues, or to 
expect the Darfur Security Arrangements Implementation Commission to 
begin efforts at disarming, demobilizing and reintegrating fighters 
when the fighting has not ended.  However the commissions have not 
engaged in strategic planning efforts to prepare for the time when 
conditions are appropriate for these projects to begin, or for 
balancing the lofty goals with the short life span of their 
organizations.  There is no planning for dramatic changes in the 
situation in Darfur, positive or negative, including the possibility 
of large scale displacements or returns.  The only exception is the 
DRDF, which has a five-year plan to focus on reconstruction, 
rehabilitation and sustainable development, and has begun to 
implement that plan. 
 
7. (SBU) The commissions are currently biding their time, dabbling 
in small scale projects while awaiting allocated funding from GoS 
(funds which up to now have not been forthcoming, another bone of 
contention for the commissions' members and leadership).  In 
general, these projects consist of addressing problems and conflicts 
that are brought to their attention.  The Darfur Council for Peace 
and Reconciliation has sent tribal mediation teams in response to 
village requests; the Darfur Land Commission has worked on land 
rights issues related to the relocation of the TDRA headquarter to 
El Fasher.  The focus is solidly on mediation of arising and 
existing conflicts, with no thought given to conflict triggers or 
the prevention, rather than management, of conflicts. 
 
--------------------------- 
Comment and Recommendation 
--------------------------- 
 
8. (SBU) While non-implementation of the DPA has legitimately 
hampered the TDRA's effectiveness, the commissions should be using 
this time to focus on what will need to happen when the conditions 
are right for implementation of a ceasefire or peace agreement. 
Both public expectations and needs will be high, and well-researched 
and well-coordinated planning could make the difference between a 
peace agreement that fails to satisfy the people of Darfur (and 
therefore fails to last...) and one that demonstrates the benefits 
of supporting such an agreement to all Darfuris. 
 
8. (SBU) RECOMMENDATION: The issues handled by the TDRA, including 
land rights issues, resource management and compensation, are 
amongst the most important and controversial of the conflict.  There 
is currently no body to ensure that implementation of TDRA programs 
is done objectively or transparently.  It is unlikely that the TDRA 
will drastically alter its present course without pressure from some 
outside body.  Perhaps technical training in public administration, 
organizational and financial management, and possibly even ethics, 
could provide both increased capacity and some level of 
international oversight for the TDRA and its constituent 
commissions.  Although the UNAMID Civil Affairs office has discussed 
providing piecemeal assistance, that office will not have the staff 
to undertake such an effort until 2009 at the earliest.  Therefore 
post recommends that the issue of TDRA reform be raised in an 
appropriate donor forum - possibly on the Friends of UNAMID agenda - 
to raise awareness of the issue, and the need for TDRA bodies to be 
adequately prepared to support, rather than undermine, the peace 
process. 
 
FERNANDEZ