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Viewing cable 08KHARTOUM749, TAWILA INCIDENT AS UNAMID TEST CASE IN PROTECTION OF

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08KHARTOUM749 2008-05-16 11:11 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXRO6085
PP RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #0749/01 1371111
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 161111Z MAY 08
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0834
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0221
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000749 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/SPG, S/CRS, SE WILLIAMSON 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM KPKO SOCI AU SU
 
SUBJECT: TAWILA INCIDENT AS UNAMID TEST CASE IN PROTECTION OF 
CIVILIANS 
 
1. (SBU) SUMMARY. Violence in Tawila, North Darfur on May 12, 
threatens to create a humanitarian crisis if left unchecked and 
unaddressed by the United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur 
(UNAMID).  An interagency UNAMID team plans to travel to the region 
on May 15 to do an assessment and to map out the way forward on 
arguably the most fundamental yet currently the most murky of 
UNAMID's mandated responsibilities - protection of civilians.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
VIOLENCE IN SENSITIVE DARFUR LOCATION 
------------------------------------- 
2. (SBU) At 0800 on May 12 in the central market in Tawila 
(approximately 60km north of El Fasher in North Darfur), a 
Government of Sudan (GoS) paramilitary officer (one Abbas Zacaria) 
was shot in the head and killed by two Central Reserve Police 
members [NOTE: UNAMID J3 reported on May 13 that the perpetrators 
were Sudan Liberation Army/Abdelwahid (SLA/AW) members who were put 
up to the task by SLA/Minni Minawi (SLA/MM) members.  Tawila is home 
to several SLA factions, in addition to Arab militias and other 
assorted bad guys.  Tawila is also rife with tensions between the 
ethnic Zaghawa and Fur tribes.  The UNAMID Humanitarian Liaison 
Officer reported that the GoS officer had been beaten to death, vice 
shot.  END NOTE]. 
 
3. (SBU) Following the killing, at approximately 1100, GoS 
paramilitary officers retaliated by shooting into the air in the 
Tawila market and by entering Tawila IDP camps, where they were 
reported as looting and setting fire to shelters; UNAMID had photos 
taken at 1400 showing burnt structures in the camp.  This action 
caused at least 500 IDPs to flee their homes, seeking refuge in and 
around the UNAMID Tawila Company Headquarters [NOTE: In the past, 
residents of Tawila have traditionally sought refuge right outside 
the AMIS military camp (now the UNAMID Tawila company).  The 
humanitarian community deemed that area unsafe, and AMIS had 
objected to service provisions to these IDPs in order to avoid 
settling IDPs immediately outside the base.  A minimum of services 
were nonetheless provided, but the location is not intended to be a 
long-term camp.  END NOTE].  On May 15 UNAMID Tawila Company 
Commander reported that the number of IDPs at the company location 
had increased "by the thousands."  UNAMID also reported rumors of 
SLA/MM coercion to push additional IDPs into the Tawila company 
location. 
 
TENSIONS REMAIN HIGH 
-------------------- 
4. (SBU) As of May 15, tensions remained high between GoS and SLA 
forces in Tawila.  UNAMID reported that since the GoS considered 
SLA/MM to be behind the attack, it told UNAMID it would pull out of 
Tawila only after taking over SLA/MM positions and offices in the 
area, which it alleged to have done on May 14, forcing SLA/MM to 
retreat to the hills outside Tawila, where that group was said to be 
planning reprisal attacks.  A convoy of at least 80 GoS military 
vehicles was reportedly moving outside Tawila toward Jebel Eisa (an 
SLA/AW stronghold) at 1700 on May 14.  According to SLA/MM reps, the 
Wali of North Darfur and his North Darfur security committee had 
traveled to Malha, North Darfur, on May 13, to convene a meeting 
with the local officials before this convoy arrived.  SLA/MM reps 
predicted targeting of areas in Jebel Eisa, Hara, Hilif, Dardiefa, 
Ein Bissaro and Khattan. 
 
5. (SBU) IDPs from Tawila have refused to return to their camp for 
lack of security.  UNAMID Humanitarian Liaison Officer convened a 
meeting on the morning of May 14 including UNAMID military, police 
and human rights representatives, as well as reps from OCHA ahead of 
a planned mission to Tawila on May 15 [NOTE: This mission had 
originally been scheduled for May 14, but due to the GoS decision to 
ground UN flights from El Fasher, it had to be re-scheduled.  END 
NOTE]. 
 
TAWILA AS TEST CASE 
------------------- 
6. (SBU) The Humanitarian Liaison Officer was concerned by the lack 
of understanding on the part of UNAMID in Tawila on how to deal with 
the IDP situation that was, in his estimation, fast threatening to 
become a humanitarian crisis with regard to protection of civilians 
and assurance of safety and security for IDPs.  "These IDPs don't 
need assistance," he asserted.  "They need protection," and stressed 
that protection of civilians was a fundamental part of UNAMID's 
mandate.  The Liaison Officer, with the help of the UNAMID Military 
Chief of Staff, had drafted a paper on protection of civilians that 
was approved as a guideline for the Mission and that would serve as 
the basis for the May 15 assessment.  He noted that the assessment 
team would include not only military, police, humanitarian and human 
rights components, but Civil Affairs and Political Affairs as well. 
 
KHARTOUM 00000749  002 OF 002 
 
 
 
7. (SBU) The Humanitarian Liaison was firm that UNAMID must address 
this protection situation head-on, as Tawila represented not only 
the original epicenter of the Darfur crisis (Tawila, with its 
strategic location, was the site of some of the deadliest battles in 
the Darfur conflict), but also a "flashpoint," given its proximity 
to El Fasher and its current status as a case study for UNAMID's 
ability to respond to protection concerns. 
 
8. (SBU) The Humanitarian Liaison was concerned that troops on the 
ground did not seem to exhibit the training or will to deal with 
this type of issue, and he was equally worried that the Deputy Force 
Commander himself considered UNAMID assets to be insufficient to 
deal with this type of problem.  Nevertheless, the mission is 
expected to proceed on May 15 as a way of establishing standard 
operating procedures for UNAMID's response capacity and verification 
mechanisms. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
9. (SBU) Despite the tendency to wince at the idea that UNAMID might 
not be up to the fundamental task of protecting civilians at risk, 
there is a slight silver lining.  While thu Deputy DOrce CgmmanderQ 
may"Not `e fogucinc on`th%s p9xes v Isug3$#Th(veu0cf(UnIQyFnl$QQ 
lnl(g(cu~yraQvn`v, g(6YgDy to become the rule 
rather than the exception and will likely include those military 
types who need reminding on occasion of the root of their mission in 
Darfur. This case will be particularly difficult to adjudicate 
because it does not fit the clear pattern of "Khartoum regime 
preying on innocent civilians". Like much of the violence in Darfur 
now, it involves a tangled constellation of rebel groups and 
militias allied or opposed to the government - at least on paper - 
and competing tribal agendas (such as tension between Fur and 
Zaghawa, both "victims" of much earlier Darfur violence) stoked or 
manipulated by the regime.     END COMMENT. 
 
FERNANDEZ