Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 97115 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
ETRD EAGR ETTC EAID ECON EFIN ECIN EINV ELAB EAIR ENRG EPET EWWT ECPS EIND EMIN ELTN EC ETMIN EUC EZ ET ELECTIONS ENVR EU EUN EG EINT ER ECONOMICS ES EMS ENIV EEB EN ECE ECOSOC EK ENVIRONMENT EFIS EI EWT ENGRD ECPSN EXIM EIAD ERIN ECPC EDEV ENGY ECTRD EPA ESTH ECCT EINVECON ENGR ERTD EUR EAP EWWC ELTD EL EXIMOPIC EXTERNAL ETRDEC ESCAP ECO EGAD ELNT ECONOMIC ENV ETRN EIAR EUMEM ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID EREL ECOM ECONETRDEAGRJA ETCC ETRG ECONOMY EMED ETR ENERG EITC EFINOECD EURM EENG ERA EXPORT ENRD ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EGEN EBRD EVIN ETRAD ECOWAS EFTA ECONETRDBESPAR EGOVSY EPIN EID ECONENRG EDRC ESENV ETT EB ENER ELTNSNAR ECHEVARRIA ETRC EPIT EDUC ESA EFI ENRGY ESCI EE EAIDXMXAXBXFFR EETC ECIP EIAID EIVN EBEXP ESTN EING EGOV ETRA EPETEIND ELAN ETRDGK EAIDRW ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ENVI ELN EAG EPCS EPRT EPTED ETRB EUM EAIDS EFIC EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM EAIDAR ESF EIDN ELAM EDU EV EAIDAF ECN EDA EXBS EINTECPS ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EPREL EAC EINVEFIN ETA EAGER EINDIR ECA ECLAC ELAP EITI EUCOM ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID EARG ELDIN EINVKSCA ENNP EFINECONCS EFINTS ECCP ETC EAIRASECCASCID EINN ETRP EAIDNI EFQ ECOQKPKO EGPHUM EBUD ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ENERGY ELB EINDETRD EMI ECONEFIN EIB EURN ETRDEINVTINTCS EIN EFIM ETIO ELAINE EMN EATO EWTR EIPR EINVETC ETTD ETDR EIQ ECONCS EPPD ENRGIZ EISL ESPINOSA ELEC EAIG ESLCO EUREM ENTG ERD EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH ECINECONCS ETRO ETRDECONWTOCS ECUN EFND EPECO EAIRECONRP ERGR ETRDPGOV ECPN ENRGMO EPWR EET EAIS EAGRE EDUARDO EAGRRP EAIDPHUMPRELUG EICN ECONQH EVN EGHG ELBR EINF EAIDHO EENV ETEX ERNG ED
KMDR KPAO KPKO KJUS KCRM KGHG KFRD KWMN KDEM KTFN KHIV KGIC KIDE KSCA KNNP KHUM KIPR KSUM KISL KIRF KCOR KRCM KPAL KWBG KN KS KOMC KSEP KFLU KPWR KTIA KSEO KMPI KHLS KICC KSTH KMCA KVPR KPRM KE KU KZ KFLO KSAF KTIP KTEX KBCT KOCI KOLY KOR KAWC KACT KUNR KTDB KSTC KLIG KSKN KNN KCFE KCIP KGHA KHDP KPOW KUNC KDRL KV KPREL KCRS KPOL KRVC KRIM KGIT KWIR KT KIRC KOMO KRFD KUWAIT KG KFIN KSCI KTFIN KFTN KGOV KPRV KSAC KGIV KCRIM KPIR KSOC KBIO KW KGLB KMWN KPO KFSC KSEAO KSTCPL KSI KPRP KREC KFPC KUNH KCSA KMRS KNDP KR KICCPUR KPPAO KCSY KTBT KCIS KNEP KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNNB KGCC KINR KPOP KMFO KENV KNAR KVIR KDRG KDMR KFCE KNAO KDEN KGCN KICA KIMMITT KMCC KLFU KMSG KSEC KUM KCUL KMNP KSMT KCOM KOMCSG KSPR KPMI KRAD KIND KCRP KAUST KWAWC KTER KCHG KRDP KPAS KITA KTSC KPAOPREL KWGB KIRP KJUST KMIG KLAB KTFR KSEI KSTT KAPO KSTS KLSO KWNN KPOA KHSA KNPP KPAONZ KBTS KWWW KY KJRE KPAOKMDRKE KCRCM KSCS KWMNCI KESO KWUN KPLS KIIP KEDEM KPAOY KRIF KGICKS KREF KTRD KFRDSOCIRO KTAO KJU KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KEN KO KNEI KEMR KKIV KEAI KWAC KRCIM KWCI KFIU KWIC KCORR KOMS KNNO KPAI KBWG KTTB KTBD KTIALG KILS KFEM KTDM KESS KNUC KPA KOMCCO KCEM KRCS KWBGSY KNPPIS KNNPMNUC KWN KERG KLTN KALM KCCP KSUMPHUM KREL KGH KLIP KTLA KAWK KWMM KVRP KVRC KAID KSLG KDEMK KX KIF KNPR KCFC KFTFN KTFM KPDD KCERS KMOC KDEMAF KMEPI KEMS KDRM KEPREL KBTR KEDU KNP KIRL KNNR KMPT KISLPINR KTPN KA KJUSTH KPIN KDEV KTDD KAKA KFRP KWNM KTSD KINL KJUSKUNR KWWMN KECF KWBC KPRO KVBL KOM KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KEDM KFLD KLPM KRGY KNNF KICR KIFR KM KWMNCS KAWS KLAP KPAK KDDG KCGC KID KNSD KMPF KPFO KDP KCMR KRMS KNPT KNNNP KTIAPARM KDTB KNUP KPGOV KNAP KNNC KUK KSRE KREISLER KIVP KQ KTIAEUN KPALAOIS KRM KISLAO KWM KFLOA
PHUM PINR PTER PGOV PREL PREF PL PM PHSA PE PARM PINS PK PUNE PO PALESTINIAN PU PBTS PROP PTBS POL POLI PA PGOVZI POLMIL POLITICAL PARTIES POLM PD POLITICS POLICY PAS PMIL PINT PNAT PV PKO PPOL PERSONS PING PBIO PH PETR PARMS PRES PCON PETERS PRELBR PT PLAB PP PAK PDEM PKPA PSOCI PF PLO PTERM PJUS PSOE PELOSI PROPERTY PGOVPREL PARP PRL PNIR PHUMKPAL PG PREZ PGIC PBOV PAO PKK PROV PHSAK PHUMPREL PROTECTION PGOVBL PSI PRELPK PGOVENRG PUM PRELKPKO PATTY PSOC PRIVATIZATION PRELSP PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PMIG PREC PAIGH PROG PSHA PARK PETER POG PHUS PPREL PS PTERPREL PRELPGOV POV PKPO PGOVECON POUS PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PWBG PMAR PREM PAR PNR PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PARMIR PGOVGM PHUH PARTM PN PRE PTE PY POLUN PPEL PDOV PGOVSOCI PIRF PGOVPM PBST PRELEVU PGOR PBTSRU PRM PRELKPAOIZ PGVO PERL PGOC PAGR PMIN PHUMR PVIP PPD PGV PRAM PINL PKPAL PTERE PGOF PINO PHAS PODC PRHUM PHUMA PREO PPA PEPFAR PGO PRGOV PAC PRESL PORG PKFK PEPR PRELP PREFA PNG PGOVPHUMKPAO PRELECON PINOCHET PFOR PGOVLO PHUMBA PRELC PREK PHUME PHJM POLINT PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PGOVE PHALANAGE PARTY PECON PEACE PROCESS PLN PRELSW PAHO PEDRO PRELA PASS PPAO PGPV PNUM PCUL PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGIV PRFE POGOV PEL PBT PAMQ PINF PSEPC POSTS PHUMPGOV PVOV PHSAPREL PROLIFERATION PENA PRELTBIOBA PIN PRELL PGOVPTER PHAM PHYTRP PTEL PTERPGOV PHARM PROTESTS PRELAF PKBL PRELKPAO PKNP PARMP PHUML PFOV PERM PUOS PRELGOV PHUMPTER PARAGRAPH PERURENA PBTSEWWT PCI PETROL PINSO PINSCE PQL PEREZ PBS

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 08KHARTOUM721, SPLA COS ON INTRA-SPLM TENSIONS AND RELATIONS WITH

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #08KHARTOUM721.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08KHARTOUM721 2008-05-12 09:24 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXRO1572
OO RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #0721/01 1330924
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 120924Z MAY 08 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0788
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000721 
 
DEPT FOR AF/SPG, A/S FRAZER, SE WILLIAMSON 
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU
SUBJECT: SPLA COS ON INTRA-SPLM TENSIONS AND RELATIONS WITH 
MISSERIYA 
 
1. (SBU) CDA Fernandez and Acting CG met with SPLA Chief of Staff 
LTG Oyai Deng Ajak on May 9.  They discussed recent Misseriya/SPLA 
tensions within Sudan's oil-field region along the 1956 border, SPLA 
difficulties integrating a sometimes fickle Misseriya force, and 
Unity's State Governor Taban Deng Gai's ouster by a scheming GOSS VP 
Machar from his state SPLM chairmanship and its attendant political 
impact on the SPLM National Convention, and potentially the GOSS. 
 
---------------------------------- 
CONTINUED ISSUES WITH REDEPLOYMENT 
---------------------------------- 
 
2. (SBU) Competing claims over land north and south of the 1956 
border and earlier SAF attempts to redeploy from the South, 
dismissed by Ajak as mere propaganda, have again heightened SPLA/SAF 
tensions within the oil field region.  The SPLA Chief of Staff 
maintained that the SAF is consolidating its forces in the area, 
noting an expansive SAF presence stretching from Nuba Mountains to 
Heglig and Muglad.  "They have at least three divisions of 
35,000-plus troops - Nuba alone has 25,000," he claimed. (COMMENT: 
This assertion is hardly new, and remains increasingly difficult for 
UNMIS to verify or refute. END COMMENT).  Ajak maintained that the 
SAF is intentionally strengthening its positions around the Korodad 
and Bentiu oil fields in order that Khartoum can continue to draw on 
their wealth even amidst a war with the South.  "But they are making 
very wrong calculations," Ajak noted.  The Charge countered that the 
SAF wants to reap the spoils of war without directly engaging in 
offensive combat.  Ajak agreed, but noted "at the end of the day we 
will run out of patience, particularly if they keep moving to expand 
into territory we consider part of the South." 
 
3. (SBU) Ajak reviewed the SPLA rationale for its recent withdrawal 
from Kharsana, citing lack of potable water and the town's 
compromised location far northeast of Abyei.  The Chief of Staff 
allowed that there were six separate SAF units at varying positions 
behind the SPLA contingent, and that violence could have led to his 
soldiers' entrapment in a poor tactical position. Following the SPLA 
departure, SAF moved in to occupy the location despite advance 
discussions with the southern military and the Chief of Staff's 
understanding that the parties had reached a mutual restraint pact. 
 
 
------------------------------------------- 
THE MISSERIYA: FRIEND OR FOE OR PRAGMATIST? 
------------------------------------------- 
 
4. (SBU) Ongoing SPLA-Misseriya tensions were cast within the 
context of an "impoverished and backward local population similar to 
much of the South" effortlessly motivated by money and the lure of 
captured spoils.  Ajak described a Baggara (Note: Baggara are cattle 
herding Arab tribes like the Misseriya and Southern Rizeigat) 
mentality that was perplexing to the point of absurdity.  "The 
Baggara generally can be managed but it will take time, he 
acknowledged." The Misseriya Emir of the group which attacked the 
SPLA one month prior outside Aweil is currently in Juba seeking to 
make up with the SPLM.  He apologized for the attack, vowed to 
return the one SPLA Toyota Landcruiser captured during the skirmish, 
and pledged to return captured weapons as well.  "How is it," the 
Chief of Staff laughed, "that these people can do the wrong thing 
one month and the right thing the next?" 
 
5. (SBU) The SPLA has no easier a time managing its relations with 
Misseriya who wish to be integrated into its ranks.  According to 
Ajak, the 2500-man "Debaab Force" (local militia who joined the SPLA 
in 2007) Misseriya outside of Bentiu now brought their own internal 
problems.  The ill-trained, undisciplined militia group has been 
receiving pay and uniforms since joining the SPLA and assembling in 
Unity State.  Malfeasance by some Misseriya pay-masters and officers 
has stoked intra-militia tensions. "Deserters that flee to their 
home areas are those same who return to the South to attack us," 
Ajak said.  "The very same troops who begged to join our ranks not 
long ago." He noted that about 150 of these SPLA/Misseriya renegades 
had actually engaged in attacks against SPLA regular units. The 
Charge suggested that the SPLM aggressively reiterate their support 
for the Misseriya's unfettered access to grazing land in the South. 
Ajak responded that the point had been explained "very clearly" to 
the Misseriya in the past during Garang's stewardship of the 
military and after SPLM efforts during the Naivasha peace talks. 
"Because they are not united behind one or two voices, the message 
is not reaching all Baggara, and so they believe Khartoum went it 
attempts to manipulate them through claims that their land is being 
stolen by SPLA." 
 
-------------------------- 
RIEK'S COUP IN UNITY STATE 
 
KHARTOUM 00000721  002 OF 002 
 
 
-------------------------- 
 
6. (SBU) The Charge turned to recent political fallout linked to 
Unity State Governor Taban Deng Gai's ouster from his state chairman 
seat, and drew a blunt response from the Chief of Staff.  "It's 
Riek, and although I don't know what's precisely in his mind, the 
move was mostly about gaining power for his wife" (Angelina Teny 
Machar, GNU State Minister for Energy and Mines) and greater money 
and power for the both of them.  Ajak described a classic Machar 
power play whereby the GOSS Vice President duped avaricious and 
pliable ex-Southern Sudan Defense Force Commander Paulino Matiep and 
titular SPLA Deputy Chief of Staff into believing that Matiep 
protege and GOSS Health Minister Joseph Monytiel Wiejang would 
generate larger kick-backs to the ailing commander.  Ajak maintained 
that Taban Deng Gai fed Matiep a steady stream of cash to keep his 
Nuer followers in check during repeated clan-based political 
infighting in Unity State.  The Chief of Staff remarked "Paulino 
takes money with no accountability, and he believes Riek when he is 
told that he the SPLM State Chairman will automatically become the 
governor.  So he expects even more money from Monytiel." 
 
7. (SBU) Vice President Machar's takeover of the state congress, 
Ajak complained, "was done in a very crude and primitive way."  The 
Chief of Staff noted that Machar's attempts to unseat Gai 
encompassed last two years, and has involved anything ranging from 
local-level political insubordination to death threats.  GOSS 
President Kiir has remained a steadfast ally of Gai throughout, 
noting to both Machar and his wife Angelina Teny in the past that 
despite complaints in the media and elsewhere, he believed Gai was 
doing well and that if such threats continued he would order the 
SPLA to protect the governor. 
 
8. (SBU) For the Unity State Congress, the Vice President brought 
two platoons of seventy-five soldiers with him, and set to work 
intimidating convention-goers, delegates, and the congress 
supervisor alike. (NOTE: Each state congress has supervisors, senior 
SPLM members from outside that state that oversee the proceedings, 
file reports to Kiir in his capacity as party chairman and can step 
in to address irregularities. END NOTE.)  Ajak believed that the May 
10 Interim National Council meeting, the last before the historic 
National Convention, would likely review Taban Deng Gai's 
allegations that Machar had manipulated the congress's outcome. 
Ajak contends that Machar exercised his status as Vice Chairman of 
the SPLM to block Gai's right as governor to nominate five percent 
of the state's delegates - a standing party rule and something which 
would have pushed the Governor into the victory column during the 
vote count.  (COMMENT: Instead, Machar's move places the Government 
of Southern Sudan closer to crisis.  If Monytiel's victory is 
preserved, he will have to resign his cabinet seat, leaving the GOSS 
with two vacant ministerial slots to fill. END COMMENT.) 
 
9. (SBU) COMMENT: A relaxed and expansive General Oyai Deng Ajak 
seemed unaffected by the recent loss of his ostensible boss, SPLA 
Affairs Minister Dim Deng who died in a plane crash on May 2. His 
distressing depiction of infighting and intrigue in the ranks of the 
SPLA and SPLM rings true and shows how power in Sudan, whether North 
or South, always balances on the blade of a knife as allies squabble 
and undermine each other despite the threat from the NCP.  His 
detailed description of Riek Machar's machinations bodes ill for 
Southern peace and unity as sooner or later the ambitious Riek will 
overreach and have to be slapped down by Salva Kiir. 
 
FERNANDEZ