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Viewing cable 08KHARTOUM667, RESPONSE: CHINA'S ENGAGEMENT IN SUDAN

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08KHARTOUM667 2008-05-01 14:59 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXRO3148
OO RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHKH #0667/01 1221459
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 011459Z MAY 08
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0700
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA IMMEDIATE
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000667 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL MARR SU CH XA XE
SUBJECT: RESPONSE: CHINA'S ENGAGEMENT IN SUDAN 
 
REF: SECSTATE 41697 
 
------- 
Summary 
------- 
 
1. (SBU) China's engagement in Sudan centers on the pursuit 
of its economic interests, particularly oil, and these 
interests underpin its relationship with the ruling National 
Congress Party (NCP).  China's engagement on the political 
issues related to the conflict in Darfur or tensions between 
Northern and Southern Sudan has been limited, however, 
despite the risk these issues pose to the country's stability 
in the long term--and therefore to China's economic 
involvement.  Yet opportunities for useful Chinese engagement 
abound.  On Darfur, China can couple its support for and 
contributions to UNAMID with bilateral political dialogue 
with Khartoum in order to: 1) Facilitate UNAMID deployment, 
2) Eliminate bureaucratic obstacles to humanitarian 
operations, and 3) Gain acknowledgment of Darfurian's 
legitimate grievances.  On Southern Sudan, China can launch 
infrastructure development projects that provide a "peace 
dividend" for the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) and the 
Government of South Sudan (GOSS).  Lastly, China's mission in 
Sudan can be a more active participant in Khartoum-level 
discussions on improving security and humanitarian access in 
Darfur and overcoming the major obstacles to the CPA, 
particularly resolution of the Abyei issue and preparations 
for the elections in 2009.  End summary. 
 
------------- 
Oil, oil, oil 
------------- 
 
2. (SBU) Chinese engagement in Sudan centers on the pursuit 
of its economic interests, particularly oil.  China is 
primarily responsible for the development of Sudan's 
petroleum industry and the main beneficiary of it.  The 
Chinese National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) has been 
present in Sudan since 1996 and currently has the largest 
share in Sudan's most productive blocks (namely blocks 1/2/4 
producing the high quality Nile blend and blocks 3/7 
producing the lower quality Dar blend).  Due to rising 
production in blocks 3 and 7 in 2007, crude oil exports from 
Sudan to China doubled last year to approximately 200,00 
barrels a days, with many estimates ranking Sudan as China's 
sixth-largest oil supplier.  These ties underpin China's 
relationship with the ruling National Congress Party of 
President Al-Bashir. 
 
3. (SBU) The CNPC's contracts with the GNU now 
disproportionately benefit China.  However, oil experts, 
including the Norwegian Petroleum Envoy to Sudan, assert that 
even if the contracts were renegotiated, China will be more 
focused on energy security and access to oil than to its 
price.  Other experts emphasize that Chinese companies appear 
anxious to extract oil as quickly and cheaply as possible, 
which proves detrimental to the longevity of the wells and 
the environment.  Allega4R2;Q---------------------------------- -- 
Tentative China-Southern Sudan Relations 
---------------------------------------- 
 
4. (SBU) Chinese economic engagement in Southern Sudan, 
however, has been significantly more limited.  Tentative 
steps to strengthen China's relationship with the Government 
of Southern Sudan (GoSS) have yielded few concrete results. 
In the first high-level contact, GoSS President Salva Kiir 
visited Beijing in the summer of 2007 and met with the senior 
Chinese leadership.  While the Chinese have pledged to open a 
consulate in Juba, construction has not yet begun, and the 
only visible diplomatic engagement with the GoSS occurred 
when the Chinese Ambassador visited Juba in late 2007 with a 
large Chinese delegation. 
 
5. (SBU) The Ministry of Regional Cooperation (the de facto 
GoSS Foreign Ministry) attributes the lack of progress on the 
China-GoSS relationship both to lingering Southern resentment 
toward China because of its backing for the North and the 
Ministry's own lack of capacity to focus on developing the 
relationship.  Though a Chinese technical assessment team 
traveled through the South to survey power needs and China 
has expressed an interest in infrastructure projects, no 
significant investment projects in Southern Sudan are 
 
KHARTOUM 00000667  002 OF 002 
 
 
underway. 
 
------------ 
Peacekeeping 
------------ 
 
6. (SBU) To burnish its international image, China has 
contributed military forces to the two peacekeeping missions 
operating in the country: the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) 
which monitors the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) that 
ended the North/South civil war and the UN-African Union 
Mission in Darfur (UNAMID).  While Chinese units in UNAMID 
are handicapped by delays in equipment deliveries, the UNMIS 
Force Commander has often reported that Chinese units in his 
force are among the most disciplined and effective of any 
contingent.  Additional Chinese troop contributions to UNAMID 
should be encouraged. 
 
--------------------------- 
Little Political Engagement 
--------------------------- 
 
7. (SBU) China's engagement on political issues related to 
the conflict in Darfur or the tensions between Northern and 
Southern Sudan has been limited.  Focusing its ire on 
Darfur's rebel groups, China has not demonstrated a 
willingness to press Khartoum to take initial steps that 
would build confidence in a peace process. Similarly, Beijing 
has used little or no leverage to overcome the obstacles to 
implementation of the CPA, the single most determinative 
factor on Sudan's future stability.  While the Chinese 
Ambassador and US CDA speak frequently and compare notes on 
political issues, common cause with the U.S. Mission in Sudan 
on these pressing issues is more or less non-existent. 
 
---------------------------------- 
A New U.S.-China Dialogue on Sudan 
---------------------------------- 
 
8. (SBU) A U.S. dialogue with China on its engagement in 
Sudan should focus on confronting the gravest challenges to 
the country's future.  In addition to providing measurable 
progress on U.S. priorities in Sudan, a combination of 
Chinese actions on Darfur, in Southern Sudan, and within the 
diplomatic community will contribute to managing and 
resolving Sudan's numerous internal conflicts and thus 
securing China's economic interests in the country over the 
long-term. 
 
9. (SBU) On Darfur, China can couple its support for and 
contributions to UNAMID with bilateral political dialogue 
with the NCP in order to: 1) Facilitate UNAMID deployment, 2) 
Eliminate bureaucratic obstacles to humanitarian operations 
(as embodied in the March 2007 Joint Communique between Sudan 
and the UN), and 3) Acknowledge the legitimate grievances of 
Darfurians with regard to political marginalization and 
resource sharing, which inspired the rebellion in 2003 and 
sustain support among the population for intransigent rebel 
leaders.  If China were willing to participate in P-5 joint 
demarches to the GOS, this would make a significant 
impression on the Khartoum regime is/when it raises obstacles. 
 
10. (SBU) On Southern Sudan, China can demonstrate a more 
balanced approach by launching infrastructure development 
projects in critical areas such as roads and social services, 
in both the South and the Three Areas.  Such programs will 
increase the CPA's "peace dividend" and contribute to the 
broader USG goal of making unity attractive to Southern 
Sudanese--which can proceed irrespective of the GoSS' lack of 
capacity for diplomatic engagement. 
 
11. (SBU) Finally, China's mission in Sudan can be a more 
active participant in Khartoum-level discussions on improving 
security and humanitarian access in Darfur and advancing the 
critical components of the CPA, particularly resolution of 
the Abyei issue and preparations for the elections in 2009 
instead of just parroting the NCP's standard party line. 
While discussions do not in and of themselves guarantee 
progress, such participation would signify to the NCP more 
constructive Chinese oversight of its policies as well as 
affect greater Western and Chinese cooperation in addressing 
these challenges.  Indeed, Chinese officials were visible 
during the negotiations--and the signing--of the Joint 
Humanitarian Communique in 2007, which contributed to its 
initial success. 
FERNANDEZ