Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 97115 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
ETRD EAGR ETTC EAID ECON EFIN ECIN EINV ELAB EAIR ENRG EPET EWWT ECPS EIND EMIN ELTN EC ETMIN EUC EZ ET ELECTIONS ENVR EU EUN EG EINT ER ECONOMICS ES EMS ENIV EEB EN ECE ECOSOC EK ENVIRONMENT EFIS EI EWT ENGRD ECPSN EXIM EIAD ERIN ECPC EDEV ENGY ECTRD EPA ESTH ECCT EINVECON ENGR ERTD EUR EAP EWWC ELTD EL EXIMOPIC EXTERNAL ETRDEC ESCAP ECO EGAD ELNT ECONOMIC ENV ETRN EIAR EUMEM ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID EREL ECOM ECONETRDEAGRJA ETCC ETRG ECONOMY EMED ETR ENERG EITC EFINOECD EURM EENG ERA EXPORT ENRD ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EGEN EBRD EVIN ETRAD ECOWAS EFTA ECONETRDBESPAR EGOVSY EPIN EID ECONENRG EDRC ESENV ETT EB ENER ELTNSNAR ECHEVARRIA ETRC EPIT EDUC ESA EFI ENRGY ESCI EE EAIDXMXAXBXFFR EETC ECIP EIAID EIVN EBEXP ESTN EING EGOV ETRA EPETEIND ELAN ETRDGK EAIDRW ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ENVI ELN EAG EPCS EPRT EPTED ETRB EUM EAIDS EFIC EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM EAIDAR ESF EIDN ELAM EDU EV EAIDAF ECN EDA EXBS EINTECPS ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EPREL EAC EINVEFIN ETA EAGER EINDIR ECA ECLAC ELAP EITI EUCOM ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID EARG ELDIN EINVKSCA ENNP EFINECONCS EFINTS ECCP ETC EAIRASECCASCID EINN ETRP EAIDNI EFQ ECOQKPKO EGPHUM EBUD ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ENERGY ELB EINDETRD EMI ECONEFIN EIB EURN ETRDEINVTINTCS EIN EFIM ETIO ELAINE EMN EATO EWTR EIPR EINVETC ETTD ETDR EIQ ECONCS EPPD ENRGIZ EISL ESPINOSA ELEC EAIG ESLCO EUREM ENTG ERD EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH ECINECONCS ETRO ETRDECONWTOCS ECUN EFND EPECO EAIRECONRP ERGR ETRDPGOV ECPN ENRGMO EPWR EET EAIS EAGRE EDUARDO EAGRRP EAIDPHUMPRELUG EICN ECONQH EVN EGHG ELBR EINF EAIDHO EENV ETEX ERNG ED
KMDR KPAO KPKO KJUS KCRM KGHG KFRD KWMN KDEM KTFN KHIV KGIC KIDE KSCA KNNP KHUM KIPR KSUM KISL KIRF KCOR KRCM KPAL KWBG KN KS KOMC KSEP KFLU KPWR KTIA KSEO KMPI KHLS KICC KSTH KMCA KVPR KPRM KE KU KZ KFLO KSAF KTIP KTEX KBCT KOCI KOLY KOR KAWC KACT KUNR KTDB KSTC KLIG KSKN KNN KCFE KCIP KGHA KHDP KPOW KUNC KDRL KV KPREL KCRS KPOL KRVC KRIM KGIT KWIR KT KIRC KOMO KRFD KUWAIT KG KFIN KSCI KTFIN KFTN KGOV KPRV KSAC KGIV KCRIM KPIR KSOC KBIO KW KGLB KMWN KPO KFSC KSEAO KSTCPL KSI KPRP KREC KFPC KUNH KCSA KMRS KNDP KR KICCPUR KPPAO KCSY KTBT KCIS KNEP KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNNB KGCC KINR KPOP KMFO KENV KNAR KVIR KDRG KDMR KFCE KNAO KDEN KGCN KICA KIMMITT KMCC KLFU KMSG KSEC KUM KCUL KMNP KSMT KCOM KOMCSG KSPR KPMI KRAD KIND KCRP KAUST KWAWC KTER KCHG KRDP KPAS KITA KTSC KPAOPREL KWGB KIRP KJUST KMIG KLAB KTFR KSEI KSTT KAPO KSTS KLSO KWNN KPOA KHSA KNPP KPAONZ KBTS KWWW KY KJRE KPAOKMDRKE KCRCM KSCS KWMNCI KESO KWUN KPLS KIIP KEDEM KPAOY KRIF KGICKS KREF KTRD KFRDSOCIRO KTAO KJU KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KEN KO KNEI KEMR KKIV KEAI KWAC KRCIM KWCI KFIU KWIC KCORR KOMS KNNO KPAI KBWG KTTB KTBD KTIALG KILS KFEM KTDM KESS KNUC KPA KOMCCO KCEM KRCS KWBGSY KNPPIS KNNPMNUC KWN KERG KLTN KALM KCCP KSUMPHUM KREL KGH KLIP KTLA KAWK KWMM KVRP KVRC KAID KSLG KDEMK KX KIF KNPR KCFC KFTFN KTFM KPDD KCERS KMOC KDEMAF KMEPI KEMS KDRM KEPREL KBTR KEDU KNP KIRL KNNR KMPT KISLPINR KTPN KA KJUSTH KPIN KDEV KTDD KAKA KFRP KWNM KTSD KINL KJUSKUNR KWWMN KECF KWBC KPRO KVBL KOM KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KEDM KFLD KLPM KRGY KNNF KICR KIFR KM KWMNCS KAWS KLAP KPAK KDDG KCGC KID KNSD KMPF KPFO KDP KCMR KRMS KNPT KNNNP KTIAPARM KDTB KNUP KPGOV KNAP KNNC KUK KSRE KREISLER KIVP KQ KTIAEUN KPALAOIS KRM KISLAO KWM KFLOA
PHUM PINR PTER PGOV PREL PREF PL PM PHSA PE PARM PINS PK PUNE PO PALESTINIAN PU PBTS PROP PTBS POL POLI PA PGOVZI POLMIL POLITICAL PARTIES POLM PD POLITICS POLICY PAS PMIL PINT PNAT PV PKO PPOL PERSONS PING PBIO PH PETR PARMS PRES PCON PETERS PRELBR PT PLAB PP PAK PDEM PKPA PSOCI PF PLO PTERM PJUS PSOE PELOSI PROPERTY PGOVPREL PARP PRL PNIR PHUMKPAL PG PREZ PGIC PBOV PAO PKK PROV PHSAK PHUMPREL PROTECTION PGOVBL PSI PRELPK PGOVENRG PUM PRELKPKO PATTY PSOC PRIVATIZATION PRELSP PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PMIG PREC PAIGH PROG PSHA PARK PETER POG PHUS PPREL PS PTERPREL PRELPGOV POV PKPO PGOVECON POUS PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PWBG PMAR PREM PAR PNR PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PARMIR PGOVGM PHUH PARTM PN PRE PTE PY POLUN PPEL PDOV PGOVSOCI PIRF PGOVPM PBST PRELEVU PGOR PBTSRU PRM PRELKPAOIZ PGVO PERL PGOC PAGR PMIN PHUMR PVIP PPD PGV PRAM PINL PKPAL PTERE PGOF PINO PHAS PODC PRHUM PHUMA PREO PPA PEPFAR PGO PRGOV PAC PRESL PORG PKFK PEPR PRELP PREFA PNG PGOVPHUMKPAO PRELECON PINOCHET PFOR PGOVLO PHUMBA PRELC PREK PHUME PHJM POLINT PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PGOVE PHALANAGE PARTY PECON PEACE PROCESS PLN PRELSW PAHO PEDRO PRELA PASS PPAO PGPV PNUM PCUL PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGIV PRFE POGOV PEL PBT PAMQ PINF PSEPC POSTS PHUMPGOV PVOV PHSAPREL PROLIFERATION PENA PRELTBIOBA PIN PRELL PGOVPTER PHAM PHYTRP PTEL PTERPGOV PHARM PROTESTS PRELAF PKBL PRELKPAO PKNP PARMP PHUML PFOV PERM PUOS PRELGOV PHUMPTER PARAGRAPH PERURENA PBTSEWWT PCI PETROL PINSO PINSCE PQL PEREZ PBS

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 08BRASILIA643, BRAZIL,S MILITARY PARTNERSHIP WITH FRANCE: TRUE

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #08BRASILIA643.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08BRASILIA643 2008-05-13 19:00 2011-07-11 00:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Brasilia
VZCZCXRO3342
RR RUEHRG
DE RUEHBR #0643/01 1341900
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 131900Z MAY 08
FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1633
INFO RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0364
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0385
RUEHRG/AMCONSUL RECIFE 8031
RUEHRI/AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO 6149
RUEHSO/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO 2054
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 0018
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRASILIA 000643 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR WHA/BSC, EUR/WE AND PM/RSAT 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/12/2018 
TAGS: PREL PARM BR MASS
SUBJECT: BRAZIL,S MILITARY PARTNERSHIP WITH FRANCE: TRUE 
LOVE OR A MARRIAGE OF CONVENIENCE? 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Clifford Sobel 
 
 1.  (C)  SUMMARY.  The recent meeting of Presidents Lula and 
Sarkozy and the visit of Defense Minister Jobim to Paris 
triggered a wave of Francophilia within the Brazilian foreign 
policy establishment, particularly with regard to the 
strategic partnership.  Despite heavy coverage in the press 
of the Brasilia-Paris &strategic alliance,8 concrete 
examples of potential cooperation are sparse beyond the 
signing of a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA).  France 
reportedly may assist Brazilian construction of a 
nuclear-powered submarine through a promised &technology 
transfer,8 although French diplomats here say no agreements 
were signed.  In Mission,s view, elements of the Brazilian 
leadership believe they share broad interests with France, 
particularly France,s perceived tendency to stand up to the 
USG, but there is little substance at present to the 
ballyhooed security partnership.  The Brazil-France 
relationship can, however, set some useful precedents as we 
try to improve our own political military ties with Brazil. 
The public and press hype for the French connection 
notwithstanding, the result of Jobim's trip may be more a 
marriage blanc than amour veritable.  END SUMMARY. 
 
2.  (SBU)  The February 12 meeting in French Guiana between 
Presidents Lula and Sarkozy and the visit of Defense Minister 
Jobim to Paris at the end of January led to widespread 
enthusiastic reporting on a new &strategic alliance8 
focusing on access to French technologies for Brazilian 
military modernization and including the signing of a SOFA 
between the two countries.  An announcement that Brazil will 
buy French Scorpene submarines, possibly for use in 
developing an indigenous nuclear submarine, provided the only 
other possible result.  Apart from this, potential 
cooperation between Brazil and France has been limited to 
speculative discussions of potential transfers of 
helicopters, aircraft and satellite systems.  Folha de Sao 
Paulo quoted government sources as stating that the success 
of Jobim,s visit to Paris &sharpened the appetite8 of the 
U.S. and Germany to make sales, but that such interest had 
come too late. 
 
3.  (C)  In meetings with Ambassador Sobel, Jobim has 
downplayed the relationship with France and clearly stated a 
desire for access to U.S. military technologies.  He has, 
however, encountered resistance from the Ministry for 
External Relations (MRE).  Jobim,s plan to visit Washington 
in January was blocked by objections that he should visit 
Brazil,s neighbors first.  Such objections did not prevent 
his visiting France (technically a neighbor through French 
Guiana) or Russia (in Mission,s view, not a neighbor at 
all); in bowing out of Jobim's trip to Washington, Long Term 
Planning Minister Unger told the Ambassador that visiting 
France and Russia carried no connotation of subservience to a 
greater power, which a trip to the United States will 
suggest, he fears, if not handled properly.   That said, 
Jobim understands that while a partnership with France is 
more attractive politically, there is more to be gained by 
working closely with the U.S. 
 
4.  (C)  The principal deliverable of Jobim,s visit to 
France, the SOFA, was in the works for two years and had 
stalled on Brazilian insistence that any SOFA would violate 
Brazilian law, a similar objection to that raised against a 
Brazil-U.S. SOFA.  When asked why this was no longer an 
obstacle, Jobim,s Chief of Staff, Murilo Marques Barboza 
told polmil officer and DATT that the draft SOFA had been 
written so as to avoid such an objection.  The French Embassy 
informed Mission that the text is based on a standard NATO 
SOFA.  Indeed, the text posted on the Ministry,s website 
contains basic legal understandings that each side will 
follow its own laws and build in similar language to that 
found in the draft U.S.-Brazil Defense Cooperation Agreement. 
 
 
5.  (C)  The other major result of Jobim,s trip was the 
announcement that Brazil will purchase French Scorpene diesel 
electric submarines.  The MOD has encouraged the view that 
these vessels will further Brazilian ambitions to construct 
an indigenous nuclear sub even though naval experts state 
that there are considerable differences in design between 
 
BRASILIA 00000643  002 OF 003 
 
 
conventional and nuclear vessels that would seem to preclude 
such a connection.  The nuclear-powered submarine is one of 
the Brazilian military,s highest priorities (ref a), and the 
promise of French technology proved tempting enough for 
Brazil to switch its conventional sub purchases from Germany 
to France.  The Brazilian government has not, however, 
disclosed what technologies it will obtain from France, and 
the French DCM in Brasilia told PolCouns that no agreements 
for weapons purchases or technology transfer were signed.  As 
yet, the Scorpene purchase is the only specific system that 
Brazil has stated it will purchase, and it does not represent 
a transfer of new technology not already present in Brazil,s 
German-design submarines, merely (in the words of a U.S. 
naval expert) a switch from the underwater equivalent of 
Mercedes to Peugeot.  Although French diplomats here share 
our skepticism with regard to the likelihood of Brazil 
developing a nuclear capability any time soon, they see 
Brazil's interest as a possible opportunity for sales and for 
developing a stronger relationship.  Nonetheless, they say 
that Itamaraty continues to obstruct their efforts to work 
with other ministries (as Itamaraty does with us) and that a 
suggestion of joint efforts on the border between French 
Guiana and Brazil was rejected.  On March 11, the MOD again 
announced Brazil's intention to purchase submarines and 
helicopters from France, as well as seek help on nuclear 
propulsion but as yet has not officially announced Minister 
Jobim's March 18-22 trip to Washington. 
 
6.  (C)  In discussions with MOD contacts, Brazil,s highest 
priority in making decisions about purchase of defense 
equipment will be technology transfer.  Brazil not only seeks 
to improve its military capabilities but to revive its 
defense industries which were perceived as producing 
significant exports during the Cold War period.  Minister 
Unger has citied France,s perceived greater openness to 
technology transfer as an advantage of a closer partnership. 
While French technology transfer policy officially complies 
with the EU Code of Conduct and is similar to U.S. policy 
guidelines, the perception is that the U.S. is seen as much 
more restrictive. 
 
7.  (C)  In a recent conversation with U.S. MLO, a Brazilian 
Air Force officer said that he believed that Air Force 
leadership would prefer that Brazil,s next generation 
fighter be the F-35, but that politics and a more aggressive 
French sales approach gave the advantage to the French 
Rafale, &an aircraft nobody wants.8  He cited MRE 
perceptions of U.S. &rigidity of rules and regulations8 as 
the obstacle.  To articulate their view of the difficulty of 
U.S. technology transfer policies, Brazilians frequently cite 
the USG refusal to allow the sale of Brazilian-made Super 
Tucano aircraft to Venezuela.  While this was not a 
technology transfer question, opponents of cooperation with 
the U.S. have been unchallenged when they cite it as evidence 
that the U.S. will oppose technology transfers to Brazil. 
Foreign Ministry Special Advisor Marcos Pinta Gama expressed 
a similar view, saying that while the U.S. and Brazilian 
militaries have good relations and Brazil would prefer to 
work with the U.S. on its force modernization, the perception 
in Brasilia is that French equipment, even though less 
capable, would be easier to acquire.  Pinta Gama also cited 
supposed French willingness to allow Brazilian licensed 
production of military items as an advantage of doing 
business with France. 
 
8.  (C)   EMBASSY COMMENT.  The chief value of Brazil,s 
opening to France may ultimately be in the precedent it sets 
for international security cooperation.  The Brazilian 
military understands that beyond sales of equipment that it 
views as second-rate, France does not have much to offer. 
Following up on Jobim,s visit to Washington presents an 
opportunity to make a case for stronger U.S.-Brazil 
engagement.  The Minister and his advisors would prefer U.S. 
partnership for Brazil,s military modernization, but face 
the assumption that U.S. export controls are too restrictive. 
 Accurate briefings on U.S. arms transfer policies, with 
information on the success of technology sharing with partner 
states can overcome Brazilian preconceptions and promote 
greater openness to U.S. military systems.  While to some 
extent, Brazil wants to use French competition as leverage on 
U.S. policy, as noted in reftel, there is a real opportunity 
 
BRASILIA 00000643  003 OF 003 
 
 
to use Brazilian defense restructuring to advance the 
bilateral relationship.  The French relationship may also 
pave the way to other bilateral cooperation.  Until Jobim 
went to Paris, Brazil had balked at discussion of a SOFA. 
Now, with the agreement with France under his belt, Jobim has 
indicated a willingness to discuss a SOFA with the U.S. as 
well as a General Security of Information Agreement (GSOIA). 
 There is no reason for the USG to buy into the picture 
presented by the press in Brazil, which often suggests that 
defense cooperation with France and the U.S. is an either-or 
choice.  While the GOB finds ties to France more politically 
acceptable, we can benefit from this interest, which may set 
precedents for U.S.-Brazilian interactions of greater 
substance. 
SOBEL