Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 97115 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
ETRD EAGR ETTC EAID ECON EFIN ECIN EINV ELAB EAIR ENRG EPET EWWT ECPS EIND EMIN ELTN EC ETMIN EUC EZ ET ELECTIONS ENVR EU EUN EG EINT ER ECONOMICS ES EMS ENIV EEB EN ECE ECOSOC EK ENVIRONMENT EFIS EI EWT ENGRD ECPSN EXIM EIAD ERIN ECPC EDEV ENGY ECTRD EPA ESTH ECCT EINVECON ENGR ERTD EUR EAP EWWC ELTD EL EXIMOPIC EXTERNAL ETRDEC ESCAP ECO EGAD ELNT ECONOMIC ENV ETRN EIAR EUMEM ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID EREL ECOM ECONETRDEAGRJA ETCC ETRG ECONOMY EMED ETR ENERG EITC EFINOECD EURM EENG ERA EXPORT ENRD ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EGEN EBRD EVIN ETRAD ECOWAS EFTA ECONETRDBESPAR EGOVSY EPIN EID ECONENRG EDRC ESENV ETT EB ENER ELTNSNAR ECHEVARRIA ETRC EPIT EDUC ESA EFI ENRGY ESCI EE EAIDXMXAXBXFFR EETC ECIP EIAID EIVN EBEXP ESTN EING EGOV ETRA EPETEIND ELAN ETRDGK EAIDRW ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ENVI ELN EAG EPCS EPRT EPTED ETRB EUM EAIDS EFIC EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM EAIDAR ESF EIDN ELAM EDU EV EAIDAF ECN EDA EXBS EINTECPS ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EPREL EAC EINVEFIN ETA EAGER EINDIR ECA ECLAC ELAP EITI EUCOM ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID EARG ELDIN EINVKSCA ENNP EFINECONCS EFINTS ECCP ETC EAIRASECCASCID EINN ETRP EAIDNI EFQ ECOQKPKO EGPHUM EBUD ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ENERGY ELB EINDETRD EMI ECONEFIN EIB EURN ETRDEINVTINTCS EIN EFIM ETIO ELAINE EMN EATO EWTR EIPR EINVETC ETTD ETDR EIQ ECONCS EPPD ENRGIZ EISL ESPINOSA ELEC EAIG ESLCO EUREM ENTG ERD EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH ECINECONCS ETRO ETRDECONWTOCS ECUN EFND EPECO EAIRECONRP ERGR ETRDPGOV ECPN ENRGMO EPWR EET EAIS EAGRE EDUARDO EAGRRP EAIDPHUMPRELUG EICN ECONQH EVN EGHG ELBR EINF EAIDHO EENV ETEX ERNG ED
KMDR KPAO KPKO KJUS KCRM KGHG KFRD KWMN KDEM KTFN KHIV KGIC KIDE KSCA KNNP KHUM KIPR KSUM KISL KIRF KCOR KRCM KPAL KWBG KN KS KOMC KSEP KFLU KPWR KTIA KSEO KMPI KHLS KICC KSTH KMCA KVPR KPRM KE KU KZ KFLO KSAF KTIP KTEX KBCT KOCI KOLY KOR KAWC KACT KUNR KTDB KSTC KLIG KSKN KNN KCFE KCIP KGHA KHDP KPOW KUNC KDRL KV KPREL KCRS KPOL KRVC KRIM KGIT KWIR KT KIRC KOMO KRFD KUWAIT KG KFIN KSCI KTFIN KFTN KGOV KPRV KSAC KGIV KCRIM KPIR KSOC KBIO KW KGLB KMWN KPO KFSC KSEAO KSTCPL KSI KPRP KREC KFPC KUNH KCSA KMRS KNDP KR KICCPUR KPPAO KCSY KTBT KCIS KNEP KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNNB KGCC KINR KPOP KMFO KENV KNAR KVIR KDRG KDMR KFCE KNAO KDEN KGCN KICA KIMMITT KMCC KLFU KMSG KSEC KUM KCUL KMNP KSMT KCOM KOMCSG KSPR KPMI KRAD KIND KCRP KAUST KWAWC KTER KCHG KRDP KPAS KITA KTSC KPAOPREL KWGB KIRP KJUST KMIG KLAB KTFR KSEI KSTT KAPO KSTS KLSO KWNN KPOA KHSA KNPP KPAONZ KBTS KWWW KY KJRE KPAOKMDRKE KCRCM KSCS KWMNCI KESO KWUN KPLS KIIP KEDEM KPAOY KRIF KGICKS KREF KTRD KFRDSOCIRO KTAO KJU KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KEN KO KNEI KEMR KKIV KEAI KWAC KRCIM KWCI KFIU KWIC KCORR KOMS KNNO KPAI KBWG KTTB KTBD KTIALG KILS KFEM KTDM KESS KNUC KPA KOMCCO KCEM KRCS KWBGSY KNPPIS KNNPMNUC KWN KERG KLTN KALM KCCP KSUMPHUM KREL KGH KLIP KTLA KAWK KWMM KVRP KVRC KAID KSLG KDEMK KX KIF KNPR KCFC KFTFN KTFM KPDD KCERS KMOC KDEMAF KMEPI KEMS KDRM KEPREL KBTR KEDU KNP KIRL KNNR KMPT KISLPINR KTPN KA KJUSTH KPIN KDEV KTDD KAKA KFRP KWNM KTSD KINL KJUSKUNR KWWMN KECF KWBC KPRO KVBL KOM KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KEDM KFLD KLPM KRGY KNNF KICR KIFR KM KWMNCS KAWS KLAP KPAK KDDG KCGC KID KNSD KMPF KPFO KDP KCMR KRMS KNPT KNNNP KTIAPARM KDTB KNUP KPGOV KNAP KNNC KUK KSRE KREISLER KIVP KQ KTIAEUN KPALAOIS KRM KISLAO KWM KFLOA
PHUM PINR PTER PGOV PREL PREF PL PM PHSA PE PARM PINS PK PUNE PO PALESTINIAN PU PBTS PROP PTBS POL POLI PA PGOVZI POLMIL POLITICAL PARTIES POLM PD POLITICS POLICY PAS PMIL PINT PNAT PV PKO PPOL PERSONS PING PBIO PH PETR PARMS PRES PCON PETERS PRELBR PT PLAB PP PAK PDEM PKPA PSOCI PF PLO PTERM PJUS PSOE PELOSI PROPERTY PGOVPREL PARP PRL PNIR PHUMKPAL PG PREZ PGIC PBOV PAO PKK PROV PHSAK PHUMPREL PROTECTION PGOVBL PSI PRELPK PGOVENRG PUM PRELKPKO PATTY PSOC PRIVATIZATION PRELSP PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PMIG PREC PAIGH PROG PSHA PARK PETER POG PHUS PPREL PS PTERPREL PRELPGOV POV PKPO PGOVECON POUS PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PWBG PMAR PREM PAR PNR PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PARMIR PGOVGM PHUH PARTM PN PRE PTE PY POLUN PPEL PDOV PGOVSOCI PIRF PGOVPM PBST PRELEVU PGOR PBTSRU PRM PRELKPAOIZ PGVO PERL PGOC PAGR PMIN PHUMR PVIP PPD PGV PRAM PINL PKPAL PTERE PGOF PINO PHAS PODC PRHUM PHUMA PREO PPA PEPFAR PGO PRGOV PAC PRESL PORG PKFK PEPR PRELP PREFA PNG PGOVPHUMKPAO PRELECON PINOCHET PFOR PGOVLO PHUMBA PRELC PREK PHUME PHJM POLINT PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PGOVE PHALANAGE PARTY PECON PEACE PROCESS PLN PRELSW PAHO PEDRO PRELA PASS PPAO PGPV PNUM PCUL PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGIV PRFE POGOV PEL PBT PAMQ PINF PSEPC POSTS PHUMPGOV PVOV PHSAPREL PROLIFERATION PENA PRELTBIOBA PIN PRELL PGOVPTER PHAM PHYTRP PTEL PTERPGOV PHARM PROTESTS PRELAF PKBL PRELKPAO PKNP PARMP PHUML PFOV PERM PUOS PRELGOV PHUMPTER PARAGRAPH PERURENA PBTSEWWT PCI PETROL PINSO PINSCE PQL PEREZ PBS

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 08BEIRUT761, LEBANON: SAAD HARIRI NOT YET DECIDED ON PRIME

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #08BEIRUT761.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08BEIRUT761 2008-05-24 17:25 2011-05-06 00:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Beirut
Appears in these articles:
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/11352
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/11351
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/11627
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/11626
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/11712
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/11713
VZCZCXRO2785
OO RUEHAG RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHLB #0761/01 1451725
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 241725Z MAY 08
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2024
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2382
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 2689
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 000761 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA 
ALSO FOR IO-A/S SILVERBERG AND PDAS WARLICK 
USUN FOR KHALILZAD/WOLFF/KUMAR/PHEE 
NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/YERGER/GAVITO 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/23/2018 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PINR ASEC UNSC EAIR SA IR LE
SUBJECT: LEBANON:  SAAD HARIRI NOT YET DECIDED ON PRIME 
MINISTER, DISILLUSIONED WITH INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 
 
REF: A. BEIRUT 759 
     B. BEIRUT 758 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires a.i. Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4 
(b) and (d). 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
1. (C) A somber and defeatist-sounding March 14 leader Saad 
Hariri did not appear to have decided whether he would become 
prime minister in the next cabinet.  Citing the election of a 
president as the only victory emerging from Doha, he 
complained about the lack of response from the international 
community in the wake of Hizballah's takeover of much of 
downtown Beirut.  He again pressed for accelerated military 
and financial assistance, stressing the need for items like 
Cobra attack helicopters to enable the Lebanese Armed Forces 
(LAF) to stand up to Hizballah.  End summary. 
 
2. (C) CDA Sison, accompanied by Pol/Econ Chief, met with 
majority leader Saad Hariri at his office in Qoreitem on May 
24, less than 24 hours before Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) 
Commander General Michel Sleiman was scheduled to be elected 
president.  Hariri advisors Ghattas Khoury and Nader Hariri 
and notetaker Nadine Chehab also attended the meeting. 
 
3. (C) The Charge opened the meeting stressing that the 
majority was facing a marathon rather than a sprint, although 
both the immediate tactical decisions and longer term 
strategic decisions were key to winning the 2009 
parliamentary elections.  As Khoury and Nader Hariri had 
stated before Saad entered the room, Saad's Future Movement 
and March 14 had some tough challenges ahead, as they seek to 
solidify political support, recover from the humiliation 
suffered heaped upon the Sunnis by Hizballah, and form a 
cabinet capable of responding to the people's needs.  Saad 
acknowledged that the majority was in a marathon race. 
 
4. (C) The Charge also relayed her discussion with Sleiman 
the evening before (Ref B), in which she had stressed the 
need to implement the Doha agreement in its entirety, 
including addressing the issue of the relationship between 
the state and Hizballah.  Although the U.S. would not enter 
into the name game, she had stressed to Sleiman the need to 
keep the LAF in good hands to ensure that the current 
ambitious U.S.-LAF program of training and equipment remained 
on track. 
 
DOHA: WE DID WHAT WAS 
NECESSARY TO SAVE LEBANON 
------------------------- 
 
5. (C) Saad was in his deepest defeatist mode, fiddling 
incessantly with his prayer beads and repeatedly expressing 
his disillusionment with the international community.  "When 
we were under fire, everyone was in a coma," he said; "We had 
to do what we did to save Lebanon."  The Sunnis were 
"heartbroken," Saad continued (Khoury used the word "raped"), 
and he refused to give them any more "false expectations." 
 
6. (C) Note: Before Saad joined the meeting, Khoury called 
the Doha agreement "decent" and the best possible under the 
circumstances.  He agreed with the Charge that March 14 had 
secured a success in ensuring that the word "resistance" did 
not make it into the final text.  Khoury further noted that 
Saad was "adamant" that what Hizballah did in Beirut would 
not pass lightly, and that Saad had conveyed this to General 
Sleiman.  End note. 
 
7. (C) The only victory from Doha was that Lebanon would 
finally elect a president, Saad continued.  But Sleiman now 
has a big problem:  whereas he once was "well-liked" by all 
the Lebanese, now, after his recent inaction facing 
Hizballah, he was now "well-hated."  (Comment: A plethora of 
Lebanese flags and posters of Sleiman have sprung up 
throughout Beirut over the past few days as part of a 
coordinated LAF PR campaign.  End comment.) 
 
KEEPING MUM ON WHO 
WILL BE PRIME MINISTER 
 
BEIRUT 00000761  002 OF 002 
 
 
---------------------- 
 
8. (C) Saad did not appear to have decided on who would be 
the next prime minister, merely stating that it was "up to 
me."  (Note:  Before Saad entered, Nader told us the Saudis 
would respect whichever decision Saad makes.  However, we 
have heard from several contacts that the Saudis told Saad 
current PM Fouad Siniora should remain as prime minister. 
End note.)  "We'll do what we have to do to keep the country 
stable," Saad added, agreeing with the Charge that the next 
10 months would be critical in the lead-up to the spring 2009 
parliamentary elections. 
 
9. (C) Before Saad joined the meeting, Nader acknowledged 
that Doha was only "round one" and that the majority had a 
long way to go.  Khoury added that the majority needed to do 
what was best for the Lebanese people over the next 10 
months, addressing social issues to which PM Siniora had not 
been sensitive, citing Economic Minister Sami Haddad attempt 
to raise the price of bread as a key example.  Siniora is 
stubborn, Khoury said, and difficult to work with.  Khoury 
expected that, as had happened with late PM Rafiq Hariri, 
ultimately the cabinet would be comprised of a "clear slate" 
of leaders not involved in the current wrangling over cabinet 
seats. 
 
SEND COBRAS NOW! 
---------------- 
 
10. (C) Saad complained about remarks made by the USG about 
Hizballah losing support, saying, "This doesn't help us." 
What we need is accelerated military and Paris III 
assistance, he said, rather than mere words.  The Charge 
noted that the U.S. already had committed over $300 million 
in U.S. military training and equipment assistance to the LAF 
and was looking at ways to further support the LAF.  Saad 
dismissed this, countering that Iran and Syria are providing 
much more than $300 million to Hizballah.  He noted that he 
would see Iranian FM Mottaki during his visit for Sleiman's 
swearing in, but would "avoid" Syrian FM Moallem. 
 
11. (C) "We need Cobra attack helicopters!" he said, if we 
are to face down Hizballah. "The U.S. has no sense of 
urgency," he complained, while we are living here in the 
middle of a storm."  The Charge noted this week's delivery of 
U.S. ammunition to the LAF, as well as the body armor 
shipment received earlier in the month. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
12. (C) Saad appeared genuinely torn as to what to do about 
the prime ministership.  Even his advisors, before Saad 
entered the room, seemed in the dark, telling the Charge, 
"You tell us" who will be prime minister.  Although defeatist 
in attitude, he also appeared resolved to attack the 
political challenges leading up to the 2009 parliamentary 
elections and fully cognizant of the uphill battles ahead. 
SISON