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Viewing cable 08BAGHDAD1347, RESULTS OF FINANCIAL SYSTEMS ASSESSMENT TEAM VISIT TO THE

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08BAGHDAD1347 2008-05-01 09:56 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Baghdad
VZCZCXRO2945
RR RUEHBC RUEHDA RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #1347/01 1220956
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 010956Z MAY 08
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7117
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 06 BAGHDAD 001347 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ECON EFIN PGOV PREL KTFN KCRM PTER SNAR IZ
SUBJECT: RESULTS OF FINANCIAL SYSTEMS ASSESSMENT TEAM VISIT TO THE 
KURDISTAN REGION OF IRAQ (FIRST OF TWO CABLES) 
 
1. (U) This is an RRT Erbil reporting cable. 
 
2. (SBU) A tailored Financial System Assessment Team (FSAT) 
consisting of Gary Novis (Department of State, Office of the 
Coordinator for Counterterrorism (S/CT)-Head of Delegation), Robert 
Stapleton, (Department of Justice, Asset Forfeiture and Money 
Laundering Section), Matthew Johnson  (Treasury - Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency), Gregg Davis (Department of Defense, 
Iraq Threat Finance Cell) and Elizabeth Ingalls (Department of 
State, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism (S/CT) 
conducted an onsite visit to the Kurdistan Region of Iraq from 
December 8-14, 2007.  The team was accompanied by Jeffery Hilsgen 
(Department of State, Regional Reconstruction Team in Erbil). The 
team met with a wide array of government and private sector entities 
in the Kurdistan Region, including representatives from the 
Kurdistan Regional Government's (KRG)  Ministries of finance, 
interior and justice, as well as central bank branch leaders, police 
and airport security officials, bankers, money exchangers and money 
transmitters.  By necessity, the FSAT was limited in both duration 
and geographic scope and therefore this assessment should be seen in 
this context.  The FSAT team, however, does note the near universal 
desire for counterterrorist finance and anti-money laundering 
training and technical assistance in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. 
 
 
Executive Summary 
----------------- 
 
3. (SBU) The KRG understands the serious nature of money laundering 
and terrorist financing and acknowledges the need for training, 
particularly given its history of internal and external isolation. 
The KRG is primarily focused on combating Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and 
its affiliated groups, as well as groups supported by Iran, as they 
are seen as the primary terrorist threat to Iraq and the Kurdistan 
Region.  While Kurdistan Region's economy is primarily cash based, 
this is likely to change as energy sector development increases the 
need for the development of a more robust formal financial sector 
that is integrated into the international financial community. 
Therefore, development of sound anti-money laundering and 
counterterrorist financing (AML/CTF) regimes that are well 
integrated into the overall AML/CTF system of Iraq, are critical in 
reducing the risk of terrorist financing and money laundering in the 
Kurdistan Region and Iraq. 
 
4. (U) The KRG governs three provinces - Erbil, Sulaimaniyah, and 
Dohuk.  In 2006, the KRG absorbed several ministries in Sulaimaniyah 
that had previously functioned somewhat independently.  The KRG has 
not yet absorbed the Sulaimaniyah ministries of finance, interior 
and peshmerga affairs.  Likewise, there are two branches of the 
Central Bank of Iraq (CBI) in the Kurdistan Region - a branch in 
Erbil and a branch in Sulaimaniyah.. 
 
5. (SBU) The FSAT noted a number of areas of concern and 
vulnerabilities in which training and technical assistance could 
help reduce the KAR's vulnerability to terrorist financing and money 
laundering.  For example, the FSAT noted the lack of connectivity 
and communication between the Central Bank branches both within the 
KAR and with the Central Bank of Iraq, as well as a lack of an 
institutionalized AML/CTF framework.  There was also a significant 
disconnect between the Central Bank branches and Iraq's financial 
intelligence unit (FIU), the Money Laundering Reporting Office 
(MLRO).  These difficulties are likely to be compounded by the fire 
that occurred at the Central Bank in Baghdad on January 28 which 
destroyed parts of the Central Bank building and equipment. 
Additionally, representatives from the Kurdistan Region's Central 
Bank Branches stated that the basic knowledge level of their 
employees relating to financial and regulatory matters is quite low 
and needs to be raised. 
 
6. (SBU) In the judicial sector there appears to be a lack of 
continuity in the application of the Anti-Money Laundering law, and 
there are no specialized courts or professional skills development 
for the complex crimes of money laundering and terrorist financing. 
In addition, while law enforcement authorities vigorously pursue 
leads for terrorism and terrorist financing, they could benefit from 
additional investigative training, and particularly from financial 
"follow the money" investigative training.  Finally, the team noted 
that Bulk Cash Smuggling training should be pursued as a means of 
strengthening the implementation of Iraq's cross border currency 
reporting requirements. 
 
Financial Sector Development 
---------------------------- 
 
7. (SBU) The rudimentary financial sector in the Kurdistan Region 
functions within a largely cash-based economy. Most transactions are 
conducted via a "hawala" type system of money exchangers and money 
transmitters.  Integration of the formal financial sector with other 
parts of Iraq and the international financial system remains very 
limited.  This situation, while likely to change as the oil sector 
becomes more developed and the need for standard international 
 
BAGHDAD 00001347  002 OF 006 
 
 
transactions increases, is a major cause for concern, as different 
interests both inside and outside of Iraq vie for financial 
influence and control. 
 
The Financial Sector 
-------------------- 
 
8. (U) The financial sector in the Kurdistan Region consists of 
public and private banks, as well as money exchangers and money 
transmitters.  Banks in the Kurdistan Region are responsible for 
providing banking services to both the general public and, through 
public banks, to government entities as well.  As noted earlier the 
Central Bank of Iraq (CBI) is responsible for licensing all public 
and private banks in Iraq.  Representatives from the banking 
community noted that they are still in the early stages of 
attracting both individuals and business customers, as years of 
economic instability and numerous bank failures have led many to 
distrust banks.  The banking community in the Kurdistan Region has 
also suffered both technologically and experientially as a result of 
both international and internal isolation during the regime of 
Saddam Hussein. 
 
9. (SBU) The FSAT held discussions with representatives from several 
money exchange and money transmitter businesses.  They confirmed 
that most transactions, foreign exchange operations, and money 
remittances take place through these businesses and not through the 
banking sector.  Most international remittances are done via related 
offices in Amman or Dubai.  While simple funds transfers can take 
weeks to accomplish through the banking sector, the same 
transactions can be done very rapidly and at lower cost through 
money exchange and transfer sectors. 
 
Financial Sector Challenges and Vulnerabilities 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
10. (U) The financial sector in the Kurdistan Region faces a number 
of challenges with respect to terrorist financing and money 
laundering.  Kurdish bankers' professional skills atrophied and 
remained underdeveloped during the regime of Saddam Hussein.  The 
overall level of banking expertise is limited, especially among the 
area's Iraqi-owned banks that possess little knowledge or expertise 
with regard to execution of international transactions.  The banking 
sector in general lacks sufficient technology to function 
effectively domestically, let alone internationally.  There is a 
lack of modern banking technology, in particular a complete absence 
of an electronic payment system and wire transfer capability.  As 
the financial sector is relatively new, there is little 
institutional knowledge with respect to AML/CTF issues. 
Furthermore, while the banks are ostensibly providing traditional 
banking services such as lending to the community, in practice they 
collect funds and send excess reserves to the Central Bank in 
Baghdad where they receive 18-20 percent return on deposit 
facilities in excess of the obligatory reserve requirement (as of 2 
March 2008 this return is 15-18 percent.)  Deposit facilities for 
dinar are term deposits having 7, 14, and 30 day maturities. 
Outside of this relationship, there is poor communication with the 
Central Bank, particularly with respect to addressing potential 
money laundering, suspected terrorist financing and other potential 
risks. 
 
11. (SBU) The banking sector believes that terrorist financing and 
money laundering risks lie primarily with the money 
exchange/transfer service sector.  They advocate and are lobbying 
for a legal ban against such services.  Based on our experiences, 
the FSAT does not advocate this approach.  Given the low-level of 
development of the banking sector, such a policy would likely prove 
counter-productive, difficult to enforce, and remove incentives for 
the money exchangers and transmitters to cooperate with authorities. 
 The FSAT recommends that the KRG authorities look at alternative 
solutions, such as more stringent licensing of the money exchangers 
and transmitters and a requirement to report suspicious 
transactions, as more effective means of reducing vulnerabilities 
relating to terrorist financing and money laundering in this sector. 
 
 
12. (SBU) Although financial institutions are required to report 
suspicious transactions, including potential money laundering and 
terrorist financing under the anti-money laundering ordinance, in 
practice they do not.  This is due to a lack of training, technology 
and the isolation of the MLRO. 
 
13. (SBU) The banking sector as a whole will benefit from training 
and technical assistance in all areas of banking.  The acquisition 
and implementation of modern banking technology will not only 
improve the effectiveness of the banking sector overall, it will 
also provide banks with increased capability to collect and report 
data, such as suspicious transactions.  This will help reduce the 
banking sector's money laundering and terrorist financing risks. 
 
14. (SBU) As the MLRO becomes more established and experienced it 
should engage in a public outreach program in the Kurdistan Region 
 
BAGHDAD 00001347  003 OF 006 
 
 
and the rest of Iraq, to educate the banking sector and general 
public on the risks of money laundering and terrorist financing and 
the benefits in reporting suspicious transactions. 
 
The Central Bank of Iraq 
------------------------ 
 
15. (U) The CBI has four branches; two of these branches are in the 
Kurdistan Region (in Erbil and Sulaimaniyah).  A third branch is in 
Basra, and the fourth is in Mosul.  The CBI also houses Iraq's 
financial intelligence unit, the MLRO.  In the Kurdistan Region, the 
branch offices of the CBI have, contrary to Iraqi law, assumed 
responsibility for licensing and examining private and public banks, 
and money exchangers and transmitters.  Currently the Central Bank 
of Iraq branch in Erbil licenses a total of 45 private banks and 
branches and 22 public banks and branches.  The Central Bank in 
Sulaimaniyah licenses 12 private banks and branches and 16 public 
banks and branches. 
 
16. (U) Both Central Bank branches are required to conduct periodic 
examinations of the banks.  For public banks this occurs every 6 
months and every three months for private banks.  The Central Bank 
branch in Erbil currently has ten examiners (five of which are money 
laundering examiners) while the Central Bank of Sulaimaniyah has 
nine examiners (three of which are money laundering examiners).  At 
this time, there have been no meaningful examinations or visitations 
by employees of the Central Banks to any of the banks or branches 
they are charged with overseeing. 
 
Central Bank Challenges and Vulnerabilities 
------------------------------------------- 
 
17. (SBU) CBI oversight and control of the Kurdistan Region's 
post-2003 banking system remains inadequate.  The FSAT believes the 
CBI could become even less adept at fulfilling its regulatory 
oversight responsibilities, given the expected petrodollar-fueled 
development and expansion of the Kurdistan Region's commercial 
banking system.  In other words, the CBI's slowly improving 
regulatory capabilities will likely not match the expected faster 
pace of development in the banking sector. One of the most 
significant challenges facing the two Central Bank branches in the 
Kurdistan Region is the lack of communication between the branches 
themselves and and the Central Bank of Iraq in Baghdad.  In 
addition, CBI branch leaders in Erbil and Sulaimaniyah remain 
adamantly independent of CBI headquarters in Baghdad with respect to 
addressing money laundering, terrorist financing and other illegal 
financial activities. 
 
18. (SBU) The FSAT noted the strong interest in the Central Bank 
branches for increased training to address a number of challenges 
and vulnerabilities that they face with respect to money laundering 
and terrorist financing.  One of the challenges confronting the 
Central Bank is the lack of trust and confidence in the formal 
financial sector due to the history of misuse and abuses of this 
sector during the Saddam Hussein regime.  The Central Bank branches 
also acknowledged a lack of communication between the central bank 
branches in the Kurdistan Region and headquarters in Baghdad.  This 
lack of communication makes the Central Bank of Iraq particularly 
vulnerable to those who can and will exploit this vulnerability to 
engage in money laundering and terrorist finance activity. 
 
19. (SBU) An additional vulnerability lies in the largely 
unregulated money exchange and money transmitter businesses. 
Although they are required to be licensed, the level of supervision 
is at best nominal.  Currently, the licensing of the money exchange 
and money transmitter business is carried out by the Ministry of 
Finance.  However, this responsibility is being transferred back to 
the Central Bank.  Due to the lack of oversight by the Central Bank 
relating to the formal financial sector, this transfer will not by 
itself reduce the level of vulnerability in this sector.  The money 
exchanges are not subject to the same examination process as banks 
nor are they required to report suspicious transactions. 
 
20. (SBU) Central Bank branch officials acknowledge that the current 
training on AML/CTF and banking examination practices is inadequate. 
 In addition, the MLRO, which should assist in the training and 
monitoring for ML/TF, is not developed enough yet to execute its 
core mission.  Additionally, the lack of substantive communication 
with Central Banks branches outside of Baghdad continues to hinder 
any efforts in the area of AML/CTF. 
 
Recommendations for Central Bank 
Training and Technical Assistance 
--------------------------------- 
 
21. (SBU) Although it falls somewhat outside the scope of the 
AML/CTF assistance, the FSAT highlights the need for improved 
technology to assist the Central Bank branches in conducting their 
core responsibilities, particularly in the areas of fund transfers, 
analysis (cash and credit positions) and prudent safety and 
soundness examinations.  Communication standards need to be 
 
BAGHDAD 00001347  004 OF 006 
 
 
developed and implemented (via technological/IT solutions) so the 
Central Bank branches can communicate and with each other, with the 
Central Bank headquarters in Baghdad, and the MLRO.  Effective 
communication will reduce exposure and the risks associated with 
financial fraud, money laundering and terrorist financing. 
 
22. (SBU) With respect to anti-money laundering, the FSAT believes 
the Central Bank employees will benefit from regulatory training 
that focuses on banking processes, electronic funds transfers, bank 
examination policy and procedures and AML/CTF techniques.  As time 
progresses, and the MLRO becomes more capable (or experienced), 
consideration should be given to the concept of placing a MLRO 
representative in each of the Central Bank branches.  This would 
facilitate communication and enhance the Central Bank branches' 
AML/CTF knowledge and capabilities. 
 
Ministry of Finance 
------------------- 
 
23. (U) The KRG Ministries of Finance in Erbil and Sulaimaniyah are 
primarily responsible for disbursing funds to the various government 
ministries once the Kurdistan National Assembly (KNA) has passed an 
approved budget.  The Ministries of Finance also have an audit and 
control function that is responsible for ensuring the ministries are 
operating within their respective budgets.  In addition to these 
general responsibilities, these ministries are supposed to maintain 
a list of all licensed money exchangers and transmitters. 
Currently, there is no such list. 
 
24. (SBU) The Ministries of Finance are currently not capable of 
effectively and efficiently performing their overall mission due to 
a lack of financial and budgeting processes.  In addition, their 
employees do not have the necessary expertise to perform critical 
audits of the monies being disbursed to the various government 
agencies. 
 
25. (SBU) The FSAT recommends that such information (i.e., license 
applications and approvals, owner and operator information, etc.) 
associated with all money exchangers and transmitters collected into 
a database and shared with the appropriate authorities such as the 
Central Bank branches and the MLRO. 
 
26. (SBU) The FSAT also recommends that the Ministries of Finance 
commence a robust training program to enhance their audit and 
control functions.  Currently no one effectively audits or 
investigates discrepancies in the various ministries' budget and 
payment systems. 
 
Justice Sector 
-------------- 
 
27. (U) The FSAT met with members of the Judiciary and the Ministry 
of Justice. 
 
Basic Structure and Criminal Procedure 
-------------------------------------- 
 
28. (U) There are three levels of courts: the court of first degree, 
the court of appeal, and the court of assignation.  The court of 
first degree includes criminal courts, civil courts, investigative 
courts, juvenile courts, labor courts, and secular courts for 
non-Muslims.  A few days prior to the arrival of the FSAT, the 
President of the KRG approved a new law that creates a Judicial 
Council, thus making the courts independent of the KRG's Ministry of 
Justice (MOJ) and the executive branch. 
 
Criminal Procedure 
------------------ 
 
29. (SBU) A criminal case must go through a series of phases before 
it can be brought to the court of first instance.  During the 
initial investigative phase of the case, law enforcement initiates 
an investigation, approved by the MOJ, during which law enforcement 
entities collect evidence pertaining to the crime that allegedly 
occurred.  The case is then submitted to an investigative judge in 
the investigative court.  If the investigative judge believes that 
the evidence is sufficient to proceed, s/he will refer the case to 
the public prosecutor, who can then refer the case to the criminal 
court.  The prosecutor reviews the investigative judge's decision 
and advises the criminal court whether to take the case.  The 
prosecutor can also refer the case back to the investigative judge 
if s/he thinks there are gaps in the case.  If the investigative 
judge does not believe the evidence meets the burden to refer the 
case to the criminal court, s/he can dismiss the case and release 
the individual.  The investigative judge has six months to review a 
case.  If s/he needs more time to conclude the investigation, s/he 
can petition the court for an extension.  If the case makes it to 
the court of first degree, a three judge panel hears the case, with 
two judges acting as reserves.  Of the three judges, one may be the 
President of the Court, and only he addresses the participants in 
the proceedings.  Should the defense or prosecutor have a question 
 
BAGHDAD 00001347  005 OF 006 
 
 
of a witness, s/he must ask the judge to ask the question.  The 
trials are bifurcated for guilt and penalty.  If the court finds the 
defendant guilty, it will then issue a separate ruling on the 
penalty.  Should the court issue a death sentence, the defendant 
gets an automatic appeal to the Court of Cassation.  In all other 
cases, the parties must request an appeal and have 30 days to do so 
from the time the court issues its opinion. 
 
30. (SBU) The Public Prosecutor acts like a monitor in criminal 
trials, and is permitted to raise issues or questions.  If the court 
does not address the issue(s) the prosecutor raises, s/he may appeal 
the court's decision.  At the conclusion of the trial, the 
prosecutor writes a report about the trial. 
 
31. (SBU) There was little to no discussion about money laundering 
cases that have made their way through the courts.  It appears to be 
safe to say that KRG officials have not prosecuted anyone under the 
AML law implemented by the CPA.  The courts can order confiscation 
of property, but it appears they can only do so if directly related 
to the crime, including drug proceeds.  According to the Iraqi Penal 
Code, a person must pay the government back for any property s/he 
stole from the government, even if the person must do so at his/her 
own expense.  In other cases of theft, restitution is made to the 
victim(s).  Any property forfeited to the state becomes state 
property and goes into the general treasury.  Should the government 
confiscate perishables, it can sell them off while the case is 
on-going and if the defendant is acquitted, the government returns 
the money it realized from the sale of the goods to the defendant. 
While the case is on-going, the government appoints a judicial 
guardian to supervise and maintain the property pending the outcome 
of the case. 
 
32. (SBU) The Kurdistan Region does not have any special courts 
dedicated to trying a narrow set of cases, (e.g., a court dedicated 
to trying only terrorism cases).  But, according to some officials, 
there is a special investigative court dedicated to examining 
terrorism cases.  The Public Prosecutor does not have prosecutors 
who specialize in prosecuting certain types of cases, (i.e., there 
are no prosecutors devoted to prosecuting only financial crimes). 
 
Justice Sector and Vulnerabilities 
---------------------------------- 
 
33. (SBU) Based upon the discussions the FSAT had with MOJ and 
judicial authorities, several challenges and vulnerabilities were 
noted.  As with other institutions, the MOJ and judicial authorities 
in the Kurdistan Region have been hampered by international and 
domestic isolation.  In addition, there was a lack of independence 
of the judiciary as well as some reported cases of political 
influence over the administration of justice.  As mentioned above, 
however, the KRG just passed a new law granting the judiciary 
independence.  This may help to alleviate some of these issues, but 
training on an independent judiciary is of the utmost importance. 
 
34. (SBU) One specific concern noted by the FSAT was the lack of the 
application of the anti-money laundering law within the Kurdistan 
Region.  There is confusion amongst KRG officials as to how the law 
is applied.  Some believe that the CPA AML law is not in effect in 
the Kurdistan Region because the Kurdistan National Assembly never 
approved it.  Other officials believe the law is in effect in the 
Kurdistan Region and should be applied, but they noted the lack of 
will amongst officials in the region to apply the law.  While there 
is no question that AML training is absolutely necessary for all KRG 
law enforcement officials, prosecutors and judges, there are other, 
more basic issues that first must be addressed via training.  , Due 
to the lack of a strong Central Bank, inadequate technology employed 
by banks,  and a deeply rooted distrust of the banking sector, 
comprehensive AML training at this time may be premature.  However, 
if the training were tailored and specific, AML training would be 
beneficial in the regulation, investigation and prosecution of cases 
involving money exchange houses. 
 
35. (SBU) The KRG has prosecuted a number of terrorist cases.  The 
KRG judicial officials noted that security at terrorism trials 
remains an issue. There have been no terrorist financing cases. 
Officials also noted that Iraq does not have a stand alone terrorist 
financing law. 
 
36. (SBU) Based on these discussions the FSAT team recommends a 
number of training initiatives.  First the FSAT recommends training, 
perhaps in the form of a legal symposium on the Anti-Money 
Laundering law and its application.  Second, if amenable, we can 
provide comments on the new law creating an independent judiciary. 
The judiciary is also in need of training to address its new-found 
independence.  The FSAT believes that the Kurdistan Region's 
prosecutors could benefit from specialized basic and general 
training on financial crimes tailored to the current specific needs 
in Iraq.  Furthermore, the FSAT believes that joint judicial and 
prosecutorial training in case management techniques would help 
improve the efficiency of the Kurdistan Region's  legal system. 
Finally, the Iraqis are in desperate need of training to combat 
 
BAGHDAD 00001347  006 OF 006 
 
 
corruption; however, due to the lack of will to prosecute certain 
types of cases, most notably against politicians, results may be 
limited. 
 
Ministry of Interior 
 
37. (SBU) The Ministries of Interior (MOI) in Erbil and Sulaimaniyah 
are primarily responsible for general law enforcement operations, 
with the exception of drugs and terrorism, which is the purview of 
the Asayeesh (Security Police), with whom they cooperate.  The MOIs, 
however, have a significant law enforcement training function. 
 
38. (SBU) There is a Ministry of Interior in Erbil as well as in 
Sulaimaniyah, with the MOI in Erbil covering both Erbil and Dohuk 
provinces.  The Ministries informed the FSAT that they are working 
on a draft law to combine the two ministries.  It appears as though 
the MOI in Erbil has more state of the art equipment, because the 
MOI in Sulaimaniyah stated that when they have an issue they cannot 
resolve in their small lab in Sulaimaniyah, they turn to the lab in 
Erbil for assistance.  The police under the control of the MOI have 
the ability to conduct undercover operations and controlled 
deliveries, but do not have the equipment to conduct surveillance. 
 
39. (SBU) In order to join the police forces under the purview of 
the MOI, one must attend a college for police.  If one is a high 
school graduate, s/he would attend the college for three years.  If 
one is a college graduate, s/he would only have to attend the 
college for 8-9 months.  Courses at the college include physical 
training, law, human rights, and democracy.  The MOI in Erbil told 
the FSAT that they are building a new police academy in Dohuk that 
would be ready in six months, with classrooms that will hold 30-40 
students and will accommodate computer presentations.  The MOI in 
Sulaimaniyah told the FSAT that they also have their own police 
college that is better than the academy in Baghdad, but not as good 
as the one in Dohuk. 
 
40. (SBU) Almost all of the police force is armed with AK-47's. 
According to the MOI in Erbil, about one-third of the police force 
is armed with pistols.  Police officers can only arrest with a 
warrant, unless they witnessed someone committing a crime.  The MOI 
police also need the permission of the MOJ in order to conduct an 
investigation. 
 
41. (SBU) Both MOI's admitted they need training in investigating 
money laundering and financial crimes.  While there appears to be 
good communication between the ministries in the KRG, there appears 
to be poor communication with the central government.  The MOI in 
Erbil claims to have a good relationship with police in Mosul and 
Kirkuk, but no one claims to have good communication with Baghdad. 
The MOI in Sulaimaniyah stated that it is difficult to purchase the 
necessary weapons and ammunition it needs and that they are not 
getting any assistance from Baghdad in this regard. 
 
MOI Challenges and Vulnerabilities 
---------------------------------- 
 
42. (SBU) MOI officers and personnel could benefit from additional 
training in basic investigative techniques as well as financial 
investigative training.  Communication between local law enforcement 
throughout Iraq must improve, and the central government in Baghdad 
must provide the necessary information to the various law 
enforcement groups throughout the country, including sharing 
Interpol notices, developing a criminal database, and communication 
with the MLRO.  Not only would the MOI benefit from a more uniform 
training of its cadets in Erbil, Dohuk and Sulaimaniyah, but so 
would all of Iraq.  Training appears to be disjointed and better in 
some parts of the country than in others.  It is important that a 
national, federalized police force be able to function with the same 
skill level regardless of its location.  Perhaps the central 
government needs to develop a national curriculum and should look 
towards the training grounds in the Kurdistan Region as a starting 
point for training all national law enforcement.  MOI officials 
noted that they do not conduct surveillance because they lack the 
necessary equipment. 
 
 
BUTENIS