Currently released so far... 97115 / 251,287
Articles
Brazil
Sri Lanka
United Kingdom
Sweden
00. Editorial
United States
Latin America
Egypt
Jordan
Yemen
Thailand
Browse latest releases
2010/12/01
2010/12/02
2010/12/03
2010/12/04
2010/12/05
2010/12/06
2010/12/07
2010/12/08
2010/12/09
2010/12/10
2010/12/11
2010/12/12
2010/12/13
2010/12/14
2010/12/15
2010/12/16
2010/12/17
2010/12/18
2010/12/19
2010/12/20
2010/12/21
2010/12/22
2010/12/23
2010/12/25
2010/12/26
2010/12/27
2010/12/28
2010/12/29
2010/12/30
2011/01/01
2011/01/02
2011/01/04
2011/01/05
2011/01/07
2011/01/09
2011/01/11
2011/01/12
2011/01/13
2011/01/14
2011/01/15
2011/01/16
2011/01/17
2011/01/18
2011/01/19
2011/01/20
2011/01/21
2011/01/22
2011/01/23
2011/01/24
2011/01/25
2011/01/26
2011/01/27
2011/01/28
2011/01/29
2011/01/30
2011/01/31
2011/02/01
2011/02/02
2011/02/03
2011/02/04
2011/02/05
2011/02/06
2011/02/07
2011/02/08
2011/02/09
2011/02/10
2011/02/11
2011/02/12
2011/02/13
2011/02/14
2011/02/15
2011/02/16
2011/02/17
2011/02/18
2011/02/19
2011/02/20
2011/02/21
2011/02/22
2011/02/23
2011/02/24
2011/02/25
2011/02/26
2011/02/27
2011/02/28
2011/03/01
2011/03/02
2011/03/03
2011/03/04
2011/03/05
2011/03/06
2011/03/07
2011/03/08
2011/03/09
2011/03/10
2011/03/11
2011/03/13
2011/03/14
2011/03/15
2011/03/16
2011/03/17
2011/03/18
2011/03/19
2011/03/20
2011/03/21
2011/03/22
2011/03/23
2011/03/24
2011/03/25
2011/03/26
2011/03/27
2011/03/28
2011/03/29
2011/03/30
2011/03/31
2011/04/01
2011/04/02
2011/04/03
2011/04/04
2011/04/05
2011/04/06
2011/04/07
2011/04/08
2011/04/09
2011/04/10
2011/04/11
2011/04/12
2011/04/13
2011/04/14
2011/04/15
2011/04/16
2011/04/17
2011/04/18
2011/04/19
2011/04/20
2011/04/21
2011/04/22
2011/04/23
2011/04/24
2011/04/25
2011/04/26
2011/04/27
2011/04/28
2011/04/29
2011/04/30
2011/05/01
2011/05/02
2011/05/03
2011/05/04
2011/05/05
2011/05/06
2011/05/07
2011/05/09
2011/05/10
2011/05/11
2011/05/12
2011/05/13
2011/05/14
2011/05/15
2011/05/16
2011/05/17
2011/05/18
2011/05/19
2011/05/20
2011/05/21
2011/05/22
2011/05/23
2011/05/24
2011/05/25
2011/05/26
2011/05/27
2011/05/28
2011/05/29
2011/05/30
2011/05/31
2011/06/01
2011/06/02
2011/06/03
2011/06/04
2011/06/05
2011/06/06
2011/06/07
2011/06/08
2011/06/09
2011/06/10
2011/06/11
2011/06/12
2011/06/13
2011/06/14
2011/06/15
2011/06/16
2011/06/17
2011/06/18
2011/06/19
2011/06/20
2011/06/21
2011/06/22
2011/06/23
2011/06/24
2011/06/25
2011/06/26
2011/06/27
2011/06/28
2011/06/29
2011/06/30
2011/07/01
2011/07/02
2011/07/04
2011/07/05
2011/07/06
2011/07/07
2011/07/08
2011/07/10
2011/07/11
2011/07/12
2011/07/13
2011/07/14
2011/07/15
2011/07/16
2011/07/17
2011/07/18
2011/07/19
2011/07/20
2011/07/21
2011/07/22
2011/07/23
2011/07/25
2011/07/27
2011/07/28
2011/07/29
2011/07/31
2011/08/01
2011/08/02
2011/08/03
2011/08/05
2011/08/06
2011/08/07
2011/08/08
2011/08/10
2011/08/11
2011/08/12
2011/08/13
2011/08/15
2011/08/16
2011/08/17
2011/08/19
2011/08/21
2011/08/22
2011/08/23
2011/08/24
2011/08/25
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Athens
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Apia
Embassy Antananarivo
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Accra
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Consulate Auckland
Consulate Amsterdam
Consulate Alexandria
Consulate Adana
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embasy Bonn
Embassy Bujumbura
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Budapest
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Brazzaville
Embassy Bratislava
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Bern
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belmopan
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Banjul
Embassy Bangui
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Consulate Belfast
Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Cotonou
Embassy Copenhagen
Embassy Conakry
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Canberra
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Curacao
Consulate Ciudad Juarez
Consulate Chiang Mai
Consulate Chennai
Consulate Chengdu
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Dili
Embassy Dhaka
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
DIR FSINFATC
Consulate Dusseldorf
Consulate Durban
Consulate Dubai
Consulate Dhahran
Embassy Guatemala
Embassy Grenada
Embassy Georgetown
Embassy Gaborone
Consulate Guayaquil
Consulate Guangzhou
Consulate Guadalajara
Embassy Helsinki
Embassy Harare
Embassy Hanoi
Consulate Hong Kong
Consulate Ho Chi Minh City
Consulate Hermosillo
Consulate Hamilton
Consulate Hamburg
Consulate Halifax
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kolonia
Embassy Kinshasa
Embassy Kingston
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kathmandu
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Consulate Krakow
Consulate Kolkata
Consulate Karachi
Consulate Kaduna
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Lusaka
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Lome
Embassy Ljubljana
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy Lilongwe
Embassy Libreville
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Leipzig
Consulate Lahore
Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE
Mission USNATO
Mission UNESCO
Mission Geneva
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Montevideo
Embassy Monrovia
Embassy Mogadishu
Embassy Minsk
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Mbabane
Embassy Maseru
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manila
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Malabo
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Consulate Mumbai
Consulate Montreal
Consulate Monterrey
Consulate Milan
Consulate Merida
Consulate Melbourne
Consulate Matamoros
Consulate Marseille
Embassy Nouakchott
Embassy Nicosia
Embassy Niamey
Embassy New Delhi
Embassy Ndjamena
Embassy Nassau
Embassy Nairobi
Consulate Nuevo Laredo
Consulate Naples
Consulate Naha
Consulate Nagoya
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Praia
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Of Spain
Embassy Port Moresby
Embassy Port Louis
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Podgorica
Embassy Phnom Penh
Embassy Paris
Embassy Paramaribo
Embassy Panama
Consulate Ponta Delgada
Consulate Peshawar
REO Mosul
REO Kirkuk
REO Hillah
REO Basrah
Embassy Rome
Embassy Riyadh
Embassy Riga
Embassy Reykjavik
Embassy Rangoon
Embassy Rabat
Consulate Rio De Janeiro
Consulate Recife
Secretary of State
Embassy Suva
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santo Domingo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy Sanaa
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy San Jose
Consulate Surabaya
Consulate Strasbourg
Consulate St Petersburg
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sapporo
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy Tokyo
Embassy Tirana
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tashkent
Embassy Tallinn
Consulate Toronto
Consulate Tijuana
Consulate Thessaloniki
USUN New York
USMISSION USTR GENEVA
USEU Brussels
US Office Almaty
US Mission Geneva
US Mission CD Geneva
US Interests Section Havana
US Delegation, Secretary
US Delegation FEST TWO
UNVIE
UN Rome
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius
Embassy Vientiane
Embassy Vienna
Embassy Vatican
Embassy Valletta
Consulate Vladivostok
Consulate Vancouver
Browse by tag
AF
ADANA
ASEC
AFIN
AMGT
AE
AORC
AID
AR
AO
AU
ASEAN
AGOA
AFGHANISTAN
AFFAIRS
AMED
APER
ASECARP
APEC
AEMR
AS
AA
ANET
AFLU
ABLD
AL
ASUP
AJ
APECO
AMER
ABUD
AODE
AM
AFSN
AESC
AND
AG
ALOW
AROC
AVIANFLU
ATRN
ACOA
AEGR
AMGMT
AADP
AFSI
ACABQ
APRM
AZ
AIDS
ASE
AGAO
ADCO
ABDALLAH
ARF
AIDAC
ACOTA
ASCH
AC
ASEG
AGR
ACS
AMCHAMS
AN
AMIA
ASIG
ADPM
ADB
ANARCHISTS
ALOWAR
ARM
AUC
AINF
AINT
AORG
AY
AVIAN
AMEDCASCKFLO
AK
ARSO
ARABBL
ASO
ANTITERRORISM
ARABL
AOWC
AGRICULTURE
ALJAZEERA
AMTC
AFINM
AOCR
ABER
ARR
AFPK
ASSEMBLY
ASSK
AZE
AORCYM
AINR
AGMT
AEC
ACKM
APRC
AIN
ASCC
AFPREL
ASED
APERTH
ASFC
ASECTH
AFSA
AOMS
AORCO
ANTXON
ARC
AFAF
ADIP
AIAG
AFARI
AEMED
AORL
AX
ASECAF
AOPC
ASECAFIN
AFZAL
APCS
AMB
AGUIRRE
AEMRASECCASCKFLOMARRPRELPINRAMGTJMXL
AIT
ARCH
AMEX
ALI
AQ
ATFN
AMBASSADOR
AORCD
AVIATION
ARAS
AINFCY
ACBAQ
AOPR
AREP
ALEXANDER
ATRD
AEIR
AOIC
ABLDG
ASEX
AFR
ASCE
ATRA
ASEK
AER
ALOUNI
AMCT
AVERY
APR
AMAT
AEMRS
ASPA
AFU
AMG
ATPDEA
ALL
AECL
ACAO
ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
AORD
AFL
AME
ADM
ASECPHUM
AGIT
ABT
ASECVE
AGUILAR
AT
ABMC
ALZUGUREN
ANGEL
ASR
ANTONIO
BMGT
BEXP
BM
BG
BL
BA
BR
BTA
BO
BY
BBSR
BLUE
BK
BF
BTIO
BELLVIEW
BE
BU
BN
BH
BD
BC
BTC
BILAT
BT
BX
BRUSSELS
BP
BB
BRPA
BUSH
BURMA
BMENA
BESP
BIT
BBG
BGD
BMEAID
BAGHDAD
BEN
BIO
BMOT
BWC
BLUNT
BURNS
BUT
BGMT
BAIO
BCW
BOEHNER
BFIF
BOL
BASHAR
BIMSTEC
BOU
BIDEN
BZ
BFIN
BTRA
BI
BHUM
BOIKO
BERARDUCCI
BOUCHAIB
BORDER
BEXPC
BTIU
BTT
BIOS
BEXB
BGPGOV
BOND
BLR
CE
CG
CH
CVR
CASC
CU
CI
CD
CO
CDG
CB
CJAN
CPAS
COM
CVIS
CMGT
CT
CENTCOM
CNARC
CTERR
COUNTER
CHIEF
CDC
CTR
CBW
COUNTRY
CLEARANCE
CY
CA
CM
CS
CWC
CN
CITES
CF
CWG
CIVS
CFIS
CASCC
CROATIA
CONS
COUNTERTERRORISM
CASA
COE
CJ
CHR
CODEL
CR
CBC
CACS
CHERTOFF
CAS
CONTROL
CONDITIONS
CONDOLEEZZA
CITEL
CV
CLINTON
CHG
CZ
CON
CTBT
CEN
CRIMES
COMMERCE
CLOK
CRISTINA
CFED
CARC
CND
CTM
CARICOM
COUNTRYCLEARANCE
CBTH
CHINA
CSW
CICTE
CJUS
CYPRUS
CW
CAMBODIA
CENSUS
CIDA
CRIME
CBG
CBE
CMGMT
CAIO
CEC
CARSON
CPCTC
CEDAW
COMESA
CVIA
CWCM
CEA
COSI
CAPC
CGEN
COPUOS
CGOPRC
COETRD
CKGR
CFE
CQ
CITT
CIC
CARIB
CVIC
CLO
CAFTA
CVISU
CHRISTOPHER
CACM
CIAT
CDB
CIS
CUL
CHAO
CNC
CL
CSEP
COMMAND
CENTER
COL
CAN
CAJC
CUIS
CONSULAR
CLMT
CIA
CBSA
CEUDA
CAC
CROS
CIO
CPUOS
CKOR
CVPR
CONG
CONTROLS
CEPTER
CVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGKIRF
CDCE
DPOL
DEMARCHE
DHS
DR
DA
DISENGAGEMENT
DEMOCRATIC
DEFENSE
DJ
DY
DARFUR
DHRF
DEA
DTRO
DPRK
DO
DARFR
DOC
DRL
DK
DOJ
DTRA
DOMESTIC
DAC
DOD
DEAX
DIEZ
DEOC
DELTAVIOLENCE
DCOM
DMINE
DRC
DCG
DPKO
DOMESTICPOLITICS
DE
DB
DOT
DEPT
DOE
DHLAKAMA
DHSX
DS
DKEM
DAO
DCM
DANIEL
DEM
DAVID
DCRM
ETRD
EAGR
ETTC
EAID
ECON
EFIN
ECIN
EINV
ELAB
EAIR
ENRG
EPET
EWWT
ECPS
EIND
EMIN
ELTN
EC
ETMIN
EUC
EZ
ET
ELECTIONS
ENVR
EU
EUN
EG
EINT
ER
ECONOMICS
ES
EMS
ENIV
EEB
EN
ECE
ECOSOC
EK
ENVIRONMENT
EFIS
EI
EWT
ENGRD
ECPSN
EXIM
EIAD
ERIN
ECPC
EDEV
ENGY
ECTRD
EPA
ESTH
ECCT
EINVECON
ENGR
ERTD
EUR
EAP
EWWC
ELTD
EL
EXIMOPIC
EXTERNAL
ETRDEC
ESCAP
ECO
EGAD
ELNT
ECONOMIC
ENV
ETRN
EIAR
EUMEM
ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID
EREL
ECOM
ECONETRDEAGRJA
ETCC
ETRG
ECONOMY
EMED
ETR
ENERG
EITC
EFINOECD
EURM
EENG
ERA
EXPORT
ENRD
ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC
EGEN
EBRD
EVIN
ETRAD
ECOWAS
EFTA
ECONETRDBESPAR
EGOVSY
EPIN
EID
ECONENRG
EDRC
ESENV
ETT
EB
ENER
ELTNSNAR
ECHEVARRIA
ETRC
EPIT
EDUC
ESA
EFI
ENRGY
ESCI
EE
EAIDXMXAXBXFFR
EETC
ECIP
EIAID
EIVN
EBEXP
ESTN
EING
EGOV
ETRA
EPETEIND
ELAN
ETRDGK
EAIDRW
ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS
EPEC
ENVI
ELN
EAG
EPCS
EPRT
EPTED
ETRB
EUM
EAIDS
EFIC
EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM
EAIDAR
ESF
EIDN
ELAM
EDU
EV
EAIDAF
ECN
EDA
EXBS
EINTECPS
ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ
EPREL
EAC
EINVEFIN
ETA
EAGER
EINDIR
ECA
ECLAC
ELAP
EITI
EUCOM
ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID
EARG
ELDIN
EINVKSCA
ENNP
EFINECONCS
EFINTS
ECCP
ETC
EAIRASECCASCID
EINN
ETRP
EAIDNI
EFQ
ECOQKPKO
EGPHUM
EBUD
ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ
ENERGY
ELB
EINDETRD
EMI
ECONEFIN
EIB
EURN
ETRDEINVTINTCS
EIN
EFIM
ETIO
ELAINE
EMN
EATO
EWTR
EIPR
EINVETC
ETTD
ETDR
EIQ
ECONCS
EPPD
ENRGIZ
EISL
ESPINOSA
ELEC
EAIG
ESLCO
EUREM
ENTG
ERD
EINVECONSENVCSJA
EEPET
EUNCH
ECINECONCS
ETRO
ETRDECONWTOCS
ECUN
EFND
EPECO
EAIRECONRP
ERGR
ETRDPGOV
ECPN
ENRGMO
EPWR
EET
EAIS
EAGRE
EDUARDO
EAGRRP
EAIDPHUMPRELUG
EICN
ECONQH
EVN
EGHG
ELBR
EINF
EAIDHO
EENV
ETEX
ERNG
ED
FR
FREEDOM
FINREF
FJ
FI
FRELIMO
FOREIGN
FAA
FETHI
FAS
FTAA
FRB
FAO
FCS
FINANCE
FWS
FTA
FEMA
FDA
FLU
FRANCISCO
FBI
FORCE
FO
FARC
FK
FT
FCSC
FAC
FM
FMGT
FINV
FCSCEG
FARM
FERNANDO
FINR
FIN
FINE
FIR
FDIC
FOR
FOI
FCUL
FKLU
FMLN
FISO
FIXED
GM
GMUS
GG
GR
GE
GAZA
GT
GH
GZ
GJ
GLOBAL
GV
GABY
GOI
GA
GCC
GB
GY
GATT
GC
GUAM
GEORGE
GTIP
GOV
GOMEZ
GUTIERREZ
GL
GKGIC
GF
GU
GWI
GARCIA
GTMO
GN
GANGS
GIPNC
GAERC
GREGG
GUILLERMO
GASPAR
GERARD
GI
HK
HR
HUMANR
HUMAN
HO
HA
HUMANRIGHTS
HU
HHS
HIV
HUM
HRKAWC
HILLEN
HILLARY
HDP
HUMRIT
HSTC
HUMANITARIAN
HCOPIL
HADLEY
HURI
HL
HRETRD
HOURANI
HG
HARRIET
HESHAM
HI
HNCHR
HARRY
HRECON
HRC
HOSTAGES
HEBRON
HUMOR
HSWG
HYMPSK
HECTOR
HN
HYDE
HUD
HRPGOV
HIGHLIGHTS
ID
ILC
IS
IZ
ICAO
IMO
ITU
IR
IAEA
ICRC
IPROP
IT
IBRD
ISRAELI
IRAQI
ISSUES
ITRA
IV
IO
IGAD
IRAQ
IN
IMF
ICTR
ISCON
IADB
IDB
IEA
INR
IWC
ICCAT
ILO
INMARSAT
IOM
ICJ
IQ
ISPA
ITRD
IPR
INTELSAT
ISN
IAHRC
INTERNAL
IFAD
IICA
IHO
IRAN
IL
IRCE
IC
INTELLECTUAL
IRM
IE
ICTY
IDLI
IFO
ISCA
INF
INL
ISRAEL
INV
IBB
INFLUENZA
ISPL
ITER
ITIA
INRA
ISAF
IACHR
INTERPOL
IFR
IRS
INRB
IEF
ISAAC
ICC
INDO
IIP
IATTC
INAUGURATION
IND
INS
IZPREL
IACI
IEFIN
INNP
ILAB
IA
IMTS
ITALY
ITALIAN
IFIN
IRAJ
IX
ICG
IF
ITPHUM
ITA
IP
IACW
IK
IUCN
IZEAID
IRPE
IDA
ISLAMISTS
ITF
INRO
IBET
IDP
IRC
ISO
ICES
IRMO
ITPGOV
IQNV
IMSO
IRDB
IMET
INCB
IFRC
JA
JO
JP
JM
JCIC
JOHN
JE
JEFFERY
JS
JUS
JN
JOHNNIE
JAMES
JKUS
JOSEPH
JML
JAWAD
JSRP
JIMENEZ
JOSE
JKJUS
JK
JAPAN
KMDR
KPAO
KPKO
KJUS
KCRM
KGHG
KFRD
KWMN
KDEM
KTFN
KHIV
KGIC
KIDE
KSCA
KNNP
KHUM
KIPR
KSUM
KISL
KIRF
KCOR
KRCM
KPAL
KWBG
KN
KS
KOMC
KSEP
KFLU
KPWR
KTIA
KSEO
KMPI
KHLS
KICC
KSTH
KMCA
KVPR
KPRM
KE
KU
KZ
KFLO
KSAF
KTIP
KTEX
KBCT
KOCI
KOLY
KOR
KAWC
KACT
KUNR
KTDB
KSTC
KLIG
KSKN
KNN
KCFE
KCIP
KGHA
KHDP
KPOW
KUNC
KDRL
KV
KPREL
KCRS
KPOL
KRVC
KRIM
KGIT
KWIR
KT
KIRC
KOMO
KRFD
KUWAIT
KG
KFIN
KSCI
KTFIN
KFTN
KGOV
KPRV
KSAC
KGIV
KCRIM
KPIR
KSOC
KBIO
KW
KGLB
KMWN
KPO
KFSC
KSEAO
KSTCPL
KSI
KPRP
KREC
KFPC
KUNH
KCSA
KMRS
KNDP
KR
KICCPUR
KPPAO
KCSY
KTBT
KCIS
KNEP
KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KNNB
KGCC
KINR
KPOP
KMFO
KENV
KNAR
KVIR
KDRG
KDMR
KFCE
KNAO
KDEN
KGCN
KICA
KIMMITT
KMCC
KLFU
KMSG
KSEC
KUM
KCUL
KMNP
KSMT
KCOM
KOMCSG
KSPR
KPMI
KRAD
KIND
KCRP
KAUST
KWAWC
KTER
KCHG
KRDP
KPAS
KITA
KTSC
KPAOPREL
KWGB
KIRP
KJUST
KMIG
KLAB
KTFR
KSEI
KSTT
KAPO
KSTS
KLSO
KWNN
KPOA
KHSA
KNPP
KPAONZ
KBTS
KWWW
KY
KJRE
KPAOKMDRKE
KCRCM
KSCS
KWMNCI
KESO
KWUN
KPLS
KIIP
KEDEM
KPAOY
KRIF
KGICKS
KREF
KTRD
KFRDSOCIRO
KTAO
KJU
KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW
KEN
KO
KNEI
KEMR
KKIV
KEAI
KWAC
KRCIM
KWCI
KFIU
KWIC
KCORR
KOMS
KNNO
KPAI
KBWG
KTTB
KTBD
KTIALG
KILS
KFEM
KTDM
KESS
KNUC
KPA
KOMCCO
KCEM
KRCS
KWBGSY
KNPPIS
KNNPMNUC
KWN
KERG
KLTN
KALM
KCCP
KSUMPHUM
KREL
KGH
KLIP
KTLA
KAWK
KWMM
KVRP
KVRC
KAID
KSLG
KDEMK
KX
KIF
KNPR
KCFC
KFTFN
KTFM
KPDD
KCERS
KMOC
KDEMAF
KMEPI
KEMS
KDRM
KEPREL
KBTR
KEDU
KNP
KIRL
KNNR
KMPT
KISLPINR
KTPN
KA
KJUSTH
KPIN
KDEV
KTDD
KAKA
KFRP
KWNM
KTSD
KINL
KJUSKUNR
KWWMN
KECF
KWBC
KPRO
KVBL
KOM
KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG
KEDM
KFLD
KLPM
KRGY
KNNF
KICR
KIFR
KM
KWMNCS
KAWS
KLAP
KPAK
KDDG
KCGC
KID
KNSD
KMPF
KPFO
KDP
KCMR
KRMS
KNPT
KNNNP
KTIAPARM
KDTB
KNUP
KPGOV
KNAP
KNNC
KUK
KSRE
KREISLER
KIVP
KQ
KTIAEUN
KPALAOIS
KRM
KISLAO
KWM
KFLOA
LE
LU
LH
LA
LG
LO
LY
LANTERN
LI
LABOR
LORAN
LTTE
LT
LAS
LAB
LAW
LVPR
LARREA
LEBIK
LAURA
LS
LOTT
LOVE
LR
LEON
LAVIN
LGAT
LV
LAOS
LOG
LN
LB
MOPS
MO
MARR
ML
MASS
MZ
MR
MNUC
MX
MV
MCC
MY
MEDIA
MTCRE
MG
MCAP
MOPPS
MP
MI
MK
MC
MD
MA
MU
MASC
MW
MT
MEPP
MN
MTCR
MH
MEPI
MIL
MNUCPTEREZ
MMAR
MICHAEL
MUNC
MDC
MPOS
MONUC
MAR
MGMT
MAS
MEPN
MENDIETA
MARIA
MONTENEGRO
MOOPS
MSG
MARITIME
MURRAY
MUKASEY
MOTO
MCA
MFO
MEX
MRSEC
MMED
MACP
MAAR
MINUSTAH
MCCONNELL
MAPP
MGT
MARQUEZ
MANUEL
MNUR
MCCAIN
MF
MOHAMMAD
MOHAMED
MNU
MFA
MILITANTS
MINORITIES
MTS
MLS
MILI
MIAH
MEETINGS
MERCOSUR
MED
MARAD
MNVC
MINURSO
MNUCUN
MIK
MARK
MBM
MPP
MILITARY
MAPS
MNUK
MILA
MTRRE
MACEDONIA
MICHEL
MASSMNUC
MUCN
MQADHAFI
MPS
MARRGH
MRCRE
MTRE
MORALES
MAP
MCTRE
MHUC
MOPSGRPARM
MOROCCO
MCAPS
NL
NU
NS
NI
NPT
NATO
NO
NG
NATEU
NSF
NZ
NAS
NP
NDP
NLD
NGO
NEPAD
NAFTA
NASA
NEA
NGUYEN
NIH
NK
NIPP
NONE
NR
NANCY
NEGROPONTE
NRR
NERG
NSSP
NSG
NSFO
NE
NATSIOS
NFSO
NATIONAL
NTDB
NT
NCD
NTSB
NRC
NELSON
NAM
NH
NPG
NEC
NSC
NFATC
NMFS
NATOIRAQ
NAR
NZUS
NARC
NCCC
NA
NC
NEW
NRG
NUIN
NOVO
NATOPREL
NEY
NV
NICHOLAS
NPA
NW
NARCOTICS
NORAD
NOAA
NON
NTTC
NKNNP
NMNUC
NUMBERING
ODIP
OIIP
OPRC
OSCE
OREP
OTRA
OPET
OSCI
OVIP
OECD
OCII
OUALI
OPDC
OEXC
OFPD
OPIC
OFDP
OPCW
OECV
OAS
OM
OMIG
ODAG
OPREP
ORA
OIC
OEXCSCULKPAO
OIG
OASS
OFFICIALS
ORTA
OSAC
OIL
OIE
OEXP
OPEC
OPDAT
OMS
OES
OHI
OMAR
OCRA
OFSO
OCBD
OSTA
OAO
ONA
OTP
ORC
OAU
OXEC
OA
ODPC
OPDP
OVIPPRELUNGANU
OASC
OSHA
OPCD
OTR
OPPI
OPCR
OF
OFDPQIS
OSIC
OHUM
OSTRA
OASCC
OBSP
OFDA
OPICEAGR
OIM
OGAC
OTA
OTRAORP
OPPC
OESC
OCEA
OVP
ON
OPAD
OTAR
OCS
ODC
OTRD
OCED
OSD
ORUE
OREG
PHUM
PINR
PTER
PGOV
PREL
PREF
PL
PM
PHSA
PE
PARM
PINS
PK
PUNE
PO
PALESTINIAN
PU
PBTS
PROP
PTBS
POL
POLI
PA
PGOVZI
POLMIL
POLITICAL
PARTIES
POLM
PD
POLITICS
POLICY
PAS
PMIL
PINT
PNAT
PV
PKO
PPOL
PERSONS
PING
PBIO
PH
PETR
PARMS
PRES
PCON
PETERS
PRELBR
PT
PLAB
PP
PAK
PDEM
PKPA
PSOCI
PF
PLO
PTERM
PJUS
PSOE
PELOSI
PROPERTY
PGOVPREL
PARP
PRL
PNIR
PHUMKPAL
PG
PREZ
PGIC
PBOV
PAO
PKK
PROV
PHSAK
PHUMPREL
PROTECTION
PGOVBL
PSI
PRELPK
PGOVENRG
PUM
PRELKPKO
PATTY
PSOC
PRIVATIZATION
PRELSP
PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ
PMIG
PREC
PAIGH
PROG
PSHA
PARK
PETER
POG
PHUS
PPREL
PS
PTERPREL
PRELPGOV
POV
PKPO
PGOVECON
POUS
PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN
PWBG
PMAR
PREM
PAR
PNR
PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO
PARMIR
PGOVGM
PHUH
PARTM
PN
PRE
PTE
PY
POLUN
PPEL
PDOV
PGOVSOCI
PIRF
PGOVPM
PBST
PRELEVU
PGOR
PBTSRU
PRM
PRELKPAOIZ
PGVO
PERL
PGOC
PAGR
PMIN
PHUMR
PVIP
PPD
PGV
PRAM
PINL
PKPAL
PTERE
PGOF
PINO
PHAS
PODC
PRHUM
PHUMA
PREO
PPA
PEPFAR
PGO
PRGOV
PAC
PRESL
PORG
PKFK
PEPR
PRELP
PREFA
PNG
PGOVPHUMKPAO
PRELECON
PINOCHET
PFOR
PGOVLO
PHUMBA
PRELC
PREK
PHUME
PHJM
POLINT
PGOVPZ
PGOVKCRM
PGOVE
PHALANAGE
PARTY
PECON
PEACE
PROCESS
PLN
PRELSW
PAHO
PEDRO
PRELA
PASS
PPAO
PGPV
PNUM
PCUL
PGGV
PSA
PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
PGIV
PRFE
POGOV
PEL
PBT
PAMQ
PINF
PSEPC
POSTS
PHUMPGOV
PVOV
PHSAPREL
PROLIFERATION
PENA
PRELTBIOBA
PIN
PRELL
PGOVPTER
PHAM
PHYTRP
PTEL
PTERPGOV
PHARM
PROTESTS
PRELAF
PKBL
PRELKPAO
PKNP
PARMP
PHUML
PFOV
PERM
PUOS
PRELGOV
PHUMPTER
PARAGRAPH
PERURENA
PBTSEWWT
PCI
PETROL
PINSO
PINSCE
PQL
PEREZ
PBS
RS
REFUGEES
RW
RP
RELFREE
RO
REGIONAL
RIGHTS
REACTION
REPORT
RU
RENAMO
RIGHTSPOLMIL
REFORM
RM
REFUGEE
REL
RELATIONS
ROW
RREL
REGION
RATIFICATION
RBI
RICE
ROOD
RODENAS
RUIZ
RODHAM
ROBERT
RGY
ROY
REUBEN
RELIGIOUS
RUEHZO
RODRIGUEZ
RUEUN
RELAM
RSP
RF
RSO
RCMP
REO
ROSS
RPTS
RENE
REID
RUPREL
RMA
RI
REMON
RPEL
RFE
RFIN
RA
RAFAEL
RAY
RUS
RPREL
ROBERTG
RECIN
RAMONTEIJELO
SNAR
SP
SN
SMIG
SL
SOCI
SU
SG
SF
SENV
SZ
SOE
SCUL
SY
SO
SR
SYR
SE
SA
SW
SIPDIS
SCIENCE
SADC
SI
SCI
SOCIETY
SC
SAARC
STR
SECRETARY
SANC
SSH
ST
SNA
SGWI
SEP
SOCIS
SETTLEMENTS
SPECIALIST
SK
SHUM
START
STET
SCVL
SREF
SCHUL
SCUIL
SYRIA
SECURITY
SPCE
SYAI
SMIL
SOWGC
STEPHEN
SNRV
SKCA
SENSITIVE
SECI
SNAP
SPP
SCUD
SOM
SPECI
SMIGBG
SENC
SCRM
SGNV
SECTOR
SENVEAGREAIDTBIOECONSOCIXR
SENVSXE
SASIAIN
SACU
SENVSPL
SWMN
STEINBERG
SOPN
SOCR
SCOI
SCRS
SILVASANDE
SWE
SARS
SNARIZ
SUDAN
SENVQGR
SM
SNARKTFN
SAAD
SD
SAN
SIPRNET
STATE
SENS
SUBJECT
SFNV
SECSTATE
SSA
SPCVIS
SOI
SOFA
SCULKPAOECONTU
SPTER
SKSAF
SENVKGHG
SHI
SEVN
SANR
SPSTATE
SMITH
SCOM
SH
SNARCS
SNARN
SIPRS
SNARM
SIPDI
SCPR
SNIG
SELAB
SULLIVAN
SENVENV
SECDEF
SOLIC
SOIC
SPAS
SASC
SOSI
SEC
SEN
SENVCASCEAIDID
TU
TH
TW
TSPA
TRGY
TPHY
TBIO
TIFA
TS
TZ
TX
TSPL
TT
TK
TC
TINT
TERFIN
TERRORISM
TIP
TURKEY
TI
TECHNOLOGY
TNGD
TRSY
TRAFFICKING
TOPEC
TPSL
TP
TD
TR
TA
TIO
TREATY
TO
THPY
TECH
TRADE
TPSA
TG
TAGS
TF
TRAD
THKSJA
TVBIO
TNDG
TN
TBIOZK
TWI
TV
TWL
TRT
TWRO
TSRY
TTPGOV
TAUSCHER
TRBY
TRBIO
TL
TPKO
TIA
TGRY
TSPAM
TREL
TNAR
TBI
TFIN
TPHYPA
TWCH
THOMMA
THOMAS
TERROR
TRY
TBID
TPP
TE
THANH
TJ
TBKIO
UNGA
USUN
UN
UG
UNSC
UK
UP
US
UNCTAD
UNVIE
UNHRC
USTR
UNAMA
UNCRIME
UNESCO
UV
UNDP
UNHCR
UNCSD
UNCHR
UZ
USAID
UNEP
UNO
UNPUOS
UY
UNDC
UNCITRAL
UNAUS
UNCND
UA
UNMIK
USTDA
USEU
USDA
UNICEF
UR
UNFICYP
USNC
USTRRP
UNODC
UNRWA
UNOMIG
USTRPS
USAU
USCC
UNEF
UNGAPL
UNFPA
UNSCE
USSC
UGA
UEU
UNMIC
UNTAC
UNION
UNCLASSIFIED
USPS
UNA
UMIK
USOAS
UNMOVIC
UNFA
UNAIDS
UNCHC
USGS
UNSE
UNRCR
UNTERR
USG
UE
UAE
UNWRA
UNCSW
UNSCR
UNCHS
UNDESCO
UNPAR
UNC
UB
UNSCS
UKXG
UNGACG
UNREST
UNHR
USPTO
UNFCYP
USCG
UNIDROIT
UNSCD
UPU
UNBRO
UNECE
USTRUWR
UNCC
UNESCOSCULPRELPHUMKPALCUIRXFVEKV
VM
VE
VT
VETTING
VN
VZ
VIS
VC
VTPREL
VIP
VTEAID
VTEG
VOA
VA
VTIZ
VANG
VISIT
VO
VENZ
VAT
VI
VEPREL
VEN
WFP
WTO
WHO
WTRO
WBG
WMO
WIPO
WA
WI
WSIS
WHA
WCL
WE
WMN
WEBZ
WS
WAR
WZ
WMD
WW
WILLIAM
WEET
WAEMU
WM
WWBG
WWT
WWARD
WITH
WMDT
WTRQ
WCO
WEU
WALTER
WRTO
WB
WHTI
WBEG
WCI
WEF
WAKI
WHOA
WGC
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 08BAGHDAD1347, RESULTS OF FINANCIAL SYSTEMS ASSESSMENT TEAM VISIT TO THE
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #08BAGHDAD1347.
| Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 08BAGHDAD1347 | 2008-05-01 09:56 | 2011-08-24 16:30 | UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY | Embassy Baghdad |
VZCZCXRO2945
RR RUEHBC RUEHDA RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #1347/01 1220956
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 010956Z MAY 08
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7117
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 06 BAGHDAD 001347
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ECON EFIN PGOV PREL KTFN KCRM PTER SNAR IZ
SUBJECT: RESULTS OF FINANCIAL SYSTEMS ASSESSMENT TEAM VISIT TO THE
KURDISTAN REGION OF IRAQ (FIRST OF TWO CABLES)
¶1. (U) This is an RRT Erbil reporting cable.
¶2. (SBU) A tailored Financial System Assessment Team (FSAT)
consisting of Gary Novis (Department of State, Office of the
Coordinator for Counterterrorism (S/CT)-Head of Delegation), Robert
Stapleton, (Department of Justice, Asset Forfeiture and Money
Laundering Section), Matthew Johnson (Treasury - Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency), Gregg Davis (Department of Defense,
Iraq Threat Finance Cell) and Elizabeth Ingalls (Department of
State, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism (S/CT)
conducted an onsite visit to the Kurdistan Region of Iraq from
December 8-14, 2007. The team was accompanied by Jeffery Hilsgen
(Department of State, Regional Reconstruction Team in Erbil). The
team met with a wide array of government and private sector entities
in the Kurdistan Region, including representatives from the
Kurdistan Regional Government's (KRG) Ministries of finance,
interior and justice, as well as central bank branch leaders, police
and airport security officials, bankers, money exchangers and money
transmitters. By necessity, the FSAT was limited in both duration
and geographic scope and therefore this assessment should be seen in
this context. The FSAT team, however, does note the near universal
desire for counterterrorist finance and anti-money laundering
training and technical assistance in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq.
Executive Summary
-----------------
¶3. (SBU) The KRG understands the serious nature of money laundering
and terrorist financing and acknowledges the need for training,
particularly given its history of internal and external isolation.
The KRG is primarily focused on combating Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and
its affiliated groups, as well as groups supported by Iran, as they
are seen as the primary terrorist threat to Iraq and the Kurdistan
Region. While Kurdistan Region's economy is primarily cash based,
this is likely to change as energy sector development increases the
need for the development of a more robust formal financial sector
that is integrated into the international financial community.
Therefore, development of sound anti-money laundering and
counterterrorist financing (AML/CTF) regimes that are well
integrated into the overall AML/CTF system of Iraq, are critical in
reducing the risk of terrorist financing and money laundering in the
Kurdistan Region and Iraq.
¶4. (U) The KRG governs three provinces - Erbil, Sulaimaniyah, and
Dohuk. In 2006, the KRG absorbed several ministries in Sulaimaniyah
that had previously functioned somewhat independently. The KRG has
not yet absorbed the Sulaimaniyah ministries of finance, interior
and peshmerga affairs. Likewise, there are two branches of the
Central Bank of Iraq (CBI) in the Kurdistan Region - a branch in
Erbil and a branch in Sulaimaniyah..
¶5. (SBU) The FSAT noted a number of areas of concern and
vulnerabilities in which training and technical assistance could
help reduce the KAR's vulnerability to terrorist financing and money
laundering. For example, the FSAT noted the lack of connectivity
and communication between the Central Bank branches both within the
KAR and with the Central Bank of Iraq, as well as a lack of an
institutionalized AML/CTF framework. There was also a significant
disconnect between the Central Bank branches and Iraq's financial
intelligence unit (FIU), the Money Laundering Reporting Office
(MLRO). These difficulties are likely to be compounded by the fire
that occurred at the Central Bank in Baghdad on January 28 which
destroyed parts of the Central Bank building and equipment.
Additionally, representatives from the Kurdistan Region's Central
Bank Branches stated that the basic knowledge level of their
employees relating to financial and regulatory matters is quite low
and needs to be raised.
¶6. (SBU) In the judicial sector there appears to be a lack of
continuity in the application of the Anti-Money Laundering law, and
there are no specialized courts or professional skills development
for the complex crimes of money laundering and terrorist financing.
In addition, while law enforcement authorities vigorously pursue
leads for terrorism and terrorist financing, they could benefit from
additional investigative training, and particularly from financial
"follow the money" investigative training. Finally, the team noted
that Bulk Cash Smuggling training should be pursued as a means of
strengthening the implementation of Iraq's cross border currency
reporting requirements.
Financial Sector Development
----------------------------
¶7. (SBU) The rudimentary financial sector in the Kurdistan Region
functions within a largely cash-based economy. Most transactions are
conducted via a "hawala" type system of money exchangers and money
transmitters. Integration of the formal financial sector with other
parts of Iraq and the international financial system remains very
limited. This situation, while likely to change as the oil sector
becomes more developed and the need for standard international
BAGHDAD 00001347 002 OF 006
transactions increases, is a major cause for concern, as different
interests both inside and outside of Iraq vie for financial
influence and control.
The Financial Sector
--------------------
¶8. (U) The financial sector in the Kurdistan Region consists of
public and private banks, as well as money exchangers and money
transmitters. Banks in the Kurdistan Region are responsible for
providing banking services to both the general public and, through
public banks, to government entities as well. As noted earlier the
Central Bank of Iraq (CBI) is responsible for licensing all public
and private banks in Iraq. Representatives from the banking
community noted that they are still in the early stages of
attracting both individuals and business customers, as years of
economic instability and numerous bank failures have led many to
distrust banks. The banking community in the Kurdistan Region has
also suffered both technologically and experientially as a result of
both international and internal isolation during the regime of
Saddam Hussein.
¶9. (SBU) The FSAT held discussions with representatives from several
money exchange and money transmitter businesses. They confirmed
that most transactions, foreign exchange operations, and money
remittances take place through these businesses and not through the
banking sector. Most international remittances are done via related
offices in Amman or Dubai. While simple funds transfers can take
weeks to accomplish through the banking sector, the same
transactions can be done very rapidly and at lower cost through
money exchange and transfer sectors.
Financial Sector Challenges and Vulnerabilities
--------------------------------------------- --
¶10. (U) The financial sector in the Kurdistan Region faces a number
of challenges with respect to terrorist financing and money
laundering. Kurdish bankers' professional skills atrophied and
remained underdeveloped during the regime of Saddam Hussein. The
overall level of banking expertise is limited, especially among the
area's Iraqi-owned banks that possess little knowledge or expertise
with regard to execution of international transactions. The banking
sector in general lacks sufficient technology to function
effectively domestically, let alone internationally. There is a
lack of modern banking technology, in particular a complete absence
of an electronic payment system and wire transfer capability. As
the financial sector is relatively new, there is little
institutional knowledge with respect to AML/CTF issues.
Furthermore, while the banks are ostensibly providing traditional
banking services such as lending to the community, in practice they
collect funds and send excess reserves to the Central Bank in
Baghdad where they receive 18-20 percent return on deposit
facilities in excess of the obligatory reserve requirement (as of 2
March 2008 this return is 15-18 percent.) Deposit facilities for
dinar are term deposits having 7, 14, and 30 day maturities.
Outside of this relationship, there is poor communication with the
Central Bank, particularly with respect to addressing potential
money laundering, suspected terrorist financing and other potential
risks.
¶11. (SBU) The banking sector believes that terrorist financing and
money laundering risks lie primarily with the money
exchange/transfer service sector. They advocate and are lobbying
for a legal ban against such services. Based on our experiences,
the FSAT does not advocate this approach. Given the low-level of
development of the banking sector, such a policy would likely prove
counter-productive, difficult to enforce, and remove incentives for
the money exchangers and transmitters to cooperate with authorities.
The FSAT recommends that the KRG authorities look at alternative
solutions, such as more stringent licensing of the money exchangers
and transmitters and a requirement to report suspicious
transactions, as more effective means of reducing vulnerabilities
relating to terrorist financing and money laundering in this sector.
¶12. (SBU) Although financial institutions are required to report
suspicious transactions, including potential money laundering and
terrorist financing under the anti-money laundering ordinance, in
practice they do not. This is due to a lack of training, technology
and the isolation of the MLRO.
¶13. (SBU) The banking sector as a whole will benefit from training
and technical assistance in all areas of banking. The acquisition
and implementation of modern banking technology will not only
improve the effectiveness of the banking sector overall, it will
also provide banks with increased capability to collect and report
data, such as suspicious transactions. This will help reduce the
banking sector's money laundering and terrorist financing risks.
¶14. (SBU) As the MLRO becomes more established and experienced it
should engage in a public outreach program in the Kurdistan Region
BAGHDAD 00001347 003 OF 006
and the rest of Iraq, to educate the banking sector and general
public on the risks of money laundering and terrorist financing and
the benefits in reporting suspicious transactions.
The Central Bank of Iraq
------------------------
¶15. (U) The CBI has four branches; two of these branches are in the
Kurdistan Region (in Erbil and Sulaimaniyah). A third branch is in
Basra, and the fourth is in Mosul. The CBI also houses Iraq's
financial intelligence unit, the MLRO. In the Kurdistan Region, the
branch offices of the CBI have, contrary to Iraqi law, assumed
responsibility for licensing and examining private and public banks,
and money exchangers and transmitters. Currently the Central Bank
of Iraq branch in Erbil licenses a total of 45 private banks and
branches and 22 public banks and branches. The Central Bank in
Sulaimaniyah licenses 12 private banks and branches and 16 public
banks and branches.
¶16. (U) Both Central Bank branches are required to conduct periodic
examinations of the banks. For public banks this occurs every 6
months and every three months for private banks. The Central Bank
branch in Erbil currently has ten examiners (five of which are money
laundering examiners) while the Central Bank of Sulaimaniyah has
nine examiners (three of which are money laundering examiners). At
this time, there have been no meaningful examinations or visitations
by employees of the Central Banks to any of the banks or branches
they are charged with overseeing.
Central Bank Challenges and Vulnerabilities
-------------------------------------------
¶17. (SBU) CBI oversight and control of the Kurdistan Region's
post-2003 banking system remains inadequate. The FSAT believes the
CBI could become even less adept at fulfilling its regulatory
oversight responsibilities, given the expected petrodollar-fueled
development and expansion of the Kurdistan Region's commercial
banking system. In other words, the CBI's slowly improving
regulatory capabilities will likely not match the expected faster
pace of development in the banking sector. One of the most
significant challenges facing the two Central Bank branches in the
Kurdistan Region is the lack of communication between the branches
themselves and and the Central Bank of Iraq in Baghdad. In
addition, CBI branch leaders in Erbil and Sulaimaniyah remain
adamantly independent of CBI headquarters in Baghdad with respect to
addressing money laundering, terrorist financing and other illegal
financial activities.
¶18. (SBU) The FSAT noted the strong interest in the Central Bank
branches for increased training to address a number of challenges
and vulnerabilities that they face with respect to money laundering
and terrorist financing. One of the challenges confronting the
Central Bank is the lack of trust and confidence in the formal
financial sector due to the history of misuse and abuses of this
sector during the Saddam Hussein regime. The Central Bank branches
also acknowledged a lack of communication between the central bank
branches in the Kurdistan Region and headquarters in Baghdad. This
lack of communication makes the Central Bank of Iraq particularly
vulnerable to those who can and will exploit this vulnerability to
engage in money laundering and terrorist finance activity.
¶19. (SBU) An additional vulnerability lies in the largely
unregulated money exchange and money transmitter businesses.
Although they are required to be licensed, the level of supervision
is at best nominal. Currently, the licensing of the money exchange
and money transmitter business is carried out by the Ministry of
Finance. However, this responsibility is being transferred back to
the Central Bank. Due to the lack of oversight by the Central Bank
relating to the formal financial sector, this transfer will not by
itself reduce the level of vulnerability in this sector. The money
exchanges are not subject to the same examination process as banks
nor are they required to report suspicious transactions.
¶20. (SBU) Central Bank branch officials acknowledge that the current
training on AML/CTF and banking examination practices is inadequate.
In addition, the MLRO, which should assist in the training and
monitoring for ML/TF, is not developed enough yet to execute its
core mission. Additionally, the lack of substantive communication
with Central Banks branches outside of Baghdad continues to hinder
any efforts in the area of AML/CTF.
Recommendations for Central Bank
Training and Technical Assistance
---------------------------------
¶21. (SBU) Although it falls somewhat outside the scope of the
AML/CTF assistance, the FSAT highlights the need for improved
technology to assist the Central Bank branches in conducting their
core responsibilities, particularly in the areas of fund transfers,
analysis (cash and credit positions) and prudent safety and
soundness examinations. Communication standards need to be
BAGHDAD 00001347 004 OF 006
developed and implemented (via technological/IT solutions) so the
Central Bank branches can communicate and with each other, with the
Central Bank headquarters in Baghdad, and the MLRO. Effective
communication will reduce exposure and the risks associated with
financial fraud, money laundering and terrorist financing.
¶22. (SBU) With respect to anti-money laundering, the FSAT believes
the Central Bank employees will benefit from regulatory training
that focuses on banking processes, electronic funds transfers, bank
examination policy and procedures and AML/CTF techniques. As time
progresses, and the MLRO becomes more capable (or experienced),
consideration should be given to the concept of placing a MLRO
representative in each of the Central Bank branches. This would
facilitate communication and enhance the Central Bank branches'
AML/CTF knowledge and capabilities.
Ministry of Finance
-------------------
¶23. (U) The KRG Ministries of Finance in Erbil and Sulaimaniyah are
primarily responsible for disbursing funds to the various government
ministries once the Kurdistan National Assembly (KNA) has passed an
approved budget. The Ministries of Finance also have an audit and
control function that is responsible for ensuring the ministries are
operating within their respective budgets. In addition to these
general responsibilities, these ministries are supposed to maintain
a list of all licensed money exchangers and transmitters.
Currently, there is no such list.
¶24. (SBU) The Ministries of Finance are currently not capable of
effectively and efficiently performing their overall mission due to
a lack of financial and budgeting processes. In addition, their
employees do not have the necessary expertise to perform critical
audits of the monies being disbursed to the various government
agencies.
¶25. (SBU) The FSAT recommends that such information (i.e., license
applications and approvals, owner and operator information, etc.)
associated with all money exchangers and transmitters collected into
a database and shared with the appropriate authorities such as the
Central Bank branches and the MLRO.
¶26. (SBU) The FSAT also recommends that the Ministries of Finance
commence a robust training program to enhance their audit and
control functions. Currently no one effectively audits or
investigates discrepancies in the various ministries' budget and
payment systems.
Justice Sector
--------------
¶27. (U) The FSAT met with members of the Judiciary and the Ministry
of Justice.
Basic Structure and Criminal Procedure
--------------------------------------
¶28. (U) There are three levels of courts: the court of first degree,
the court of appeal, and the court of assignation. The court of
first degree includes criminal courts, civil courts, investigative
courts, juvenile courts, labor courts, and secular courts for
non-Muslims. A few days prior to the arrival of the FSAT, the
President of the KRG approved a new law that creates a Judicial
Council, thus making the courts independent of the KRG's Ministry of
Justice (MOJ) and the executive branch.
Criminal Procedure
------------------
¶29. (SBU) A criminal case must go through a series of phases before
it can be brought to the court of first instance. During the
initial investigative phase of the case, law enforcement initiates
an investigation, approved by the MOJ, during which law enforcement
entities collect evidence pertaining to the crime that allegedly
occurred. The case is then submitted to an investigative judge in
the investigative court. If the investigative judge believes that
the evidence is sufficient to proceed, s/he will refer the case to
the public prosecutor, who can then refer the case to the criminal
court. The prosecutor reviews the investigative judge's decision
and advises the criminal court whether to take the case. The
prosecutor can also refer the case back to the investigative judge
if s/he thinks there are gaps in the case. If the investigative
judge does not believe the evidence meets the burden to refer the
case to the criminal court, s/he can dismiss the case and release
the individual. The investigative judge has six months to review a
case. If s/he needs more time to conclude the investigation, s/he
can petition the court for an extension. If the case makes it to
the court of first degree, a three judge panel hears the case, with
two judges acting as reserves. Of the three judges, one may be the
President of the Court, and only he addresses the participants in
the proceedings. Should the defense or prosecutor have a question
BAGHDAD 00001347 005 OF 006
of a witness, s/he must ask the judge to ask the question. The
trials are bifurcated for guilt and penalty. If the court finds the
defendant guilty, it will then issue a separate ruling on the
penalty. Should the court issue a death sentence, the defendant
gets an automatic appeal to the Court of Cassation. In all other
cases, the parties must request an appeal and have 30 days to do so
from the time the court issues its opinion.
¶30. (SBU) The Public Prosecutor acts like a monitor in criminal
trials, and is permitted to raise issues or questions. If the court
does not address the issue(s) the prosecutor raises, s/he may appeal
the court's decision. At the conclusion of the trial, the
prosecutor writes a report about the trial.
¶31. (SBU) There was little to no discussion about money laundering
cases that have made their way through the courts. It appears to be
safe to say that KRG officials have not prosecuted anyone under the
AML law implemented by the CPA. The courts can order confiscation
of property, but it appears they can only do so if directly related
to the crime, including drug proceeds. According to the Iraqi Penal
Code, a person must pay the government back for any property s/he
stole from the government, even if the person must do so at his/her
own expense. In other cases of theft, restitution is made to the
victim(s). Any property forfeited to the state becomes state
property and goes into the general treasury. Should the government
confiscate perishables, it can sell them off while the case is
on-going and if the defendant is acquitted, the government returns
the money it realized from the sale of the goods to the defendant.
While the case is on-going, the government appoints a judicial
guardian to supervise and maintain the property pending the outcome
of the case.
¶32. (SBU) The Kurdistan Region does not have any special courts
dedicated to trying a narrow set of cases, (e.g., a court dedicated
to trying only terrorism cases). But, according to some officials,
there is a special investigative court dedicated to examining
terrorism cases. The Public Prosecutor does not have prosecutors
who specialize in prosecuting certain types of cases, (i.e., there
are no prosecutors devoted to prosecuting only financial crimes).
Justice Sector and Vulnerabilities
----------------------------------
¶33. (SBU) Based upon the discussions the FSAT had with MOJ and
judicial authorities, several challenges and vulnerabilities were
noted. As with other institutions, the MOJ and judicial authorities
in the Kurdistan Region have been hampered by international and
domestic isolation. In addition, there was a lack of independence
of the judiciary as well as some reported cases of political
influence over the administration of justice. As mentioned above,
however, the KRG just passed a new law granting the judiciary
independence. This may help to alleviate some of these issues, but
training on an independent judiciary is of the utmost importance.
¶34. (SBU) One specific concern noted by the FSAT was the lack of the
application of the anti-money laundering law within the Kurdistan
Region. There is confusion amongst KRG officials as to how the law
is applied. Some believe that the CPA AML law is not in effect in
the Kurdistan Region because the Kurdistan National Assembly never
approved it. Other officials believe the law is in effect in the
Kurdistan Region and should be applied, but they noted the lack of
will amongst officials in the region to apply the law. While there
is no question that AML training is absolutely necessary for all KRG
law enforcement officials, prosecutors and judges, there are other,
more basic issues that first must be addressed via training. , Due
to the lack of a strong Central Bank, inadequate technology employed
by banks, and a deeply rooted distrust of the banking sector,
comprehensive AML training at this time may be premature. However,
if the training were tailored and specific, AML training would be
beneficial in the regulation, investigation and prosecution of cases
involving money exchange houses.
¶35. (SBU) The KRG has prosecuted a number of terrorist cases. The
KRG judicial officials noted that security at terrorism trials
remains an issue. There have been no terrorist financing cases.
Officials also noted that Iraq does not have a stand alone terrorist
financing law.
¶36. (SBU) Based on these discussions the FSAT team recommends a
number of training initiatives. First the FSAT recommends training,
perhaps in the form of a legal symposium on the Anti-Money
Laundering law and its application. Second, if amenable, we can
provide comments on the new law creating an independent judiciary.
The judiciary is also in need of training to address its new-found
independence. The FSAT believes that the Kurdistan Region's
prosecutors could benefit from specialized basic and general
training on financial crimes tailored to the current specific needs
in Iraq. Furthermore, the FSAT believes that joint judicial and
prosecutorial training in case management techniques would help
improve the efficiency of the Kurdistan Region's legal system.
Finally, the Iraqis are in desperate need of training to combat
BAGHDAD 00001347 006 OF 006
corruption; however, due to the lack of will to prosecute certain
types of cases, most notably against politicians, results may be
limited.
Ministry of Interior
¶37. (SBU) The Ministries of Interior (MOI) in Erbil and Sulaimaniyah
are primarily responsible for general law enforcement operations,
with the exception of drugs and terrorism, which is the purview of
the Asayeesh (Security Police), with whom they cooperate. The MOIs,
however, have a significant law enforcement training function.
¶38. (SBU) There is a Ministry of Interior in Erbil as well as in
Sulaimaniyah, with the MOI in Erbil covering both Erbil and Dohuk
provinces. The Ministries informed the FSAT that they are working
on a draft law to combine the two ministries. It appears as though
the MOI in Erbil has more state of the art equipment, because the
MOI in Sulaimaniyah stated that when they have an issue they cannot
resolve in their small lab in Sulaimaniyah, they turn to the lab in
Erbil for assistance. The police under the control of the MOI have
the ability to conduct undercover operations and controlled
deliveries, but do not have the equipment to conduct surveillance.
¶39. (SBU) In order to join the police forces under the purview of
the MOI, one must attend a college for police. If one is a high
school graduate, s/he would attend the college for three years. If
one is a college graduate, s/he would only have to attend the
college for 8-9 months. Courses at the college include physical
training, law, human rights, and democracy. The MOI in Erbil told
the FSAT that they are building a new police academy in Dohuk that
would be ready in six months, with classrooms that will hold 30-40
students and will accommodate computer presentations. The MOI in
Sulaimaniyah told the FSAT that they also have their own police
college that is better than the academy in Baghdad, but not as good
as the one in Dohuk.
¶40. (SBU) Almost all of the police force is armed with AK-47's.
According to the MOI in Erbil, about one-third of the police force
is armed with pistols. Police officers can only arrest with a
warrant, unless they witnessed someone committing a crime. The MOI
police also need the permission of the MOJ in order to conduct an
investigation.
¶41. (SBU) Both MOI's admitted they need training in investigating
money laundering and financial crimes. While there appears to be
good communication between the ministries in the KRG, there appears
to be poor communication with the central government. The MOI in
Erbil claims to have a good relationship with police in Mosul and
Kirkuk, but no one claims to have good communication with Baghdad.
The MOI in Sulaimaniyah stated that it is difficult to purchase the
necessary weapons and ammunition it needs and that they are not
getting any assistance from Baghdad in this regard.
MOI Challenges and Vulnerabilities
----------------------------------
¶42. (SBU) MOI officers and personnel could benefit from additional
training in basic investigative techniques as well as financial
investigative training. Communication between local law enforcement
throughout Iraq must improve, and the central government in Baghdad
must provide the necessary information to the various law
enforcement groups throughout the country, including sharing
Interpol notices, developing a criminal database, and communication
with the MLRO. Not only would the MOI benefit from a more uniform
training of its cadets in Erbil, Dohuk and Sulaimaniyah, but so
would all of Iraq. Training appears to be disjointed and better in
some parts of the country than in others. It is important that a
national, federalized police force be able to function with the same
skill level regardless of its location. Perhaps the central
government needs to develop a national curriculum and should look
towards the training grounds in the Kurdistan Region as a starting
point for training all national law enforcement. MOI officials
noted that they do not conduct surveillance because they lack the
necessary equipment.
BUTENIS