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Viewing cable 08ADDISABABA1415, ADDIS ABABA EAC MEETS TO DISCUSS MAY 20 EXPLOSIONS ON

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08ADDISABABA1415 2008-05-21 14:24 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Addis Ababa
VZCZCXRO9794
RR RUEHROV
DE RUEHDS #1415/01 1421424
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 211424Z MAY 08
FM AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0712
RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ADDIS ABABA 001415 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR: DS/IP/AF, DS/IP/ITA, AF/EX AND CA/OCS/ACS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: CASC ASEC ET
SUBJECT: ADDIS ABABA EAC MEETS TO DISCUSS MAY 20 EXPLOSIONS ON 
PUBLIC TRANSPORT MINI-VAN. 
 
1.   (U) On Wednesday, May 21, 2008 The Addis Ababa Emergency Action 
Committee (EAC) met to discuss the May 20 incident in which a public 
transport mini-van experienced a bombing resulting in casualties. 
The following EAC members were present: DCM, USAID, PAO, MGT, GSO, 
ORA, MSG, OBO, CLO, USAU, POL/ECON, REFCOORD, HU, CLO, SAO, DAO, RSO 
and Peace Corps. 
 
------------------- 
THE MAY 20 INCIDENT 
------------------- 
 
2.  (U) On Tuesday, May 20, 2008 at approximately 20:08 hours local 
time RSO Addis Ababa received reports of an explosion in Addis 
Ababa, Ethiopia.  It was reported a small local transport mini van 
had exploded on a public street located adjacent to the Hilton 
Hotel, directly outside the offices of the Ethiopian Government 
Mapping Agency.   This incident occurred approximately 1.5 miles 
south of the Chancery, on a heavily traveled street passing through 
a part of the city primarily occupied by Government of Ethiopia 
offices (to include Ministry of Foreign Affairs) as well as the two 
major hotels (Hilton and Sheraton).  Three persons were reported 
killed, five to nine others were reported wounded (depending on the 
source) as result of this incident. 
 
3.  (U) The Mission does not have any residential or official 
locations in this area.  However, the Hilton hotel is frequented and 
utilized by Mission personnel on a daily basis.  The road where this 
incident occurred is traveled on a daily basis by most Mission 
personnel travelling to/from the Embassy.  All Mission personnel are 
safe and accounted for.  Initially it was reported all those injured 
and killed were local nationals.  Later it was disclosed one of 
those injured might be an Israeli citizen, who was a passenger on 
the bus. Late on May 21, embassy learned that this individual was a 
dual American/Israeli national.  At about 4:15 local May 21 we 
received notification that this individual died of his wounds.  The 
consular section is taking appropriate notification actions. 
 
4.  (U) No Mission personnel where reported to have been in the 
immediate vicinity of this explosion. Some Mission personnel 
residing at the nearby Hilton Hotel reported hearing and feeling the 
explosion.  Other mission personnel reported passing through the 
scene of the incident immediately before (less then 5 minutes) the 
explosion occurred.  Within a short period of time following the 
explosion, it was observed and reported most mini-van public 
transports were apparently pulled from the street. Ethiopian police 
response was swift, and the area was cordoned off for several hours. 
 The area was cleaned and reopened to traffic by 2245 hours. During 
the early morning hours of May 21, all that remained of this 
incident was a large trace burn mark on the pavement, some vehicle 
glass fragments and some areas of staining on the asphalt 
(presumably the result of vehicle or human fluids). 
 
5.  (SBU) Sources advise the following: 
 
-The bombing of the mini van public transport is a malicious and 
intentional act, and was not an accident. 
 
-According to Ethiopian press reports, this incident was the result 
of a terrorist act (NFI). 
 
-One source advised the explosion involved a timed device that was 
on the mini-van (NFI); 
 
-Another source stated the explosion was the result of C-4 or high 
explosives (NFI). 
 
6.  (U) RSO Addis Ababa called in a telephone report to DS Command 
Center upon receiving initial report of the explosion as well as a 
later follow-up report as additional details were made available on 
the evening of the incident. This was followed by a written Spot 
Report to DS command center on the morning of May 21. All 
information provided regarding this incident is subject to change as 
additional information becomes available. 
 
----------- 
EAC MEETING 
----------- 
 
7.  (U) The RSO briefed the EAC regarding the above incident.  The 
EAC assesses this incident as follows: 
 
-The May 20 bombing of the public transport mini van represents a 
disturbing trend when recalling the previous month's near 
simultaneous bombings of two commercial petrol stations in Addis 
Ababa, which also resulted in local civilian casualties.  No group 
ever took credit for this incident. 
 
-Both the public transport mini-van and petrol bombings appear to be 
targeting Ethiopians. Both of these venues are primarily patronized 
by poor to moderate income Ethiopians.  The petrol station bombings 
 
ADDIS ABAB 00001415  002 OF 002 
 
 
targeted the kerosene pumps.  Kerosene is primarily used by poor and 
moderate income Ethiopians for cooking and heating purposes. 
 
- The EAC agreed a warden message was prudent. Post will work with 
CA to accomplish this. 
 
-Although the EAC agreed these incidents represent a disturbing 
trend, they do not necessarily represent an increased risk to the 
U.S. diplomatic mission in Ethiopia.  Mission personnel (with the 
exception of Peace Corps volunteers) are discouraged from using 
public transport.  The EAC concurred with advising American citizens 
who do use public transportation to be aware of the risk posed by 
unattended items in public places. 
 
-The EAC agreed it was prudent to fine tune posts' notification 
systems, to include revamping the telephone tree as well as 
encouraging wide spread and regular monitoring of the Embassy's 
radio network by all COM personnel. The RSO will take the lead on 
this and issue mission wide guidance within the next 24 hours. 
 
-Post's physical and procedural security posture is already 
operating at an optimal level.  The RSO will brief the LGF and RSO 
personnel and remind them to be proactive and vigilant. 
 
8.  (U) Post EAC will continue this situation as well as the 
security environment in Ethiopia in general, and report any 
developments to the department accordingly. 
 
YAMAMOTO