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Viewing cable 08KINSHASA359, GOMA NOTES 04/16/08 - GOMA PROCESS: BACK TO THE BUSINESS AT

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08KINSHASA359 2008-04-18 08:54 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Kinshasa
VZCZCXRO1262
OO RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMR RUEHRN
DE RUEHKI #0359/01 1090854
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 180854Z APR 08
FM AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7898
INFO RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE
RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AF DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY COLLECTIVE
RUEHJB/AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA 0029
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUZEJAA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KINSHASA 000359 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO CG UN EUN
SUBJECT: GOMA NOTES 04/16/08 - GOMA PROCESS: BACK TO THE BUSINESS AT 
HAND 
 
REF: Kinshasa 349 
 
1. (SBU) Summary:  The Goma process Joint Technical Committee on 
Peace and Security debated and approved bylaws for the conduct of 
internal business in Goma April 15-16.  The sessions were generally 
businesslike, in contrast to an earlier meeting April 12.  Many of 
the most egregious passages had been massaged out by the time the 
draft reached the plenary, thanks in particular to the patience and 
skill of the Facilitation members within the working group.  Under 
the rules, decision-making will be by consensus among full members; 
in case of "persistent" deadlock, the Facilitation will arbitrate. 
The committee will next consider provincial structures and finally 
the calendar.  End summary. 
 
2. (SBU) After a dreadful session on April 12, the Goma process 
Joint Technical Committee on Peace and Security (JTCPS) resumed on 
April 15 and 16 to review draft bylaws (internal rules) that had 
been produced over the previous week or so by a working group that 
included 11 representatives of the GDRC and of the Goma signatories, 
plus members of the International Facilitation and sundry "experts" 
who seemed more like enforcers and overseers for the JTCPS 
Co-Chairman, Vice Admiral Didier Etumba. 
 
3. (SBU) Etumba resumed his role as co-chair, joined by MONUC's John 
Almstrom April 15 and the EU's Jean-Michel Dumont April 16 (with 
Almstrom gone to Bukavu).  Almstrom had had a talk with Etumba after 
a brush with chaos at the April 12 meeting, and it appears that 
others in his entourage had as well:  while occasionally subsiding 
into irrelevant soliloquy, both plenaries were generally 
businesslike, and purposeful work even went on (with FARDC Regional 
Commander General Vainqueur Mayala and his staff, as well as various 
members of the Facilitation, rushing off at various times) after 
news of the terrible aviation disaster reached the meeting room (ref 
A). 
 
4. (SBU) Etumba was on the whole courteous to his interlocutors, 
cutting them off unceremoniously only when they started (as is their 
wont) trailing off into obsessive ranting or ineffectual petulance. 
After a free-for-all the previous Saturday, everyone seemed a bit 
startled that things were once again being taken in hand and, on the 
whole, they shaped up accordingly. 
 
5. (SBU) This was fortunate, as the business at hand was sensitive 
and, if mismanaged, perilous.  Since the resolution of many 
contentious issues had been deferred on March 9 at the time of the 
parties' recommitment to the Goma process ("we can deal with that 
when we consider the internal rules"), and since granting the JTCPS 
the right and duty to come up with its own internal procedures had 
been a key GDRC concession, a lot was riding on the outcome. 
 
6. (SBU) It was far from clear that a workable set of rules would in 
fact come out of all this; what had emerged from some of the working 
group's early sessions had been scary.  Many of the most egregious 
passages had been massaged out by the time the draft reached the 
plenary, thanks in particular to the patience and skill of the 
Facilitation members within the working group (particularly EUSEC's 
Lt-Col J.-L. Colovan), but there were still a few land mines in the 
working draft, places where either the government or the 
Facilitation had to succeed in putting their foot down or the JTCPS 
would have faced serious mischief going forward.  (Comment:  It 
probably still does, but at least some obvious openings for this are 
now shut.  End comment.) 
 
7. (SBU) After having alluded loosely and dangerously to "voting" 
April 12, Etumba dropped any mention of it and insisted that each 
article be adopted by consensus, with objections or suggested 
changes being debated and with the self-evident rightness of a 
position or the clear determination of the co-chair or the 
Facilitation to block a recommendation eventually prevailing.  In 
fact, on the key issue of JTCPS decision-making (where shifting 
formulas for super-majorities and blocking minorities had a few 
weeks ago been a make-or-break issue for CNDP), the working group's 
draft position -- that decisions be taken by consensus and that the 
Facilitation be asked to negotiate a compromise in the event of 
deadlock -- was assented to without a murmur.  (Comment:  The 
Facilitation may not fully realize what it has gotten itself into 
thereby, but that will be a matter for another day.  End comment.) 
 
 
8. (SBU) There remain a few items that are not entirely to the 
Facilitation's liking, but they are now reasonably hedged in by 
qualifiers.  Some key items: 
 
--  Since who votes and who doesn't is no longer an issue, the full 
 
KINSHASA 00000359  002 OF 003 
 
 
membership of the JTCPS now unequivocally includes the co-chairs, 
the permanent secretary, the Technical Harmonization Bureau and, 
importantly, the entities of the Facilitation (UN, EU, US, AU, 
IC/GLR -- the latter two have been notable by their absence). 
 
--  Decision-making is by consensus among full members.  In case of 
"persistent" deadlock, the Facilitation is asked to arbitrate. 
 
--  The JTCPS has reaffirmed that it deliberates and acts 
autonomously with respect to the implementation of the Actes 
d'Engagement, but may not revisit the terms of the latter. 
 
--  Its main job is to set out and implement a calendar for 
achieving the stated goals of the Actes.  A proposal to develop a 
full "work plan to implement" specific clauses but not others was 
beaten back.  The danger that the JTCPS could become some kind of 
rump Parliament has receded. 
 
--  After much debate, members may call themselves "Commissaires" 
(which could mean either commissioners or commissars).  Etumba was 
among those against, pointing out that a "Commissaire de Police" is 
equivalent in military rank only to a second lieutenant and that he 
prefers being a general, but the demand for the title was so great 
that it prevailed.  Since, as many speakers pointed out, they will 
not be "commissaires de" anything at all ("commissaires de paix" was 
suggested at one point, which would have been a bit much, 
considering who they are), the internal rules will untranslatably 
grant them the protocol title of "Commissaire." 
 
--  Co-chairmanship by and presence of the Facilitation within the 
plenary and every subcommission, committee, subcommittee and working 
group has been recognized.  The co-chairmanship must be present (in 
addition to a quorum) for a meeting to convene validly. 
 
--  The JTCPS is headquartered and convenes in Goma, but may decide 
to convene elsewhere upon a decision by the plenary. 
 
--  The provincial "Cadres de Concertation," the only vehicle in 
which real-world civic bodies (including traditional chiefs, the 
provincial assemblies, the judiciary, religious institutions and 
other civil-society groups) can interact with the JTCPS remain as 
originally envisaged and have not become, as suggested, yet another 
forum for the same ratios of armed groups-plus-GDRC to have yet more 
meetings. 
 
--  There will be no provision for automatic remuneration for 
"experts." 
 
--  A bizarre and overreaching provision by which the JTCPS members 
would have extra-legislatively awarded themselves some kind of 
blanket immunity from prosecution for their actions within the 
JTCPS, for membership in banned groups, and for any and all previous 
criminal activity has been twisted and scrubbed into an obscure and 
reasonably harmless clause invoking Constitutional free-speech 
provisions.  Pending agreement on the final text, it probably has no 
legal force or standing, but it makes everybody feel better. 
 
--  A lengthy list of perks and allowances has been honed down to 
more than it should be but less than it could have been.  Members 
are to receive:  a salary; a fixed allowance for miscellaneous costs 
(housing, transportation, etc.); per diems for travel; reimbursement 
of medical expenses; a final lump-sum payment, of an amount to be 
determined (six months' pay had been modestly recommended).  The 
Facilitation insisted on wording specifying that all of this must 
derive exclusively from GDRC sources. 
 
9. (SBU) The internal rules took effect immediately upon adoption by 
the Plenary.  Again looking slightly dazed, the group rose to its 
feet and gave itself a standing ovation. 
 
10. (SBU) Comment:  This (and many other lesser but still important 
points that were on the whole sensibly resolved) may not seem like 
much to show for ten or so days of mind-numbing working group 
discussions and two (very) long days of plenary debate, but they 
measure a long journey away from much that had been loony or 
dangerous.  The principle of decision-making by consensus has been 
reaffirmed, and its importance demonstrated.  Now, on to provincial 
structures (some more silly ideas to beat back there) and then on to 
the calendar that is the heart of the matter. 
 
11. (SBU) Comment, continued:  At one point during the lengthy 
discussion of the pseudo-amnesty, a CNDP rep stood up and said, 
"Well, in fact we should suspend all activity until the Amnesty Act 
has been passed."  This was a provocation, not a serious proposal, 
 
KINSHASA 00000359  003 OF 003 
 
 
but it highlights a real issue.  The Amnesty Act is a specific 
undertaking of the Goma Actes, a solemn promise of the GDRC.  The 
continued absence of any visible movement toward its passage leaves 
us with a land mine:  any and all groups can use it as a pretext to 
pull out, or threaten to, whenever it suits them.  End comment. 
 
GARVELINK