Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 97115 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
ETRD EAGR ETTC EAID ECON EFIN ECIN EINV ELAB EAIR ENRG EPET EWWT ECPS EIND EMIN ELTN EC ETMIN EUC EZ ET ELECTIONS ENVR EU EUN EG EINT ER ECONOMICS ES EMS ENIV EEB EN ECE ECOSOC EK ENVIRONMENT EFIS EI EWT ENGRD ECPSN EXIM EIAD ERIN ECPC EDEV ENGY ECTRD EPA ESTH ECCT EINVECON ENGR ERTD EUR EAP EWWC ELTD EL EXIMOPIC EXTERNAL ETRDEC ESCAP ECO EGAD ELNT ECONOMIC ENV ETRN EIAR EUMEM ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID EREL ECOM ECONETRDEAGRJA ETCC ETRG ECONOMY EMED ETR ENERG EITC EFINOECD EURM EENG ERA EXPORT ENRD ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EGEN EBRD EVIN ETRAD ECOWAS EFTA ECONETRDBESPAR EGOVSY EPIN EID ECONENRG EDRC ESENV ETT EB ENER ELTNSNAR ECHEVARRIA ETRC EPIT EDUC ESA EFI ENRGY ESCI EE EAIDXMXAXBXFFR EETC ECIP EIAID EIVN EBEXP ESTN EING EGOV ETRA EPETEIND ELAN ETRDGK EAIDRW ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ENVI ELN EAG EPCS EPRT EPTED ETRB EUM EAIDS EFIC EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM EAIDAR ESF EIDN ELAM EDU EV EAIDAF ECN EDA EXBS EINTECPS ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EPREL EAC EINVEFIN ETA EAGER EINDIR ECA ECLAC ELAP EITI EUCOM ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID EARG ELDIN EINVKSCA ENNP EFINECONCS EFINTS ECCP ETC EAIRASECCASCID EINN ETRP EAIDNI EFQ ECOQKPKO EGPHUM EBUD ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ENERGY ELB EINDETRD EMI ECONEFIN EIB EURN ETRDEINVTINTCS EIN EFIM ETIO ELAINE EMN EATO EWTR EIPR EINVETC ETTD ETDR EIQ ECONCS EPPD ENRGIZ EISL ESPINOSA ELEC EAIG ESLCO EUREM ENTG ERD EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH ECINECONCS ETRO ETRDECONWTOCS ECUN EFND EPECO EAIRECONRP ERGR ETRDPGOV ECPN ENRGMO EPWR EET EAIS EAGRE EDUARDO EAGRRP EAIDPHUMPRELUG EICN ECONQH EVN EGHG ELBR EINF EAIDHO EENV ETEX ERNG ED
KMDR KPAO KPKO KJUS KCRM KGHG KFRD KWMN KDEM KTFN KHIV KGIC KIDE KSCA KNNP KHUM KIPR KSUM KISL KIRF KCOR KRCM KPAL KWBG KN KS KOMC KSEP KFLU KPWR KTIA KSEO KMPI KHLS KICC KSTH KMCA KVPR KPRM KE KU KZ KFLO KSAF KTIP KTEX KBCT KOCI KOLY KOR KAWC KACT KUNR KTDB KSTC KLIG KSKN KNN KCFE KCIP KGHA KHDP KPOW KUNC KDRL KV KPREL KCRS KPOL KRVC KRIM KGIT KWIR KT KIRC KOMO KRFD KUWAIT KG KFIN KSCI KTFIN KFTN KGOV KPRV KSAC KGIV KCRIM KPIR KSOC KBIO KW KGLB KMWN KPO KFSC KSEAO KSTCPL KSI KPRP KREC KFPC KUNH KCSA KMRS KNDP KR KICCPUR KPPAO KCSY KTBT KCIS KNEP KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNNB KGCC KINR KPOP KMFO KENV KNAR KVIR KDRG KDMR KFCE KNAO KDEN KGCN KICA KIMMITT KMCC KLFU KMSG KSEC KUM KCUL KMNP KSMT KCOM KOMCSG KSPR KPMI KRAD KIND KCRP KAUST KWAWC KTER KCHG KRDP KPAS KITA KTSC KPAOPREL KWGB KIRP KJUST KMIG KLAB KTFR KSEI KSTT KAPO KSTS KLSO KWNN KPOA KHSA KNPP KPAONZ KBTS KWWW KY KJRE KPAOKMDRKE KCRCM KSCS KWMNCI KESO KWUN KPLS KIIP KEDEM KPAOY KRIF KGICKS KREF KTRD KFRDSOCIRO KTAO KJU KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KEN KO KNEI KEMR KKIV KEAI KWAC KRCIM KWCI KFIU KWIC KCORR KOMS KNNO KPAI KBWG KTTB KTBD KTIALG KILS KFEM KTDM KESS KNUC KPA KOMCCO KCEM KRCS KWBGSY KNPPIS KNNPMNUC KWN KERG KLTN KALM KCCP KSUMPHUM KREL KGH KLIP KTLA KAWK KWMM KVRP KVRC KAID KSLG KDEMK KX KIF KNPR KCFC KFTFN KTFM KPDD KCERS KMOC KDEMAF KMEPI KEMS KDRM KEPREL KBTR KEDU KNP KIRL KNNR KMPT KISLPINR KTPN KA KJUSTH KPIN KDEV KTDD KAKA KFRP KWNM KTSD KINL KJUSKUNR KWWMN KECF KWBC KPRO KVBL KOM KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KEDM KFLD KLPM KRGY KNNF KICR KIFR KM KWMNCS KAWS KLAP KPAK KDDG KCGC KID KNSD KMPF KPFO KDP KCMR KRMS KNPT KNNNP KTIAPARM KDTB KNUP KPGOV KNAP KNNC KUK KSRE KREISLER KIVP KQ KTIAEUN KPALAOIS KRM KISLAO KWM KFLOA
PHUM PINR PTER PGOV PREL PREF PL PM PHSA PE PARM PINS PK PUNE PO PALESTINIAN PU PBTS PROP PTBS POL POLI PA PGOVZI POLMIL POLITICAL PARTIES POLM PD POLITICS POLICY PAS PMIL PINT PNAT PV PKO PPOL PERSONS PING PBIO PH PETR PARMS PRES PCON PETERS PRELBR PT PLAB PP PAK PDEM PKPA PSOCI PF PLO PTERM PJUS PSOE PELOSI PROPERTY PGOVPREL PARP PRL PNIR PHUMKPAL PG PREZ PGIC PBOV PAO PKK PROV PHSAK PHUMPREL PROTECTION PGOVBL PSI PRELPK PGOVENRG PUM PRELKPKO PATTY PSOC PRIVATIZATION PRELSP PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PMIG PREC PAIGH PROG PSHA PARK PETER POG PHUS PPREL PS PTERPREL PRELPGOV POV PKPO PGOVECON POUS PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PWBG PMAR PREM PAR PNR PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PARMIR PGOVGM PHUH PARTM PN PRE PTE PY POLUN PPEL PDOV PGOVSOCI PIRF PGOVPM PBST PRELEVU PGOR PBTSRU PRM PRELKPAOIZ PGVO PERL PGOC PAGR PMIN PHUMR PVIP PPD PGV PRAM PINL PKPAL PTERE PGOF PINO PHAS PODC PRHUM PHUMA PREO PPA PEPFAR PGO PRGOV PAC PRESL PORG PKFK PEPR PRELP PREFA PNG PGOVPHUMKPAO PRELECON PINOCHET PFOR PGOVLO PHUMBA PRELC PREK PHUME PHJM POLINT PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PGOVE PHALANAGE PARTY PECON PEACE PROCESS PLN PRELSW PAHO PEDRO PRELA PASS PPAO PGPV PNUM PCUL PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGIV PRFE POGOV PEL PBT PAMQ PINF PSEPC POSTS PHUMPGOV PVOV PHSAPREL PROLIFERATION PENA PRELTBIOBA PIN PRELL PGOVPTER PHAM PHYTRP PTEL PTERPGOV PHARM PROTESTS PRELAF PKBL PRELKPAO PKNP PARMP PHUML PFOV PERM PUOS PRELGOV PHUMPTER PARAGRAPH PERURENA PBTSEWWT PCI PETROL PINSO PINSCE PQL PEREZ PBS

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 08KIGALI258, RWANDA: UNHCR MANAGING SCARCITY AND INCREASED

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #08KIGALI258.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08KIGALI258 2008-04-10 12:19 2011-08-24 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Kigali
VZCZCXYZ0013
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHLGB #0258/01 1011219
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 101219Z APR 08
FM AMEMBASSY KIGALI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5220
INFO RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 0220
RUEHJB/AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA 0275
RUEHDR/AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM 1089
RUEHKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA 1858
RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA 0410
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0197
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 1176
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0451
UNCLAS KIGALI 000258 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR PRM 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PREF RW
SUBJECT: RWANDA: UNHCR MANAGING SCARCITY AND INCREASED 
NUMBERS 
 
 
1. (U) Summary:  Managing the Congolese refugee population in 
Rwanda presented a significant challenge to UNHCR and its 
implementing partners.  Congolese continue to arrive in the 
camps, and the camp birth rate adds significantly to the 
refugee population.  The camps are overcrowded, with space 
allocations below SPHERE standards.  With the exception of 
food, all indicators to measure refugee care and maintenance 
are below the established standards.  In light of the 
political situation in the DRC, it is unlikely that: 1) 
refugees will not arrive in 2008-2009, or 2) significant 
repatriation will alleviate camp crowding in the same period. 
 In the coming year, maintaining the present level of camp 
services will require an increase in resources that UNHCR 
does not expect to achieve.  End summary. 
 
----------------------------------------- 
CAMP POPULATION GROWS AS RESOURCES SHRINK 
----------------------------------------- 
 
2. (U) In the first three months of 2008, ARC registered 
3,337 new arrivals at the Nyabiheke refugee camp.  The camp, 
originally built to hold a maximum of 5000 refugees, has a 
population of 8,582.  The additional refugees placed an 
unexpected demand on camp resources, and on the environment. 
Firewood, the principal fuel for refugees, is in short 
supply.  Foraging by refugees in the neighboring fields and 
forests resulted in isolated incidents of violence between 
refugee youth and the surrounding Rwandan population.  As a 
result of the topography of the camp, refugee shelters are 
clustered together in a way that precludes the privacy and 
healthy separation foreseen by SPHERE standards. 
 
3. (U) The condition of refugee shelters was generally poor. 
In the Gihembe camp, refugees did not have sufficient 
building materials to repair weather damage and deterioration 
of their homes.  Plastic sheeting, supplied by UNHCR in 2008 
to serve as roofing material, was of poor quality, leading to 
water damage to the mud and wattle construction of the 
shelters.  UNHCR protection officers told RefCoord the 
plastic sheeting they received recently was of a uniformly 
inferior quality.  However, they had no replacement 
materials, and had no control over the quality of materials 
they received from UNHCR logistics. 
 
4. (U) Wood for fires and for construction was in short 
supply.  The Government of Rwanda (GOR) placed some areas 
close to camps off limits for wood harvesting, forcing 
Rwandan camp authorities and UNHCR to transport wood from 
designated areas to the camp.  Even with these measures, wood 
was in chronically short supply. 
 
5. (U) The picture was similar in all the Congolese camps in 
Rwanda.  The slow increase in refugee numbers and the age of 
the camp infrastructure led to a steady decrease in UNHCR's 
ability to maintain standards of service provision.  ARC and 
UNHCR were effectively managing the resources at their 
disposal, making hard decisions about priorities for building 
and rehabilitation.  ARC distributed wooden poles to serve as 
the framework for new housing.  Working with refugee 
committees, ARC was overseeing the rehabilitation of key camp 
facilities such as the health clinics and centers for the 
prevention of gender based violence.  ARC camp managers had 
some small success encouraging refugee committees to rebuild 
shelters. 
 
--------------------------------- 
Q--------------------------------- 
BENEFICIARY PROGRAMMING ON TARGET 
--------------------------------- 
 
6. (U) Key programs for refugees continued and were meeting 
program targets.  Camp managers reported a high coverage for 
immunization programs, and the health profile for refugees 
was similar to that of the local population.  HIV/AIDS 
programs supported by PEPFAR funds were well managed. 
Refugees had access to information about avoiding HIV 
infection, and those living with HIV were protected by 
refugee committees and camp workers from discrimination. 
Programs to prevent and address gender based violence were 
meeting grant targets.  Unfortunately, the participation of 
men in GBV programs lagged well behind the targets dictated 
by UNHCR and ARC program plans. 
 
 
 
7. (U) The GOR appeared to have a good working relationship 
with UNHCR in Kigali and in the field.  Officers of the 
Ministry for Local Government (MINALOC) were present at all 
the camps, and had regular contact with UNHCR.  In the camps, 
the MINALOC officers appeared to have regular contact with 
refugees and camp management. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
PROTECTION PROBLEMS FOR UNHCR, GOR AND PARTNERS 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
8. (U) After a three-month gap, a new senior protection 
officer began working in Kigali.  During RefCoord's visit, 
the officer was only beginning her assessment of protection 
issues.  She listed the shortage of firewood among her most 
difficult protection challenges.  UNHCR took over the 
distribution of firewood in 2007.  Since that time, shortages 
continued in all the camps. 
 
9. (U) The GOR was concerned with reforestation, and policed 
the collection of firewood in and around the refugee camps. 
Refugees foraged to meet household needs, in violation of the 
law, provoking anger among the local population. 
 
10. (U) Access to services and identity documents was also a 
concern for refugees.  Congolese refugees had never been 
issued identity cards that would assure their freedom of 
movement, and access to facilities in Rwanda.  The GOR 
undertook to issue identity cards for refugees after 
completing the ongoing national identity card programs for 
Rwandan citizens. 
 
11. (U) UNHCR was concerned that the GOR was slow in 
completing status determinations for asylum seekers.  The 
identification of unaccompanied minors in the camps and among 
asylum seekers was also an important protection concern. 
UNHCR was working closely with the government to improve 
MINALOC capacity to provide refugee and asylum services. 
 
12. (U) Overcrowding in the camps made land another important 
protection issue.  The GOR and UNHCR were working together to 
identify suitable sites for a new refugee camp.  The GOR 
submitted three sites to UNHCR planners in March 2008.  UNHCR 
rejected one sight immediately.  Proposals for the two 
remaining sites were submitted to UNHCR headquarters for 
further study.  UNHCR-Rwanda is confident the GOR will open a 
new site in fiscal year 2009. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
PLANNING SCENARIOS FOR UNHCR IN RWANDA 
-------------------------------------- 
 
13. (U) UNHCR was preparing to deal with three possible 
scenarios for Congolese refugees in 2009-2010.  The first and 
most likely scenario is the status quo.  Refugees would 
continue to arrive at the present rate, and the land 
available for their use would remain restricted.  In this 
scenario, an increase in funding would be needed to maintain 
the minimal standards for care and maintenance. 
 
14. (U) In the second, less likely scenario, refugees, 
encouraged by peace and stability at home, register in large 
numbers for repatriation to DRC.  In this instance, the 
logistic support to manage returns would be synchronized with 
the absorption capacity in the regions of return within the 
DRC. 
 
15. (U) The third scenario supposes an influx of refugees 
from the DRC sparked by failed peace talks, or violence 
between armed groups contending for power in the Kivus.  That 
scenario presented the gravest consequences for UNHCR in 
Rwanda.  Responding to an influx would require UNHCR to 
QRwanda.  Responding to an influx would require UNHCR to 
quickly call on emergency resources from Geneva, and from 
other UN organizations already present in Rwanda.  Given the 
present land situation, a significant influx could easily 
snowball into the kind of complex emergency for which the 
"One UN" concept was designed. 
 
16. (U) Comment:  UNHCR and partners are doing a good job of 
managing scarcity.  However, shortages are forcing local 
 
actors to concentrate of maintaining refugees at a level just 
under SPHERE standards.  In the event of repatriation to DRC, 
refugees and refugee agencies are ill prepared to manage a 
complex return scenario.  Cross-border cooperation is 
limited, and refugees are not practicing self-reliance in a 
way that would prepare them to begin life again in a 
post-conflict DRC.  End comment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SIM