Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 97115 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
ETRD EAGR ETTC EAID ECON EFIN ECIN EINV ELAB EAIR ENRG EPET EWWT ECPS EIND EMIN ELTN EC ETMIN EUC EZ ET ELECTIONS ENVR EU EUN EG EINT ER ECONOMICS ES EMS ENIV EEB EN ECE ECOSOC EK ENVIRONMENT EFIS EI EWT ENGRD ECPSN EXIM EIAD ERIN ECPC EDEV ENGY ECTRD EPA ESTH ECCT EINVECON ENGR ERTD EUR EAP EWWC ELTD EL EXIMOPIC EXTERNAL ETRDEC ESCAP ECO EGAD ELNT ECONOMIC ENV ETRN EIAR EUMEM ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID EREL ECOM ECONETRDEAGRJA ETCC ETRG ECONOMY EMED ETR ENERG EITC EFINOECD EURM EENG ERA EXPORT ENRD ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EGEN EBRD EVIN ETRAD ECOWAS EFTA ECONETRDBESPAR EGOVSY EPIN EID ECONENRG EDRC ESENV ETT EB ENER ELTNSNAR ECHEVARRIA ETRC EPIT EDUC ESA EFI ENRGY ESCI EE EAIDXMXAXBXFFR EETC ECIP EIAID EIVN EBEXP ESTN EING EGOV ETRA EPETEIND ELAN ETRDGK EAIDRW ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ENVI ELN EAG EPCS EPRT EPTED ETRB EUM EAIDS EFIC EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM EAIDAR ESF EIDN ELAM EDU EV EAIDAF ECN EDA EXBS EINTECPS ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EPREL EAC EINVEFIN ETA EAGER EINDIR ECA ECLAC ELAP EITI EUCOM ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID EARG ELDIN EINVKSCA ENNP EFINECONCS EFINTS ECCP ETC EAIRASECCASCID EINN ETRP EAIDNI EFQ ECOQKPKO EGPHUM EBUD ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ENERGY ELB EINDETRD EMI ECONEFIN EIB EURN ETRDEINVTINTCS EIN EFIM ETIO ELAINE EMN EATO EWTR EIPR EINVETC ETTD ETDR EIQ ECONCS EPPD ENRGIZ EISL ESPINOSA ELEC EAIG ESLCO EUREM ENTG ERD EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH ECINECONCS ETRO ETRDECONWTOCS ECUN EFND EPECO EAIRECONRP ERGR ETRDPGOV ECPN ENRGMO EPWR EET EAIS EAGRE EDUARDO EAGRRP EAIDPHUMPRELUG EICN ECONQH EVN EGHG ELBR EINF EAIDHO EENV ETEX ERNG ED
KMDR KPAO KPKO KJUS KCRM KGHG KFRD KWMN KDEM KTFN KHIV KGIC KIDE KSCA KNNP KHUM KIPR KSUM KISL KIRF KCOR KRCM KPAL KWBG KN KS KOMC KSEP KFLU KPWR KTIA KSEO KMPI KHLS KICC KSTH KMCA KVPR KPRM KE KU KZ KFLO KSAF KTIP KTEX KBCT KOCI KOLY KOR KAWC KACT KUNR KTDB KSTC KLIG KSKN KNN KCFE KCIP KGHA KHDP KPOW KUNC KDRL KV KPREL KCRS KPOL KRVC KRIM KGIT KWIR KT KIRC KOMO KRFD KUWAIT KG KFIN KSCI KTFIN KFTN KGOV KPRV KSAC KGIV KCRIM KPIR KSOC KBIO KW KGLB KMWN KPO KFSC KSEAO KSTCPL KSI KPRP KREC KFPC KUNH KCSA KMRS KNDP KR KICCPUR KPPAO KCSY KTBT KCIS KNEP KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNNB KGCC KINR KPOP KMFO KENV KNAR KVIR KDRG KDMR KFCE KNAO KDEN KGCN KICA KIMMITT KMCC KLFU KMSG KSEC KUM KCUL KMNP KSMT KCOM KOMCSG KSPR KPMI KRAD KIND KCRP KAUST KWAWC KTER KCHG KRDP KPAS KITA KTSC KPAOPREL KWGB KIRP KJUST KMIG KLAB KTFR KSEI KSTT KAPO KSTS KLSO KWNN KPOA KHSA KNPP KPAONZ KBTS KWWW KY KJRE KPAOKMDRKE KCRCM KSCS KWMNCI KESO KWUN KPLS KIIP KEDEM KPAOY KRIF KGICKS KREF KTRD KFRDSOCIRO KTAO KJU KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KEN KO KNEI KEMR KKIV KEAI KWAC KRCIM KWCI KFIU KWIC KCORR KOMS KNNO KPAI KBWG KTTB KTBD KTIALG KILS KFEM KTDM KESS KNUC KPA KOMCCO KCEM KRCS KWBGSY KNPPIS KNNPMNUC KWN KERG KLTN KALM KCCP KSUMPHUM KREL KGH KLIP KTLA KAWK KWMM KVRP KVRC KAID KSLG KDEMK KX KIF KNPR KCFC KFTFN KTFM KPDD KCERS KMOC KDEMAF KMEPI KEMS KDRM KEPREL KBTR KEDU KNP KIRL KNNR KMPT KISLPINR KTPN KA KJUSTH KPIN KDEV KTDD KAKA KFRP KWNM KTSD KINL KJUSKUNR KWWMN KECF KWBC KPRO KVBL KOM KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KEDM KFLD KLPM KRGY KNNF KICR KIFR KM KWMNCS KAWS KLAP KPAK KDDG KCGC KID KNSD KMPF KPFO KDP KCMR KRMS KNPT KNNNP KTIAPARM KDTB KNUP KPGOV KNAP KNNC KUK KSRE KREISLER KIVP KQ KTIAEUN KPALAOIS KRM KISLAO KWM KFLOA
PHUM PINR PTER PGOV PREL PREF PL PM PHSA PE PARM PINS PK PUNE PO PALESTINIAN PU PBTS PROP PTBS POL POLI PA PGOVZI POLMIL POLITICAL PARTIES POLM PD POLITICS POLICY PAS PMIL PINT PNAT PV PKO PPOL PERSONS PING PBIO PH PETR PARMS PRES PCON PETERS PRELBR PT PLAB PP PAK PDEM PKPA PSOCI PF PLO PTERM PJUS PSOE PELOSI PROPERTY PGOVPREL PARP PRL PNIR PHUMKPAL PG PREZ PGIC PBOV PAO PKK PROV PHSAK PHUMPREL PROTECTION PGOVBL PSI PRELPK PGOVENRG PUM PRELKPKO PATTY PSOC PRIVATIZATION PRELSP PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PMIG PREC PAIGH PROG PSHA PARK PETER POG PHUS PPREL PS PTERPREL PRELPGOV POV PKPO PGOVECON POUS PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PWBG PMAR PREM PAR PNR PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PARMIR PGOVGM PHUH PARTM PN PRE PTE PY POLUN PPEL PDOV PGOVSOCI PIRF PGOVPM PBST PRELEVU PGOR PBTSRU PRM PRELKPAOIZ PGVO PERL PGOC PAGR PMIN PHUMR PVIP PPD PGV PRAM PINL PKPAL PTERE PGOF PINO PHAS PODC PRHUM PHUMA PREO PPA PEPFAR PGO PRGOV PAC PRESL PORG PKFK PEPR PRELP PREFA PNG PGOVPHUMKPAO PRELECON PINOCHET PFOR PGOVLO PHUMBA PRELC PREK PHUME PHJM POLINT PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PGOVE PHALANAGE PARTY PECON PEACE PROCESS PLN PRELSW PAHO PEDRO PRELA PASS PPAO PGPV PNUM PCUL PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGIV PRFE POGOV PEL PBT PAMQ PINF PSEPC POSTS PHUMPGOV PVOV PHSAPREL PROLIFERATION PENA PRELTBIOBA PIN PRELL PGOVPTER PHAM PHYTRP PTEL PTERPGOV PHARM PROTESTS PRELAF PKBL PRELKPAO PKNP PARMP PHUML PFOV PERM PUOS PRELGOV PHUMPTER PARAGRAPH PERURENA PBTSEWWT PCI PETROL PINSO PINSCE PQL PEREZ PBS

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 08KHARTOUM604, WHEN THE THIRST FOR POWER TRUMPS CPA COMMITMENTS

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #08KHARTOUM604.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08KHARTOUM604 2008-04-18 10:01 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXRO1283
OO RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #0604/01 1091001
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 181001Z APR 08
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0594
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000604 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/SPG, A/S FRAZER, S/E WILLIAMSON, DRL 
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO KDEM SOCI AU UNSC SU
SUBJECT: WHEN THE THIRST FOR POWER TRUMPS CPA COMMITMENTS 
 
Refs: A. Khartoum 575 
B. Khartoum 566 
 
-------- 
SUMMARY 
-------- 
1. (SBU) The GoSS' reluctance to carry out the census in the South 
(and its latest statement that it reserves the right to dispute the 
census results) indicates that it is fearful that the actual size of 
the population in the South and NCP manipulation of the census 
process will result in less than the one third figure that CPA power 
sharing formulas are based on. Anything less than one third of the 
total population will negatively affect its power-sharing 
arrangements at a national level.  In fact, the Southern population 
may well be lower than most in the GOSS think (UNFPA mapping 
indicates that it may be as low as 18%) but even if the census is 
not manipulated and accurately reflects a lower population count, 
the GOSS will not believe or accept that the results have not been 
tampered with.  Other opposition parties have rebuked the GoSS' 
decision and are skeptical of its aims.  Donors, who have been 
scratching their heads to figure out what went wrong, are beginning 
to grasp the dynamics of the reasons behind the GoSS' reluctance. 
At the same time, they look back at the USD 60 million they spent 
over the past 2.5 years to prepare the South for this important CPA 
benchmark and wonder what other surprises the NCP and the SPLM have 
in store in advance of the 2009 elections.  End comment. 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
GOSS PROVISIONALLY SUPPORTS NEW CENSUS DATE 
--------------------------------------------- 
2. (SBU) On 16 April, the Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) 
Council of Ministers issued a press release regarding its decision 
to go forward with the national census on 22 April provided certain 
conditions are met (ref A).  GoSS President Salva Kiir Mayardit 
discussed with the GoSS ministers his 13 April meeting with the 
Presidency in Khartoum and convinced the GoSS to support the new 
census date in light of some "positive proposals" by the NCP to 
resolve Southern census concerns.  The GoSS' acceptance of moving 
forward with the census, however, comes with caveats.  Furthermore, 
the GoSS expressed doubt that its census concerns could be met by 
the new census date. If its concerns are not met, the GoSS announces 
the Presidency may have to "extend the deferment period or extend 
the counting period in Southern Sudan."  Furthermore, the GoSS makes 
it clear that under what it deems "the current incomplete status of 
preparedness for a successful outcome" of the census, it "reserves 
the right to have an opinion on the general outcome of the census 
results." 
 
3. (SBU) [Background Note:  In its 12 April Press Conference on 
Deferment of the Census, the GoSS stated six reasons for its 
decision to postpone the census in the South:  the inability of 
Southern IDPs to return to the South and thus be counted as part of 
the South's population, the absence of questions on ethnicity and 
religion on the questionnaires, the "slow, untimely, and inadequate" 
flow of census funds to the South, particularly for security of 
census officials, the non-demarcation of the North-South border, 
insecurity along the North-South border, and the security situation 
in Darfur which will prohibit many in Darfur from participating (ref 
B).  In a press statement from the GNU Presidency issued on 14 
April, it responded to the GoSS' concerns by: postponing the census 
until 22 April all over the country, directing the "GNU, GoSS, and 
specialized bodies" to work together to remove obstacles that block 
the voluntary return of IDPs and ensure their safety, instructing 
"all levels of the government" to provide the necessary resources 
for the census, and directing "specialized bodies" to use the 
questionnaires, their results, and the resulting analyses to "grasp 
the scope of the cultural and social diversity in the country."  End 
note.] 
 
------------------------- 
OPPOSITION PARTIES REACT 
------------------------- 
4. (SBU) Poloff spoke to various opposition parties to gain a 
perspective on the GoSS reluctance to hold the census in the South. 
Mr. Tag el Sir Mohamed Saleh, Deputy Secretary General of the 
Democratic Unionist Party (DUP)(Mirghani Faction) said that "it has 
been known from the beginning that the census is a part of the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). The GoSS knew it was coming; it 
can't blame anybody for census unpreparedness when it had 3 years to 
prepare." He went on to say, "The SPLM is concerned that the census 
might make their share of power and wealth very thin; that's why 
they are trying to avoid it." Saleh said that a solution to the 
census crisis will only be reached if there is NCP-SPLM dialogue and 
if CPA guarantors, especially the USA, assist. Muez Hadret, member 
of DUP (Hassanain Faction) Legislative Committee said that his party 
supports the demands of the SPLM, but disagrees with the timing of 
these demands. "The SPLM is fully responsible for implementing the 
 
KHARTOUM 00000604  002 OF 002 
 
 
CPA as much as the NCP is." He criticized the SPLM and the GoSS for 
not expressing their census concerns until the last minute. "The 
census is a very important mechanism of the democratic 
transformation and there won't be elections without it. If we delay 
the census, everything else will be delayed."  Hadret stated that 
reaching a compromise is essential to ending the crisis. [Note: 
Technically, elections could go forward without a census, although 
the parties would have to broker some kind of political deal for 
power-sharing before the elections if this were to occur. End 
Note]. 
 
5. (SBU) Dr. Bashir Adam Rahma, Deputy Secretary General for 
Turabi's Popular Congress Party (PCP) commented that, "the five 
conditions the GoSS put forward for approval of the census are 
nothing more than a pressure tool on the NCP to meet their [the 
GoSS'] demands." He warned that a delay of the census means a delay 
in the democratic transformation of Sudan which will give more time 
for the current regime to "continue practicing its policies and 
corruption", as well as, "depriving the Sudanese people from justice 
and freedom." 
 
----------------------- 
DONORS SPIN IN CIRCLES 
----------------------- 
6. (SBU) After spending over two years and USD 60 million to help 
the South prepare for the census, international donors were 
surprised and confounded by the GoSS' response to the census. Not 
only has UNMIS provided the GoSS with many assurances (and a 
face-saving way out of its 12 April decision, coordinated with 
Western embassies) that it will address many of its census concerns, 
other international donors have made joint and bilateral appeals to 
the GoSS and SPLM members to go forward with the census.  Donors 
point out that the census is an important CPA benchmark on the way 
towards the 2009 elections and the 2011 referendum.  If the census 
is derailed, there could be serious implications for the movement on 
the elections and the referendum. 
 
-------- 
COMMENT 
-------- 
7. (SBU) It has become increasingly evident that the GoSS does not 
want the census to take place out of fear that the NCP will 
manipulate the process or that the South's real population numbers 
will be much lower than the GoSS desires, with the result that 
Southern population numbers will neither enhance, nor sustain, the 
South's share of power in the GNU National Assembly.  Currently, the 
SPLM and other Southern parties hold one-third of the Parliament's 
450 seats.  The South's population based on the pre-census household 
mapping exercise shows that the South only makes up 18 percent of 
households (which, per UNFPA, can be translated into population) in 
Sudan.  Even if the census accurately shows less than a third of 
Sudan's population for the South, the SPLM will still believe that 
it has been cheated.  The 16 April GoSS press release indicates that 
if the GoSS believes the South is undercounted (i.e. - either 
through NCP manipulation or because the results do not favor them), 
it reserves the right to reject the census results which, per the 
CPA, confirm and/or adjust the national power-sharing arrangement. 
The fundamental lack of trust between the parties means that the 
census is sure to become a source of conflict and dispute regardless 
of whether the count is accurate.  We expect continued negotiations 
and surprises before, during, and after the census - if it in fact 
goes forward as scheduled next week. 
 
FERNANDEZ