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Viewing cable 08KAMPALA587, NORTHERN UGANDA: HELPING KONY UNDERSTAND JUSTICE

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08KAMPALA587 2008-04-28 13:41 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Kampala
VZCZCXRO9765
RR RUEHGI RUEHRN RUEHROV
DE RUEHKM #0587/01 1191341
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 281341Z APR 08
FM AMEMBASSY KAMPALA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0264
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE
RUEHGI/AMEMBASSY BANGUI 0012
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KAMPALA 000587 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PHUM PREL PGOV UG SU CG CT
SUBJECT: NORTHERN UGANDA: HELPING KONY UNDERSTAND JUSTICE 
ISSUES 
 
REF: A. KAMPALA 555 
     B. KAMPALA 483 
     C. KHARTOUM 643 
 
KAMPALA 00000587  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
1.  (SBU) Summary:  The Ugandan Government, Lord's Resistance 
Army (LRA) delegation members, lawyers, and judicial 
officials will meet in Kampala from May 6-8 to discuss the 
legal options for LRA leader Joseph Kony.  The LRA delegation 
says it wants to understand the national legal framework for 
a trial if Kony signed the agreement.  Armed with the same 
information, the LRA delegation, GOU officials, and northern 
traditional and religious leaders would travel to Rikwangba 
to meet Kony on May 10.  Information from ConGen Juba 
indicates that Government of Southern Sudan mediator, Riek 
Machar, may have other plans for a meeting with Kony.  GOU 
negotiators will reach out to Machar to clarify his 
intentions.  Uganda's Principal Judge, James Ogoola, who may 
also travel to Rikwangba.  Ogoola outlined for poloffs the 
plans for a court to try Kony, and the serious problems 
facing the reestablishment of the judiciary.  End Summary. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - 
MAY MEETING WITH KONY 
- - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
2.  (SBU) LRA delegation members James Obita and Santa Okot 
reiterated their views on the upcoming meeting with the GOU 
and Kony about the justice and accountability options in the 
agreement (Ref A).  Obita said that Kony requested the 
meeting to discuss the accountability options in the peace 
agreement.  The attendees would be Kony, the current LRA 
team, GOU negotiators, lawyers, judges, and northern 
traditional and religious leaders.  Obita said the Government 
of Southern Sudan mediator Riek Machar had not returned any 
of his calls, and has yet to answer his request for airtime 
to enable the LRA delegation to maintain contact with Kony. 
Obita wanted to avoid a large gathering such as the April 10 
signing ceremony which scared off the LRA leader, who 
allegedly believed it was a trap where he would be 
assassinated or arrested (Ref B). Obita was concerned Machar 
might hijack the meeting. 
 
3.  (SBU) (Note: Per Ref C, Machar's reference to the refusal 
of the U.S. Embassy in Kampala to provide a pay off of USD 
400,000 stems from allegations made by former LRA delegation 
leader David Matsanga.  On March 31, LRA delegation member 
Santo Okot approached USAID with a proposal for USD 400,000 
that would pay for the transport of northern officials to 
Rikwangba for the April 10 signing ceremony.  Mission 
personnel advised Okot that there were no funds for her 
proposal.  Matsanga subsequently told P/E Chief on April 12, 
after he was sacked, that Okot had sought the funds to pay 
Kony to sign the Final Peace Agreement.  Matsanga claimed 
that Kony had demanded between USD 400,000 and 1 million to 
sign and that the Acholi members of the delegation were 
seeking the money from donors.  We suspect that Matsanga's 
accusations could be another attempt to cover for his lack of 
contact with Kony and search for other scapegoats for Kony's 
failure to show up on April 10.  End Note.) 
 
4.  (SBU) Okot said that the LRA delegation could not alone 
explain the legal framework for Kony.  She said the LRA 
leader was asking questions about the types of charges that 
could be brought and what were the sentences.  The LRA 
requested the meeting with the Government to better 
understand where the preparations stood on the Special 
Division of the High Court and amending Ugandan laws to 
satisfy the International Criminal Court (ICC).  She 
reiterated that the meeting with Kony would cover the legal 
and traditional accountability mechanisms in the agreement. 
The meeting would not be a signing ceremony, according to 
Okot, and she reminded P/E Chief that Kony feared being 
arrested. 
 
5.  (SBU) Government negotiators also share the LRA 
delegates' views on the purpose of the meetings in May. 
Minister for International Relations Henry Okello Oryem told 
P/E Chief on April 28 that the GOU felt it was important for 
Kony to have an opportunity to have his questions answered by 
experts.  The initial meeting between the LRA delegation, GOU 
negotiators, legal experts, and judges would prepare both 
delegations for the meeting so they would hear the same 
information.  GOU officials, such as lead negotiator Ruhakana 
Rugunda, Oryem, GOU lawyers, and judges, would accompany the 
LRA and northern traditional and religious leaders to 
Rikwangba on May 10.  After receiving Ref C, in which Machar 
stated that he wanted international observers to accompany 
him to Rikwangba on May 10, P/E Chief confirmed with Rugunda 
and Oryem that the meeting was to be exclusive to the LRA, 
 
KAMPALA 00000587  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
GOU, and northern leaders.  Oryem said that he or Rugunda 
would contact Machar, who Oryem said may be trying to turn 
the meeting into another signing ceremony, which was not what 
Kony wanted. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
LEGAL FRAMEWORK PREPARATIONS 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
6.  (SBU)  On April 26, P/E Chief met with Principal Judge 
James Ogoola, who would be responsible for setting up the 
High Court's Special Division.  Ogoola stated that he did not 
believe that Kony would sign the Final Peace Agreement.  He 
said that preparations for the creation of a Special Division 
have remained in the planning stages because the GOU saw no 
signs that Kony would submit himself to a legal trial. 
Nonetheless, Ogoola would be among the High Court judges who 
would meet with the LRA delegation and Government negotiators 
and lawyers from May 6-8 to discuss Kony's legal options and 
the mechanics of a trial.  LRA delegation members want Ogoola 
to accompany them to Rikwangba. 
 
7.  (SBU) Kony's trial would be slowed by the lack of a 
comprehensive law under which to try him, according to 
Ogoola.  Uganda does not have war crimes as a chargeable 
offense and would need to create new laws, but these could 
not be made retroactive.  The best way forward would be for 
Uganda to ratify the Rome Statute and then argue that the new 
laws would domesticate it.  This required close cooperation 
between the Ministry of Justice and Parliament.  Otherwise, 
Kony could be tried for murder, rape, and kidnapping under 
existing laws, but Ogoola questioned whether that would 
satisfy the ICC. 
 
8.  (SBU) Court resources to hold a trial that meets 
international standards will be another problem, according to 
Ogoola.  Ugandan judges were competent to oversee the cases, 
but the judicial institutions would require an infusion of 
resources.  A trial for Kony and the two other ICC indictees 
could last ten years each.  He based his assessment on the 
standards set at the Arusha trials for Rwanda.  Uganda would 
probably try the three ICC indictees simultaneously, 
according to Ogoola.  He suggested that if a bench of three 
judges would hear Kony's trial, then that would require five 
judges in terms of manpower to ensure illnesses and other 
commitments did not interfere with the trials.  In addition, 
he expected that some of the judges would rotate to know what 
was going on in the other trials.  Ogoola said that a court 
building to try Kony should be built in northern Uganda. 
High profile cases, such as opposition leader Kizza 
Besigye's, attracted large, sometimes violent crowds, and 
brought Kampala to a standstill every time he appeared at 
court.  Ogoola speculated that crowd control and security 
would be a huge problem due to the nature of the case. 
 
9.  (SBU) A fair trial for the LRA leaders would require a 
department to support the defense lawyers and prosecution, 
according to Ogoola.  He said it would take years for the GOU 
to collect information and build its case.  The sheer number 
of victims and witnesses would easily overwhelm the trial 
process.  Ogoola expressed concern that some victims would 
not get justice.  Others would need witness protection.  None 
of these problems were insurmountable, according to Ogoola, 
but would require a significant infusion of resources. 
 
9.  (SBU) Even if Kony did not sign the agreement, Ogoola 
speculated that there could be hundreds of cases brought to 
the legal system in northern Uganda by families affected by 
LRA activities.  He also said that rehabilitating the justice 
system posed a serious challenge to the Government's plans 
for development, economic recovery, and reconciliation in the 
north.  The courts had stopped functioning during the 
conflict, but the police continued rresting people.  The 
prisons and jails were holding three-to-four times their 
capacity, which has led to serious allegations of human 
rights abuses.  Ogoola said his two-week circuit riding stint 
in northern Ugandan courts resulted in the freeing of 150 to 
200 people from prison per district.  Five other judges also 
went to the north on circuit rides to decongest the court 
backlogs and prisons, with about 200 people let out of prison 
by each judge.  (Note: Most of the people in prison are 
charged and awaiting trial, not yet sentenced.  End Note.) 
Nonetheless, he said that additional sessions would be needed 
throughout 2008 to relieve the enormous backlog and help get 
the court system ready to absorb new cases that could come 
with the end to the conflict. 
 
- - - - 
COMMENT 
 
KAMPALA 00000587  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
- - - - 
 
10.  (SBU) The LRA and Government negotiating teams expect 
the meetings on accountability options for Kony to be limited 
to those who can explain the legal and traditional justice 
systems.  We understand that Riek Machar had wanted a 
separate meeting with the elusive LRA leader, but may be 
hoping that he can see Kony when he meets his team on May 10. 
 Machar's request to ConGen Juba to have international 
observers present could become problematic given the nature 
of the proposed meeting.  We will follow up with Rugunda and 
Oryem after they reach out to Machar. 
BROWNING