Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 97115 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
ETRD EAGR ETTC EAID ECON EFIN ECIN EINV ELAB EAIR ENRG EPET EWWT ECPS EIND EMIN ELTN EC ETMIN EUC EZ ET ELECTIONS ENVR EU EUN EG EINT ER ECONOMICS ES EMS ENIV EEB EN ECE ECOSOC EK ENVIRONMENT EFIS EI EWT ENGRD ECPSN EXIM EIAD ERIN ECPC EDEV ENGY ECTRD EPA ESTH ECCT EINVECON ENGR ERTD EUR EAP EWWC ELTD EL EXIMOPIC EXTERNAL ETRDEC ESCAP ECO EGAD ELNT ECONOMIC ENV ETRN EIAR EUMEM ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID EREL ECOM ECONETRDEAGRJA ETCC ETRG ECONOMY EMED ETR ENERG EITC EFINOECD EURM EENG ERA EXPORT ENRD ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EGEN EBRD EVIN ETRAD ECOWAS EFTA ECONETRDBESPAR EGOVSY EPIN EID ECONENRG EDRC ESENV ETT EB ENER ELTNSNAR ECHEVARRIA ETRC EPIT EDUC ESA EFI ENRGY ESCI EE EAIDXMXAXBXFFR EETC ECIP EIAID EIVN EBEXP ESTN EING EGOV ETRA EPETEIND ELAN ETRDGK EAIDRW ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ENVI ELN EAG EPCS EPRT EPTED ETRB EUM EAIDS EFIC EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM EAIDAR ESF EIDN ELAM EDU EV EAIDAF ECN EDA EXBS EINTECPS ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EPREL EAC EINVEFIN ETA EAGER EINDIR ECA ECLAC ELAP EITI EUCOM ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID EARG ELDIN EINVKSCA ENNP EFINECONCS EFINTS ECCP ETC EAIRASECCASCID EINN ETRP EAIDNI EFQ ECOQKPKO EGPHUM EBUD ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ENERGY ELB EINDETRD EMI ECONEFIN EIB EURN ETRDEINVTINTCS EIN EFIM ETIO ELAINE EMN EATO EWTR EIPR EINVETC ETTD ETDR EIQ ECONCS EPPD ENRGIZ EISL ESPINOSA ELEC EAIG ESLCO EUREM ENTG ERD EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH ECINECONCS ETRO ETRDECONWTOCS ECUN EFND EPECO EAIRECONRP ERGR ETRDPGOV ECPN ENRGMO EPWR EET EAIS EAGRE EDUARDO EAGRRP EAIDPHUMPRELUG EICN ECONQH EVN EGHG ELBR EINF EAIDHO EENV ETEX ERNG ED
KMDR KPAO KPKO KJUS KCRM KGHG KFRD KWMN KDEM KTFN KHIV KGIC KIDE KSCA KNNP KHUM KIPR KSUM KISL KIRF KCOR KRCM KPAL KWBG KN KS KOMC KSEP KFLU KPWR KTIA KSEO KMPI KHLS KICC KSTH KMCA KVPR KPRM KE KU KZ KFLO KSAF KTIP KTEX KBCT KOCI KOLY KOR KAWC KACT KUNR KTDB KSTC KLIG KSKN KNN KCFE KCIP KGHA KHDP KPOW KUNC KDRL KV KPREL KCRS KPOL KRVC KRIM KGIT KWIR KT KIRC KOMO KRFD KUWAIT KG KFIN KSCI KTFIN KFTN KGOV KPRV KSAC KGIV KCRIM KPIR KSOC KBIO KW KGLB KMWN KPO KFSC KSEAO KSTCPL KSI KPRP KREC KFPC KUNH KCSA KMRS KNDP KR KICCPUR KPPAO KCSY KTBT KCIS KNEP KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNNB KGCC KINR KPOP KMFO KENV KNAR KVIR KDRG KDMR KFCE KNAO KDEN KGCN KICA KIMMITT KMCC KLFU KMSG KSEC KUM KCUL KMNP KSMT KCOM KOMCSG KSPR KPMI KRAD KIND KCRP KAUST KWAWC KTER KCHG KRDP KPAS KITA KTSC KPAOPREL KWGB KIRP KJUST KMIG KLAB KTFR KSEI KSTT KAPO KSTS KLSO KWNN KPOA KHSA KNPP KPAONZ KBTS KWWW KY KJRE KPAOKMDRKE KCRCM KSCS KWMNCI KESO KWUN KPLS KIIP KEDEM KPAOY KRIF KGICKS KREF KTRD KFRDSOCIRO KTAO KJU KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KEN KO KNEI KEMR KKIV KEAI KWAC KRCIM KWCI KFIU KWIC KCORR KOMS KNNO KPAI KBWG KTTB KTBD KTIALG KILS KFEM KTDM KESS KNUC KPA KOMCCO KCEM KRCS KWBGSY KNPPIS KNNPMNUC KWN KERG KLTN KALM KCCP KSUMPHUM KREL KGH KLIP KTLA KAWK KWMM KVRP KVRC KAID KSLG KDEMK KX KIF KNPR KCFC KFTFN KTFM KPDD KCERS KMOC KDEMAF KMEPI KEMS KDRM KEPREL KBTR KEDU KNP KIRL KNNR KMPT KISLPINR KTPN KA KJUSTH KPIN KDEV KTDD KAKA KFRP KWNM KTSD KINL KJUSKUNR KWWMN KECF KWBC KPRO KVBL KOM KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KEDM KFLD KLPM KRGY KNNF KICR KIFR KM KWMNCS KAWS KLAP KPAK KDDG KCGC KID KNSD KMPF KPFO KDP KCMR KRMS KNPT KNNNP KTIAPARM KDTB KNUP KPGOV KNAP KNNC KUK KSRE KREISLER KIVP KQ KTIAEUN KPALAOIS KRM KISLAO KWM KFLOA
PHUM PINR PTER PGOV PREL PREF PL PM PHSA PE PARM PINS PK PUNE PO PALESTINIAN PU PBTS PROP PTBS POL POLI PA PGOVZI POLMIL POLITICAL PARTIES POLM PD POLITICS POLICY PAS PMIL PINT PNAT PV PKO PPOL PERSONS PING PBIO PH PETR PARMS PRES PCON PETERS PRELBR PT PLAB PP PAK PDEM PKPA PSOCI PF PLO PTERM PJUS PSOE PELOSI PROPERTY PGOVPREL PARP PRL PNIR PHUMKPAL PG PREZ PGIC PBOV PAO PKK PROV PHSAK PHUMPREL PROTECTION PGOVBL PSI PRELPK PGOVENRG PUM PRELKPKO PATTY PSOC PRIVATIZATION PRELSP PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PMIG PREC PAIGH PROG PSHA PARK PETER POG PHUS PPREL PS PTERPREL PRELPGOV POV PKPO PGOVECON POUS PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PWBG PMAR PREM PAR PNR PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PARMIR PGOVGM PHUH PARTM PN PRE PTE PY POLUN PPEL PDOV PGOVSOCI PIRF PGOVPM PBST PRELEVU PGOR PBTSRU PRM PRELKPAOIZ PGVO PERL PGOC PAGR PMIN PHUMR PVIP PPD PGV PRAM PINL PKPAL PTERE PGOF PINO PHAS PODC PRHUM PHUMA PREO PPA PEPFAR PGO PRGOV PAC PRESL PORG PKFK PEPR PRELP PREFA PNG PGOVPHUMKPAO PRELECON PINOCHET PFOR PGOVLO PHUMBA PRELC PREK PHUME PHJM POLINT PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PGOVE PHALANAGE PARTY PECON PEACE PROCESS PLN PRELSW PAHO PEDRO PRELA PASS PPAO PGPV PNUM PCUL PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGIV PRFE POGOV PEL PBT PAMQ PINF PSEPC POSTS PHUMPGOV PVOV PHSAPREL PROLIFERATION PENA PRELTBIOBA PIN PRELL PGOVPTER PHAM PHYTRP PTEL PTERPGOV PHARM PROTESTS PRELAF PKBL PRELKPAO PKNP PARMP PHUML PFOV PERM PUOS PRELGOV PHUMPTER PARAGRAPH PERURENA PBTSEWWT PCI PETROL PINSO PINSCE PQL PEREZ PBS

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 08JAKARTA856, JUDICIAL REFORMS FACE UNCERTAIN FUTURE IN

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #08JAKARTA856.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08JAKARTA856 2008-04-29 09:24 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Jakarta
VZCZCXRO0547
OO RUEHCHI RUEHCN RUEHDT RUEHHM
DE RUEHJA #0856/01 1200924
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 290924Z APR 08
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8861
INFO RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS PRIORITY
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 2414
RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA 0933
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 1794
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 1892
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON 2588
RUEHHK/AMCONSUL HONG KONG 2632
RUEHPT/AMCONSUL PERTH 0749
RUEAWJB/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 JAKARTA 000856 
 
AIDAC 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EAP, EAP/MTS, EAP/MLS, INL FOR BOULDIN/BUHLER 
DEPT FOR EEB/IFD/OMA 
DOJ/OPDAT FOR LEHMANN/ALEXANDRE 
SINGAPORE FOR BAKER 
TREASURY FOR IA-BAUKOL 
NSC FOR E.PHU 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV KJUS KCOR ID
SUBJECT: JUDICIAL REFORMS FACE UNCERTAIN FUTURE IN 
PARLIAMENT 
 
REF: A. JAKARTA 739 
 
     B. JAKARTA 183 
     C. 07 JAKARTA 2953 
     D. 07 JAKARTA 2753 
     E. 07 JAKARTA 2464 
     F. 07 JAKARTA 514 
 
JAKARTA 00000856  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
1.  (U) This message is Sensitive but Unclassified--Please 
handle accordingly. 
 
2.  (SBU) SUMMARY:  Judicial reform faces an uncertain future 
as Parliament's (DPR) Law and Human Rights Commission begins 
drafting bills in several key areas.  The most significant 
changes would likely be at the special Anti-Corruption Court, 
where a battle is being waged between those who want to 
empower the body--and, by extension, the Corruption 
Eradication Commission--and those who would prefer to see it 
weakened or eliminated. 
 
3.  (SBU) SUMMARY (Con'd):  Other bills would reform the way 
judges in Indonesia are supervised, but will likely leave 
other critical judicial issues untouched.  Over all, 
substantial judicial reform does not appear to be a high 
legislative priority at this time, especially with the 
political focus quickly shifting to the national elections 
slated to take place next year.  END SUMMARY. 
 
THE REFORM PLAN 
 
4.  (SBU) The 2008 legislative agenda for the Indonesian 
Parliament (DPR) includes four bills related to judicial 
reform.  According to the plan, the bills will focus on four 
key judicial institutions: the Anti-Corruption Court (ACC); 
the Supreme Court (SC); the Judicial Commission (JC); and, 
the Constitutional Court (CC).  According to Mission 
contacts, none of the bills are near completion and it is 
unlikely that the DPR's Law and Human Rights Commission will 
take up more than two before the 2009 election season opens. 
However, some details have started to emerge on the possible 
makeup of the drafts. 
 
ANTI-CORRUPTION COURT: BAROMETER FOR CORRUPTION REFORM 
 
5.  (SBU) The ACC is both the most urgent and the most 
controversial issue facing the Law and Human Rights 
Commission.  The ACC was created in tandem with its partner 
body, the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK), in order 
to try high profile corruption cases outside the general 
courts, which are widely seen as corrupt.  The body has been 
a great success, issuing convictions in 100% of the cases 
brought before it.  However, in December 2006, the 
Constitutional Court ruled that the ACC was unconstitutional 
due to problems with original legislation and the 
differential treatment defendants received in the ACC versus 
the general courts. 
 
6.  (SBU) The Constitutional Court gave the ACC a three-year 
grace period to continue operating and instructed Parliament 
to pass a law that outlined the ACC's specific roles and 
responsibilities.  A Ministry of Law and Human Rights 
drafting team has submitted an ACC draft bill to the 
President for approval (ref E).  However, an NGO contact 
recently told us that the DPR intends to draft its own bill. 
The Law and Human Rights Commission has already requested 
drafting input from the KPK, which in turn has asked several 
NGOs for their input. 
 
7.  (SBU) The draft ACC has two critical variables: the 
number of courts and the ratio between career and non-career 
(so called ad hoc) judges.  The Ministry's draft law would 
establish five "model" Anti-Corruption Courts that would be 
 
JAKARTA 00000856  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
housed within district courts throughout Indonesia.  The ACC 
would be part of the district court, but would have a special 
docket for corruption cases only.  Both the KPK and Attorney 
General's Office would have authority to try cases in the 
ACC, addressing a fundamental point of the CC's December 2006 
ruling.  The "model courts" would be established in Jakarta, 
Medan, Semarang, Surabaya, and Makassar, according to head of 
the Ministry's drafting team Romli Atmasasmita.  Over time, 
the proposal would call for at least one ACC in every 
province.  The Supreme Court has already begun providing 
specialized training in anti-corruption law to career judges 
with a view towards staffing the new regional ACCs. 
 
8.  (SBU) The second and even more critical issue is the 
career - ad hoc judge ratio.  The ACC's clean reputation is 
largely due to the fact that ad hoc judges hold a majority on 
the Court, according to many government and civil society 
activists.  The Supreme Court, which appoints all career 
judges to the district courts, regards this non-career, ad 
hoc judge majority as an affront to its judicial authority. 
The Ministry's current proposal would maintain the ad hoc 
judge majority, placing two ad hoc judges and one career 
judge on a standard ACC panel.  However, an alternate 
proposal being floated would create a larger number of courts 
and give career judges a majority share on the panels, 
thereby weakening what many see as the ACC's best feature. 
 
9.  (SBU) Although the December 2009 deadline is still a year 
and half away, the next few months will be a critical period 
as Parliament will soon be shifting virtually all of its 
attention to the 2009 national elections.  If there is no 
progress on the ACC in the next few months, there is a risk 
that the law will not be passed before its deadline, 
according to Indonesia Corruption Watch head Teten Masduki. 
 
THE SUPREME COURT: SIDESTEPPING THE ISSUES 
 
10.  (SBU) Plagued by corruption, political influence and 
mismanagement, the SC remains Indonesia's most problematic 
high judicial institution.  Despite some reforms and a new 
transparency policy (ref B), the SC has actively resisted 
external supervision and auditing, and its inner workings 
remain hidden from view (ref C). 
 
11.  (SBU) According to Embassy contacts, however, the DPR is 
unlikely to attempt to tackle any of these issues in the 
upcoming legislation.  Instead, contacts say they are likely 
to raise the justices retirement age from 65 to 70 in order 
to reduce the burden of having to quickly replace the large 
number of aging justices.  (Note: the Chief Justice, who is 
due to retire this year, has stated publicly that he will 
retire regardless of any changes in the law.)   Some 
observers have noted that a higher retirement age will in 
fact hinder further judicial reform by delaying the time when 
younger, reformist judges can take over from the old guard. 
One justice told us that the bill may also contain language 
to the effect that SC decisions are not subject to review by 
external bodies, a provision clearly aimed at the Judicial 
Commission (see below). 
 
THE JUDICIAL COMMISSION RESSURRECTED? 
 
12.  (SBU) The JC, which was intended to provide external 
supervision over judicial behavior, has largely been 
sidelined since a 2006 Constitutional Court decision stripped 
it of supervisory powers (ref F).  Judicial reform advocates 
have been calling for legislation to restore its powers ever 
since, but the DPR, notwithstanding comments made by senior 
leaders, hhas no prioritized the issue.  Moreover", the JC's 
credbility suffered a severe b"low when one of its 
comissioners was himself found guilty of accepting abribe 
 
JAKARTA 00000856  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
in March (ref D).  Still, the DPR is scheduled to draft a 
bill which will likely restore some aspect of the JC's 
authority to monitor judical behavior.  According to one NGO 
contact, the draft may ultimately opt for a joint supervisory 
board containing both JC commissioners and SC judges. 
 
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT: IF IT AIN'T BROKE... 
 
13.  (SBU) The agenda for the CC bill remains very obscure, 
and it is unlikely to actually come before the DPR prior to 
next year's elections.  Unlike the Supreme Court and the 
Judicial Commission, the CC has a solid reputation as a 
well-run, professional institution.  Despite this, some DPR 
members have complained that the CC is too eager to throw out 
DPR-enacted legislation and have suggested that its authority 
needs to be limited in some way.  A year ago--in the wake of 
the ACC and JC decisions (see above)--there appeared to be 
some public support for this position.  However, public 
criticism of the CC has declined, and lately there have been 
calls to actually expand the CC's power by giving it 
jurisdiction over regional election disputes, several of 
which were recently bungled by the Supreme Court. 
 
LIMITED ENTHUSIASM FOR REFORM 
 
14.  (SBU) Despite the DPR's fairly ambitious agenda for the 
legal sector, the overall picture is one of limited 
enthusiasm for further reform.  The debate on the ACC is 
likely to grow even more contentious in the wake of the 
recent arrests of five current and former DPR members by the 
KPK (ref A). 
 
15.  (SBU) While NGOs and judicial activists are pushing hard 
to renew the court's authority before the December 2009 
deadline, many members of the DPR are openly fearful of the 
ACC and the KPK, and some would clearly prefer to see the 
body weakened or abolished.  In this context, the fate of the 
ACC bill will be a major test of the DPR's commitment to 
improving the rule of law of Indonesia.  All of this is 
happening as Indonesia gears up for the 2009 national 
elections, and it is unclear whether legislators will allow 
themselves any time to really focus on and move forward with 
reform efforts given the press of the political calendar. 
 
HUME