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Viewing cable 08HAVANA316, COLOMBIAN AMBASSADOR ON CUBAN ROLE IN

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08HAVANA316 2008-04-16 14:40 2011-05-02 00:00 CONFIDENTIAL US Interests Section Havana
Appears in these articles:
http://m.elcomercio.com/wikileaks/cable.php?c=6512bd4
http://www4.elcomercio.com/Noticia-Principal/cuba_no_apoyo___a_quito_en_el___conflicto_con_bogota.aspx
VZCZCXYZ0020
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUB #0316/01 1071440
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 161440Z APR 08
FM USINT HAVANA
TO RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3126
INFO RUEHSW/AMEMBASSY BERN IMMEDIATE 0188
C O N F I D E N T I A L HAVANA 000316 

SIPDIS 

SIPDIS 
///////////////////////////////////////////// /////// 
DO NOT, REPEAT DO NOT PROCESS MESSAGE IS WAITING FOR 
EAO GUDIANCE. 
///////////////////////////////////////////// ////// 

DEPT FOR WHA, WHA/CCA 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/17/2017 
TAGS: PREL PGOV CU CO EC VN
SUBJECT: COLOMBIAN AMBASSADOR ON CUBAN ROLE IN 
COLOMBIA/ECUADOR DISPUTE 

REF: HAVANA 0229 (EXDIS) 

Classified By: COM MICHAEL E. PARMLY FOR REASONS 1.4 B AND D 

SUMMARY 
-------- 
1. (C) COLOMBIAN AMBASSADOR LONDONO TOLD US 15 APRIL THAT 
CUBA CONTINUES TO PLAY AN UNUSUALLY DISCREET ROLE IN 
COLOMBIA'S DISPUTE WITH ECUADOR.  THE CUBANS HAVE STUCK TO 
THEIR ALMOST COMPLETE SILENCE ON THE ISSUE.  FM PEREZ ROQUE, 
IN LONDONO'S VIEW ON DIRECT INSTRUCTIONS FROM RAUL CASTRO, 
TOLD GRULAC AMBASSADORS TO HAVANA LAST WEEK THAT THE GOC 
VALUES AS MUCH ITS TIES TO THE ONE AS TO THE OTHER.  LONDONO 
REJECTED ANY NOTION THAT HAVANA SOUGHT TO KEEP DISPUTE 
RESOLUTION OUT OF VENUES WHERE THERE IS A U.S. PRESENCE.  HE 
POSITED THAT IN RECENT WEEKS, HE HAD SEEN SMALL BUT IMPORTANT 
SIGNS THAT THE GOC WANTS TO LOWER THE TEMPERATURE WITH 
WASHINGTON.  END SUMMARY. 

CUBA ON COLOMBIA-ECUADOR:  STRICT IMPARTIALITY 
--------------------------------------------- - 
2. (C) COLOMBIAN AMBASSADOR TO HAVANA JULIO LONDONO, DEAN OF 
THE DIP CORPS HERE WITH TEN YEARS ON THE GROUND, BRIEFED COM 
ON THE CUBAN ROLE IN THE COLOMBIA-ECUADOR BORDER DISPUTE. 
"STRICT HANDS-OFF" AND "TOTAL IMPARTIALITY" WERE TWO TERMS 
LONDONO USED IN DESCRIBING THE GOC ATTITUDE.  BUILDING ON 
EARLIER COMMENTS TO US ON THE CUBAN ROLE, LONDONO SAID CUBAN 
OFFICIALS, STARTING WITH PRESIDENT RAUL CASTRO, WENT OUT OF 
THEIR WAY NOT/NOT TO COMMENT, EITHER PUBLICLY OR PRIVATELY, 
ABOUT WHO WAS RIGHT AND WHO WAS WRONG IN THE DISPUTE. 
HOWEVER, LONDONO SAID HE WAS CONVINCED -- THOUGH HE DECLINED 
TO SAY ON WHAT BASIS -- THAT HAVANA, EITHER THROUGH DISCREET 
EMISSARIES OR EVEN IN DIRECT PHONE CALLS, HAD TOLD VENEZUELAN 
LEADER CHAVEZ TO BACK OFF ON HIS INFLAMED RHETORIC.  LONDONO 
HIMSELF HAD CONFINED HIS CONTACTS TO PCC INTERNATIONAL 
SECRETARY FERNANDO REMIREZ DE ESTENOZ.  IN SEVERAL MEETINGS, 

SIPDIS 
REMIREZ HAD SOUGHT INFORMATION FROM LONDONO ON WHERE THINGS 
STOOD.  LONDONO HAD OFFERED THE COLOMBIAN PERSPECTIVE, WHICH 
REMIREZ HAD LARGELY TAKEN ON BOARD WITHOUT COMMENT.  AT NO 
POINT HAD REMIREZ OFFERED A PREFERRED OUTCOME FROM CUBA'S 
PERSPECTIVE, LONDONO OBSERVED. 

3. (C) LONDONO SAID THE CUBAN FOREIGN MINISTRY'S 
EXCEPTIONALLY LOW PROFILE WAS ONLY ALTERED SOMEWHAT THE WEEK 
OF 7 APRIL.  THE GRULAC AMBASSADORS TO HAVANA HAD HOSTED FM 
FELIPE PEREZ ROQUE TO DINNER AT THE HOTEL NACIONAL.  IN HIS 
REMARKS ON DEVELOPMENTS IN THE HEMISPHERE, THE ONLY SPECIFIC 
PROBLEM PEREZ ROQUE REFERRED TO WAS THE COLOMBIA-ECUADOR 
DISPUTE.  THE FM LAUDED THE STATE OF CUBA'S RELATIONS WITH 
ECUADOR, BUT POINTEDLY ADDED THAT HAVANA VALUES ITS CLOSE 
TIES TO BOGOTA EQUALLY.  PEREZ ROQUE CONCLUDED WITH A BLAND 
EXPRESSION OF CUBA'S DESIRE TO SEE THE TWO SOUTH AMERICAN 
NEIGHBORS SETTLE THEIR DIFFERENCE AMICABLY. 

FAILED ECUADORIAN PRESSURE TO GET CUBA TO SPEAK OUT 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
4. (C) THE COLOMBIAN AMBASSADOR TOLD US THE ECUADORIANS HAD 
BEEN QUITE EXERCISED AT HAVANA'S CAREFUL ATTITUDE IN THE 
CRISIS.  HIS ECUADORIAN COUNTERPART, UNIVERSEI ZAMBRANO, TOLD 
LONDONO HE HAD RECEIVED INSTRUCTIONS TO CALL THE CUBANS ON 
THE POINT AND TO SEEK AN EXPLANATION.  LONDONO SAID HE KNOWS 
THAT ZAMBRANO WAS RECEIVED AT A HIGH LEVEL OF MINREX TO 
DELIVER QUITO'S MESSAGE OF IMPATIENCE, BUT THE ECUADORIANS 
HAVE NOT TOLD HIM WHAT MINREX'S RESPONSE WAS. 

CUBANS NOT SEEKING TO FREEZE OUT THE U.S., IN LONDONO'S VIEW 
--------------------------------------------- --------------- 
5. (C) LONDONO ADVISED US NOT TO PLACE TOO MUCH STOCK IN THE 
VENUE -- SANTO DOMINGO -- WHERE A NUMBER OF THE REGIONAL 
ACTORS, INCLUDING COLOMBIA AND ECUADOR, VENEZUELA AND 
NICARAGUA, BUT NOT THE UNITED STATES WERE PRESENT.  IN ANY 
CASE, LONDONO SAID THAT AT NO POINT DID CUBAN OFFICIALS TELL 
HIM THEY WANTED TO EXCLUDE THE USG FROM DISCUSSION OF AN 
OUTCOME.  LONDONO ACKNOWLEDGED THAT FIDEL, IN HIS REGULAR 
"REFLECTIONS" IN THE CUBAN PRESS, HAD CROWED THAT THE SANTO 
DOMINGO OUTCOME HAD BEEN POSSIBLE PRECISELY BECAUSE THE USG 
HAD BEEN ABSENT, BUT HE DID NOT BELIEVE THAT POINT OF VIEW 
REPRESENTED RAUL'S VIEWS. 
RAUL TRYING TO LOWER THE TEMPERATURE 
------------------------------------ 
6. (C) LONDONO'S INTERPRETATION IS THAT RAUL ACCEPTS HIS 
BROTHER'S RANTS NOT BECAUSE HE AGREES WITH THEM, BUT RATHER 
BECAUSE 1) IT IS NOT WORTH THE EFFORT TO TRY TO STOP THE 
IRREPRESSIBLE FIDEL; AND 2) LETTING FIDEL RATTLE ON GIVES 
RAUL COVER WITH THE HARD LINERS IN THE REGIME.  THE COLOMBIAN 
AMBASSADOR, CURRENT DEAN OF THE DIP CORPS HERE AND A TEN-YEAR 
VETERAN IN HAVANA WHO HAS MET MANY TIMES WITH BOTH FIDEL AND 
RAUL, SAID RAUL IS NOW FIRMLY IN CHARGE OF EVENTS ON THE 
ISLAND, AT LEAST INSOFAR AS THE REGIME IS CONCERNED.  HE 

POINTED TO THE REMOVAL OF HATEFUL ANTI-U.S. BILLBOARDS AROUND 
TOWN AS ANOTHER SIGN OF THE MORE PRAGMATIC, LESS IDEOLOGICAL 
CHARACTER NOW AT THE HEAD OF THE REGIME.  WHEN COM PRESSED, 
LONDONO SAID HE HAD NO INSIGHTS AS TO WHEN THE REGIME WOULD 
RELEASE POLITICAL PRISONERS, AND HE AGREED THAT SUCH AN ACT 
WOULD BE THE MOST CONCRETE SIGN OF THE REGIME WANTING TO GO 
IN A TRULY NEW DIRECTION.  LONDONO EXPRESSED SURPRISE THAT 
THE REGIME HAD NOT TAKEN ADVANTAGE OF THE VISITS OF VATICAN 
STATE SECRETARY BERTONE OR EU COMMISSIONER MICHEL TO RELEASE 
POL PRISONERS, BUT HE AGREED THAT THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 
SHOULD KEEP PRESSING THE POINT.  "QUIETLY," HE ADDED. 

COMMENT 
------- 
7. (C) LONDONO TOLD US PRESIDENT URIBE HAS ASKED HIM TO TAKE 
THE LEAD FOR COLOMBIA IN REACHING A FINAL SETTLEMENT WITH 
ECUADOR IN THE DISPUTE.  FOR NOW HE INTENDS TO DO THAT JOB 
WHILE RETAINING HIS HAVANA POSTING.  LONDONO HAS GOOD 
PROFESSIONAL TIES WITH SENIOR REGIME OFFICIALS HERE, BUT IS 
NOT AS SYCOPHANTIC AS MANY OF HIS COUNTERPARTS.  FROM THAT 
PERSPECTIVE, HIS ANALYSIS OF RAUL'S EFFORTS TO LOWER THE 
IDEOLOGICAL CONTENT OF CUBAN BEHAVIOR IS WORTH CONSIDERATION. 

PARMLY