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Viewing cable 08AITTAIPEI474, MEDIA REACTION: U.S.-CHINA-TAIWAN RELATIONS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08AITTAIPEI474 2008-04-01 09:03 2011-08-23 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
VZCZCXYZ0004
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHIN #0474/01 0920903
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 010903Z APR 08
FM AIT TAIPEI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8616
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 8121
RUEHHK/AMCONSUL HONG KONG 9359
UNCLAS AIT TAIPEI 000474 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR INR/R/MR, EAP/TC, EAP/PA, EAP/PD - NIDA EMMONS 
DEPARTMENT PASS AIT/WASHINGTON 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OPRC KMDR KPAO TW
SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION: U.S.-CHINA-TAIWAN RELATIONS 
 
 
1. Summary:  Taiwan's major Chinese-language focused their April 1 
news coverage on the controversy over whether the Chen Shui-bian 
caretaker government should raise or freeze gasoline prices; on 
president-elect Ma Ying-jeou's planned meeting with President Chen 
Shui-bian Tuesday morning; on possible developments in the 
cross-Strait relations; and on the future direction of the defeated 
DPP.  The centrist, KMT-leaning "China Times" ran an exclusive 
banner headline on page four that said "National Security Bureau: 
Chinese Communist Party Takes Precautions against [Possible] 'Taiwan 
Independence Incidents' before May 20." 
 
2. In terms of editorials and commentaries, a column in the 
mass-circulation "Apple Daily" said president-elect Ma and vice 
president-elect Vincent Siew will soon come to realize that it is 
never easy to be a leader.  The article said forming a new cabinet 
and finding a way to deal with China are the two challenges Ma and 
Siew will face initially.  A "China Times" column cautioned both 
sides of the Taiwan Strait on the possibility that U.S. President 
George W. Bush, in order to leave a legacy, may want to push Taiwan 
and China to talk, mediating a peace agreement before he steps down 
in another nine months.  An op-ed in the pro-unification "United 
Daily News" suggested that Ma be more cautious when he makes remarks 
now, because Beijing will be watching closely and evaluate Ma's 
every word.  End summary. 
 
[Ed. Note: A searchable archive of past issues of AIT/Taipei's media 
review products may be found at 
www.intelink.gov/communities/state/taiwanmedi areview.] 
 
A) "The Difficulty of Being A Leader" 
 
Columnist Antonio Chiang said in his column in the mass-circulation 
"Apple Daily" [circulation: 520,000] (4/1): 
 
"... Washington and Beijing both congratulated Ma Ying-jeou [on Ma's 
election].  However, it will be Ma's wishful thinking if he thinks 
most of the ideas he advocated, such as the peace accord, the 1992 
consensus, and the three links [across the Taiwan Strait] can be 
achieved right away.  A-Bian also tried to push these agendas when 
he assumed office initially, but to no avail.  Everyone is curious 
what excellent plan Ma can offer [for the strained cross-Strait 
relations] other than showing a goodwill gesture toward Beijing. 
 
"It is a dynamic game to deal with the Chinese Communists.  [Ma] has 
to consolidate every step when [he] advances.  Every move likely 
will increase or decrease his freedom to act.  For the political 
negotiations initiated by Beijing, regardless of the agenda, Taiwan 
is essentially regarded [by Beijing] as both a rival and a target 
for negotiations.  Once Taiwan accepts such an agenda, if will only 
win back itself should the island wins, but it will lose everything 
if it loses.  However, for Beijing, it will win anyway, as long as 
Taiwan is willing to talk. ..." 
 
B) "[U.S. President George W.] Bush Seeking to Leave a Legacy; Both 
Sides Should Take Precautions" 
 
Deputy Editor-in-Chief Kuo Chen-lung wrote in the "International 
Column" in the centrist, KMT-leaning "China Times" [circulation: 
400,000] (4/1): 
 
"... Ma Ying-jeou's visit to the United States is definitely not as 
simple as setting a precedent.  What the United States really wants 
is to meet with the [Taiwan] president-elect and talk about 
cross-Strait relations in a broad and practical manner; Washington 
not only wants to discuss the content of [Ma's] inaugural address 
but also to involve itself in the steps and timeline of the 
development of cross-Strait relations, so that they can pose the 
question, 'Is there anything the United States can do [for Taiwan 
and China]?' 
 
"Judging from the situation that [U.S. President George W.] Bush has 
been running into a wall [in international issues involving the 
Middle East, North Korea and Africa], if a mechanism for 
cross-Strait contact and interaction can be formed in the six months 
after Ma's election, it will be the biggest diplomatic achievement 
[for Bush] in his term of office.  The resumption of talks by mid- 
or low-level officials [across the Taiwan Strait], such as Taiwan's 
Straits Exchange Foundation and China's Association for Relations 
Across the Taiwan Strait, is not a political reconciliation in the 
United States' view.  The best option [for Washington] will be to 
arrange a summit, bringing Ma and Hu Jintao together to stand next 
to Bush.  Even if [both sides] fail to achieve anything in the 
future, it will be an excellent photo opportunity.  Isn't it so that 
the Camp David accords won the Nobel peace prize?  Who cares if the 
mechanism will be able to last long? 
 
"Ma certainly does not want to be pushed; he has four, or even eight 
years to do so, and he can decide at his own pace.  Hu has less than 
five years left [on the throne], and he is willing and he can wait. 
 
But Bush has only nine months left in the remainder his term; he may 
overstep his authority and hasten to act as a mediator, because he 
is impatient.  Hu can drag his feet, can take advantage of the 
aspect favorable for Beijing because of Washington's push for talks. 
 But for Ma, he can hardly say 'No' to Bush because the United 
States has a great influence on Taiwan. ... It will be a tragedy for 
both sides of the Taiwan Strait should it really happen some day 
that [KMT Legislator] Su Chi and [China's Deputy Foreign Minister] 
Dai Bingguo are forced to draft an agreement under the supervision 
of the United States' next secretary of state." 
 
C) "The Election Is Over, Ma Should Be Careful of What He Says" 
 
Barry Chen, a professor at the Graduate Institute of American 
Studies of Chinese Culture University and a visiting scholar at 
Beijing Union University, opined in the pro-unification "United 
Daily News" [circulation: 400,000] (4/1): 
 
"... Now that Ma [Ying-jeou] is elected, Beijing has rose beyond 
[the stage of] viewing Ma's words as simply campaign rhetoric and is 
seriously waiting for Ma to explain clearly his cross-Strait policy. 
 Beijing is at least highly concerned about how Ma will handle the 
three cornerstones, on which the 1992 consensus was built.  The 
first [cornerstone] is the one China as stated in the Constitution 
of the Republic of China, which Beijing regards as the basis for 
[the statement that] 'both sides across the Taiwan Strait belong to 
one China.'  As a result, [China] advocates that the Taiwan issue 
should be decided jointly by all the Chinese people, including the 
Taiwan people.  But Ma asserts that the future of Taiwan has to be 
determined by Taiwan's 23 million people. 
 
"Second, although Chen Shui-bian has terminated [Taiwan's] National 
Unification Council, which was established in accordance with the 
National Unification Guidelines, Beijing and Washington both believe 
that the National Unification Council still exists while its 
operation is just frozen.  Beijing is waiting to see how Ma will 
manage the issue of the National Unification Council.  Third, most 
Taiwan people used to consider themselves as both Taiwan people and 
Chinese people.  Today, most people consider themselves only Taiwan 
people but not Chinese.  Beijing is also concerned about how Ma will 
respond to this phenomenon. ..." 
 
YOUNG