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Viewing cable 08VIENTIANE180, FRAUD SUMMARY-(VIENTIANE): Q1 FY 2008

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08VIENTIANE180 2008-03-20 10:22 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Vientiane
VZCZCXRO0247
RR RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHHM RUEHNH
DE RUEHVN #0180/01 0801022
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 201022Z MAR 08
FM AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1921
INFO RUEHBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK 7649
RUEHPNH/NVC PORTSMOUTH 0456
RUCNASE/ASEAN MEMBER COLLECTIVE
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 VIENTIANE 000180 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR CA/EX/FPP (Overstrom) 
STATE FOR EAP/MLS (Bestic) 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KFRD CVIS CPAS CMGT ASEC LA
SUBJECT: FRAUD SUMMARY-(VIENTIANE):  Q1 FY 2008 
 
A. (U) The Lao People's Democratic Republic is a least-developed 
country with a single-party communist government.  With an estimated 
$572 per capita income, Laos is one of the poorest countries in East 
Asia.  Nearly 71% of the population lives on less than $2 a day, 
with 23% living on less than $1 per day.  Illiteracy is about 47%. 
Agriculture is the major sector of the economy, contributing 46% of 
the GDP and employing approximately 79% of the population, mostly in 
subsistence farming. 
 
The main contributors to fraud in Laos are poverty and the large 
proportion of the population with family ties in the U.S., as 
citizens attempt to illegally emigrate permanently, often to join 
relatives there, or to temporarily work illegally in the United 
States.  Most of the applicant pool at Embassy Vientiane, as well as 
most of the fraud, comes from two of Laos's 49 ethnic groups: the 
ethnic Lao and the Hmong.  The ethnic Lao are the largest ethnic 
group in Laos.  The Hmong constitute about ten percent of the 
population of Laos but make up an estimated 25 to 30 percent of our 
applicant pool.  There are almost a third as many ethnic Hmong in 
the U.S. as there are in Laos.  The most recent U.S. census 
estimated that 170,000 ethnic Lao and 170,000 ethnic Hmong currently 
live in the United States. 
 
Passports and national ID cards are the only nationally issued forms 
of identification.  The information on a Lao passport or ID card 
cannot be accepted at face value.  False or duplicate identities are 
common among visa applicants. Obtaining a passport issued with a 
false identity is relatively easy, in many cases not even requiring 
a bribe.  Laos does not have a well-established tradition of civil 
documents, and, as such, there is little standardization or security 
for documents such as birth or marriage certificates.  Additionally, 
many of these documents are issued at the village level by the 
village chief, and, as such, will say generally whatever the 
requestor wants them to say.  Many documents submitted to the 
Consular Section in support of an application for any service are 
handwritten.  Further, forged or false business licenses, bank 
books, identity cards, and household registration books are common. 
Detection of altered or fraudulent documents is usually easy as 
production is unsophisticated. 
 
2. (U) B. NIV Fraud 
 
Eighty-nine percent of NIV applicants at post are B2 applicants, the 
majority of whom are applying to visit relatives. Identity fraud is 
the largest problem facing the Consular section in Laos. Some 
applicants who are refused visas return at a later time with a new 
identity which is reflected in a new national ID card, new household 
registration, and new passport.  Vientiane has one of the highest 
adjusted NIV refusal rates in the world.  A recent B1/B2 validation 
study indicated a high non-return rate, thus we consider this post 
to be a medium fraud post. 
Religious Worker Visas. The board of directors of a Lao Buddhist 
temple in Arkansas reported in December 2007 that the previous abbot 
and president were fired for financial activities not approved by 
the board, including inviting unneeded monks from Laos.  FPU had 
noticed a spike in this temple's applications since May 2007 and had 
been monitoring new cases, until this confirmation arrived. The 
abbot was not supposed to be in Arkansas in the first place; his 
visa authorized residence at a temple in Las Vegas.  This is 
indicative of a suspected larger problem of "monk-swapping" by 
temples and "temple-hopping" by R-1 recipients. Four monks assigned 
to Wat Buddha Samakittham were elsewhere. Two of them were elsewhere 
with the blessing of the original temple, who noted that they no 
longer wish to be held financially responsible for these two. The 
FPU will conduct a validity study to better gauge the scope of the 
practice of monks leaving or changing temples and their return rate. 
The FPU has been tracking past and current R-1 requests for the 
approximately 100 Lao temples in the U.S. We have enacted other new 
screening measures for R-1 applications, such as using pre-interview 
check-lists, requesting more complete supportive documentation, and 
occasional quizzing of monks in Pali and Sanskrit, the sacred 
languages used by Buddhist monks. 
 
B1/B2 and P1 visas. One well-known Lao singer diverted from her 
avowed non-profit performances to engage in a full scale concert 
tour of the U.S.  She has been entered P6C into CLASS. During the 
Hmong New Year in December, we experience an annual rush of poorly 
qualified singers, dancers and artists wishing to perform at 
festivals in the U.S. This has prompted closer examination of 
performers and their venues. P-1 performers are likewise being held 
to a stricter interpretation of INA 101(a)(15)(p)(i)(b)(I) that 
stipulates that an entertainer "perform with or is an integral and 
essential part of the performance of an entertainment group that 
has... been recognized internationally as being outstanding in the 
discipline for a sustained and substantial period of time." Most of 
these P-1 applicants for the last few years were sponsored by a 
single firm based in Virginia, specializing in tours of temple 
venues.  They received a standard $200/week salary plus tips, with a 
 
VIENTIANE 00000180  002 OF 002 
 
 
good return rate from a mini-validation check-up. On closer 
examination, we found that their evidence for international 
recognition and professional history was lacking. When we checked 
with temples appearing on a list of proposed concert venues, we 
found almost none had been contacted by the concert organizer yet. 
 
3. (U) C. IV Fraud: For Lao IV and K1 visa applicants, there is a 
certain amount of relationship fraud, consistent with a medium fraud 
level. This generally includes sham relationships for immigration 
benefit through a K-1 visa application. Post is developing a list of 
fraud indicators commonly seen in sham fiance relationships based 
on Lao and Hmong cultural norms. The limited education of most Lao 
applicants and the culturally accepted practice of arranged 
marriages means that some bona fide applicants and their fianc(e)s 
in the United States who have every intention of marrying and 
following immigration law may not have the kinds of evidence of 
relationship that we would like to see (such as specific knowledge 
about each other's lives, interests, etc.). 
 
 
4. (SBU) D. DV Fraud:  Medium Fraud. As mentioned in the fourth 
quarterly report for 2007, many "winners" of the DV lottery could 
not substantiate education or vocational qualifications. Suspicious 
spousal relationships are common. 
 
5. (U) E. ACS and Passport Fraud: Low Fraud. There is a growing 
number of American citizens in Laos, as tourism to Laos is growing 
and as Lao-Americans return for tourism, business, or to retire. ACS 
reviews PIERS for any application to replace a lost or stolen 
passport, as well as for other ACS services where questions arise. 
Because of the still small numbers of American citizens resident in 
Laos, CRBA issuances are still relatively low (31 in 2007). Post 
uncovered no fraud in the CRBA applications. However, post has 
recently suggested DNA evidence to prove paternity in four CRBA 
cases. Those cases have not yet been resolved. 
6. (SBU) F. Adoption Fraud: Medium with high potential.  Adoption of 
a Lao child by a foreign citizen is prohibited in Laos. However, 
because it was prohibited by Prime Ministerial decree, the Prime 
Minister's office can waive the restriction. The PM's office usually 
does so if the adopting parents are close relatives of the children. 
As such, post sees very few adoption cases (7 in 2007). Post 
occasionally sees adoption cases where American citizen relatives 
try to adopt children that are not true orphans. In these cases, the 
surviving biological parent (or parents) generally state that they 
gave up custody of the children to their relatives "to give them a 
better life."   In 2007, an American church-based NGO has begun the 
process for opening an office in Laos that would eventually 
facilitate the adoption of Lao orphans by U.S. citizens. 
7.  (U) G. Asylum and other DHS Benefit Fraud:  Nothing new to 
report. There is little or no asylum or DHS benefit fraud from the 
limited number of Visa 92/93 cases that post processes. In cases of 
suspected relationship fraud, or where EOR is lacking, post has 
suggested DNA tests to prove the relationship. One malafide 
applicant was discovered through DNA in 2007. 
8. (U) H. Cooperation with the Authorities:  The Consular Chief 
meets regularly with working level counterparts at the Consular 
Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to discuss Lao 
passport fraud. Each week, three to five applicants present 
duplicate passports issued with new names, surnames and dates of 
birth.  This is done in an attempt to hide prior refusals. Consular 
officers confiscate these passports, which are detected during the 
visa interview process by the IDENT system.  The passports are 
returned to MFA with information about the applicants and their 
claimed identities. 
 
MFA officials have stated that the false identity problem is a local 
problem, as vital documents are issued at the village level, 
household registrations are issued at the district level, identity 
cards are issued at the provincial level, and passports are issued 
based on those documents. 
While the MFA has stated that holding two identities is a crime 
under Lao law, they have not clarified what penalties these crimes 
might warrant, and what procedure one must follow to legally change 
one's name (a common occurrence in Laos, generally to change one's 
luck). The MFA has requested that we send any fraudulent identity 
passports to them for their action, but there seems to be little 
follow-up by authorities to punish offenders. 
Most requests to meet with immigration police or district and 
provincial officials must go through the MFA. Most government 
officials will not meet with us unless there are diplomatic notes 
between the Embassy and MFA regarding such a meeting. MFA response 
time to meeting requests is slow and sometimes non-existent. 
9. (U) I.  Areas of Particular Concern:  Post holds consular lunches 
with other Embassies' consular representatives on a quarterly basis 
to share issues of concern and fraud trends. Australia, France, 
Germany, Japan and Singapore Consuls usually attend. 
MCGEEHAN