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Viewing cable 08TELAVIV501, ISRAELI FM LIVNI MEETS CODEL, SAYS FATAH CANNOT OVERTAKE

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08TELAVIV501 2008-03-04 13:03 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Tel Aviv
VZCZCXYZ3677
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTV #0501/01 0641303
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 041303Z MAR 08
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5666
INFO RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN 3737
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 1712
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 4263
RUEHLB/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 3517
RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 9206
UNCLAS TEL AVIV 000501 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV KPAL KWBG IS IR
SUBJECT: ISRAELI FM LIVNI MEETS CODEL, SAYS FATAH CANNOT OVERTAKE 
HAMAS IN GAZA 
 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
1.(SBU) On Monday, February 18, CODELs Kyl and Brownback met with 
Israel Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni at the Knesset to hear Israeli 
perspectives on Iran and the peace process.  Livni spoke at length 
regarding the challenges posed by Hamas, most significantly noting 
that the organization's function as a social movement with broad 
popular support now poses as great a threat to Israeli security as 
the organization's terrorist activities. Livni assessed that while 
there was once hope that Fatah could win back Gaza, this possibility 
is unlikely in the near future. End Summary. 
 
---- 
IRAN 
---- 
 
2. (SBU) On Monday, February 18, CODELs Kyl and Brownback met with 
Israel Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni at the Knesset to hear Israeli 
perspectives on Iran and the peace process.  Livni observed that the 
world is increasingly divided between the forces of extremism and 
moderation, and suggested that Israel is too often the victim of 
extremists, specifically naming Iran and Hizballah in that category. 
 Livni went on to note that for the first time in years, more 
moderate Arab countries are recognizing that Iran poses a threat to 
their own security, and consequently they find themselves in the 
"strange place" of sharing a position with Israel.  She suggested 
that this may be a factor in the Arab countries' hesitation to 
confront Iran, and may have caused the perception in the Arab world 
that engagement with Iran on the nuclear issue is a sign of 
weakness.  Livni concluded with the observation that this is a 
"crucial moment" to confront the Iranians, and that a failure to do 
so may result in the international community's tacit acceptance of 
an Iranian nuclear power. 
 
-------------- 
HAMAS AND GAZA 
-------------- 
 
3. (SBU) Livni asserted that the division between extremists and 
moderates is also a battle being fought within Palestinian society. 
She remarked that in Gaza, Hamas operates not only as a terrorist 
organization, but also as a social movement that educates children, 
pays salaries, and provides welfare services.  To the extent that 
these efforts have won the loyalty of the Palestinian population, 
Livni argued, the Hamas social movement poses as great a threat to 
Israeli security as the organization's Qassam rocket attacks and 
terror activities. 
 
4. (SBU) Livni attributed the increased danger of Qassam rocket 
attacks from Gaza to the failure of Egypt to secure the Gaza-Egypt 
border, noting that more weapons with greater range capabilities are 
now flowing into Gaza and enabling Hamas to hit a wider range of 
targets inside Israel.  Livni opined that while there was once hope 
that Fatah could win back Gaza, she no longer believes this is 
possible in the near term.  While she was careful to note that 
Israel has not intended to reoccupy Gaza, Livni tacitly suggested 
that this is becoming a possibility.  She argued that the focus now 
must be to stop the influx of weaponry into Gaza, both to enhance 
Israeli security and to avoid being further disadvantaged if at some 
point Israeli forces must go back in. 
 
--------------------------------------- 
PEACE PROCESS AND PALESTINIAN STATEHOOD 
--------------------------------------- 
 
5. (SBU) With respect to the peace process, Livni articulated a 
"dual strategy" for advancing the political process, characterized 
by trying to come to an agreement with President Mahmoud Abbas, who 
has accepted Israel's right to exist, while simultaneously isolating 
Hamas and acting against terrorist threats. In the past, Livni 
observed, Israel has demanded that all terrorist activity be halted 
and Roadmap Phase One requirements be met before undertaking any 
negotiations.  She noted that this changed at Annapolis, when Israel 
decided to move forward in negotiations with the understanding that 
any future agreement would be subject to the implementation of 
stipulations articulated in the Roadmap.  Livni highlighted Israel's 
desire to keep negotiations private and out of the public arena, 
noting that this is important to the process and has been successful 
thus far. 
 
6. (SBU) With regard to a future Palestinian state, Livni pointedly 
noted that Israel cannot afford to have a terrorist state or a 
failed state on its borders, and suggested this is one reason why 
Israel decided not to launch a full attack on Lebanon in the summer 
 
2006 war.  Livni remarked that Israeli approval of Palestinian 
borders would depend on assurances that the Palestinian state remain 
demilitarized and that its establishment secure an absolute end to 
all Palestinian claims against Israel.  In this context, Livni 
articulated Israel's opposition to Palestinian "right of return," 
suggesting that any compromise on this issue would only provide a 
loophole for further conflict. 
 
--------------- 
ROLE OF THE U.S. 
---------------- 
 
7. (SBU) Livni emphasized the importance of understanding between 
the U.S. and Israel, and remarked that Israel needs U.S. support to 
negotiate an agreement that will protect and secure Israel in both 
the short and long term.  She was careful to note that Israel needs 
to be in control of the process and not be pressured by the U.S. or 
any international community actors.  She asked that the U.S. 
continue to stand with Israel and be willing "to say to the 
Palestinians, at some point, 'no more.'" 
 
8. (U) CODEL Kyl cleared on this cable. 
 
JONES