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Viewing cable 08TAIPEI406, PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION IN SOUTHERN TAIWAN: DPP, KMT SEE

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08TAIPEI406 2008-03-21 10:19 2011-08-23 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
VZCZCXRO1249
OO RUEHCN RUEHGH
DE RUEHIN #0406/01 0811019
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 211019Z MAR 08
FM AIT TAIPEI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8485
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 8038
RUEHGH/AMCONSUL SHANGHAI 1918
RUEHCN/AMCONSUL CHENGDU 2543
RUEHSH/AMCONSUL SHENYANG 6513
RUEHGZ/AMCONSUL GUANGZHOU 1103
RUEHHK/AMCONSUL HONG KONG 9294
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 TAIPEI 000406 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
DEPT FOR AIT/W, EAP/TC, INR/EAP 
 
FROM AIT KAOHSIUNG BRANCH OFFICE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV TW
SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION IN SOUTHERN TAIWAN:  DPP, KMT SEE 
CLOSE FIGHT IN TAINAN 
 
REF: Taipei 00371 
 
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED, PLEASE PROTECT ACCORDINGLY 
 
1.  (SBU)  Summary:  In separate March 19 meetings with Director 
Young, Tainan City Mayor Hsu Tien-Tsair highlighted the DPP's big 
local advantage, while the city's KMT chair Cheng Ching-Jen claimed 
growing enthusiasm for Ma Ying-Jeou.  Hsu acknowledged voters' 
unhappiness with President Chen but suggested Hsieh would actually 
best Ma at ending the Chen era.  In contrast to Hsu's dismissal of 
Ma's recent Tainan campaign stops, Cheng stressed that Ma's "long 
stay" visits impressed local voters.  Both Hsu and Cheng 
acknowledged that neither party was pushing the UN referenda 
strongly, although Hsu worried about implications of the referenda 
failing.  With Tainan City a must win for Hsieh, Hsu has been 
campaigning all out, using Hsieh's latest attack lines to good 
effect throughout the Tainan area.  End Summary. 
 
2.  (SBU) During his March 19 trip to southern Taiwan to discuss 
Taiwan's Presidential election, Director Young met separately with 
Tainan City Mayor Hsu Tien-Tsair and KMT Tainan City Chair Cheng 
Ching-Jen.  Tainan City, a pan-Green stronghold, overwhelmingly 
supported President Chen in 2000 and 2004 and delivered both of its 
Legislative Yuan seats to the DPP in January 2008 elections.  Hsu, 
who credits Chen for helping him win Tainan City's 2002 mayoral 
race, spent ten years studying in the U.S. and presides over a 
strong local economy.  Cheng, a veteran KMT official, recently took 
over as Tainan City KMT chair to try to reverse the KMT's local 
fortunes. 
 
DPP's Hsu: Greens Holding Steady in Tainan 
------------------------------------------ 
 
3.  (SBU) Describing the DPP's Tainan City electoral advantage, 
Mayor Hsu estimated the DPP's local support at 55 percent versus the 
KMT's 45 percent.  In his 2007 re-election, Hsu noted, he beat his 
KMT opponent by 60 to 40 percent.  For the 2008 Presidential 
election, the DPP hoped for 57 percent in Tainan City (Chen's 2004 
mark), but 60 percent or even 64 percent (about an 80,000-vote 
margin) was not out of reach.  Given the city's robust economy and 
low unemployment, Hsu was bullish about the DPP's local prospects. 
 
4.  (SBU) Hsu highlighted three reasons for the DPP's January 2008 
Legislative Yuan election setback:  opposition to President Chen, 
Chen's indiscrete statements, and a sluggish economy island wide. 
He explained that the weak economy actually began in 1993, well 
before Chen, and that thanks to local initiatives like the Tainan 
Science-Based Industrial Park, Tainan's economy suffered less. 
Furthermore, if voters really wanted to end the Chen era, they 
should vote for Hsieh, who could marginalize Chen's subsequent 
influence. 
 
5.  (SBU) Hsu agreed with Director's observation that Hsieh would 
find it difficult trying to distance himself from Chen.  Hsieh had 
no other choice, Hsu explained, since voters were dissatisfied with 
Chen.  Nevertheless, Hsu insisted, voters had not given up on the 
DPP.  Therefore, Hsieh would let Chen continue campaigning so Chen 
could save face and consolidate deep Greens, but he would not let 
Chen make any speeches to minimize any chance of further 
controversy. 
 
6.  (SBU) Hsu commended Hsieh's strategy focusing on one-party 
dominance, the one-China market, and the credibility of Ma and 
Siew's statements ("whatever they say is nonsense" - "yi pai hu 
yan").  The one-party issue would remind voters of the KMT's 
traditional arrogance; the one-China market controversy would prompt 
professionals, worried about future job prospects, to desert Ma; and 
Ma's clumsy handling of his green-card matter would cause voters to 
question his credibility. 
 
7.  (SBU) Commenting on Ma's campaign visits to Tainan, Hsu scoffed 
that Ma had been to Tainan so many times, he had lost count.  The 
visits were too short for Ma to establish any grass-roots 
relationships.  He dismissed the highly publicized defection of Wang 
Chang-Kun, chairman of Tainan City's Doctors' Association, from 
pan-Green to pan-Blue.  Wang's endorsement may help KMT propaganda 
outside of Tainan, he stated, but Tainan citizens knew that Wang had 
little local influence. 
 
8.  (SBU) On the UN referendum, Hsu commented that few party 
 
TAIPEI 00000406  002 OF 002 
 
 
leaders, save Chen, were promoting it aggressively.  Without the 
push, the referendum was unlikely to pass.  Hsu said Hsieh was aware 
of the international community's concerns and planned to set the 
matter aside.  Nevertheless, Hsu complained, China continued to 
restrict Taiwan's international space.  If the referendum failed, 
the international community would take Taiwan's predicament less 
seriously. 
 
KMT's Cheng:  Focus on Ma and DPP Dirty Tricks 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
9.  (SBU) Tainan City KMT Chair Cheng Ching-Jen believed that during 
the last four years, the gap between the KMT and DPP in Tainan had 
narrowed.  While President Chen won Tainan City handily in 2004, the 
pan-Blue in 2008 lost the Legislative Yuan election party tally by 
only 12,000 votes and the district tally by just 7,000 votes.  For 
the 2008 Presidential election, he hoped the KMT could secure up to 
48 percent of the city's vote by capitalizing on voters' desire for 
change.  The sluggish economy was the KMT's best issue locally, he 
underscored, noting that even in Tainan City, Mayor Hsu had amassed 
a 31 billion Taiwan dollar (one billion USD) debt. 
 
10.  (SBU) Cheng applauded the success of the KMT's March 16 Tainan 
City rally.  Large numbers of young people were among the estimated 
30,000 KMT supporters participating, he noted, a shift from 2004. 
By contrast, the DPP's March 15 Tainan rally was sparsely attended, 
he claimed, and the DPP's follow-on rally on March 16 lacked the 
passion of the DPP's 2004 effort.  Cheng praised Ma for visiting 
Tainan City frequently following the January LY elections. 
According to Cheng, Ma's personal touch, sincerity and simplicity 
impressed local voters and boosted local campaign morale. 
 
11.  (SBU) Noting that Hsieh had no local connection with Tainan 
City, Cheng suggested that President Chen's local popularity would 
not transfer to Hsieh.  He dismissed Hsieh's attack on one-Party 
dominance, mentioning that in the U.S., one party frequently held 
both executive and legislative power.  He defended KMT legislators' 
behavior at the DPP's Taipei Headquarters, explaining that 
legislators had the right to investigate financial irregularities. 
He commented that the UN referendum would not hinder the KMT's 
campaign efforts.  While the KMT supported its own version of the 
referendum, it did not have the time or energy to promote it 
actively.  All focus was on the Presidential election. 
 
12.  (SBU) Confident of Ma's victory island wide, Cheng highlighted 
KMT concern over possible last-minute DPP "dirty tricks."  For 
example, Cheng feared Hsieh might take to the airwaves on election 
eve pretending to brandish Ma's green card.  Unlike 2004 (after the 
Chen shooting incident), the KMT was prepared to respond quickly. 
In Tainan, three-wheeled vehicles broadcasting KMT counterattacks 
were ready to deploy throughout the city at a moment's notice.  To 
maintain momentum, the KMT planned to hold a large Tainan City 
election eve parade. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
13.  (SBU) Barring a major upset, Hsieh will win Tainan City. 
President Chen, neighboring Tainan County's native son, still 
captures deep-Green hearts throughout the Tainan area. 
Nevertheless, even strong Chen backers in the south, like Mayor Hsu, 
frankly acknowledge Chen's drag on the national ticket.  With 
Kaohsiung City and Kaohsiung County still tight, a big Hsieh win in 
Tainan is a must.  Mayor Hsu in particular has gone all out for 
Hsieh, using the one-party dominance theme to good effect in urban 
Tainan, while his surrogates stress the one-China market issue in 
outlying Tainan County's agricultural areas.  However, local KMT 
contacts think the KMT's successful March 16 rally showed surprising 
strength for Ma in the city; if Ma can narrow his gap with Hsieh in 
Tainan on election night, they believe, Hsieh is likely to struggle 
in other key southern battlegrounds. 
 
CASTRO 
 
YOUNG