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Viewing cable 08QUITO247, AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENT CORREA

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08QUITO247 2008-03-12 20:58 2011-04-11 20:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Quito
Appears in these articles:
http://www.eluniverso.com/2011/04/11/1/1355/cable-145522.html
VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHQT #0247/01 0722058
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 122058Z MAR 08
FM AMEMBASSY QUITO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8611
INFO RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 7434
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 3862
RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 0755
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 2942
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ MAR LIMA 2477
RUEHMU/AMEMBASSY MANAGUA 0495
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 3076
RUEHGL/AMCONSUL GUAYAQUIL 3394
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
id: 145522
date: 3/12/2008 20:58
refid: 08QUITO247
origin: Embassy Quito
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination: 08QUITO216|08QUITO228
header:
VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHQT #0247/01 0722058
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 122058Z MAR 08
FM AMEMBASSY QUITO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8611
INFO RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 7434
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 3862
RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 0755
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 2942
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ MAR LIMA 2477
RUEHMU/AMEMBASSY MANAGUA 0495
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 3076
RUEHGL/AMCONSUL GUAYAQUIL 3394
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC


----------------- header ends ----------------

C O N F I D E N T I A L QUITO 000247 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/12/2028 
TAGS: PREL PTER MARR EC CO VE
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENT CORREA 
 
REF: A. QUITO 216 
     B. QUITO 228 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Linda Jewell for reasons 1.4 (d). 
 
1.  (C) Summary:  Meeting with the Ambassador on March 12, 
President Correa made clear that he wanted to continue 
working with the United States, including in Ecuador's 
northern border region.  He again vehemently denied an 
inappropriate relationship with the FARC, saying that would 
not be in his interest.  The Ambassador offered assurances 
that the Manta FOL was not involved in supporting the 
Colombian incursion and provided information on the Embraer 
Super Tucano to dispel suggestions it was not capable of 
carrying out the Colombian operation.  Correa was unsure what 
to expect out of the March 17 OAS ministerial meeting.  (End 
Summary) 
 
2.  (C) President Correa quickly responded to the 
Ambassador's request for a meeting, scheduling it for 12:30 
pm March 12, his first day back in the office following his 
Chile trip.  The meeting was one-on-one.  Correa appeared 
more relaxed than he had at their March 3 meeting (Ref A). 
The Ambassador told Correa she was there to see where we are 
and what type of relationship with the United States he 
wanted going forward.  She pointed out that many in his 
Administration are waiting for a signal from Correa on how to 
treat the United States. 
 
3.  (C) Correa assured her that he wanted to continue working 
with the United States, noting that he likes the U.S. and has 
many ties with us.  However, he reiterated his disappointment 
in the USG stance on the Colombian incursion.  Specifically, 
Correa expressed concern about continued Department comments 
on Ecuador's relationship with the FARC.  He again vehemently 
denied any inappropriate relationship, saying that he had 
never met a FARC member and that there would be no benefit 
for him in establishing such a relationship.  Correa said it 
was not that he was tolerating the FARC or letting it stay in 
Ecuador, nor had he ever thought of inviting the FARC 
Secretariat to Quito.  He stressed that such actions would 
 
SIPDIS 
not be in his interest.  Correa recognized that the FARC was 
at war with the democratically-elected government of 
Colombia, and that it could well come after his government 
next.  Correa said he wanted to continue working with the 
U.S. in the Northern Border region, and lamented the limits 
to the resources and personnel Ecuador could afford.  He 
cited the pathetic, even humiliating, fact that the 
Ecuadorian army did not have a working helicopter to quickly 
mobilize to the scene, and that the radar system for the zone 
was inoperable. 
 
4.  (C) Correa criticized Colombia, saying he could never 
sanction the execution of wounded individuals, as he believed 
the Colombian military did in the Reyes camp.  He expressed 
appreciation for Chavez' solidarity, but emphasized that "we 
(Ecuadorians) are different ('somos otra cosa.')"  Asked what 
he expected from the OAS ministerial, Correa was uncertain 
what would come out of it. 
 
5.  (C) Correa said the problem for him was that it was 
difficult for him to prove a negative, that he had no ties 
with the FARC.  The Ambassador said we have the same problem 
with proving that the Forward Operating Location (FOL) in 
Manta had nothing to do with the Colombian military 
operation.  She provided information showing that Colombia's 
Super Tucano aircraft, with modifications, could have 
accomplished the Colombian attack.  Correa promised to share 
the info with the OAS since he had suggested to the 
delegation, based on reports from his own staff, that the 
Colombian aircraft would not have been capable. 
 
6.  (S) Comment:  Correa was clearly still unhappy with the 
USG.  However, he did not sound like he was ready to give up 
on a constructive relationship with us, and seemed to 
appreciate the Ambassador asking to see him.  He said he 
favored FM Salvador having a meeting with the Deputy 
Secretary on the margins of next week,s OAS ministerial, if 
 
SIPDIS 
it could be arranged.  Correa's denial of an inappropriate 
relationship with the FARC appeared sincere.  It is unclear 
to us whether Correa knew everything that Minister Larrea put 
on the table in his discussions with the FARC, or whether 
Larrea might have been pursuing, at least in part, a personal 
agenda.  Winners and losers among Correa's jockeying inner 
circle of advisors in the wake of this event remain to seen, 
as well as possible broader internal policy and personnel 
fallout.  Correa,s actions in the coming days are likely to 
be telling. 
Jewell 

=======================CABLE ENDS============================