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Viewing cable 08NDJAMENA122, JAMOUS: DEBY STRONG, ABDELWAHID AL NUR WEAK, AND DARFUR

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08NDJAMENA122 2008-03-28 12:44 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Ndjamena
VZCZCXRO7350
RR RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHNJ #0122/01 0881244
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 281244Z MAR 08
FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6118
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 NDJAMENA 000122 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE, SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR AF/C AND AF/SPG 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PREF UN AU CD SU
SUBJECT: JAMOUS: DEBY STRONG, ABDELWAHID AL NUR WEAK, AND DARFUR 
ELECTIONS IMPOSSIBLE BEFORE PEACE ACCORD 
 
REF: NDJAMENA 117 
 
1. (SBU) Summary: Due to recent defections within two of the major 
Chadian opposition movements, President Idriss Deby's Government 
"faces no major danger" in the next year, SLA/Unity leader Suleiman 
Jamous told Poloffs on March 25.  He nonetheless warned that Deby's 
overthrow at the instigation of Sudan would "crush" the Darfur rebel 
movements and lead to "a true genocide" in the region.  Jamous 
indicated that elections in Darfur will not be possible before a 
political settlement is reached with the Sudanese Government. 
Casting doubt on the popular support for rival SLA leader Abdulwahid 
al Nur, Jamous said that a deal between Khartoum, SLA/Unity, and the 
URF that focused on security should be the focus of the peace 
process.  He proposed that a single Darfur state "ruled by the rebel 
groups," the provision of one-third of the seats in the national 
government for Darfurians, the full disarmament of the rebels, and a 
complete withdrawal of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) from the 
region would be the most effective guarantee to ensure Khartoum's 
compliance with a peace agreement. 
 
 
 
2.  Jamous' comments on fissures within the Chadian rebel community 
track generally with what we know from other sources, including the 
GOC.  That Khartoum's alleged preference for the Arab Soubiane 
grates on Nouri and Erdimi reflects deep antagonism by non-Arab 
northerners (Zaghawa and Gorane alike) for Chadian Arabs. If 
dissension within rebel ranks prevents another attack on N'Djamema 
until after the 08 rainy season, so much the better, but it is 
important to remember that the initiative lies entirely in rebel 
hands: they decide - or not - when and where to move. End summary. 
 
 
---------------------------- 
Deby "Faces No Major Danger" 
---------------------------- 
 
3. (SBU) Meeting with Poloffs on March 25, Sudan Liberation Army 
(SLA)/Unity leader Suleiman Jamous predicted that President Deby 
"faces no major danger in the near future" and did not anticipate 
another large-scale attack on N'djamena in the next year.  According 
to Jamous, major elements of Mahamat Nouri's Union des Forces de la 
Democratie et du Developpment (UFDD) and of Timan Erdimi's Rally of 
Forces for Change (RFC) have defected to the Chadian Government.  In 
addition, Nouri and Erdimi are angry over Khartoum's perceived 
support for Ahmed Soubian as the leader of a post-Deby regime, 
derailing a coordinated rebel offensive. 
 
4. (SBU) Jamous acknowledged that SLA/Unity was prepared to assist 
Deby's Government in its effort to repel the Chadian rebel offensive 
in February.  After the rebel retreat, SLA/Unity sent a delegation, 
consisting of Jamous and several senior SLA commanders, to N'djamena 
to "congratulate" Deby.  He warned that the collapse of Deby's 
government would be catastrophic for Darfur as Khartoum would then 
move to eliminate the rebel groups that are fighting on behalf of 
Darfurians.  "If Bashir overthrows Deby, the main issue will be to 
squeeze Darfur," he explained.  "They will crush us and a true 
genocide will start." 
 
----------------------------------- 
No Elections in Darfur Before Peace 
----------------------------------- 
 
5. (SBU) A political settlement between Darfur's rebel groups and 
the Sudanese Government is a pre-requisite to Darfur's participation 
in the elections scheduled for 2009, stated Jamous.  "There is no 
chance for Darfur in the elections unless we can make a political 
deal and have time to prepare before the elections are held," he 
said.  SLA/Unity has sought an alliance with the Sudan People's 
Liberation Movement (SPLM) against "the center" and remains 
optimistic that it can work with the "Southerners," which is the 
reason that senior SLA commander Kadu attended the SPLM-sponsored 
conference for Darfur rebel movements in late 2007. 
 
6. (SBU) However, Jamous explained that the "international community 
must know that we're not going to stand in the shade of the 
Southerners."  Darfur must have an adequate share in the federal 
government--approximately one-third of the positions in the national 
administration and of the seats in the National 
Assembly--commensurate with its population. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
Abdelwahid: Not As Strong As You Think 
-------------------------------------- 
 
7. (SBU) Asserting that SLA/Unity is the strongest military force in 
Darfur, Jamous dismissed the perception that rival SLA leader 
Abdelwahid al Nur is the most influential political leader among 
Darfurians.  He blamed the international community for 
 
NDJAMENA 00000122  002 OF 002 
 
 
"mis-assessing" Abdelwahid's popularity in the IDP camps--which he 
alleged is only 10-percent of IDPs--and predicted that a political 
settlement between SLA/Unity, the United Revolutionary Front (URF), 
and Khartoum would leave Abdelwahid isolated.  "It would just be him 
and Gadura (the chief SLA/Abdelwahid commander) sitting on a 
mountain," said Jamous.  He called on the international community to 
pressure Abdelwahid and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) to 
prevent further fragmentation of the movements. 
 
8. (SBU) According to Jamous, both SLA/Unity and the URF were 
cross-tribal movements with broad appeal--SLA/Unity because it is 
comprised of Arab, Fur, Kubur, and Zaghawa members and the URF 
because its leadership consisted of Arabs, Massaleit, and Zaghawa 
(reftel).  Most IDPs are focused on alleviating their suffering 
rather than political goals, meaning they will support any group 
that can guarantee security in an agreement with the Government. 
(Note: Both SLA/Unity and the URF are dominated by the Zaghawa, 
despite the presence of representatives of some other tribes in both 
the political and military structures of each movement.  End note.) 
 
9. (SBU) Jamous claimed that SLA/Unity has overcome its internal 
power struggles and there is now consensus that Abdullah Yehia is 
the movement's leader, with Jamous serving as humanitarian 
coordinator and Sharif Harir working as the secretary of external 
relations.  The faction is now governed by a "Council of 51" and has 
left some posts in the movement vacant to accommodate defectors from 
SLA/Abdelwahid. 
 
--------------------------------- 
Negotiations to Focus on Security 
--------------------------------- 
 
10. (SBU) Emphasizing that SLA/Unity is prepared to start 
negotiations at any time, Jamous characterized security as paramount 
and recommended that the UN/AU mediation follow a model similar to 
the Naivasha process: begin with an agreement on interim security 
arrangements (like the Machakos Procotol), then address power and 
wealth-sharing, and then finalize the security framework.  He 
claimed that neither he nor SLA/Unity is interested in securing 
political positions for themselves, only in addressing the plight of 
civilians.  Poloff questioned why, if power and wealth-sharing are 
unimportant, final security arrangements cannot be negotiated as 
soon as possible in order to protect the civilian population. 
Jamous replied that power and wealth-sharing were the "check" on 
Sudan to adhere to its security commitments. 
 
11. (SBU) "You cannot trust the Government," said Jamous.  "When 
they find the chance, they won't stop killing civilians." 
Consolidating Darfur into a single region "ruled by the rebel 
groups," the full disarmament of the rebels, and a complete 
withdrawal of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) from the region would 
be the most effective security guarantee.  In addition, ministerial 
posts for Darfurians in the Government of National Unity will ensure 
that wealth is dispersed from the "center."  The failure of the 
Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA), said Jamous, is that the Transitional 
Darfur Regional Authority (TDRA) and its Chairman, Minni Minawi, do 
not have control over the governors of the three Darfur states. 
"This is why I told Minni not to sign." 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
12.  (SBU) Jamous' comments on fissures within the Chadian rebel 
community track generally with what we know from other sources, 
including the GOC (see septel report on March 26 meeting with the 
Chadian Foreign Minister).  That Khartoum's alleged preference for 
the Arab Soubiane grates on Nouri and Erdimi reflects deep 
antagonism by non-Arab northerners (Zaghawa and Gorane alike) for 
Chadian Arabs. If dissension within rebel ranks prevents another 
attack on N'Djamema until after the 08 rainy season, so much the 
better, but it is important to remember that the initiative lies 
entirely in rebel hands: they decide - or not - when and where to 
move.  Nigro