Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 97115 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
ETRD EAGR ETTC EAID ECON EFIN ECIN EINV ELAB EAIR ENRG EPET EWWT ECPS EIND EMIN ELTN EC ETMIN EUC EZ ET ELECTIONS ENVR EU EUN EG EINT ER ECONOMICS ES EMS ENIV EEB EN ECE ECOSOC EK ENVIRONMENT EFIS EI EWT ENGRD ECPSN EXIM EIAD ERIN ECPC EDEV ENGY ECTRD EPA ESTH ECCT EINVECON ENGR ERTD EUR EAP EWWC ELTD EL EXIMOPIC EXTERNAL ETRDEC ESCAP ECO EGAD ELNT ECONOMIC ENV ETRN EIAR EUMEM ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID EREL ECOM ECONETRDEAGRJA ETCC ETRG ECONOMY EMED ETR ENERG EITC EFINOECD EURM EENG ERA EXPORT ENRD ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EGEN EBRD EVIN ETRAD ECOWAS EFTA ECONETRDBESPAR EGOVSY EPIN EID ECONENRG EDRC ESENV ETT EB ENER ELTNSNAR ECHEVARRIA ETRC EPIT EDUC ESA EFI ENRGY ESCI EE EAIDXMXAXBXFFR EETC ECIP EIAID EIVN EBEXP ESTN EING EGOV ETRA EPETEIND ELAN ETRDGK EAIDRW ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ENVI ELN EAG EPCS EPRT EPTED ETRB EUM EAIDS EFIC EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM EAIDAR ESF EIDN ELAM EDU EV EAIDAF ECN EDA EXBS EINTECPS ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EPREL EAC EINVEFIN ETA EAGER EINDIR ECA ECLAC ELAP EITI EUCOM ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID EARG ELDIN EINVKSCA ENNP EFINECONCS EFINTS ECCP ETC EAIRASECCASCID EINN ETRP EAIDNI EFQ ECOQKPKO EGPHUM EBUD ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ENERGY ELB EINDETRD EMI ECONEFIN EIB EURN ETRDEINVTINTCS EIN EFIM ETIO ELAINE EMN EATO EWTR EIPR EINVETC ETTD ETDR EIQ ECONCS EPPD ENRGIZ EISL ESPINOSA ELEC EAIG ESLCO EUREM ENTG ERD EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH ECINECONCS ETRO ETRDECONWTOCS ECUN EFND EPECO EAIRECONRP ERGR ETRDPGOV ECPN ENRGMO EPWR EET EAIS EAGRE EDUARDO EAGRRP EAIDPHUMPRELUG EICN ECONQH EVN EGHG ELBR EINF EAIDHO EENV ETEX ERNG ED
KMDR KPAO KPKO KJUS KCRM KGHG KFRD KWMN KDEM KTFN KHIV KGIC KIDE KSCA KNNP KHUM KIPR KSUM KISL KIRF KCOR KRCM KPAL KWBG KN KS KOMC KSEP KFLU KPWR KTIA KSEO KMPI KHLS KICC KSTH KMCA KVPR KPRM KE KU KZ KFLO KSAF KTIP KTEX KBCT KOCI KOLY KOR KAWC KACT KUNR KTDB KSTC KLIG KSKN KNN KCFE KCIP KGHA KHDP KPOW KUNC KDRL KV KPREL KCRS KPOL KRVC KRIM KGIT KWIR KT KIRC KOMO KRFD KUWAIT KG KFIN KSCI KTFIN KFTN KGOV KPRV KSAC KGIV KCRIM KPIR KSOC KBIO KW KGLB KMWN KPO KFSC KSEAO KSTCPL KSI KPRP KREC KFPC KUNH KCSA KMRS KNDP KR KICCPUR KPPAO KCSY KTBT KCIS KNEP KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNNB KGCC KINR KPOP KMFO KENV KNAR KVIR KDRG KDMR KFCE KNAO KDEN KGCN KICA KIMMITT KMCC KLFU KMSG KSEC KUM KCUL KMNP KSMT KCOM KOMCSG KSPR KPMI KRAD KIND KCRP KAUST KWAWC KTER KCHG KRDP KPAS KITA KTSC KPAOPREL KWGB KIRP KJUST KMIG KLAB KTFR KSEI KSTT KAPO KSTS KLSO KWNN KPOA KHSA KNPP KPAONZ KBTS KWWW KY KJRE KPAOKMDRKE KCRCM KSCS KWMNCI KESO KWUN KPLS KIIP KEDEM KPAOY KRIF KGICKS KREF KTRD KFRDSOCIRO KTAO KJU KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KEN KO KNEI KEMR KKIV KEAI KWAC KRCIM KWCI KFIU KWIC KCORR KOMS KNNO KPAI KBWG KTTB KTBD KTIALG KILS KFEM KTDM KESS KNUC KPA KOMCCO KCEM KRCS KWBGSY KNPPIS KNNPMNUC KWN KERG KLTN KALM KCCP KSUMPHUM KREL KGH KLIP KTLA KAWK KWMM KVRP KVRC KAID KSLG KDEMK KX KIF KNPR KCFC KFTFN KTFM KPDD KCERS KMOC KDEMAF KMEPI KEMS KDRM KEPREL KBTR KEDU KNP KIRL KNNR KMPT KISLPINR KTPN KA KJUSTH KPIN KDEV KTDD KAKA KFRP KWNM KTSD KINL KJUSKUNR KWWMN KECF KWBC KPRO KVBL KOM KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KEDM KFLD KLPM KRGY KNNF KICR KIFR KM KWMNCS KAWS KLAP KPAK KDDG KCGC KID KNSD KMPF KPFO KDP KCMR KRMS KNPT KNNNP KTIAPARM KDTB KNUP KPGOV KNAP KNNC KUK KSRE KREISLER KIVP KQ KTIAEUN KPALAOIS KRM KISLAO KWM KFLOA
PHUM PINR PTER PGOV PREL PREF PL PM PHSA PE PARM PINS PK PUNE PO PALESTINIAN PU PBTS PROP PTBS POL POLI PA PGOVZI POLMIL POLITICAL PARTIES POLM PD POLITICS POLICY PAS PMIL PINT PNAT PV PKO PPOL PERSONS PING PBIO PH PETR PARMS PRES PCON PETERS PRELBR PT PLAB PP PAK PDEM PKPA PSOCI PF PLO PTERM PJUS PSOE PELOSI PROPERTY PGOVPREL PARP PRL PNIR PHUMKPAL PG PREZ PGIC PBOV PAO PKK PROV PHSAK PHUMPREL PROTECTION PGOVBL PSI PRELPK PGOVENRG PUM PRELKPKO PATTY PSOC PRIVATIZATION PRELSP PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PMIG PREC PAIGH PROG PSHA PARK PETER POG PHUS PPREL PS PTERPREL PRELPGOV POV PKPO PGOVECON POUS PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PWBG PMAR PREM PAR PNR PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PARMIR PGOVGM PHUH PARTM PN PRE PTE PY POLUN PPEL PDOV PGOVSOCI PIRF PGOVPM PBST PRELEVU PGOR PBTSRU PRM PRELKPAOIZ PGVO PERL PGOC PAGR PMIN PHUMR PVIP PPD PGV PRAM PINL PKPAL PTERE PGOF PINO PHAS PODC PRHUM PHUMA PREO PPA PEPFAR PGO PRGOV PAC PRESL PORG PKFK PEPR PRELP PREFA PNG PGOVPHUMKPAO PRELECON PINOCHET PFOR PGOVLO PHUMBA PRELC PREK PHUME PHJM POLINT PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PGOVE PHALANAGE PARTY PECON PEACE PROCESS PLN PRELSW PAHO PEDRO PRELA PASS PPAO PGPV PNUM PCUL PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGIV PRFE POGOV PEL PBT PAMQ PINF PSEPC POSTS PHUMPGOV PVOV PHSAPREL PROLIFERATION PENA PRELTBIOBA PIN PRELL PGOVPTER PHAM PHYTRP PTEL PTERPGOV PHARM PROTESTS PRELAF PKBL PRELKPAO PKNP PARMP PHUML PFOV PERM PUOS PRELGOV PHUMPTER PARAGRAPH PERURENA PBTSEWWT PCI PETROL PINSO PINSCE PQL PEREZ PBS

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 08NDJAMENA111, NEW SRSG FOR MINURCAT/EAST CHAD GIVES AMBASSADOR

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #08NDJAMENA111.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08NDJAMENA111 2008-03-25 10:46 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Ndjamena
VZCZCXRO3655
RR RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHNJ #0111/01 0851046
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 251046Z MAR 08
FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6105
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUEHNK/AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT 0163
RUEHBP/AMEMBASSY BAMAKO 0900
RUEHGI/AMEMBASSY BANGUI 1483
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 NDJAMENA 000111 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
PARIS AND LONDON FOR AFRICA WATCHERS 
DEPT FOR AF/C, AF/RSA, S/CRS AND PRM 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PREF MARR EAID PREF UN EU SU CD
SUBJECT: NEW SRSG FOR MINURCAT/EAST CHAD GIVES AMBASSADOR 
PROGRESS REPORT, REQUESTS U.S. LIAISON OFFICER 
 
REF:  N'DJAMENA 108 
 
NDJAMENA 00000111  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
1. (U) This is an action message:  See para 10. 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
2. (SBU) New MINURCAT SRSG Victor Angelo briefed 
ambassador 3/21 on progress since he arrived two weeks 
ago, especially signing a Status of Mission Agreement 
with the GOC, after having successfully for now resisted 
GOC demands for higher pay and "international status" for 
Chadian police and gendarmes. MINURCAT is authorized not 
only 58 police trainers, but also 50 military liaison 
officers, 102 UN security officers, and up to 145 
locally-recruited assistant security officers. Angelo 
said that he wanted to move MINURCAT to Eastern Chad as 
soon as possible, despite unresolved logistical and 
transportation obstacles.  Angelo said that he regretted 
that his mission's mandate was not broader, but that 
after getting MINURCAT up and running, and overcoming 
extreme GOC suspicion of its role, he might be able to 
look at "helping Chad in other ways." 
 
3. (SBU) Angelo requested that the USG consider assigning 
a military liaison officer to MINURCAT, saying that an 
American MLO would be of considerable utility to 
MINURCAT's mission.  Besides supporting the assignment of 
military liaison officers, the Department should consider 
assigning a civilian liaison officer as well, ideally an 
S/CRS officer, which would not only underline U.S. 
support but also enable the USG to learn from the 
experience of the unique EU-UN enterprise to protect 
Darfur refugees and IDPs in eastern Chad.  End summary. 
 
 
--------------- 
NEW SRSG ANGELO 
--------------- 
 
4. (U) Ambassador met March 21 with new Speial 
Representative of the Secretary General (SRS) for 
MINURCAT in Eastern Chad, Victor Angelo. It was their 
second meeting. 
 
---------------------------------- 
STATUS OF MISSION AGREEMENT SIGNED 
---------------------------------- 
 
5. (SBU) Angelo briefed Ambassador on the progress of 
MINURCAT since he arrived two weeks ago.  Angelo said he 
had signed the Status of Mission Agreement (SOMA) with 
the GOC that morning, after having resolved problems that 
had blocked an agreement and avoided concessions to the 
GOC on pay and "international status" for its police and 
gendarmes.  The mode of payment would be directly to the 
police officer or gendarme (as UN rules required) not to 
the GOC (as the GOC had wanted) but in the presence of 
GOC officials and with their countersignature on the 
voucher. GOC demands that their police and gendarmes be 
paid more than UN rules permit and that they have 
"international status" were rejected.  The name of the 
Chadian force itself -- originally to be called Chadian 
Police to Protect Humanitarians -- was being changed to 
respond to GOC objections that it also included gendarmes 
and to NGO and IO objections to use of the word 
"humanitarian."  The new name would be announced 
shortly. 
 
-------------------------- 
MINURCAT'S FORCE STRUCTURE 
-------------------------- 
 
6. (SBU) Angelo said that MINURCAT's eventual maximum 
force structure was more robust and complex than perhaps 
some had assumed.  He was authorized not only 58 police 
trainers, but also 50 military liaison officers, 102 UN 
security officers, and up to 145 locally-recruited 
assistant security officers.  Angelo said he intended to 
make MINURCAT as robust as possible given its ambitious 
goals and the difficult circumstances it would work in. 
 
---------- 
NEXT STEPS 
---------- 
 
NDJAMENA 00000111  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
 
7. (SBU) Angelo said that he wanted to move MINURCAT to 
Eastern Chad as soon as possible.  He would overcome 
logistical roadblocks - UN lack of alacrity in 
contracting for logistical services - by sending MINURCAT 
personnel forward and seek logistical services locally. 
Lack of sufficient air mobility was also a problem, given 
the vast amount of geography that MINURCAT would have to 
cover.  Angelo said he was trying to recruit Europeans as 
military liaison and security officers, to enhance 
cooperation with EUFOR. 
 
------------------ 
MINURCAT'S MANDATE 
------------------ 
 
8. (SBU) Angelo said that he regretted that his mission's 
mandate was not broader:  He was restricted to MINURCAT 
and eastern Chad.  Angelo agreed with Ambassador's 
analysis that the international community's attempt to 
reinforce security in Chad vis-Q-vis external aggression 
was linked closely to the need to strengthen the Chadian 
state internally by increasing its legitimacy through an 
opening of its authoritarian and ethnically-based 
political system.  Angelo said that it was important 
first to get MINURCAT up and running, and second to 
overcome extreme GOC suspicion of its role in Chad.  Once 
that were accomplished, he might be able to look at 
"helping Chad in other ways." 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
9. (SBU) Angelo says he wants results and seems to be 
getting some pretty impressive ones quickly. MINURCAT 
should be deploying to its eastern Chad and Northeast CAR 
operating area soon, following closely on the heels of 
its EUFOR protecting force (reftel).  We like Angelo's 
idea of one or more U.S. liaison officers for MINURCAT 
and wonder if, besides supporting the assignment of 
military liaison officers, the Department would consider 
assigning a civilian liaison officer as well, ideally an 
S/CRS officer, to such duty.  Assigning both civilian and 
military liaison officers to MINURCAT would not only 
underline U.S. support for it but enable the USG to learn 
from the experience of the complex and conjoint EU-UN 
enterprise to protect Darfur refugees, IDPs, and other 
stressed Chadian populations in eastern Chad. 
 
-------------- 
ACTION REQUEST 
-------------- 
 
10. (U) That the Department support the assignment of a 
military liaison officer to MINURCAT and consider 
assigning a civilian liaison officer as well, ideally an 
S/CRS officer. 
 
NIGRO