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Viewing cable 08MANILA654, EAP DAS STRESSES NEED TO MAINTAIN PRESSURE ON BURMA

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08MANILA654 2008-03-14 01:33 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Manila
VZCZCXRO4549
OO RUEHCHI RUEHCN RUEHDT RUEHHM
DE RUEHML #0654/01 0740133
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 140133Z MAR 08
FM AMEMBASSY MANILA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0134
INFO RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS IMMEDIATE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING IMMEDIATE 6328
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL IMMEDIATE 2772
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE 3504
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 0261
RHHMUNA/CDRUSPACOM HONOLULU HI IMMEDIATE
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 MANILA 000654 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP, EAP/MTS, EAP/RSP 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL RP BM
SUBJECT: EAP DAS STRESSES NEED TO MAINTAIN PRESSURE ON BURMA 
 
REF: A. SECSTATE 22937 
 
     B. MANILA 282 AND PREVIOUS 
 
1. (SBU) SUMMARY: In meetings with senior Philippine 
government officials at the Presidential Palace and 
Department of Foreign Affairs, as well as foreign diplomats 
and the Embassy community, EAP Deputy Assistant Secretary 
Scot Marciel underscored the USG's continuing efforts to 
produce concrete moves toward democracy in Burma.  Together 
with Ambassador Kenney, DAS Marciel reiterated U.S. 
appreciation for the Philippine government's continued strong 
stance on Burma, particularly at the last ASEAN summit in 
Singapore and at the World Economic Forum in Davos earlier 
this year.  Arriving on the eve of UN Special Advisor 
Gambari's March 6 visit to Burma, DAS Marciel noted that the 
Burmese regime could demonstrate its seriousness about making 
democratic reforms by beginning a genuine dialogue with Aung 
San Suu Kyi and others.  He also voiced deep concern over the 
regime's planned May referendum on a draft constitution, 
which lacked any opposition input or review.  Philippine 
officials assured DAS Marciel that they would continue to 
press Burma to show progress toward democracy.  Subsequently, 
President Arroyo again publicly criticized the Burmese junta, 
saying its decision to reject foreign observers for the May 
referendum was "a sad day for democracy and our region."  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
ENCOURAGING CONTINUED PHILIPPINE SUPPORT 
---------------------------------------- 
 
2. (SBU) DAS Marciel joined the Ambassador for a March 3 
meeting at Malacanang Palace with Presidential Executive 
Secretary Eduardo Ermita, where the Ambassador expressed 
 
SIPDIS 
appreciation for President Arroyo's outspoken support for 
clear and concrete steps toward democratization on the part 
of the Burmese regime.  DAS Marciel noted that public 
pressure on the Burmese junta would continue to be necessary, 
and that support was especially important coming from fellow 
ASEAN countries such as the Philippines.  Acting Assistant 
Secretary for American Affairs Lourdes Yparraguirre, who 
 
SIPDIS 
represented the Department of Foreign Affairs at the meeting, 
welcomed these observations. 
 
3. (SBU) Subsequently, President Arroyo publicly denounced 
March 9 the Burmese junta's rejection of a UN proposal to 
monitor the planned constitutional referendum in May, calling 
on the Burmese government to "do the right thing" and allow 
outside observers. President Arroyo said that allowing 
outside observers would be a small but modest step towards 
democratization that was "long overdue in Myanmar."  She 
bluntly characterized the junta's rejection of the UN 
proposal as a "sad day for democracy and our region." 
 
4. (SBU) DAS Marciel discussed Burma issues at the Department 
of Foreign Affairs (DFA) in a March 3 meeting with Assistant 
Secretary Romeo Manalo and Executive Director Hellen Barber 
 
SIPDIS 
of the Asian and Pacific Affairs Office.  DAS Marciel thanked 
Manalo and the DFA for their consistent support (ref B) on 
Burma and expressed concerns (ref A) about the Burmese 
regime's plans for a constitutional referendum, which he said 
lack the means either to assure credibility and transparency, 
or to allow the opposition to review or provide input on the 
draft constitution.  DAS Marciel explained the U.S. position 
on Burma as supportive of UN efforts to encourage a genuine 
dialogue leading to a political transition.  Although the 
U.S. spoke out more strongly than most countries on Burma, 
there was in fact much agreement among concerned countries on 
the need for national reconciliation and a more inclusive 
political process.  The U.S. understood that a transition 
likely would take time, and that the military would continue 
to play a role in the process. We were focusing our efforts 
on encouraging the international community to continue to 
work together to press the Burmese regime to open its 
political process and begin a genuine dialogue.  The U.S. had 
serious concerns about the upcoming referendum, but 
encouraged ASEAN and other nations to support clear 
benchmarks by which its credibility and fairness could be 
measured.  Manalo noted these points and reiterated support 
for efforts to increase international pressure on the Burmese 
regime.  Manalo agreed that a legitimate dialogue leading to 
democratic reforms was an important goal and that freeing 
political prisoners should serve as a benchmark of Burma's 
progress. 
 
 
MANILA 00000654  002 OF 002 
 
 
BURMA DIPLOMACY WITH OTHER MISSIONS 
----------------------------------- 
 
5. (SBU) The Ambassador hosted a private breakfast on March 3 
for DAS Marciel with Ambassadors from Canada, Japan, New 
Zealand, and Singapore, where DAS Marciel described the 
current situation in Burma and steered the discussion toward 
promoting a sense of collective responsibility.  DAS Marciel 
also discussed ways that all countries -- especially ASEAN 
countries -- could support the current Gambari mission to 
Burma.  The Ambassador underscored that the so-called 
"likeminded Ambassadors" (Australia, Canada, Japan, New 
Zealand, Singapore, and the UK) had been strong partners, 
which all parties concurred had helped the Philippines be a 
stalwart supporter of efforts to democratize Burma. 
 
BRIEFING U.S. EMBASSY STAFF 
--------------------------- 
 
6. (SBU) DAS Marciel discussed U.S. policy on Burma with 
Embassy staff during an informal reception at the 
Ambassador's residence March 4.  The Embassy staff included 
entry-level officers, Country Team members, and U.S. Military 
and USAID officials.  DAS Marciel provided insights on how 
the Burmese regime's harsh rule had stunted Burma's economic, 
political and social growth, and resulted in rising levels of 
poverty, ethnic tension and disease for those outside of the 
ruling elite.  Entry-level officers were especially engaged 
as DAS Marciel offered thoughts on the techniques and 
challenges of crafting Burma policy in Washington and 
articulating it abroad. 
 
7. (U) DAS Marciel cleared this cable. 
 
 
 
Visit Embassy Manila's Classified SIPRNET website: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eap/manila/index. cfm 
 
You can also access this site through the State Department's 
Classified SIPRNET website: 
http://www.state.sgov. 
KENNEY