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Viewing cable 08MANAGUA289, NNP UNDER POLITICAL PRESSURE: "I WAS FIRED BY

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08MANAGUA289 2008-03-10 22:01 2011-05-09 16:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Managua
VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMU #0289/01 0702201
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 102201Z MAR 08
FM AMEMBASSY MANAGUA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2226
INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUMIAAA/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL PRIORITY
RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L MANAGUA 000289 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR WHA/CEN, INL/LP 
NSC FOR FISK/ALVARADO 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/10/2018 
TAGS: NU PGOV PREL SNAR
SUBJECT: NNP UNDER POLITICAL PRESSURE: "I WAS FIRED BY 
ORTEGA" 
 
REF: MANAGUA 263 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Paul Trivelli, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
1. (C) Summary:  Former Nicaraguan National Police (NNP) 
Juvenile Affairs Chief Hamyn Gurdian privately confirmed 
widespread speculation that his recent forced retirement, as 
well as the retirements of four other senior NNP officials 
(reftel), was indeed a political move and a "message" from 
Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega regarding his control over 
the NNP.  Gurdian asserted that NNP Chief Aminta Granera was 
"extremely unhappy" about the dismissals but had no choice in 
the situation. Despite her inability to prevent the 
dismissals, though, Granera is still "loved and supported" by 
all ranks of the NNP.  It is clear, he continued, that Ortega 
wants to attack the institutional independence and 
professionalism of the NNP, but it will take much more than a 
"small torpedo" like this attack - "Ortega would need (the 
equivalent) of 40 Tomahawk cruise missiles to truly break us 
apart."  Gurdian also discounted Ortega's February 27 
proclamation of direct authority over the Nicaraguan Army, 
doubting that Ortega will have much success in attempting to 
"shake the tree" and exercise direct control over the "much 
stronger and more autonomous" Nicaraguan Army.  End Summary. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - 
A Surprise Dismissal 
- - - - - - - - - - - 
 
2. (C) Former NNP Juvenile Affairs Chief Hamyn Gurdian 
privately told uQv+Q?'Hid not contravene any Nicaraguan laws, it was 
"awkward and unusual" to force the retirement of five highly 
regarded officers at his rank who still had potential to 
advance further in the NNP.  Gurdian added that, in the 
context of Ortega's recent statements about his direct 
control of the NNP (reftel), the message from these 
dismissals is clear: "I am in charge here." Gurdian asserted 
that NNP Chief Aminta Granera was "extremely unhappy" about 
the dismissals but had no choice in the situation. Despite 
her inability to prevent the dismissals, though, Granera is 
still "loved and supported" by all ranks of the NNP. 
 
3. (C) Gurdian dismissed media reports that he had been 
removed due to his strong affiliation with the Church of the 
Assemblies of God.  (Note: A senior Assemblies of God pastor 
in the United States called Gurdian during the meeting with 
Poloff, evidently to express his sympathy and support for 
Gurdian's plight.)  Gurdian claimed that he did not wish to 
engage in "endless speculation" regarding the actual reasons 
for his release, but he then related an account of a previous 
confrontation he had with Daniel Ortega that may have 
contributed to the current situation.  In 1994, Gurdian was 
in charge of the NNP's riot unit (or "Anti-Disturbance 
Unit"), often working to quell Sandinista-organized riots. 
In response to Gurdian's success in suppressing the riots, 
Ortega made a personal visit to his office to deliver a 
warning - "You are making a serious mistake."  Having earned 
Ortega's personal and apparently unrelenting enmity, Gurdian 
was soon afterwards removed from his position as chief of the 
unit. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Bent, Battered, But Not Broken 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
4. (C) Gurdian also confirmed the veracity of media reports 
that Ortega had used NNP retirement guidelines in an attempt 
to force NNP Chief Aminta Granera to retire after her 30 
years of service, an attempt which she successfully rebuffed. 
 Despite the move against Granera, and Ortega's subsequent 
success in directly orchestrating the forced retirements, 
Gurdian remained optimistic about the future of the NNP as an 
independent and non-politicized organization.  The NNP must 
respond like sugarcane in a hurricane, he explained, perhaps 
 
bruised, battered, and bent to the extreme, but never 
breaking.  After Ortega lost the Presidency to Violeta 
Chamorro, he continued, many of the "true believer" 
Sandinista NNP officials also ended up leaving the 
organization by the late 1990s, leaving in their wake a 
largely non-political and highly professional corps.  As 
such, Gurdian asserted, the recent forced retirements have 
only slightly damaged the independence of the NNP, as much as 
a "small torpedo." Gurdian opined that it was clear that 
Ortega wants to attack the institutional independence and 
professionalism of the NNP.  However, to truly break the 
standards of NNP independence and professionalism, Ortega 
needs to use the equivalent of "40 Tomahawk cruise missiles" 
to completely destroy the NNP institution before he can truly 
bend it to his will.  As long as Aminta remains as chief of 
the NNP, Gurdian concluded, the organization will "continue 
as before"  Gurdian also commented on Ortega's February 27 
proclamation of direct authority over the Nicaraguan Army, 
expressing his doubt that Ortega will be successful in 
"shaking the tree" to establish direct control over the "much 
stronger and more autonomous" Nicaraguan Army. 
 
- - - - 
Comment 
- - - - 
 
5. (C) Gurdian's comments serve to confirm our growing 
concern regarding Ortega's desire to politicize and control 
the NNP.  With this and other recent developments in the NNP 
(reftel), we find it difficult to share Gurdian's optimism 
over the long-term prospects of the NNP as a purely 
professional and non-political entity.  We agree that the key 
lies with NNP Chief Aminta Granera - as long as she remains 
in power, the NNP will be able to offer resistance to 
Ortega's machinations.  How long she will be able to remain 
in her position, however, is another matter altogether. 
There is no doubt that her successor will be selected by 
Ortega and will likely be more malleable to his political 
whims.  A key question is how long Aminta can stay at the 
helm.  Despite the fact that her term does not end until 
2010, she has already passed the official mandatory 
retirement age of 55 (she is 56) and next year will have 
served 30 years, the other mandatory retirement trigger. 
This regulatory dual sword of Damocles makes it increasingly 
unlikely that she will last until the end of her term. 
 
TRIVELLI