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Viewing cable 08KINSHASA238, GOMA NOTES 03/08/08 - ABBE MALUMALU GOES TO THE MOUNTAIN

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08KINSHASA238 2008-03-09 20:09 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Kinshasa
VZCZCXRO9752
OO RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMR RUEHRN
DE RUEHKI #0238/01 0692009
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 092009Z MAR 08
FM AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7646
INFO RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE
RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AF DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUZEJAA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KINSHASA 000238 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV KPKO CG UN
SUBJECT: GOMA NOTES 03/08/08 - ABBE MALUMALU GOES TO THE MOUNTAIN 
 
 
1. (SBU) Summary:  Abbe Muholongu Malumalu, the newly-appointed 
National Coordinator for the Goma peace process, traveled March 8 to 
Kirolirwe to meet with Nkunda and find a way to move beyond the 
procedural wrangling that has prevented the establishment of the 
Joint Technical Committee on Peace and Security (JC) called for 
under the Goma Acte d'Engagement and subsequently mandated by 
Presidential Decree 008/08.  Assuming that understandings reached at 
the meeting are upheld in a formal meeting in Goma scheduled for 
March 9 and (more problematically, perhaps) in Kinshasa, the 
Malumalu-Nkunda meeting appears to have been a great success, both 
in clearing away the CNDP's procedural objections in return for a 
few technical adjustments to JC structures that have always been 
something of a work in progress, and in establishing a direct, 
personal and productive link between the Goma process's two key 
players.  The two men got along very well, and now have a warm 
personal link that can easily be activated if and when the Goma 
process again bogs down, as it almost certainly will at some point. 
End summary. 
 
Mission to Masisi 
----------------- 
 
2. (SBU) As agreed March 7 (see Goma Notes 03/07/08), Abbe 
Apollinaire Muholongu Malumalu, the newly-appointed National 
Coordinator for the Goma peace process, traveled March 8 to 
Kirolirwe in Masisi territory to meet with Chairman Laurent Nkunda 
of the CNDP.  The journey was made by road, in a MONUC convoy, as a 
helicopter could not be secured in time.  Abbe Malumalu was 
accompanied by Jean-Michel Dumont (EU) and Willet Weeks (U.S.) for 
the international Facilitation and by Nicolas Scherlen and Christina 
Human for MONUC.  Rene Abandi, Betrand Bisimwa and Jean-Desire 
Muiti, the political wing of the CNDP's delegation to the Goma 
talks, also joined the MONUC convoy, and Major Seraphim Mirindi, of 
the delegation's military wing, followed along on a motorcycle. 
 
3. (SBU) The MONUC convoy arrived at Nkunda's cottage at around 1030 
and left at 1500.  A number of CNDP senior officials were present in 
addition to those who had come from Goma.  These included General 
Bosco Ntaganda, who was decked out in camouflage fatigues with 
"United States Army" disconcertingly emblazoned on his chest. 
 
4. (SBU) Abbe Malumalu had prepared an icebreaker, and so once 
everyone had all settled into their seats, instead of the usual 
chitchat, he immediately engaged Nkunda in a conversation in Swahili 
and pulled out a study he has commissioned from some university 
research groups (including that of his own university in Butembo) on 
the rehabilitation and expansion of the North Kivu road network. 
The document included charts and maps, but, he explained, the 
sectors under CNDP control had not yet been filled in -- they were 
still huge blanks -- and the CNDP's help was urgently required to 
complete the task.  This elicited much excited conversation between 
the two, with other CNDP members joining in.  The Abbe and the 
Chairman pored happily over all this for 15 or 20 minutes, and from 
then on everything seemed almost painless. 
 
5. (SBU) When the conversation switched to French and substantive 
discussions began (with the internationals sitting by in discreet 
silence), it became clear that Abbe Malumalu had been well-briefed 
and was prepared to make concessions that he later explained as 
being relatively minor but essential to ensuring that the CNDP came 
into the JC.  Each of the items was discussed frankly, with Abbe 
Malumalu occasionally saying, in effect, help me out here - give me 
a break - I'm trying to do everything I can think of to help you 
guys out and meet your concerns, but there are things (such as 
repudiating Decree 008/08) that I can't do. 
 
6. (SBU) His determination to come away with a deal was clear, and 
his delight in doing this with Nkunda himself suffused the room and 
caused Nkunda to light up.  "We have the advantage of being sons of 
this place - we know what the pitfalls are,"  he said.  He also was 
at pains to point out that he and Nkunda had been in regular phone 
contact, and that he had journeyed to Kirolirwe two years ago to ask 
for Nkunda's assistance in ensuring that the constitutional 
referendum and the presidential and parliamentary elections could 
proceed in areas under Nkunda's control.  (This support had been 
granted, and the elections had proceeded smoothly.) 
 
7. (SBU) Abbe Malumalu further delighted the CNDP by making it clear 
that in all significant respects the JC would, once established, 
mostly be a matter between himself and the CNDP, at least as far as 
North Kivu was concerned.  (Nkunda made it pretty clear that South 
Kivu matters were of little or no interest to him.)  The Mayi-mayi, 
he made clear, would be a minor irritant.  Presidential Decree 
008/08 was an opportunity, not an impediment, as it had given 
"national impetus" to the Goma process and ensured that the work of 
 
KINSHASA 00000238  002 OF 003 
 
 
the JC would not be done at cross-purposes with other government or 
donor programs.  His experience as chairman of the Independent 
Electoral Commission had shown him that, once backed by a 
presidential decree, his own job would empower him to go to the 
government to tell it what the JC was doing, not to ask what it 
should do. 
 
8. (SBU) For each of the innovations listed below, Abbe Malumalu 
presented proposals that were constructive without giving away the 
farm (e.g. provincial-level coordination offices, but only as 
implementing bodies).  In each case, CNDP officials raised the same 
kinds of objections that had led to such wrangling in Goma in recent 
weeks, only to be overridden by Nkunda who, with a little give and 
take, essentially acceded to the Abbe's suggestions. 
 
Proposed JC changes 
-------------------- 
 
9. (SBU) While the changes seem relatively minor, they were made by 
Abbe Malumalu to seem like significant concessions.  Here are the 
highlights: 
 
-- To address CNDP concerns about its levels of representation 
relative to the other signatories', two new positions and structures 
will be created at the apex of the JC structure. 
 
-- There will be a permanent secretary of the Joint Commission, who 
will be a voting member of its national coordinating body, and this 
position will be set aside for a CNDP nominee.  (The international 
Facilitation members were told informally that this will be Abandi.) 
 
 
-- There will be a new Technical Harmonization Bureau, made up of 
six members (three each for North and South Kivu, representing in 
each case the government and the Mayi-mayi, plus the CNDP in North 
Kivu and the FRF in Sourth Kivu).  Its members may later be given 
the title of commissioner by the JC's internal regulations, which 
the JC will draft and adopt once it has been established by 
presidential decree.  Its members will coordinate the work of the 
provincial coordination offices, presumably (per discussions on 
March 7) presiding the latter, rotating monthly. 
 
-- There will still be two linked interprovincial subcommissions, 
one military and the other humanitarian and social. 
 
-- The national coordinating body and the interprovincial 
subcommissions will collectively be the JC's decision-making 
structures. 
 
-- There will be a coordination office for each province, to be 
presided by members of the new Technical Harmonization Bureau. 
These, and their respective committees (replicating the dual 
subcommissions), will be implementing bodies ("organes 
d'execution").  But the creation of a provincial-level coordinating 
structure will go a long way toward assuaging CNDP's concern that 
the North Kivu processes of refugee return could get out of synch 
with military disengagement.  (Nkunda said that this concern had 
been exacerbated by Presidential Decree 008/08's placement of the 
military subcommission in Goma and the humanitarian and social 
subcommission in Bukavu, where CNDP is not popular.) 
 
-- While it was agreed to recommend that the JC adopt a voting 
procedure whereby a three-fourths vote would be required to validate 
decisions in the event that consensus is not achieved (a key CNDP 
demand), this procedure would be established by the JC itself, not 
by the upcoming new decree.  The idea here is to give the CNDP a 
blocking minority in the event that the GDRC and Mayi-mayi 
delegations gang up on it.  In fact, given the number of Mayi-mayi 
groups (there is some debate about how all these numbers add up), 
the minority might have to be increased to four-fifths.  Either way, 
Abbe Malumalu told the CNDP that it would have his support in 
seeking this once the JC is established, though he warned that it 
could also give the notoriously cranky Mayi-mayi a blocking 
majority, too. 
 
10. (SBU) Once these agreements had been hammered out, Nkunda and 
the Abbe moved onto the cottage's verandah for a private 
conversation of about 45 minutes.  Following this, Nkunda withdrew 
with his entourage to one of his bedrooms, leaving the Abbe and the 
internationals alone to eat the lunch that had been prepared.  The 
group returned an hour or so later, and their agreement to the 
points above (with occasional carping from Muiti or Bisimwa) was 
confirmed.  A subcommittee spent considerable time (as usual) trying 
to figure out how to draw a new organigram, always a complicated 
task, with lots of drafts wadded up and thrown aside. 
 
KINSHASA 00000238  003 OF 003 
 
 
 
11. (SBU) Assuming these proposals are endorsed by a full-dress 
meeting of the Goma signatories (including most North and South Kivu 
Mayi-mayi groups, but not the South Kivu FRF) scheduled for March 9 
in Goma, the CNDP will hand Abbe Malumalu their list of nominees and 
he will return to Kinshasa on March 10 and seek to have them 
enshrined in a new presidential decree.  At this point, only the 
FRF's nominee to the new Technical Harmonization Bureau would be 
missing.  Abbe Malumalu planned meet that evening with the Mayi-mayi 
groups in town for the ILCCE workshop to try to line up their 
support at tomorrow's meeting.  He seemed confident that he could 
make this happen. 
 
Other concerns 
-------------- 
 
12. (SBU) Following the conclusion of these matters, Abbe Malumalu, 
with support from the EU and the U.S., raised current humanitarian 
concerns, saying that he hoped for "a powerful sign" (in French, un 
geste fort) from Nkunda. 
 
13. (SBU) Nkunda replied that, first, he had dispatched a colleague 
named "Manzi" (presumably Emmanuel Kamanzi) to Goma with his full 
proposed disengagement plan, which was to have been presented at a 
cease-fire meeting -- later canceled -- at MONUC that morning.  This 
could, he said, be implemented in a day, if the conditions were 
right.  He further said that he was prepared to travel on next 
Friday and Saturday to IDP camps, jointly with Abbe Malumalu and 
MONUC, to brief communities on how they might safely return, and how 
the withdrawal process would work. 
 
14. (SBU) Nkunda asked when it might be possible for CNDP to open an 
office in Goma.  Abbe Malumalu said he had a better idea:  Projet 
Amani (the national-level project established under Decree 008/08 
and which CNDP had in the past disowned, saying it had nothing to do 
with them) was renting a building in Goma.  CNDP would be free to 
use this as its home away from home, and, since it has three 
storeys, its officials would be welcome to stay there instead of 
paying for hotels.  Nkunda and his colleagues seemed delighted by 
this. 
 
15. (SBU) Once this business had been dispatched, Nkunda asked to 
see Malumalu's roads plan again, and the two, joined by others, 
spent another half-hour or so poring over these like boys with an 
erector set, as the 1400 ETD went by and MONUC's IndBatt escorts 
grew increasingly impatient. 
 
Return to Goma 
-------------- 
 
16. (SBU) Following the convoy's return to Goma, Malumalu and the 
internationals met with General Etumba and explained what had been 
decided.  Etumba seemed reasonably pleased -- it seemed to be about 
what he had expected -- though he did take out his pen and start to 
redraw the new plan and add up who had how many votes at what levels 
of the JC.  As usual, this proved more than a roomful of adults 
could cope with, and in the end it was decided to leave things 
deliberately vague and hope that the goodwill from the meeting would 
let participants float through that of the next day and on to 
something more substantive, even if no one can figure out exactly 
how that something is supposed to work.  Abbe Malumalu is clearly 
confident that none of this will matter in the end, once he gets his 
commission into a room and can close the door and get down to issues 
of substance. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
17. (SBU) Assuming everything goes to plan, Abbe Malumalu has moved 
the Goma process out of the doldrums into which it has been plunged. 
 He will then have to go back to Kinshasa and steer his plan through 
the shoals here and get it converted into a new decree.  There will 
surely be very difficult moments ahead, but we can hope that the 
futility of the past few weeks will be behind us.  End comment. 
 
GARVELINK