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Viewing cable 08KHARTOUM471, CHINESE ENGINEERS WAIT FOR THEIR MATERIALS; LACK OF WATER

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08KHARTOUM471 2008-03-31 14:23 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXRO9115
PP RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #0471/01 0911423
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 311423Z MAR 08
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0345
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0128
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000471 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/SPG, S/CRS, AF SE WILLIAMSON 
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU
SUBJECT: CHINESE ENGINEERS WAIT FOR THEIR MATERIALS; LACK OF WATER 
AT NYALA SUPERCAMP SITE AN OBSTACLE TO EXPANSION 
 
REFERENCE: (A) KHARTOUM 343 
 
(B) KHARTOUM 251 
 
1. (SBU) Summary: Egypt will accept deployment of its infantry 
battalion in the hopes that its second battalion might be accepted 
at a later date.  UN contractors are refusing to transport Chinese 
prefabricated housing units to the Nyala super-camp because UN 
payment offered for transport is too low. This will cause a delay in 
the arrival of the second tranche of Chinese engineers.  Chinese 
Defense Attache said that sending large numbers of additional 
international troops to the Nyala super-camp will be problematic as 
there is no water, facilities or housing in the supercamp area.  He 
observed that while logistical problems may eventually be solved, 
the Darfur peace process seems to be going in reverse. End summary. 
 
EGYPTIANS LIKELY TO AGREE TO EL-FASHER DEPLOYMENT 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
2. (SBU) Egyptian emboff Tamer Azzam told poloff on March 27 that 
Egypt has offered two infantry battalions, but the UN has accepted 
only one.  However, Egypt would very likely agree to relocate its 
one accepted infantry battalion, originally planned for Nyala, to 
North Darfur (the Force Commander would like to see it deployed in 
Umm Kadada and Shangil Tobiya, ideally) in hopes that its offer of 
the second battalion will be eventually accepted - and that this 
second battalion would be deployed to Nyala.  The 100-troop advance 
team, now in Nyala, would be ready to move to El-Fasher when the UN 
makes its final decision. 
 
3. (SBU) Azzam said that the engineering equipment for the 275-troop 
Egyptian engineering unit is en-route to El-Geneina and should 
arrive in the first week of April.  If everything goes according to 
plan, when the engineering equipment arrives the engineers will 
begin their travel and arrive in the first week of May.  However, 
Azzam said that currently there are no storage facilities for the 
engineering equipment in El-Geneina and expressed concern that when 
the equipment arrives, there will be no place to safely store 
equipment and protect it from the weather. He said that the UN has 
not been forthcoming in providing details to either his embassy or 
to the advance team on facilities in El-Geneina.  Azzam said that he 
was uncertain about the UN arrangements to construct facilities and 
was under the impression that the U.S. was providing facilities. 
Poloff explained that the U.S. is no longer in the camp construction 
business, which ended with AMIS.  [NOTE: The Egyptian MoD indicated 
to the UNAMID Force Commander that as a condition for relocating its 
infantry battalion to North vice South Darfur, this engineering 
company would have to go to North Darfur with it, per reftels.  END 
NOTE] 
 
4. (SBU) Azzam acknowledged that the UN's rejection of the second 
battalion was based on Darfur rebel objections to the Egyptians but 
could not specify which rebel group [NOTE: All Darfur rebel groups, 
coupled with the IDPs, object to an Egyptian presence.  Abdulwahid 
has been especially vocal in his opposition. END NOTE]. 
 
UN CONTRACTOR REFUSES TO TRANSPORT MATERIALS 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
5. (SBU) Chinese Defense Attache Dong Jian Dong told poloff on March 
26 that 143 Chinese engineers are waiting for 40 containers of 
prefabricated housing units that would enable them to build housing 
for rest of the 315-man engineering contingent.  These containers 
have been cleared at Port Sudan, but the UN's local contractor is 
refusing to transport the containers, saying the negotiated price 
(approximately $1000) is too low.  Dong said that the Acting UN 
Chief of Integrated Support Services (CISS) told him that UNAMID in 
El-Fasher is unable to intervene as the UN in New York controls the 
contracting of services. 
 
6. (SBU) Dong said that the planned March 31 arrival of the rest of 
the 315 engineers will be delayed until the arrival of the 40 
containers. He said that his troops can install the units in a 
matter of hours and the troops can be flown in within days, but he 
noted that the last shipment of materials took six weeks to travel 
from Khartoum to Nyala.  Dong expressed hope that if the containers 
arrive within a week, the troops could arrive by Mid-April and begin 
construction of the super-camp. 
 
NYALA SUPERCAMP HAS NO WATER 
---------------------------- 
 
7. (SBU) Apart from the container transport problem, Dong said there 
is also a lack of water (required for cement as well as consumption 
by the troops) to begin construction of the super-camp. He said that 
his troops conducted a geologic survey which revealed there is no 
 
KHARTOUM 00000471  002 OF 002 
 
 
water anywhere in the vicinity of the Nyala super-camp.  He said 
that the entire Forward Operating Base (FOB), the Bangladeshi Formed 
Police Unit (FPU), and his troops are all using Nyala city water 
that is of a very poor quality. As a result of the water supply 
problem, Dong expressed doubt about the feasibility of adding 
additional international troops in Nyala by May 31. 
 
8. (SBU) Dong said that adding any additional troops at Nyala would 
require an expansion of infrastructure at the super-camp.  He said 
that the FOB has food facilities for 500 people and would be hard 
pressed to feed additional soldiers [NOTE: The sub-contractor which 
has provided food at the FOB, Amzar, officially closes up shop at 
all Sector locations on March 31. END NOTE].  He said that the FOB 
feeds the nearly 300 Bangladeshi and Chinese soldiers, the 200 
troops composing the Nyala Headquarters and protection detail, and 
100 early arrivals of the Eqyptian infantry battalion. 
 
CHINESE: THERE IS NO PEACE TO KEEP 
---------------------------------- 
 
9. (SBU) Dong said that while the military deployments are 
continuing, albeit slowly, he said that by comparison the political 
process is "going in reverse."  "The military is here to keep the 
peace, but there is no peace to keep," he said.  He observed that 
the rebel groups continue to splinter, with each one making their 
own set of demands, while the main rebel groups continue to retain 
influence.  He complained that Abdelwahid al Nur was "safe in 
France, for reasons known only to the French," and continues to 
enjoy popular support even while he announces the opening of an 
office in Israel and meets with all five members of the Security 
Council in Geneva.  Meanwhile, Dong noted that Justice and Equality 
Movement (JEM), the only rebel group with a national agenda and a 
strong ideological motivation, has declared they will only negotiate 
one on one with the Khartoum government with mediation by Kofi Anan. 
 Dong expressed the familiar official Chinese view that the 
political process requires increased pressure on the rebel groups to 
bring peace to Darfur. 
 
10. (SBU) Comment: The Chinese Defense Attache, whose troops were 
the first non-Africans to deploy, seems to have accepted 
"inevitable" delays the UN logistical support. This faith in the 
seemingly overwhelmed UN may be dangerous for incoming 
troop-contributing countries (TCCs) who continue to believe that 
UNAMID will provide for them, when in fact the UN has told them that 
UN troops in Darfur are to be self-sustaining.  Increased outreach 
in TCC capitals is necessary to drive home the need for 
self-sustainment, regardless of where troops are deployed within 
Darfur.  With the March 31 cessation of several key support 
services, most notably that of food provision by Amzar, it is all 
the more critical that incoming elements be able to support 
themselves. It is not impossible that one could see the shameful 
spectacle of UN troops complaining about not being fed after March 
31.  It is important to add that, despite the well-deserved bad 
reputation of the Sudanese regime, most of these problems are due to 
the UN itself. 
 
FERNANDEZ