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Viewing cable 08KHARTOUM462, DARFUR: HAC INTERROGATES AMCIT HUMANITARIAN WORKER

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08KHARTOUM462 2008-03-30 13:52 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXYZ0010
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHKH #0462/01 0901352
ZNR UUUUU ZZH (CCY AD770271 MSI7469-695)
P 301352Z MAR 08 ZDS
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0332
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0119
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
UNCLAS KHARTOUM 000462 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
C O R R E C T E D COPY TEXT 
 
DEPT FOR AF/SPG, S/CRS 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
DEPT FOR CA/OCS/ACS/AF 
AMEMBASSY CAIRO FOR DAVID POTTER 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ASO APER CASC PGOV PREL PHUM SOCI SU
SUBJECT: DARFUR: HAC INTERROGATES AMCIT HUMANITARIAN WORKER 
 
REF: A) KHARTOUM 340 
 
B) KHARTOUM 106 
C) KHARTOUM 100 
D) KHARTOUM 91 
 
1. (SBU) SUMMARY.  During the week of March 10, a Korean-American 
employee of the American Jewish World Service, visiting El Fasher, 
North Darfur, was questioned by officials of the Humanitarian Aid 
Commission (HAC) for possible links to a Darfur rebel group which 
has opened an office in Israel and was prevented from departing 
Sudan until March 17. The incident rattled an already shaky Darfur 
humanitarian community and is the second time in three months that 
HAC has detained an American citizen in Darfur (Ref B).  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
HAC LEVELS ALLEGATIONS AGAINST AMCIT VISITOR 
-------------------------------------------- 
2. (SBU) During the week of March 10, Matthew Emry, a 
Korean-American employee of the American Jewish World Service 
(AJWS), was questioned by HAC officials in El Fasher and Khartoum 
over alleged affiliations to Darfur rebel movements.  AJWS is an 
international development organization that offers grants to many 
international non-governmental organizations operating in Darfur, 
including International Rescue Committee (IRC), which Emry was 
visiting during the time of the incident. The IRC had sponsored 
Emry's visa for his travel to Sudan. On March 16, Emry was permitted 
to travel to Khartoum, where he was again questioned by HAC until he 
was permitted to depart on March 17. 
 
3. (SBU) IRC Country Director Sherman contacted conoff on March 17 
to report that Emry had been questioned in El Fasher by HAC and was 
at the time being questioned in Khartoum. Sherman told conoff that 
HAC officials had accused Emry of supporting rebel groups, 
specifically Sudan Liberation Army leader Abdulwahid Nur who 
recently opened an SLA office in Tel Aviv. Emry was permitted to 
depart later that evening. Sherman told conoff that Emry had never 
been officially arrested or charged. A week after the incident, 
Sherman met with the HAC to discuss delayed visas for IRC employees. 
Instead, HAC officials used the meeting to accuse Sherman of using 
the IRC to support SLA/Abdulwahid. [NOTE: According to a March 27 
report in the Sudanese newspaper Al-Ahdath, Emry was being 
investigated for posing as an IRC employee to conceal his AJWS 
employment and meet Darfur IDPs affiliated with Abdelwahid.  The 
paper went on to claim that Emry himself was behind Abdelwahid's 
recent decision to open an SLA office in Israel (Ref A).  END NOTE] 
 
4. (SBU) IRC AMCIT employee Melissa Alvarado (please protect) 
contacted FieldOff during the week of March 24 to recount the 
circumstances of Emry's interrogation.  According to Alvarado, 
Emry's treatment had been "harsh" and that he had "looked awful" by 
the time he left for Khartoum.  During those four days, Emry was 
questioned at the HAC office in El Fasher and then released to the 
IRC guesthouse at night.  In addition to questioning Emry about his 
ties to rebel movements, HAC officials, according to Alvarado, 
seized his laptop, which contained sensitive information about 
women's health programs being carried out in Darfur by AJWS 
partners, including IRC (Alvarado works in Gender-Based Violence for 
IRC).  HAC authorities demanded Emry surrender his personal e-mail 
address and password, which authorities then changed after having 
gone through his messages. 
 
5. (SBU) Alvarado told fieldoff that during Emry's interrogation in 
El Fasher she contacted IRC Country Director Sherman in Khartoum to 
ask for assistance.  She was told that IRC would make no overtures 
to the Embassy on Emry's behalf.  Alvarado disagreed with her 
Country Director's decision not to involve the Embassy or other 
Khartoum offices, especially as she is now concerned about her own 
personal security.  Alvarado says that during IRC Country Director 
Sherman's meeting with HAC officials in Khartoum during the week of 
March 24, HAC officials had mentioned Alvarado by name and had 
inquired about her own possible affiliations with Darfur rebel 
movements. FieldOff encouraged Alvarado to register with the Embassy 
and to remain in contact in the field to follow up on any possible 
situations that may arise. 
 
6. (SBU) COMMENT.  This incident was the second in three months 
involving HAC action against AMCITs of the INGO community in El 
Fasher.  This latest incident shows a heightened sense of paranoia 
among HAC officials with regard to INGOS' work in Darfur, paranoia 
fed by the heavy negative coverage the regime gave to Abdulwahid's 
recent opening of an office in Israel.  Such GoS reaction is having 
tangible effects on the ground for not only INGOs; many IDPs 
continually tell us that they have already noticed a decreased 
presence of international humanitarian organizations, and this 
latest incident will do nothing to convince them otherwise.  Embassy 
will continue to press HAC and other GOS officials on the 
unacceptable and self-defeating nature of such actions.  Embassy and 
El Fasher field office will reinforce with the INGO community the 
need to maintain contact with the Embassy in order to ensure the 
accountability and security of its members, particularly in cases 
involving AMCITs. 
 
7. (U) Tripoli minimize considered. 
 
FERNANDEZ