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Viewing cable 08KHARTOUM454, UNAMID TRIES HARDER WHILE DARFURIS FUME

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08KHARTOUM454 2008-03-27 08:43 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXRO5859
PP RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #0454/01 0870843
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 270843Z MAR 08 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0321
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0117
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000454 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/SPG, S/CRS, AF/C 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU
SUBJECT: UNAMID TRIES HARDER WHILE DARFURIS FUME 
 
1. (SBU)  SUMMARY:  March 25 visits to two UNAMID camps in Darfur 
revealed that UNAMID troops, while bringing much needed relative 
security to their immediate areas of control, currently lack the 
troops and equipment to be in some of the most 
operationally-important areas.  The visits also revealed disparity 
between UNAMID's analysis of security and that of many of the 
internally displaced persons (IDPs).  Local populations and UNAMID 
staff did agree, however, that the continued presence of janjaweed 
and their integration into Sudanese security structures damages 
IDP's faith in law enforcement, judicial systems, and their overall 
perception of the feasibility of improvements that UNAMID hopes to 
bring to Darfur.  END SUMMARY. 
 
2. (U) On March 25 emboffs traveled to Mukjar and Zalingi to conduct 
an inventory of high-end items (vehicles, generators, armored 
personnel carriers, etc.) for rotating Rwandan peacekeeping 
battalions. Emboffs will continue through March 30 conducting such 
inventories at base camps where Rwandans are located.  (Note:  The 
results of the inventory will be sent via e-mail to interested 
parties. At the end of the week-long inventory, septels on logistics 
and an overall assessment of UNAMID at the field level will follow. 
End Note). 
 
"WE NEED TO GET OUT THERE" 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - 
3.  (SBU) Although Mukjar base commander  T. Kareiou said that the 
immediate area around his UNAMID camp is secure, he stated that his 
troops are not able to visit the most operationally important areas 
in their sector.  Kareiou stated that in particular there has been 
decreased security in the town of Um Dukhum on the Sudanese-Chadian 
border.  Kareiou stated that he needs access to helicopters to get 
to some of the most difficult and important areas under his mandate 
such as Um Dukhum.  He said that in his four month tour he has only 
visited this area one time.  "We need a UNAMID camp like this one in 
Um Dukhum and then we could really make a difference and have a 
sense of what is going on" said Kareiou.  According to Kareiou, Um 
Dukhum has been used as a staging ground for the supply and training 
of Chadian opposition rebels by the Sudanese Government and that the 
region has become increasingly militarized and dangerous. 
 
4.  (SBU) Nigerian civpol chief Adewuyi also separately reported 
that "we are thin on the ground."  He stated that he does not have 
sufficient men to have a presence in some of the IDP camps under his 
control with a population as large as 90,000.  "It will take much 
time and will require more and more troops on the ground to ensure 
total security," stated Adewuyi.  Adewuyi added that the UNAMID 
presence has made a difference (especially with an added depth of 
activities including firewood patrols, tribal chief meetings, and 
long-range patrols,) but that it is difficult to patrol a vast area 
where weapons are just floating around and people have a 
warrior-mentality." 
 
DIFFERING PERCEPTIONS OF SECURITY 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
5.  (SBU)  In Mukjar, Gambian civpol chief Ahmed Abd Al-Aziz gave a 
glowing review of the area under his control (using the much cited 
UNAMID phrase "stable, but unpredictable"), while a brief visit to 
the nearby IDP camp revealed a much different perception.  Tribal 
elder Zakariah Kojer told emboff in the IDP camp that the situation 
within the camps is not secure, as they are restricted to the camps 
and that within them there are occasional robberies, attacks, and 
rapes.  Kojer complained that the 2006 Darfur Peace Agreement had 
not done anything for the region, and said that while the UNAMID 
presence has helped, it has not completely solved Darfur's lack of 
security.   UNAMID civpol repeatedly interrupted the tribal chief 
attempting to lead his answers and eventually said to emboff, "He 
[the Tribal Chief IDP] doesn't know what he is talking about." 
 
JANJAWEED INTEGRATED INTO SECURITY AND ABOVE THE LAW 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
6.  (SBU)  Almost all UNAMID representatives expressed concern about 
the continued presence of janjaweed, their "free reign over the 
camps," and their status above the law.  Hisham Rashid, an Egyptian 
civpol in Zalingi, stated that they recently conducted an 
investigation that provided strong evidence for and led to the 
arrest of one former Arab militia member.  Rashid stated that they 
followed the standard procedure of turning the accused over to the 
Sudanese police, but that the suspect was transferred from police 
station to police station, never tried, and eventually released. 
"This isn't the first case of where someone close to the government 
avoids a criminal sentence," stated Rashid. 
 
7.  (SBU)  Gambian civpol in Mukjar told emboffs that the janjaweed 
have been fully incorporated into the police reserve and other 
government security forces such as border units.  Abdelaziz stated 
that on one recent patrol his men stopped an armed man riding a 
camel.  Abdelaziz reported that the man was dressed in the style 
 
KHARTOUM 00000454  002 OF 002 
 
 
typical of janjaweed fighters and carrying an AK-47, but that he 
produced two official IDs, one for the border police and another for 
the Sudanese Armed Forces. 
 
9.  (SBU)  Mukjar base commander T. Kareiou reported that during the 
last three weeks he has witnessed an influx of Arab militiamen in 
Toyota landcruisers traveling west - towards Chad - through his area 
of control.  "These cars are going westward and are not coming 
back," stated Kareiou.  He stated that the Zalinji-Garsila and 
Kubum-Mukjar roads have been particularly busy.  He added that these 
vehicles bypass required government checkpoints and that when they 
do stop, they interact with the guards at the checkpoints in a 
collegial way. 
 
COMMENT 
- - - - 
10.  (SBU) The visits revealed the need for continued follow-up by 
emboffs to assess the actual the situation in these more remote 
areas - and the extent to which UNAMID is unable to fulfill its 
mandate.  Many of the camps we visited revealed that outside 
observers had a poor understanding of the conflict, were quick to 
simplify its complex tribal and ethnic dimensions, or prone to 
sugar-coat their reporting in order to please superiors.  (The one 
exception to this was the locally-employed Sudanese language 
consultants who appeared to understand the complex ethnic and social 
dynamics around them.  UNAMID could consider expanding the use of 
local Sudanese staff, not only for menial jobs, but for more analyst 
positions at the bases.) 
 
11.  Comment continued:  The reports of the integration of janjaweed 
into Sudanese security structures, their free reign and display of 
firepower in areas they once terrorized, and their avoidance of 
Sudanese judicial systems is nothing new.  This fact demonstrates 
the actual intentions of the Khartoum regime on the ground in Darfur 
to keep its forces intact and its allies happy, and continues in the 
face of UNAMID and over two years after the signing of the DPA, 
which included security provisions (e.g. articles 24-27) designed to 
disarm and demobilize the janjaweed. 
 
FERNANDEZ