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Viewing cable 08KHARTOUM437, UNAMID FORCE COMMANDER'S VISION OF DEPLOYMENT

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08KHARTOUM437 2008-03-25 07:52 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXRO4558
PP RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHKH #0437/01 0850752
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 250752Z MAR 08  ZDK PER NUMEROUS REQUESTS
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0301
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000437 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR D, AF A/S FRAZER, SE WILLIAMSON, AF/SPG, S/CRS, IO, NEA FOR 
DAS GRAY 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU
SUBJECT: UNAMID FORCE COMMANDER'S VISION OF DEPLOYMENT 
 
REF: KHARTOUM 434 
 
KHARTOUM 00000437  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
1. (SBU) SUMMARY.  A March 24 conversation with UNAMID Force 
Commander (FC) Martin Luther Agwai revealed the depth of the chasm 
between the vision on the ground in El Fasher and at UN Headquarters 
in New York of UNAMID's short-term deployment plan.  Like other 
UNAMID officials (reftel), the FC cited logistics as the greatest 
impediment to expedited deployment.  However, his deployment plan 
takes into account not only operational and military realities but 
political ramifications as well, particularly with regard to the 
Egyptian and Ethiopian battalions.  Twice in the conversation the FC 
stated that he was preparing to tell the UN "no" on certain 
deployment elements it was proposing. END SUMMARY. 
 
"IF I HAD MY WAY . . ." 
------------------------ 
2. (SBU) On March 24, his first full day back at UNAMID El Fasher 
Headquarters after conferences in Kigali, FC Agwai articulated for 
FieldOff his plan for short-term UNAMID deployment.  Reftel 
speculated there might be a disconnect between UNAMID leadership's 
vision of UNAMID deployment and the FC's own vision, but it was 
clear in the course of conversation that there is a gap only between 
El Fasher (UNAMID HQ) and UN HQ in New York thinking.  As his 
advisers had indicated, the FC highlighted as his top priorities 
getting the Egyptian battalion into Sector North and the Ethiopian 
battalion into Sector West to ensure a UNAMID presence in what he 
called "areas of need."  He was keen to move the Rwandans into Korma 
and into Sector South as four Nigerian battalions there begin to 
rotate in April/May, in order to have a better "mixture" of troop 
contributor nationalities in an area that has traditionally been 
staffed by Nigerians. 
 
3. (SBU) However, the FC acknowledged that an influx of new 
battalions (Egypt and Ethiopia included) would cause undue 
logistical strain on the mission, a strain which, in his assessment, 
constituted the most difficult part of deploying UNAMID quickly. 
"If I had my way," the FC mused, "I would expand existing camps and 
support the ten existing battalions, which would be a better use of 
resources and would result in better synergy for the mission than 
outfitting new ones."  He viewed an increase in capabilities and 
equipment for the one Senegalese, four Nigerian and four Rwandan 
battalions as a more effective way to bolster UNAMID's image and 
credibility.  He worried in particular about the demand that would 
be put on UNAMID slender air assets when the four Nigerian 
battalions would rotate out in April/May, while the new Egyptian and 
Ethiopian battalions would rotate in at the same time. 
 
"I WILL TELL THE UN NO" 
----------------------- 
4. (SBU) Turning to the topic of Egyptian and Ethiopian deployments, 
the FC said the Egyptian Government had still not formally agreed to 
re-locate its pledged battalion from Sector South to Sector North. 
The FC is keen to split battalions regionally so as to prevent 
strain on re-supply lines, but he is not optimistic that the 
Egyptians share this view.  Following extensive meetings with the 
Egyptian Ministry of Defense in Cairo, the FC could get only 
conditions rather than commitments on Egypt's plans for its 
battalion.  According to the FC, whether Egypt will deploy is a big 
"if," dependent upon assurances that the battalion would not be 
split into two locations (the FC had wanted to divide it between Umm 
Kadada and Shangil Tobayi so as to move an existing Rwandan 
battalion from Shangil Tobayi to Korma).  Its deployment is also 
contingent upon an assurance that an Egyptian engineering company 
would go with it to Umm Kadada.  The FC admitted that some of his 
advisors told him to strike a deal with Egypt on the change of venue 
for its incoming battalion before approaching Ethiopia with the same 
request for its own incoming troops (the FC wants to move the 
Ethiopians from El Fasher to the very sensitive and unstable 
Kulbus/Silea area, where a UNAMID presence is desperately needed). 
However, the FC intended to take advantage of a March 24 visit to El 
Fasher by an Ethiopian reconnaissance team, led by a Major General, 
to present his plan. 
 
5. (SBU) The FC mentioned the offers from both Egypt and Ethiopia of 
one additional battalion each.  He and his staff were skeptical 
about the Egyptian offer, as Egyptian troops are not viewed 
favorably, either by the mission leadership or by the local 
populations [NOTE: Egyptians, considered pro-Khartoum "Arabs" by 
many Darfur locals, are poorly received, if received at all, in many 
locations by rebels and IDPs.  Despite his desire to send a 
battalion as soon as possible to the town of Korma, the FC is ready 
to wait to send the Rwandans there instead of the Egyptians, as the 
rebels in the area object to "Arab" peacekeepers.  Further, the FC 
said the main reason why Egypt would consider deploying to Umm 
Kadada vice Shangil Tobayi was because of the presence of an IDP 
camp in the latter, where its peacekeepers would not get a good 
 
KHARTOUM 00000437  002 OF 002 
 
 
reception. END NOTE]. 
 
6. (SBU) On the Ethiopian offer, the FC said that he had heard 
nothing formal in this regard but that if he did, he would tell the 
UN no.  "What the UN does not understand," he explained, "is that to 
absorb a new battalion, we will have to drop a battalion off the 
list.  Otherwise, we will be raising the troop ceiling beyond our 
mandated strength."  He speculated that the additional Egyptian and 
Ethiopian battalions, if absorbed, would come in at the likely 
expense of the Thai and Nepalese battalions, a "strategy" to which 
he strenuously objected, on the basis that the "predominantly" 
African character of UNAMID did not mean an "entirely" African 
character. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
7. (SBU) As reported reftel, the divide appears to be deepening 
between UNAMID on the ground and UN HQ with regard to troop 
deployment.  It seems that New York may be making promises it cannot 
keep, as seen in Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon's reported pledge to 
President Bashir that UNAMID would accept additional Egyptian and 
Ethiopian battalions.  This instance could merit intervention with 
the SYG to clarify what he did or did not say on this matter and to 
determine if the SYG is trying to go it alone on Darfur decisions. 
Despite the political pressures the UN is facing regarding Darfur 
deployment, for the UNAMID mission to be a success there needs to be 
better coordination and consultation with the Force Commander in El 
Fasher and DPKO. 
 
8. (U) Tripoli minimize considered. 
 
FERNANDEZ