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Viewing cable 08KHARTOUM421, UNAMID WILL BRING SECURITY BUT NOT A PEACE DEAL, SAY

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08KHARTOUM421 2008-03-21 08:48 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXRO1175
PP RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #0421/01 0810848
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 210848Z MAR 08
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0270
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000421 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/SPG, AF S/E WILLIAMSON 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR, AND ALSO PASS USAID 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM SU
SUBJECT: UNAMID WILL BRING SECURITY BUT NOT A PEACE DEAL, SAY 
DARFUR'S NGO LEADERS AND EXPERTS 
 
 
1.  (SBU)  SUMMARY:  Darfur needs security before traditional 
leaders can play any role in tribal reconciliation, an indigenous 
NGO leader and Darfur expert told emboff in two separate meetings in 
El-Fasher on March 19.  Contacts emphasized that the Government of 
Sudan's recent push for tribal reconciliation is an attempt to 
divert attention from its own direct role in the Darfur crisis. 
Both contacts were dismissive of the UNAMID'S mediation efforts, 
urging further direct U.S. engagement with rebel leaders and the 
GoS.  END SUMMARY. 
 
2.  (U)  On March 19, econoff met Ahmed Adam Yousif, Manager of the 
Ajaweed Oraganization for Peace and Reconciliation in El-Fasher. 
According to Yousif and his organization's literature, Ajaweed is 
the largest non-governmental organization in Darfur working to 
"foster peaceful co-existence across differing tribes, ethnicities, 
and communities."  On the same day econoff met separately with Dr. 
Abduljabbar Abdellah Fadul, a former civil servant, director of the 
Darfur Natural Resource planning Unit, and currently the General 
Director of "The Darfur [Organization] for Development, Services, 
and Information."  Abduljabbar (as he is known to all) was recently 
a fellow at Tufts University, and has served as a Darfur researcher 
and consultant to organizations and individuals including USAID, 
DAI, and Sudan expert Alex de Waal. 
 
SECURITY FIRST, THEN TRIBAL RECONCILIATION 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
3.  (SBU)  Yousif and Abduljabbar both separately emphasized that 
only after there is stability and security will it be possible to 
encourage tribal reconciliation and a renewed role for tribal 
leadership.  Recalling the proverb "good fences make good neighbors" 
Yousif said that it is necessary to first build up the walls of 
protection before dialogue between tribes can begin.  Yousif stated 
that he is confident that UNAMID's deployment will bring security to 
Darfur.  In a separate meeting, Abduljabbar emphasized the GoS's 
culpability in the crisis, stating, "The reason the government is 
pushing tribal reconciliation is because it wants to absolve itself 
of any responsibility and blame this mess on the tribes." Both 
Yousif and Abduljabbar stated that most current reconciliation 
initiatives (such as those led by Yousif Bakheet) are government 
programs thinly disguised as independent NGOs.  Abduljabbar also 
emphasized that the majority of people in Darfur have a mixed ethnic 
heritage; that ethnicity is overemphasized in the conflict; and that 
it is not accurate to reduce Darfur's problems to tribalism. 
Abduljabbar also expressed optimism that UNAMID's deployment will 
bring the secure conditions necessary for tribal reconciliation 
initiatives. 
 
TRADITIONAL AUTHORITY 
- - - - - - - - - - - 
4.  (SBU)  Both Yousif and Abduljabbar downplayed the role of many 
of Darfur's traditional leaders (e.g. the nazir- "tribal chief," 
malik-"king," sultan, etc.).  Yousif stated that traditional leaders 
have been "paralyzed" by the government as it appoints, directs, and 
controls these leaders. Yousif stated that most of the traditional 
leaders have migrated to the cities, leaving the constituencies that 
they represented behind.  Abduljabbar emphasized that this migration 
was a "fleeing for safety" as local communities turned against their 
leaders.  According to Abduljabbar, rebel leaders rejected these 
leaders' affiliation with the National Congress Party and 
subsequently targeted and assassinated several of them in 2003 and 
2004.  "Darfur's tribal leadership has been castrated by the 
government and should not play a role today," concluded Abduljabbar. 
 
 
"WE NEED MORE U.S. ENGAGEMENT IN THE PEACE PROCESS" 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
5.  (SBU)  Yousif reported that he has not seen any positive signs 
from the UN-AU Joint Mediation Support Team (JMST).  He added that 
the JMST is "noticeably absent on the ground," and that he has 
little confidence in its ability to broker a deal between the rebels 
and the government.  "The peace process is totally out of our hands 
and I am not hopeful about what the AU and UN is doing," stated 
Yousif.   Abduljabbar separately stated that one reason 
SLM-Abdulwahid opened an office in Israel was to make an overture to 
the U.S. and to start to engage more with Washington.  According to 
Yousif, the rebel movements will only listen to the United States 
because "they believe it will come to their rescue as it did with 
the Sudan People's Liberation Movement in the North-South civil 
war."  Yousif also emphasized that the U.S. could put additional 
pressure on the rebels by directly stating what the United States is 
prepared to do in Sudan, and by further "squeezing" the countries 
which arm and support them (such as Chad and Libya.) 
 
COMMENT 
- - - - 
6.  (SBU)  These contacts' confidence in UNAMID's ability to bring 
security Darfur strongly contrasted with their bleak outlook on its 
prospects for brokering a peace deal. We knew that the JMST was not 
 
KHARTOUM 00000421  002 OF 002 
 
 
active enough in Darfur as opposed to Khartoum and outside Sudan, 
but their harsh indictment that the JMST is "noticeably absent on 
the ground" speaks volumes about the JMST's lack of interaction with 
NGO and community leaders.  It is noteworthy that both of these 
ardent supporters of tribal reconciliation emphasized that now is 
not the time for tribal reconciliation, nor a renewed role for 
tribal leaders.  These natives of Darfur also provided some 
convincing arguments for why the U.S. could take more of a lead in 
the peace process, given the ineptitude of the UN/AU mediators, and 
why the rebels may be willing to follow U.S. leadership at this 
critical period in the conflict.  It is likely that U.S. engagement 
behind the scenes with rebel leaders to push them toward 
negotiations will have an impact over time.  Clearly, we also need 
to push the JMST and UNAMID Civil Affairs to become more active on 
the ground in Darfur. 
 
FERNANDEZ