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Viewing cable 08KHARTOUM358, UNAMID FORCE COMMANDER ENGAGES WITH SLA-UNITYUNAMID UNABLE

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08KHARTOUM358 2008-03-11 07:45 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXRO2191
PP RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #0358 0710745
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 110745Z MAR 08 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0165
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
UNCLAS KHARTOUM 000358 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/SPG, S/CRS 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI AU UN US SU
SUBJECT: UNAMID FORCE COMMANDER ENGAGES WITH SLA-UNITYUNAMID UNABLE 
TO STOP FIGHTING IN WEST DARFUR BUT WILLING TO TRY TO SUPPORT 
HUMANITARIAN EFFORT 
 
1. (SBU) As part of his ongoing efforts to engage with all Darfur 
Peace Agreement (DPA) non-signatory factions, AU-UN Hybrid Operation 
in Darfur (UNAMID) Force Commander Martin Luther Agwai traveled 
March 9 to Al Hosh (N 15 degrees 02'21.9", E 024 degrees 47'56.1"), 
North Darfur to hold introductory discussions with members of Sudan 
Liberation Army-Unity.  The Force Commander's (FC) principal 
objectives were to open dialogue with the rebel group, seek their 
assurances of cooperation with the humanitarian community, explain 
UNAMID's mandate and gain SLA-Unity's views on efforts to unite 
Darfur's numerous splintered armed groups. 
 
2. (SBU) The Force Commander described UNAMID's mission (and 
provided an Arabic copy of the UNAMID mandate), the challenging 
political environment in Darfur, and the international community's 
urgent desire to help resolve the conflict.  For their part 
SLA-Unity - represented by Special Coordinator Abdul Rahman Banat 
and council member Adam Idriss - expressed appreciation for the FC's 
visit and welcomed the opportunity to maintain open channels of 
communication.  The rebel group recounted the African Union Mission 
in Sudan's (AMIS) many missteps and queried the FC on the 
anticipated nature of the relationship between UNAMID and the 
non-signatory movements.  Agwai underscored UNAMID's more robust 
mandate and his vision that any peace agreement - and a ceasefire 
tatprecedes it - must be all-inclusive.  SLA-Unity echoed the 
importance of a comprehensive ceasefire, pledged to study the 
peacekeepers' mandate (which they had not seen previously) and, at 
the next meeting, provide feedback. 
 
3. (SBU) Responding selectively to a number of Force Commander 
Agwai's queries, Banat affirmed that SLA-Unity would continue to 
facilitate humanitarian access and protect non-governmental 
organizations operating in  the group's area of control.  He 
deferred any response on the possibility of positioning UNAMID 
forces in terrain controlled by SLA-Unity, offering that the 
question must be put to his "higher political authorities." 
(Comment: Asked subsequently by FieldOff regarding the whereabouts 
of his political leadership, Banat claimed that both Suleiman Jamous 
and Sharif Harir were currently in Brussels, though for what reason 
or for how long remains unclear.  European Union contacts could not 
confirm that either of the SLA-Unity political leaders is, in fact, 
in Brussels. End Comment.) 
 
4. (SBU) On the status of rebel unification efforts, SLA-Unity 
Special Coordinator Banat only remarked that discussions "are 
ongoing intensively, though there is still no conclusion."  He 
cautioned UNAMID and the international community to not exacerbate 
the problem of rebel splintering by recognizing and giving 
legitimacy to "every armed group with a Thuraya," which was one of 
the reasons that political negotiations last year in Libya failed, 
he held.  Unlike other groups without military strength, Banat 
asserted, SLA-Unity is a force to be contended with and one that 
must be represented on any holistic ceasefire commission (CFC). 
(Note: Approximately 60 SLA-Unity fighters, armed mostly with AK-47s 
and transported by four light machine gun-mounted Landcruisers were 
visible in the vicinity of the meeting.  End Note.)  To this end, 
Banat urged UNAMID and the international community to press the 
Government of Sudan to commit to a cessation of hostilities and 
allow non-signatories to sit on a ceasefire monitoring mechanism. 
 
5. (SBU) Comment: The visit to SLA-Unity's stronghold in North 
Darfur was of greater symbolic than substantive value.  SLA-Unity 
Special Coordinator Banat did not appear to be particularly well 
informed or capable of articulating his group's military or 
political objectives, thus limiting the discussion to superficial 
rhetoric.  That they were unaware - or unwilling to disclose - the 
status of rebel unification efforts, pointed to this particular 
group's lack of sophistication and organization, which remains one 
of the impediments in building a viable peace process.  Asked 
specifically by FieldOff about relations with the Justice and 
Equality Movement (JEM), Banat only grimaced and shook his head. 
Pressed to give greater clarity on the group's constituency, the 
rebel coordinator claimed that SLA-Unity was "broad based and 
included all tribal affiliations," but declined to provide any 
further details - highlighting yet another challenge in the 
political track: weak or non-existent linkages between many of the 
rebel factions and ordinary Darfurians.  In subsequent conversations 
with FieldOff, FC Agwai acknowledged that the trip was only useful 
in the message it sent regarding UNAMID's willingness to engage all 
groups, and that he would seek to engage movements more at the 
senior field commander/political level where both sides might be 
able to take authoritative steps toward concrete objectives, such as 
a written commitment to ensure humanitarian protection or, 
eventually, a cessation of hostilities. 
 
FERNANDEZ