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Viewing cable 08ISLAMABAD1272, CJCS MULLEN'S MEETING WITH COAS GENERAL KAYANI

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08ISLAMABAD1272 2008-03-24 13:59 2011-05-20 01:00 CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN Embassy Islamabad
VZCZCXRO2815
PP RUEHLH RUEHPW
DE RUEHIL #1272/01 0841359
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 241359Z MAR 08
FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6061
INFO RUEHKP/AMCONSUL KARACHI PRIORITY 9351
RUEHLH/AMCONSUL LAHORE PRIORITY 5148
RUEHPW/AMCONSUL PESHAWAR PRIORITY 3845
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHWSMRC/USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ISLAMABAD 001272 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/24/2028 
TAGS: MARR MASS PGOV PK PREL
SUBJECT: CJCS MULLEN'S MEETING WITH COAS GENERAL KAYANI 
 
Classified By: Anne W. Patterson, for reasons 1.4 (b)(d) 
 
1.   (C) Summary: CJCS Mullen met with Pakistan's Chief of 
the Army Staff General Ashfaq Kayani twice March 3-4.  At a 
private dinner on March 3, they engaged in a discussion of 
Pakistan's new political landscape in the aftermath of the 
February 18 parliamentary elections.  During talks on March 
4, Admiral Mullen briefed Kayani on the impact of U.S. 
domestic politics on our defense ties and engaged in a broad 
exchange on several important bilateral security issues. 
Admiral Mullen's visit, the second in less than a month, was 
intended to demonstrate the U.S. government's conviction to 
deepen our engagement with senior Pakistani officials.  End 
Summary 
 
2.    (C) Admiral Mullen, Lieutenant General Carter Ham, J3 
Joint Staff and Major General James R. Helmly visited General 
Kayani's house for a private dinner on March 3.  Kayani began 
by providing a thorough explanation of the political 
situation including an analysis of the ongoing negotiations 
over the makeup of the incoming government and a description 
of the major political players.  The General acknowledged the 
stated desire of some newly ascendant politicians to impeach 
President Musharraf but said he did not think these efforts 
would succeed.   Discussing the military budget Kayani 
acknowledged it had been controlled and ""protected"" by 
President Musharraf in the past but that it would now be 
exposed to the parliament and he was ready to ""appear in 
public to defend it."" After discussing national politics 
Kayani transitioned into a discussion of the unique culture 
and history of Pakistan's FATA.  He explained how the legacy 
of the Frontier Crimes Regulation and the corresponding role 
of the Pashtun Tribal Code impacted the FATA's system of 
governance. 
 
3.    (C) On March 4, Admiral Mullen and General Kayani met 
again focusing their discussions on bilateral military ties. 
They were joined by Lieutenant General Carter Ham and Major 
General James R. Helmly for the U.S. side and Lieutenant 
General Satthar, Chief of the General Staff; Major General 
Ahmad Shuja Pasha, Director General Military Operations 
(DGMO); Major General Nadeem Ijaz, Director General Military 
Intelligence; and Brigadier Zubair, Personal Secretary to the 
Chief of the Army Staff. 
 
4.    (C) Admiral Mullen began by telling Kayani that a U.S. 
SIGINT team had completed its initial assessment of 
Pakistan's requirements and that they intended to propose 
options to assist them in developing a solution.  Admiral 
Mullen then asked Kayani for his help in approving a third 
Restricted Operating Zone for U.S. aircraft over the FATA. 
Regarding the FATA, Kayani spoke of a ""long range campaign 
plan"" to deal with Baitullah Mehsud although he provided no 
particulars.  Kayani gave the impression that his strategy 
would focus on a defensive campaign for the foreseeable 
future.  This campaign would include the initiation of 
discrete offensive operations in response to militant 
provocations so as to protect his forces and blunt tactical 
threats. 
 
5.    (C) He explained that his intent was not to ""hand the 
incoming government a problem"" but rather ""a stable 
situation."" Kayani indicated he understood the frailty of the 
new government and the need to prevent near-term challenges 
to it.  The U.S. interlocutors impressed upon Kayani to 
advise the incoming government of the need to take 
responsibility for combating militancy rather than continuing 
to engage in rhetoric. Kayani said he needed the U.S. 
Ambassador to encourage those who might become Prime Minister 
to ""establish the position and take responsibility."" 
 
6.    (C) Kayani said statements in the Western press 
regarding the deployment of U.S. trainers to Pakistan cast 
the Army in a poor light. He acknowledged the need for 
American assistance but cautioned that it could not be 
publicized because it implied that the Pakistani Army was not 
capable of facing down the militant threat. He emphasized 
that he needed Admiral Mullen's help to ""manage perceptions"" 
and that he would like the U.S. to provide train the trainer 
types of assistance so that these responsibilities would 
ultimately shift to the Pakistan Army. 
 
7.    (C) Admiral Mullen raised the issue of Coalition 
Support Funds (CSF).  Admiral Mullen told Kayani that the 
 
ISLAMABAD 00001272  002 OF 002 
 
 
U.S. goal was to move forward and that his help was needed in 
finding the best way ahead on this program. Kayani replied 
that the ""UN model"" for reimbursements served as a useful 
baseline for reforming CSF.  As to the performance of the 
program Kayani explained that the money went to the GOP but 
that the Army only received a ""small percentage."" This was 
likely due to the fact that there are no formal mechanisms 
for ensuring that the reimbursements reach the Army. 
 
8.    (C) As to allegations that claims are inflated, Kayani 
said the U.S. should recognize that not all of the Army's 
costs are claimed and that it would be easier to account for 
if we could come to agreement on the types of costs that 
would be reimbursed.  He also indicated that he was aware 
that there are some in the U.S. Congress that preferred an in 
kind reimbursement as opposed to a cash transfer.  Kayani 
reminded Admiral Mullen that the ""delay"" in processing 
reimbursement claims is a problem that requires resolution. 
 
9.    (C) Kayani said that the U.S. effort to build the 
counterinsurgency skills of the FC through the implementation 
Security Development Plan ""makes sense"" and that improving 
its capabilities would help counter the spread of militant 
activity in the FATA.  Kayani went on to explain that the 
Frontier Corps had certain discreet qualities that gave it 
""balance"" but that it also had certain limitations. 
Specifically, Kayani said the FC was incapable of ""holding 
ground"" or conducting offensive operations.  He cautioned 
that the US should not expect them to do more than they were 
capable of as it is simply ""not in their culture."" 
PATTERSON