Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 97115 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
ETRD EAGR ETTC EAID ECON EFIN ECIN EINV ELAB EAIR ENRG EPET EWWT ECPS EIND EMIN ELTN EC ETMIN EUC EZ ET ELECTIONS ENVR EU EUN EG EINT ER ECONOMICS ES EMS ENIV EEB EN ECE ECOSOC EK ENVIRONMENT EFIS EI EWT ENGRD ECPSN EXIM EIAD ERIN ECPC EDEV ENGY ECTRD EPA ESTH ECCT EINVECON ENGR ERTD EUR EAP EWWC ELTD EL EXIMOPIC EXTERNAL ETRDEC ESCAP ECO EGAD ELNT ECONOMIC ENV ETRN EIAR EUMEM ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID EREL ECOM ECONETRDEAGRJA ETCC ETRG ECONOMY EMED ETR ENERG EITC EFINOECD EURM EENG ERA EXPORT ENRD ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EGEN EBRD EVIN ETRAD ECOWAS EFTA ECONETRDBESPAR EGOVSY EPIN EID ECONENRG EDRC ESENV ETT EB ENER ELTNSNAR ECHEVARRIA ETRC EPIT EDUC ESA EFI ENRGY ESCI EE EAIDXMXAXBXFFR EETC ECIP EIAID EIVN EBEXP ESTN EING EGOV ETRA EPETEIND ELAN ETRDGK EAIDRW ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ENVI ELN EAG EPCS EPRT EPTED ETRB EUM EAIDS EFIC EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM EAIDAR ESF EIDN ELAM EDU EV EAIDAF ECN EDA EXBS EINTECPS ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EPREL EAC EINVEFIN ETA EAGER EINDIR ECA ECLAC ELAP EITI EUCOM ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID EARG ELDIN EINVKSCA ENNP EFINECONCS EFINTS ECCP ETC EAIRASECCASCID EINN ETRP EAIDNI EFQ ECOQKPKO EGPHUM EBUD ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ENERGY ELB EINDETRD EMI ECONEFIN EIB EURN ETRDEINVTINTCS EIN EFIM ETIO ELAINE EMN EATO EWTR EIPR EINVETC ETTD ETDR EIQ ECONCS EPPD ENRGIZ EISL ESPINOSA ELEC EAIG ESLCO EUREM ENTG ERD EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH ECINECONCS ETRO ETRDECONWTOCS ECUN EFND EPECO EAIRECONRP ERGR ETRDPGOV ECPN ENRGMO EPWR EET EAIS EAGRE EDUARDO EAGRRP EAIDPHUMPRELUG EICN ECONQH EVN EGHG ELBR EINF EAIDHO EENV ETEX ERNG ED
KMDR KPAO KPKO KJUS KCRM KGHG KFRD KWMN KDEM KTFN KHIV KGIC KIDE KSCA KNNP KHUM KIPR KSUM KISL KIRF KCOR KRCM KPAL KWBG KN KS KOMC KSEP KFLU KPWR KTIA KSEO KMPI KHLS KICC KSTH KMCA KVPR KPRM KE KU KZ KFLO KSAF KTIP KTEX KBCT KOCI KOLY KOR KAWC KACT KUNR KTDB KSTC KLIG KSKN KNN KCFE KCIP KGHA KHDP KPOW KUNC KDRL KV KPREL KCRS KPOL KRVC KRIM KGIT KWIR KT KIRC KOMO KRFD KUWAIT KG KFIN KSCI KTFIN KFTN KGOV KPRV KSAC KGIV KCRIM KPIR KSOC KBIO KW KGLB KMWN KPO KFSC KSEAO KSTCPL KSI KPRP KREC KFPC KUNH KCSA KMRS KNDP KR KICCPUR KPPAO KCSY KTBT KCIS KNEP KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNNB KGCC KINR KPOP KMFO KENV KNAR KVIR KDRG KDMR KFCE KNAO KDEN KGCN KICA KIMMITT KMCC KLFU KMSG KSEC KUM KCUL KMNP KSMT KCOM KOMCSG KSPR KPMI KRAD KIND KCRP KAUST KWAWC KTER KCHG KRDP KPAS KITA KTSC KPAOPREL KWGB KIRP KJUST KMIG KLAB KTFR KSEI KSTT KAPO KSTS KLSO KWNN KPOA KHSA KNPP KPAONZ KBTS KWWW KY KJRE KPAOKMDRKE KCRCM KSCS KWMNCI KESO KWUN KPLS KIIP KEDEM KPAOY KRIF KGICKS KREF KTRD KFRDSOCIRO KTAO KJU KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KEN KO KNEI KEMR KKIV KEAI KWAC KRCIM KWCI KFIU KWIC KCORR KOMS KNNO KPAI KBWG KTTB KTBD KTIALG KILS KFEM KTDM KESS KNUC KPA KOMCCO KCEM KRCS KWBGSY KNPPIS KNNPMNUC KWN KERG KLTN KALM KCCP KSUMPHUM KREL KGH KLIP KTLA KAWK KWMM KVRP KVRC KAID KSLG KDEMK KX KIF KNPR KCFC KFTFN KTFM KPDD KCERS KMOC KDEMAF KMEPI KEMS KDRM KEPREL KBTR KEDU KNP KIRL KNNR KMPT KISLPINR KTPN KA KJUSTH KPIN KDEV KTDD KAKA KFRP KWNM KTSD KINL KJUSKUNR KWWMN KECF KWBC KPRO KVBL KOM KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KEDM KFLD KLPM KRGY KNNF KICR KIFR KM KWMNCS KAWS KLAP KPAK KDDG KCGC KID KNSD KMPF KPFO KDP KCMR KRMS KNPT KNNNP KTIAPARM KDTB KNUP KPGOV KNAP KNNC KUK KSRE KREISLER KIVP KQ KTIAEUN KPALAOIS KRM KISLAO KWM KFLOA
PHUM PINR PTER PGOV PREL PREF PL PM PHSA PE PARM PINS PK PUNE PO PALESTINIAN PU PBTS PROP PTBS POL POLI PA PGOVZI POLMIL POLITICAL PARTIES POLM PD POLITICS POLICY PAS PMIL PINT PNAT PV PKO PPOL PERSONS PING PBIO PH PETR PARMS PRES PCON PETERS PRELBR PT PLAB PP PAK PDEM PKPA PSOCI PF PLO PTERM PJUS PSOE PELOSI PROPERTY PGOVPREL PARP PRL PNIR PHUMKPAL PG PREZ PGIC PBOV PAO PKK PROV PHSAK PHUMPREL PROTECTION PGOVBL PSI PRELPK PGOVENRG PUM PRELKPKO PATTY PSOC PRIVATIZATION PRELSP PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PMIG PREC PAIGH PROG PSHA PARK PETER POG PHUS PPREL PS PTERPREL PRELPGOV POV PKPO PGOVECON POUS PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PWBG PMAR PREM PAR PNR PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PARMIR PGOVGM PHUH PARTM PN PRE PTE PY POLUN PPEL PDOV PGOVSOCI PIRF PGOVPM PBST PRELEVU PGOR PBTSRU PRM PRELKPAOIZ PGVO PERL PGOC PAGR PMIN PHUMR PVIP PPD PGV PRAM PINL PKPAL PTERE PGOF PINO PHAS PODC PRHUM PHUMA PREO PPA PEPFAR PGO PRGOV PAC PRESL PORG PKFK PEPR PRELP PREFA PNG PGOVPHUMKPAO PRELECON PINOCHET PFOR PGOVLO PHUMBA PRELC PREK PHUME PHJM POLINT PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PGOVE PHALANAGE PARTY PECON PEACE PROCESS PLN PRELSW PAHO PEDRO PRELA PASS PPAO PGPV PNUM PCUL PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGIV PRFE POGOV PEL PBT PAMQ PINF PSEPC POSTS PHUMPGOV PVOV PHSAPREL PROLIFERATION PENA PRELTBIOBA PIN PRELL PGOVPTER PHAM PHYTRP PTEL PTERPGOV PHARM PROTESTS PRELAF PKBL PRELKPAO PKNP PARMP PHUML PFOV PERM PUOS PRELGOV PHUMPTER PARAGRAPH PERURENA PBTSEWWT PCI PETROL PINSO PINSCE PQL PEREZ PBS

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 08BOGOTA1167, PLAN COLOMBIA: NATIONALIZATION OF FMF/DOD FUNDING

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #08BOGOTA1167.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08BOGOTA1167 2008-03-28 21:13 2011-08-25 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Bogota
VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHBO #1167/01 0882113
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 282113Z MAR 08
FM AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2134
INFO RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 0164
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ MAR LIMA 6039
RUEHZP/AMEMBASSY PANAMA 1433
RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO 6693
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC//USDP ADMIN/CHAIRS//
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
UNCLAS BOGOTA 001167 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER MARR CO
SUBJECT: PLAN COLOMBIA: NATIONALIZATION OF FMF/DOD FUNDING 
 
------- 
Summary 
------- 
 
1.  In keeping with expected cuts in U.S. military 
assistance, post has drafted a nationalization plan that 
steadily transfers current USG funded programs to the GOC. 
The strategy identifies eight funding priorities aimed at 1) 
achieving the "irreversibility" of Colombian military 
momentum against illegal armed groups in the near term; and 
2) maintaining the influence needed to lock in the GOC as a 
strategic regional partner in the long term.  The plan 
proposes to manage the transition to achieve a "soft 
landing," providing continuity in key programs that safeguard 
USG counternarcotic and counterterrorism interests.  End 
Summary. 
 
------------------------------ 
The Nationalization Imperative 
------------------------------ 
 
2.  The U.S. Congress has asked the Departments of State and 
Defense for a strategy which gradually reduces military 
assistance under Plan Colombia, while boosting spending on 
governance, humanitarian, and development programs.  Both 
Foreign Military Funding (FMF) and Department of Defense 
(DOD) assistance will sharply decline in FY-2008 due to 
shifting U.S. priorities and the GOC's enhanced capacity to 
assume more of these costs.  Per the Congressional tasking, 
post's plan to transfer programs funded by FMF and DOD to the 
GOC aims to manage the transition in a transparent, 
predictable manner that minimizes disruptions and ensures 
continuity in key programs vital to USG counternarcotics and 
counterterrorism policies. 
 
Past Plan Colombia Funding: FY'03 - FY'08 
----------------------------------------- 
(in USD millions) 
 
        FY'03   FY'04   FY'05   FY'06   FY'07   FY'08 
        -----   -----   -----   -----   -----   ----- 
FMF      14.2    99.7    91.7    90.8    87.2    55.0 
DOD      25.0    36.0    48.0    70.2    54.7    47.7 
         ----   -----   -----   -----   -----   ----- 
Total    39.2   135.7   139.7   161.0   141.9   102.7 
 
--------------------------- 
FMF/DOD Phased Funding Plan 
--------------------------- 
 
3.  Post has divided its engagement with the Colombian 
military from 2003-2013 into three phases: build, 
consolidate, and strategic partnership. 
 
-- Phase I: FY'03 - FY'07 -- "Build Phase" 
This phase aimed to build the Colombian military's 
capabilities, allowing it to project power into unsecured 
areas and to establish government presence.  It enabled the 
Colombian military to transition from a defensive approach to 
a mobile offensive strategy.  Funding in this phase supported 
the Colombian military's "Plan Patriota" campaign plan. 
 
-- Phase II: FY'08 - FY'10 -- "Consolidate Phase" 
This phase aspires to help the Colombian military consolidate 
recent gains and to ensure the irreversibility of 
territorial, security and infrastructure advances.  During 
this period FMF/DOD funding will decline.  Still, Phase II 
funding must remain as level as possible over the FY'08 - 
FY'10 period so as not to threaten gains made to date by the 
Colombian military. 
 
-- Phase III: FY'11 and beyond -- "Strategic Partnership 
Phase" 
This phase will work to ensure that the Colombian military 
remains a U.S. strategic regional partner.  Funding during 
this phase will reduce to its lowest levels since FY'03, but 
must continue at a sufficient level to maintain U.S. 
influence and to protect core counternarcotics and 
counterterrorism interests. 
 
-------------------------- 
Forward Funding Priorities 
-------------------------- 
4.  Post's proposed funding strategy continues cuts in U.S. 
military assistance begun in Phase II, but suggests a more 
gradual approach that ensures the "irreversibility" of 
Colombian military gains and will maintain a Colombian 
"strategic partnership" with the U.S. in Phase III.  The 
strategy builds around maintaining USG funding for those 
programs which are necessary to both phases.  Post identified 
20 of its 60 FMF/DOD funded programs as "Golden Threads" - 
programs vital to "irreversibility" and essential for 
"strategic partnership".  The twenty "Golden Thread" programs 
are divided below into eight program areas (with the 
approximate percentage of FY'08 funds (FMF/DOD) dedicated to 
each program also shown): 
 
- Rotary Wing Operations (30%): to support vital air mobility 
with a training center and a depot, also bridging sustainment 
costs (for pilots and mechanics) of nationalized helicopters; 
 
- Ground Operations (20%): for special operations against 
high value targets (HVTs), a joint training center for jungle 
operations, and liaison teams for interservice 
interoperability; 
 
- Riverine Operations (12%): to boost the riverine 
interdiction and counterguerrilla effort with a Marine 
training facility, and sustainment costs for riverine forces; 
 
- Governability (6%): to fortify GOC presence in all the 
national territory through civil affairs, countermining 
operations, and humanitarian assistance programs; 
 
- Fixed Wing Operations (10%): for direct air support to 
military operations through a pilot training school, 
precision armaments, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and 
sustainment of attack and transport aircraft; 
 
- Naval Interdiction (7%): to support counterdrug efforts 
through Coast Guard operations and training, Navy maritime 
operations, and interoperability among military branches; 
 
- Intelligence and Communications (5%): intelligence 
integration and joint communications networks for secure 
sharing of information across service branches; 
 
- Joint Initiatives (10%): a set of projects to modernize and 
transform the armed forces in the areas of logistics, 
military justice, personnel management, mobile training 
teams, and academic education (e.g. English). 
 
---------------------------- 
Near Goal: "Irreversibility" 
---------------------------- 
 
5.  From FY'08 to FY'10, the emphasis will fall into three 
categories--rotary wing, ground, and riverine 
operations--which remain key to making Colombia 
self-sufficient in fighting narcoterrorism, per the original 
aims of Plan Colombia.  As articulated by Minister of Defense 
Juan Manuel Santos, the goal is to reach a tipping point, or 
a point of irreversibility, in the GOC's fight against the 
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and other 
illegal armed groups.  In this scenario, the GOC will have 
established sufficient territorial control, governance, and 
military capacity to prevent a weakened FARC or other 
criminal groups from ever again threatening the Colombian 
state, military, or civilian population.  To help Colombia 
achieve this goal, post proposes that FMF funding remain 
roughly constant at the FY-08 level through the end of 
President Uribe's term in 2010.  This will enable a 
predictable, smooth transition through the first year of the 
new administration, as well as allowing for a final 
assessment of the political and security situation before 
implementing further budget cuts. 
 
Proposed Plan Colombia Funding: FY'08 - FY'12 
--------------------------------------------- 
(in USD millions) 
 
         FY'08   FY'09   FY'10   FY'11   FY'12 
         -----   -----   -----   -----   ----- 
FMF       55.0    66.4    65.0    55.0    45.0 
DOD       47.7    45.0    43.0    35.0    25.0 
         -----   -----   -----   -----   ----- 
Total    102.7   111.4   108.0    90.0    70.0 
 
--------------------------- 
FY'09 and FY'10 FMF Caveats 
--------------------------- 
 
6.  The FY-09 request closely tracks the FY-08 request, but 
calls for USD 11 million of additional FMF that would fund 
aviation repairs, fuel truck support, and counter mine 
equipment.  In FY'10, as detailed in the Mission Strategic 
Plan (MSP), post seeks USD 65 million in FMF to sustain these 
activities.  Still, to preserve key rotary airlift 
capability, post recommends that an additional USD 20 million 
in FMF be included to implement joint sustainment and 
training programs such as the Joint Rotary Wing School, as 
well as procure 12 training helicopters and UAVs for enhanced 
interdiction, river, and border security. 
 
-------------------------------- 
End State: Strategic Partnership 
-------------------------------- 
 
7.  From FY'11 onward, the plan moves toward a long-term, 
steady-state relationship with the Colombian military.  The 
envisioned end state consists of a strategic partnership that 
works together to achieve bilateral regional security 
objectives.  The relationship will focus on finding 
value-added ways the U.S. can uniquely support the GOC to 
strengthen its institutions and skills, as well as its 
capacity to sustain bi/multilateral operations against 
narcoterrorists.  The vision contemplates an eventual 
post-conflict scenario, in which the GOC and USG frees its 
resources from operations against FARC terrorists and can 
dedicate them to counternarcotics.  Ultimately, long-term 
projects such as training facilities aim to maintain U.S. 
influence needed to lock the GOC in as a strategic partner 
supporting U.S. interests in Latin America. 
 
------------------------- 
Coordination with the GOC 
------------------------- 
 
8.  Post has coordinated the "Golden Thread" nationalization 
strategy with the Colombian military at all levels.  Since 
November 2007, MILGRP officials have met on several occasions 
with Minister of Defense Santos, Vice Minister of Defense 
Pinzon, Chief of Defense General Padilla, and all Colombian 
Service Chiefs.  MILGRP met with General Padilla on March 6 
to discuss the lower FY'08 FMF funding level.  Santos stated 
that the USG strategy supports the Colombian military's 
"Consolidation" strategy, as long as funding cuts remain 
predictable and gradual, especially in Phase II.  A 
well-planned transition and nationalization in Phase II will 
allow the Colombian military to gradually boost its funding 
to compensate, thus ensuring irreversibility of GOC security 
gains by 2010. 
 
 
BROWNFIELD