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Viewing cable 08BAGHDAD662, PRT DHI QAR: CONFLICT BETWEEN GOV AND PC

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08BAGHDAD662 2008-03-06 07:01 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Baghdad
VZCZCXYZ2856
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHGB #0662 0660701
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 060701Z MAR 08
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6082
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
UNCLAS BAGHDAD 000662 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SBU 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PINR PTER PGOV IZ
SUBJECT: PRT DHI QAR: CONFLICT BETWEEN GOV AND PC 
INTENSIFIES 
 
1.  (U) This is a PRT Dhi Qar reporting cable. 
 
2.  (SBU) Summary:  In the past two weeks Aziz Alwan, the 
ISCI Governor of Dhi Qar, has openly clashed with non-ISCI 
members of the Provincial Council (PC).  The PC initially 
angered the Governor by refusing to allow funding for a road 
project which the Governor considered a priority. The 
Governor/PC conflict then spilled over to the security 
sector: the PC recently forced the Governor to back down 
after he attempted to fire General Hussein, the Chief of 
Police (Da,wa).  End Summary. 
 
3.  (SBU) The power struggle between Governor Aziz Alwan 
(ISCI) and members of the other principal Shia factions 
within the governing coalition (Fadhila and Da'wa) has 
intensified over the past few weeks.  The catalyst was a 
dispute over funding for an upgrade to the Prophet Ibrahim 
road in Nasiriyah.  Governor Aziz considered the road a vital 
project, but in mid-February, the PC refused to fund the 
upgrade.  The Governor objected that the PC was halting 
funding to an ongoing project that would take several years 
to complete. Despite his protests, the project was halted. 
 
4.  (SBU) On 25 February the conflict spilled over to the 
area of provincial security.  The two principal security 
agencies in Nasiriyah are the Iraqi Police, headed by General 
Abdul Hussain (Da'wa) and the Tactical Support Unit (TSU), 
formerly headed by the late Colonel Abu Liq'a (ISCI).  The 
TSU historically have been loyal to the governor.  ISCI 
 
SIPDIS 
supporters viewed the Iraqi Police, under Da'wa leadership, 
as poorly led, unmotivated and ineffective.  The Governor 
recently approached the MOI in Baghdad for permission to 
remove General Hussain and reportedly gained the Ministry,s 
consent.  When the Governor attempted to order General 
Hussein to stand down from his position, he was openly 
opposed by the PC, who refused to acquiesce to his demands. 
General Hussein remained as the Chief of Police. 
 
5.  (SBU) After the killing of Colonel Abu Liq,a, the 
Governor moved quickly to replace him with Colonel Abu 
Liq,a,s brother (Major Khalid Jabbery) to ensure that ISCI 
retained control over this important security agency. ISCI 
opponents on the PC and General Hussein (now in control of 
the Provincial Security Committee) blocked Major Khalid's 
appointment.  Local media reports indicate that the opponents 
want to increase the size of the Committee from four to eight 
members and to remove the influence of the Governor in 
selecting the Committee members.  On March 3 Col. Qassim 
Obaid (ISCI), Inspector General of the Dhi Qar IP, was 
assassinated in Basrah.  The PRT suspects, but has no 
evidence, that his killing is related to growing tension 
between ISCI and its political opponents. 
 
6.  (SBU) The infighting between the Shia parties inside the 
government has refocused attention on the OMS/JAM in Dhi Qar. 
 Although the Sadrists remain outside of local government 
they could play a crucial role if it decided to back a 
particular faction, and this possibility is adding to growing 
speculation in Dhi Qar regarding OMS, intentions.  With 
Moqtada al Sadr having extended his truce, most now assume 
that the mainstream OMS/JAM has some interest in further 
involvement in "conventional" politics.  The more radical JAM 
elements remain volatile. 
 
7.  (SBU) Comment: Although tension between the Governor and 
PC is not new, the aggressive maneuvering on all sides, the 
willingness of individuals to publicly oppose the Governor, 
attempts to remove key general offices from the security 
framework and the resultant breaking of long-standing 
alliances between both ISF units and political parties all 
constitute increased tensions.  PC refusal to accede to the 
Governor's wishes on these vital security and budgetary 
issues is viewed by ISCI and its supporters as a power play 
meant to minimize ISCI power in a province long-viewed as an 
ISCI stronghold.  Growing ISCI frustration with Da'wa has 
fueled local speculation that ISCI may be readying to unseat 
Da'wa in Baghdad.  ISCI opponents in Dhi Qar may be trying to 
undercut ISCI on its home ground to put ISCI on the defensive 
and head off such a move. End Comment. 
CROCKER